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ABSTRACT 
The increasing global concern for the environment, the demand for increased 
stakeholder reporting, and the importance of sound corporate governance structures 
have triggered the need for more research into the value creation of environmental 
disclosure for stakeholders and its integration within corporate governance structures. 
The main objective of the current study is to empirically examine the relationship  
between corporate governance and each of the quantity and the quality of corporate 
environmental disclosures in the UK, while controlling for some corporate 
characteristics as well as an in-depth exploration of quality identification and 
assessment issues. In doing so, the study distinguishes between the different 
categories or areas of activity to which environmental disclosure relates as well as 
between the different types of environmental information content. Based on 
stakeholders-agency theory, the study argues that the quantity and quality of corporate 
environmental disclosure directed to various stakeholders are enhanced when 
managers' opportunism is monitored by corporate governance mechanisms, thereby, 
reducing the information gap or asymmetry.  
Content analysis of a sample of UK companies' annual reports is undertaken to 
examine the quantity and quality of corporate environmental disclosure practices and 
their association with corporate governance mechanisms, over a period of four years. 
Hence, the annual reports of FTSE-All share companies are examined for years 2004-
2007 inclusive. A checklist of environmental disclosure items and categories is 
developed and environmental disclosure indices are computed. The study suggests an 
extensive four-dimensional framework for assessing environmental disclosure quality. 
The metric developed attempts to capture the qualitative characteristics of information 
in a manner consistent with well-supported frameworks elaborated by professional 
accounting bodies and standard setting organizations.  
Although corporate environmental disclosure quantity in UK companies' annual 
reports is relatively low, corporate environmental disclosure quality is comparatively 
high. Results also revealed a significant association between environmental disclosure 
quantity and, to a lesser extent, environmental disclosure quality and most corporate 
governance mechanisms. In addition, it appears that other corporate governance 
mechanisms are significant at some categorical levels of environmental disclosure. 
The major strength of the current study is its practical implications and its usefulness 
in providing data for further extensive environmental disclosure quality development. 
The comprehensive framework developed in this study for identifying and assessing 
environmental disclosure quality, is an initial step in the direction of examining 
environmental disclosure from the stakeholder perspective, negating the traditional 
belief of quantity representation of quality and shifting disclosure quality perspective 
from volumetric measurement to semantic assessment. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1   BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW 
The past four decades have witnessed an increasing global concern for the 
environment. This concern emerges mainly from the threat caused by the harmful 
effects and environmental problems resulting from the impact of economic growth. 
Various steps have been taken toward the protection of the environment from 
pollution and the conservation of natural resources, as a result of the consideration 
given to the social responsibility on one hand and as an application to, and 
compliance with, laws and regulations on the other hand. In this regard, the role of 
environmental accounting and reporting has emerged as a result of a concern for the 
relationship between the organization and the natural environment. 
The growing public concern over the natural environment substantially increased 
awareness of corporate environmental responsibility. Companies are increasingly 
facing intensifying challenges to disseminate information about their environmental 
activities. Studies on corporate environmental reporting have proliferated. However, 
variations in corporate environmental reporting have been examined primarily in 
terms of corporate characteristics (such as size, industry grouping and financial 
performance) or general contextual factors (such as the social, political and economic 
context), while relatively little prior work has examined the internal contextual factors 
(corporate governance mechanisms) influencing disclosure practices (Adams, 2002), 
despite increasing emphasis on reporting processes and governance structures.  
In a parallel movement, corporate governance has tremendously attracted attention in 
recent years. The term corporate governance rarely existed before 1990s (Keasey et 
al., 2005b). Factors contributing to the increasing concern with corporate governance 
issues include unfriendly takeovers, institutional investors growing importance, 
increasing attention to directors' legal liability, pressure for more efficient and 
effective corporations, economic liberalisation, deregulation of industry and business, 
 3 
the demand for new corporate values and stronger adherence to natural laws (Aras 
and Crowther, 2008; Joyner and Payne, 2002; Leblanc and Gillies, 2005). Several 
major corporate scandals rocked international businesses throughout 2001-2003 and 
were followed by corporate collapses, such as Enron Corporation in the US, Coloroll, 
Polly Peck, BCCI and later Barings in the UK, Parmalat in Europe and HIH Insurance 
Ltd in Australia (Mallin, 2011; Mallin et al., 2005; O’Sullivan et al., 2008). As a 
result, tighter regulations, codes, and principles of corporate governance came into 
force in response to these scandals (Aras and Crowther, 2008; Bury and Leblanc, 
2007).  
It is commonly argued that good corporate governance is associated with increased 
transparency and credible disclosure (see Ajinkya et al., 2005; Cormier et al., 2010; 
Dunstan, 2008; Gul and Leung, 2004). Corporate disclosure in general and corporate 
environmental disclosure in particular is, therefore, one of the biggest challenges 
facing the implementation of corporate governance. Corporate environmental 
disclosure extends the accountability of companies beyond the traditional role of 
providing financial disclosure assuming that companies have wider environmental 
responsibilities (Gray et al., 1987). In this respect, environmental disclosure can be 
regarded as a means of ensuring sound corporate governance that integrates 
transparency in its environmental performance. This perspective is sometimes referred 
to as “governance-by-disclosure” wherein information disclosure is a concrete 
operationalization of transparency in the environmental domain (Gupta, 2008).  In 
order to improve the quantity and quality of corporate environmental reporting, it is 
important to examine the impact of the different corporate governance mechanisms in 
explaining the variability in such disclosure practices. However, little research has 
been conducted that directly examines the relationship between corporate 
environmental disclosure and corporate governance, and still very few studies 
addressed such relationship in the UK. This is especially true in terms of 
environmental disclosure quality as opposed to the quantity of such disclosure.  
The main objective of the current study is to empirically examine the relationship  
between corporate governance and each of the quantity and the quality of corporate 
environmental disclosures in the UK, while controlling for some corporate 
characteristics as well as an in-depth exploration of quality identification and 
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assessment issues. In doing so, the study distinguishes between the different 
categories or areas of activity to which environmental disclosure relates as well as 
between the different types of environmental information content.  
This introductory chapter is aimed at providing an overview of the arguments that 
motivated undertaking the current research. It commences with presenting the wider 
background for the study and delineating the motivations that led to the pursuit of the 
current research. The core research questions addressed in the study are then outlined 
along with a depiction of the methodological assumptions and choices underpinning 
this study and the methods employed to undertake the study. A justification for the 
pursuit of the study is provided by highlighting its importance and contribution to 
knowledge. Finally, the structure and organisation of the thesis is portrayed. 
 
1.2   MOTIVATION FOR THE STUDY 
Conventional accounting systems, along with international accounting standards, fail 
to directly and systematically address environmental concerns (Samuels, 1990). 
Failure of the conventional accounting framework in taking into account the social 
and environmental impacts of corporate activities and, hence, the need for 
environmental accounting has motivated this research. Stakeho1ders are increasingly 
concerned with the way in which companies are responding to environmental issues 
(Gamble et al., 1995). Conventional accounting systems failed to promote efforts that 
balance the different needs of various stakeholders. In other words, they failed to 
address economic growth against social and environmental needs (Saravanamuthu, 
2004). Conventional accounting systems tend to prioritize economic goals and 
jeopardize any attempt to promote socio-environmental goals. Such systems tend 
ignore environmental issues unless they have a financial impact of sufficient 
materiality to warrant recognition according to international accounting standards 
frameworks. 
Accordingly, there is an overall dissatisfaction with the mechanism of conventional 
accounting and its practices, the application of which results in unfavourable broader 
social and environmental consequences (Bebbington, 1997). Calls for change as to the 
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current nature and purpose of accounting (Gray and Collison, 2002) are motivated by 
the fact that corporate activity is no longer confined to the pursuit of profit 
maximization or economic growth (Bebbington, 2001). In this regard, the ability of 
information to induce a change in the behaviour of companies in addressing 
environmental issues should be emphasized. By providing information, companies 
tend to improve their performance in such areas that they publicly disclose. More 
recently, however, Beattie et al. (2004) reports a consensus among professionals and 
academics regarding an urgent need to expand the business reporting model beyond 
the traditional financial reporting model and to provide the information required for 
corporate transparency and accountability, through the development of disclosure 
metrics that facilitates research into voluntary disclosure quality (also see Beretta and 
Bozzolan, 2008). Particularly important is “developing new ways of documenting 
disclosure practices, identifying dimensions of disclosure quality and exploring 
possible measurement proxies” (Beattie et al., 2004: 207). 
In a similar vein,  there has been a recent dissatisfaction with mandatory financial 
reporting that induced various stakeholders to demand more comprehensive and 
quality voluntary disclosures by companies about their long-term strategies and 
performance (Boesso and Kumar, 2007).  This demand for enhanced voluntary 
disclosures has been reinforced by the stakeholder approach that a company has a 
wide range of stakeholders, not just shareholders, who have a right to information 
about the impact of the company's activities. Particularly emphasized is the value 
relevance of environmental disclosures to stakeholders (Clarkson et al., 2011; 
Cormier et al., 2011; Daub, 2007; van der Laan Smith et al., 2005) that enables a 
company to demonstrate its accountability for its environmental activities. Despite the 
growth and development of corporate environmental disclosure practice, however, its 
ability to satisfy the information needs of various stakeholders is still questionable 
(Cormier et al., 2011). Such dissatisfaction with mandatory disclosures, demand for 
increased stakeholder reporting and questionable informativeness of environmental 
disclosure have triggered the need for more research into the quality of environmental 
disclosures in order to provide clarifications about long-term corporate sustainability 
that concerns various stakeholder groups.  
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In addition, the current research is motivated by the need for sound corporate 
governance structures that effectively address the needs of various stakeholders.  
There have been a number of reasons for the upsurging attention to corporate 
governance in the UK. Particularly important is the impetus given by several major 
corporate scandals that rocked businesses in the late 1980s and the subsequent 
corporate collapses, such as Coloroll, Polly Peck, BCCI and later Barings in the UK 
(Keasey et al., 2005a; Mallin, 2011; Mallin et al., 2005). These scandals involved the 
use of creative accounting deterring evident calculation of shareholder value 
(Whittington, 1993), the weak link between excessive executive pay and corporate 
performance (Keasey and Wright, 1993), managerial expropriation of stakeholders' 
funds, the limited role of auditors and the short-term detrimental perspectives of 
economic performance adopted by the market for control and institutional investors 
(Keasey et al., 2005a). 
The previous discussion reveals that failure of conventional accounting systems to 
provide direct and systematic treatment of environmental issues, dissatisfaction with 
mandatory disclosures, demand for increased stakeholder reporting, questionable 
informativeness of environmental disclosure, and importance of sound corporate 
governance structures that effectively address the needs of various stakeholders have 
all motivated the current research. Particularly, these influences triggered the need for 
more research into the value creation of environmental disclosure for stakeholders and 
its integration within corporate governance structures. 
 
1.3   RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The main objective of the current study is to empirically examine the relationship  
between corporate governance and each of the quantity and the quality of corporate 
environmental disclosures in the UK, while controlling for some corporate 
characteristics as well as an in-depth exploration of quality identification and 
assessment issues. In order to achieve the current research objective, the study seeks 
to investigate the following questions:  
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1. What is the extent of total corporate environmental disclosure quantity and the 
quantity of environmental disclosure within each disclosure category in the annual 
reports of UK companies? What is the trend in total corporate environmental 
disclosure quantity and the quantity of environmental disclosure within each 
disclosure category over time? 
2. What is the extent of the relationship, if any, between corporate environmental 
disclosure quantity and corporate governance mechanisms? Whether the relationship, 
if any, between corporate environmental disclosure quantity and corporate governance 
mechanisms varies according to the disclosure area being examined? 
3. What is the extent of total corporate environmental disclosure quality and the 
quality of environmental disclosure within each disclosure category in the annual 
reports of UK companies? What is the trend in total corporate environmental 
disclosure quality and the quality of environmental disclosure within each disclosure 
category over time?  
4. What is the extent of the relationship, if any, between corporate environmental 
disclosure quality and corporate governance mechanisms? Whether the relationship, if 
any, between corporate environmental disclosure quality and corporate governance 
mechanisms varies according to the disclosure area being examined? 
5. How the individual qualitative characteristics or dimensions of total corporate 
environmental disclosure quality are correlated to the different corporate governance 
mechanisms?   
Providing answers to the above research questions are guided by both theoretical 
evidences and empirical findings.  
 
1.4   RESEARCH SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
The current study adopts an objective methodological position of philosophical 
assumptions. Ontologically, the current study adopts a realism position. 
Epistemologically, the study takes a positivism position. Regarding the human nature 
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assumptions, the current study assumes determinism. Accordingly, human beings are 
mainly considered as conditioned by their external circumstances. In this regard, the 
current research seeks objectively measurable and observable human behaviour.  
These philosophical assumptions imply that the study is inclined towards an objective 
nomothetic methodology, where quantitative research methods are made use of. 
Therefore, the study seeks a quantitatively measured description and exploration of 
the perceived reality of environmental disclosure and corporate governance. 
Consequently, the current study would include two different, but complementary, 
quantitative empirical research analyses. The differentiation is based on the 
phenomenon being analyzed for achieving the research objectives. First, quantitative 
analysis, using content analysis of a sample of UK companies' annual reports, will be 
undertaken to examine the quantity of corporate environmental disclosure practices 
and their association with corporate governance mechanisms, over a period of four 
years. Second, quantitative analysis, using content analysis of a sample of UK 
companies' annual reports, will be undertaken to examine the quality of corporate 
environmental disclosure practices and their association with corporate governance 
mechanisms, over a period of four years. Hence, the annual reports of FTSE-All share 
companies are examined for years 2004-2007 inclusive. A checklist of environmental 
disclosure items and categories is developed and environmental disclosure indices are 
computed. In doing so, the study distinguishes between the different categories or 
areas of activity to which environmental disclosure relates as well as between the 
different types of environmental information content.  
 
1.5   RESEARCH CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE 
The main contribution or originality of the current research is its being the first study, 
to the best of my knowledge, to empirically address corporate environmental 
disclosure quality assessment in line with the international accounting standards 
framework. The study introduces to the academic literature an extensive four-
dimensional framework for assessing environmental disclosure quality. The metric 
developed by the current study is the first comprehensive aggregate environmental-
disclosure measure, as far as I am aware, that attempts to capture the qualitative 
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characteristics of information in a manner consistent with well-supported frameworks 
elaborated by professional accounting bodies and standard setting organizations. It 
negates the traditional belief of quantity representation of quality and shifts disclosure 
quality perspective from volumetric measurement to semantic assessment. Such 
research investigating issues as environmental disclosure quality identification and 
assessment that are still relatively unexplored is quite essential.  
Botosan (2004) recommends that quality identification and measurement issues and 
questions are critically important and worthy of careful attention, and suggests that 
addressing these issues and questions, through the development of disclosure quality 
assessment frameworks in a specific research context, represents a necessary next step 
in the advancement of disclosure research. Furthermore, Beattie et al. (2004) 
highlights the pressing need for research effort devoted to developing new ways of 
documenting disclosure practices, identifying disclosure quality dimensions and 
exploring possible measurement proxies. In this respect, the current study is expected 
to fill an existing gap in corporate environmental disclosure literature by adding to a 
relatively underdeveloped research area which is corporate environmental disclosure 
quality assessment. 
This study is important for several reasons. First, and most important, is the limited 
research on the impact of corporate governance on corporate environmental 
disclosure. Second, no prior research uses comprehensive governance indicators or 
thoroughly examines the relationship in a complete manner. Third, very few prior 
studies have been conducted in the UK. Fourth, most previous studies concentrate on 
the volume of disclosure rather than its quality. Fifth, samples examined in prior 
literature have tended to be small and homogeneous, thus are restricted in both size 
and industrial composition. Sixth, most existing studies are mainly cross-sectional in 
nature. Finally, many earlier studies depend solely on a method of estima tion 
typically, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), which is unsuitable in the context of 
categorical censored data such as those typically gleaned from content analysis.  
The present study goes a step further. The study intends to systematically extend prior 
research within a UK context and to overcome the limitations inherent in prior 
research. Consequently, the study expects to contribute to the corporate environmental 
responsibility knowledge in this area. The current study contributes to two streams of 
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literature, the disclosure literature and corporate governance literature, by providing 
updated documentary and empirical evidence on the association between corporate 
governance mechanisms and each of the quantity and quality of environmental 
disclosure practices in the annual reports of UK companies, while controlling for 
corporate characteristics.  
In doing so, the study distinguishes between the different categories or areas of 
activity to which environmental disclosure relates including environmental policies, 
environmental product and process-related, regulatory compliance, environmental 
auditing, sustainability and other environmentally-related information. Adopting a 
disaggregated view of environmental disclosures identifying its main themes or 
categories rather than only an aggregated understanding would provide deeper 
understanding of and richer insights into disclosure quantity (see Beattie et al., 2004), 
thereby help to comprehensively profile the disclosure strategies adopted by the 
company (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004).  
The study provides a comprehensive representation of corporate governance by 
incorporating several corporate governance mechanisms as possible explanatory 
variables for the quantity and quality of corporate environmental disclosure practices 
of UK companies. Corporate governance mechanisms are classified into the following 
three groups: (1) Board Characteristics; (2) Board Committees Characteristics; and (3) 
Ownership Structure. The key advantage to using this setting is the existence of 
multiple, yet complementary corporate governance mechanisms that act as monitoring 
mechanisms enforcing management to act in the best interest of stakeholders which, 
in turn, might affect the disclosure decision. Taken together, these governance 
mechanisms influence the emphasis placed on environmental issues and the manner in 
which the role of a corporation and its stakeholders are defined in a society. This, in 
turn, is reflected in corporate environmental disclosure practices.  
The study attempts to develop a broadly-defined disclosure quality index in line with 
the international accounting standards framework that captures the distinct nature of 
disclosure items and that distinguishes the different types of information content. The 
development of an overall index encompassing the different qualitative characteristics 
of the information disclosed would be a major contribution of the present study.  
Another point that is considered by the study in the quantity versus quality issue of 
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environmental disclosures is the independent focus upon each individual indicator of 
quality rather than only an aggregated measure of quality. This would permit insight 
into whether indicators are complements or substitutes, as well as revealing the extent 
to which each is associated with particular corporate governance characteristics 
(Brammer and Pavelin, 2006).  
The study examines the annual reports of a large and industrially diverse sample; that 
is, FTSE All-Share Index, which is the broadest index of UK listed companies. The 
use of a large and industrially diverse sample permits a more comprehensive 
exploration of the impact of the different corporate governance characteristics upon 
corporate environmental disclosures.  
The present study sets out to define its sample both in longitudinal and cross-sectional 
perspective so as to provide a contribution to the literature on determinants of 
environmental reporting of UK companies. It conducts a longitudinal analysis over 
2004-2007 inclusive. It is the first study - as far as I am aware - to undertake a 
systematic longitudinal analysis of corporate environmental disclosure and corporate 
governance characteristics within the UK. If such relationships exist, they may well 
only be revealed over time. Moreover, it will help trace the trend of disclosure and the 
impact of corporate governance against the backdrop of environmental and economic 
development in the country (Haniffa and Cooke, 2005). Longitudinal analysis would 
help to resolve issues concerning causality and shed more light on the evolving 
pattern of the environmental disclosures (Brammer and Pavelin, 2006).  
The study employs several types of regression models and statistical analyses 
including descriptive statistics; Pearson and Spearman correlations; and OLS, GLS 
and pooled OLS regressions. Such analyses are undertaken to test the research 
hypotheses and to attest the reliability of the main OLS regression results. Sensitivity 
analysis is carried out to check the sensitivity and, hence, the robustness of the main 
regression analysis.  
Based on stakeholder-agency theory, the study's argument can be put forward as 
follows. Companies are increasingly considering the importance of demonstrating 
commitment to environmental responsibility, through the provision of comprehensive 
and high-quality environmental disclosure as means of managing their relationships 
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with stakeholders. In this respect, sound systems of corporate governance are serving 
as accountability mechanisms, by which companies are made responsive to the rights 
and needs of stakeholders, through reducing information asymmetry. Therefore, it can 
be argued that the quantity and quality of corporate environmental disclosure directed 
to various stakeholders are enhanced when managers' opportunistic manipulation is 
monitored by corporate governance mechanisms.  
The overall empirical results reinforce the study's general argument that corporate 
governance plays an important role in determining how companies mitigate agency 
problems and respond to the needs and interests of various stakeholder groups and, 
consequently, in determining the quantity and quality of corporate environmental 
disclosures in the annual reports. The informativeness or value relevance of 
environmental disclosure is a critical issue for standard-setters, investors, corporate 
decision-makers, and researchers (Berthelot et al., 2003). Accordingly, the current 
study has the potential of attracting the attention of those concerned about corporate 
accounting and who may be interested in using its findings in order to inform any 
future endeavour to guide UK companies' corporate environmental disclosure 
practices, by embedding and integrating such guidance within companies' corporate 
governance structures. 
 
1.6   STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
This section depicts the structure and organisation of the current research while 
providing an overview of its contents. The thesis is organised into seven chapters as 
follows. Chapter one is an introductory chapter that presents the background for the 
study along with the principal motivation behind undertaking the current research. 
The chapter then addresses the core research questions followed by a depiction of the 
methodological assumptions and choices underpinning this study and the methods 
employed to undertake the study. A justification for the pursuit of the study is 
provided by highlighting its importance and contribution to knowledge. 
Chapter two provides a review of the pertinent literature. It commences with an 
overview of corporate environmental disclosure practices. The concept of corporate 
 03 
governance is introduced along with tracing the evolution and historical development 
of corporate governance code of best practice in the UK. The chapter then explores 
prior literature on the quantity and quality of corporate environmental disclosure and 
their association with corporate governance mechanisms. Previous studies are divided 
into the following three streams of studies that are relevant to the present study: prior 
studies examining the relationship between environmental disclosure quantity and 
each of corporate characteristics and corporate governance; prior studies examining 
the relationship between environmental disclosure quality and each of corporate 
characteristics and corporate governance; and prior studies examining enviro nmental 
disclosure quality identification and assessment issues. The chapter concludes with a 
discussion highlighting possible reasons for the failure of prior research to establish 
consistent and conclusive results and identifying any gaps in the existing literature.  
Chapter three outlines the theoretical framework adopted by the current study. It 
reviews the different theories that help explain each of environmental disclosure and 
corporate governance practices, followed by an analysis and critique of the different 
theoretical perspectives employed. The chapter presents a detailed discussion of the 
proposed theoretical framework for the current study, justifying the choice of such 
framework in explaining the relationship between each of environmental disclosure 
quantity and quality and corporate governance. It provides the foundation on which 
the study is constructed and will guide the interpretation of results and findings. 
Chapter four depicts the research methodology employed by the current study. It 
commences with explaining the research philosophy or the methodological viewpoint 
of the research and how this verifies the choice of methods to be used in carrying out 
the study. The research design for the required analysis is developed. Quantitative 
analysis, using content analysis of a sample of UK companies' annual reports, is 
undertaken to examine the quantity and quality of corporate environmental disclosure 
practices and their association with corporate governance mechanisms. In doing so, 
the study distinguishes between the different categories or areas of activity to which 
environmental disclosure relates as well as between the different types of 
environmental information content.   
Chapter five constitutes the first part of the empirical work aimed a t quantitatively 
investigating the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and the 
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quantity of corporate environmental disclosure practices in UK companies' annual 
reports using content analysis. The chapter describes a variety of statistical tests and 
analyses, including descriptive statistics, correlation analysis and regression analysis  
undertaken in order to measure the extent and trend in corporate environmental 
disclosure quantity and to examine the relationship in question, while controlling for 
corporate characteristics. It reports the results of the study in terms of the theoretical 
framework adopted and conclusions are drawn from statistical findings. 
Chapter six constitutes the second part of the empirical work aimed at quantitatively 
investigating the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and the 
quality of corporate environmental disclosure practices in UK companies' annual 
reports using content analysis. The chapter describes a variety of statistical tests and 
analyses, including descriptive statistics, correlation analysis and regression analysis  
undertaken in order to measure the extent and trend in corporate environmental 
disclosure quality and to examine the relationship in question, while controlling for 
corporate characteristics. It reports the results of the study in terms of the theoretical 
framework adopted and conclusions are drawn from statistical findings. 
Chapter seven presents the results, findings and conclusion of the research. The 
chapter brings together a summary and conclusion of the research principal findings 
highlighting some potential implications on how to develop corporate environmental 
disclosure practices. It also sheds light on the contributions made by the current 
research to corporate environmental disclosure literature and identifies the limitations 
of the study. The chapter offers some suggestions and recommendations for future 
research. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 2.1   INTRODUCTION 
Corporate environmental disclosure has been a significant area of academic interest, 
and has precipitated a substantial literature since the 1970s. A considerable body of 
literature from a wide range of theoretical backgrounds concluded that environmental 
disclosures are an important phenomenon employed by corporations (Gray et al., 
2001) and are influenced by a variety of explanatory factors. Prior research has been 
primarily concerned with the extent and nature of corporate environmental disclosure 
within annual reports and its trend over time; its relationship to economic 
performance, environmental performance and corporate reputation; as well as the 
effect of certain corporate characteristics on the tendency to disclose environmentally 
relevant information.  
However, little research has been conducted that directly examines the relationship 
between corporate environmental disclosure and corporate governance, and still very 
few studies addressed such relationship in the UK. This is especially true in terms of 
environmental disclosure quality as opposed to the quantity of such disclosure. In 
addition, not all the principles of corporate governance have been examined in the 
literature, despite the fact that previous research has acknowledged that good 
corporate governance is associated with increased transparency and credible 
disclosure (see Ajinkya et al., 2005; Cormier et al., 2010; Dunstan, 2008; Gul and 
Leung, 2004). 
The main objective of the current study is to empirically examine the relationship  
between corporate governance and each of the quantity and the quality of corporate 
environmental disclosures in the UK, while controlling for some corporate 
characteristics as well as an in-depth exploration of quality identification and 
assessment issues. The following three streams of studies are relevant to the present 
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study: prior studies examining the relationship between environmental disclosure 
quantity and each of corporate characteristics and corporate governance; prior studies 
examining the relationship between environmental disclosure quality and each of 
corporate characteristics and corporate governance; and prior studies examining 
environmental disclosure quality identification and assessment issues. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The first section provides an 
overview of corporate environmental disclosure practices. The second section 
introduces the concept of corporate governance and traces the evolution and historical 
development of corporate governance code of best practice in the UK. The next three 
sections are devoted to reviewing prior studies investigating the relationship between 
environmental disclosure quantity and each of corporate characteristics and corporate 
governance; prior studies investigating the relationship between environmental 
disclosure quality and each of corporate characteristics and corporate governance; and 
prior studies investigating environmental disclosure quality identification and 
assessment issues respectively. The final section, discussion of prior research, 
analytically explores possible reasons for the failure of prior research to establish 
consistent and conclusive results and specifically identifies any gaps in the existing 
literature.  
  
2.2   CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTAL DISCLOSURE: AN OVERVIEW 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) reporting, of which environmental reporting is a 
part, is not a new phenomenon and has been traced as far back as 5000 BC in Egypt 
(Anderson, 1989). However, environmental reporting within corporate annual reports 
has attracted increased interest since the early 1990s and this interest acquired great 
momentum by the sustainable development debate started by the Brundtland Report  
(1987) (Jones, 2011). Unlike other aspects of corporate social responsibility, 
environmental reporting is a relatively recent feature of corporate financial reporting, 
where the need and value relevance of environmental information for stakeholders is 
an under-researched area; environmental disclosures are not explicitly required by 
most national and international accounting standards and laws; and environmental 
 61 
issues rarely appear in the agenda of either prospective accountants or prospective 
business managers (Adams, 1998). 
Environmental disclosures “constitute part of what frequently are labelled social 
responsibility disclosures. Social responsibility disclosures can include, among other 
things, disclosures relating to the interaction between an organization and its physical 
and social environment” (Deegan and Rankin, 1996: 51). Social and environmental 
disclosure “can typically be thought of as comprising information relating to a 
corporation's activities, aspirations and public image with regard to environmental, 
community, employee and consumer issues” (Gray, et al., 2001: 329). 
Environmental disclosures are simply defined as “those disclosures pertaining to the 
impact that an organizational process or operation may have on the natural 
environment” (Campbell, 2004: 108). In a detailed manner, Berthelot et al. (2003: 2) 
define corporate environmental disclosure as “the set of information items that relate 
to a firm's past, current and future environmental management activities and 
performance. Corporate environmental disclosure also comprises information about 
the past, current and future financial implications resulting from a firm's 
environmental management decisions or actions.”  
Corporate environmental disclosure is defined by the current study as the process of 
disseminating information on the impact corporate economic activities have on the 
natural environment for use by diverse stakeholders. Corporate environmental 
disclosure extends the accountability of companies beyond the traditional role of 
providing financial disclosure assuming that companies have wider environmental 
responsibilities (Gray et al., 1987). In this regard, environmental disclosure can be 
regarded as a means of ensuring sound corporate governance that integrates 
transparency in its environmental performance. This perspective is sometimes referred 
to as “governance-by-disclosure” wherein information disclosure is a concrete 
operationalization of transparency in the environmental domain (Gupta, 2008). The 
most distinguishing feature of environmental disclosure is its voluntary nature, 
particularly in the UK context. Consequently, environmental reports are characterized 
by their diversity in terms of disclosure quantity and quality.   
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Solomon (2000) conducted a survey to identify aspects of environmental reporting in 
comparison to financial reporting. The results suggest that the implicit conceptual 
framework for environmental reporting resembles the explicit financial reporting 
conceptual framework in the UK in many respects. The survey revealed that the users 
of financial reporting are also the users of environmental reporting, although greater 
emphasis is attached to some users than others; all qualitative characteristics of 
financial reporting also relate to environmental reporting; verification is necessary for 
environmental reporting as for financial reporting; companies bear the cost of 
environmental reporting as with financial reporting; the most appropriate presentation 
of environmental reporting is within annual reports as with the financial reporting. 
However, the survey also indicated differences between environmental and financial 
reporting where the elements of environmental reporting are quite different from 
those of financial reporting; there is no consensus on who should perform verification 
for environmental reporting; and less emphasis is placed by company management on 
environmental reporting issues than that by users. 
Stakeholders are increasingly demanding environmental information and, hence 
companies need to justify their activities by communicating the environmental 
dimensions of their operations rather than confining themselves to communicating 
only the economic dimensions (Cormier et al., 2011, Daub, 2007). As such, 
environmental disclosure has social as well as economic dimensions (Buhr and 
Freedman, 2001). In this regard, environmental disclosure is an important means of 
communicating the impact of a company‟s environmental activities to various 
stakeholder groups. It enables a company to demonstrate its accountability for its 
environmental activities (Gray et al., 1987; Gray et al., 1996). Despite the growth and 
development of corporate environmental disclosure practice, however, its ability to 
satisfy the information needs of various stakeholders is still questionable (Cormier et 
al., 2011).  
Corporate environmental reporting is justified on several grounds. An international 
study of environmental reporting in European, Japanese and North American 
companies found that the main reasons underlying the dissemination of corporate 
environmental information are a sense of duty to the environment, public relations, 
competitive advantage and future legal requirements (Hodgkinson, 1993). Moreover, 
 02 
the study reported the main audiences targeted by environmental reporting as being 
employees, shareholders, the media, environmental activists, customers and trade and 
industry associations (Hodgkinson, 1993), in addition to suppliers, regulators, local 
communities and science and education (UNEP/SustainAbility, 1996). A variety of 
media can be used to disclose environmental information, including annual reports, 
stand alone environmental reports, advertisements or articles, booklets, leaflets or 
brochures, labelling of products, newsletters, press releases, supplements to the annual 
report or interim reports, video tapes, and websites (Gray et al., 1995b; Jenkins and 
Yakovleva, 2006; Zeghal and Ahmed, 1990). 
 
2.2.1   Corporate Environmental Disclosure Quantity 
Various types of environmental information exist in terms of themes and topics. There 
is no clear definition of what constitutes environmental information. Most prior 
studies define environmental information on the basis of an early survey of Ernst and 
Ernst (1978) that identifies the environment as one of the main categories of corporate 
social reporting, being comprised of such information items as pollution control, 
prevention or repair of environmental damage, conservation of natural resources and 
other environmental disclosures. According to Roberts (1991), environmental 
information encompasses a range of items that can be broadly categorized into 
environmental protection statements, process-related information, product 
information, environmentally-related investments, environmentally-related research 
and development, energy usage information, political statements, employment 
information and health and safety information.   
However, the majority of previous studies have adopted an aggregated view of 
environmental disclosures rather than disaggregating disclosures into main themes or 
categories (Campbell, 2004). Although these studies included some sort of 
classification scheme of environmental disclosures, they did not separately identify 
such disclosure groupings or individually incorporate them into empirical analyses 
(see for example, Brammer and Pavelin, 2006; Deegan and Gordon, 1996; Deegan 
and Rankin, 1996; García-Ayuso and Larrinaga, 2003; Halme and Huse, 1997; Post et 
al., 2011; Stanny and Ely, 2008). 
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The absence of definite environmental information content has motivated initiatives to 
develop a comprehensive framework for environmental disclosures. A remarkable and 
prominent framework is the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) developed in co-
operation with the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). The GRI is 
aimed at disseminating globally applicable sustainability reporting guidelines to 
enable organisations to voluntarily disclose the social, environmental and economic 
dimensions of their activities (GRI, 2002). Another ethical performance framework 
introduced by the Institute for Social and Ethical Accounting (ISEA, 1999) is referred 
to as Accountability AA1000 Assurance Standard. Other international standards and 
guidelines reinforcing environmental reporting have emerged which can be classified 
under three distinct but complementary categories, including codes of conduct (e.g. 
OECD guidelines) which define standards of corporate behaviour; management 
standards (e.g. ISO14000) which offer framework for implementing socially 
responsible practices; and screenings and rankings (e.g. Dow Jones sustainability 
index, FTSE4Good) which provide basis for responsible investing (Hopkins, 2003).  
A distinctive feature of such environmental reporting initiatives and frameworks 
developed by research organisations such as the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD, 2001), the Association of Chartered Certified 
Accountant (ACCA, 1999) and the Institute for Social and Ethical Accounting (ISEA, 
1999) is an attempt to relate corporate governance structure, social and environmental 
accounting and stakeholder reporting (Boesso and Kumar, 2007). Similarly, the UK- 
based Center for Social and Environmental Accounting Research (CSEAR) and the 
Institute for Social and Ethical Accountability (ISEA) have also linked corporate 
voluntary environmental disclosure practices to long-term corporate sustainability 
(see Boesso and Kumar, 2007 for a full review of such organisations and initiatives).  
For the purposes of the current study, corporate environmental disclosure is taken to 
comprise disclosures relating to the company‟s environmental policies, environmental 
product and process-related, compliance with environmental laws and standards, 
environmental auditing, sustainability and other environmentally-related information. 
Each of these categories, which are developed based on both prior literature and  
international standards and guidelines such as GRI will be separately investigated for 
fuller depiction of variability in corporate environmental disclosure practices. 
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2.2.2   Corporate Environmental Disclosure Quality  
Quality is a generic and holistic term that has different meanings to different people.  
Several definitions of disclosure quality have been suggested in prior literature. For 
example, disclosure quality is defined as the accuracy of investors‟ beliefs about stock 
prices following the disclosure (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991). King (1996)  defines 
disclosure quality as the degree of self- interested bias in corporate disclosure.  
Disclosure quality also refers to the extent to which current and potential investors 
can read and interpret the information easily (Hopkins, 1996). In line with the IASB 
framework of the qualitative characteristics of information, Botosan (2004: 290) 
argues that “high-quality information is information that helps users make informed 
economic decisions”. Brammer and Pavelin (2006) argue that environmental 
disclosure quality is not necessarily or straightforwardly linked to the quantity of such 
disclosure and that quality is more of reporting specific actions, quantifying 
environmental impact, setting formal targets, and being subject to external audit.  
Each of these definitions refer to a particular qualitative characteristic of the disclosed 
information and largely dependent upon the purpose of the research. Gibson and 
O‟Donovan (2007) emphasize that while such classification may enable inferences to 
be drawn about the quality of information, much work still needs to be undertaken in 
terms of quality definition and the associated qualitative judgments. Botosan (2004) 
argues that the definition of quality should be based on well-supported frameworks 
elaborated by professional accounting bodies and standard setters because they reflect 
a generally accepted notion of disclosure quality. This perspective quite fits with the 
purpose of the current study as no specific user group is of particular interest to the 
research, but rather all diverse stakeholder groups are targeted. A broader and more 
general all-purpose definition of disclosure quality, therefore, seems appropriate. 
Consistent with Botosan's (2004) approach, corporate environmental disclosure 
quality is defined in the current study in terms of the information qualities or 
characteristics identified by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB); 
comparability, understandability, relevance, and reliability (IASB, 1989). 
The IASB states that information is „comparable‟ in the sense that “Users must be 
able to compare the financial statements of an entity through time in order to identify 
trends in its financial position and performance. Users must also be able to compare 
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the financial statements of different entities in order to evaluate their financial 
position, performance and changes in financial position” (IASB, 1989: 39). Implicit in 
the IASB framework is that „comparability‟ requires consistent treatment of 
information. For the purposes of the current study, „comparability‟ can be defined as 
the ability of information to consistently allow corporate performance appraisal,  
pointing out similarities and differences across time, across companies and across 
standards and norms through consistent presentation of information in a form that 
directly reveals impact of environmental activities on overall corporate performance.  
From the researcher's viewpoint, „comparability‟ is permitted with the financial 
quantification of information that can be elaborated through non-financial 
quantification and descriptive forms.  
The IASB states that information should be readily „understandable‟ by users who 
„have reasonable knowledge of business and economic activities and accounting and a  
willingness to study the information with reasonable diligence‟ (IASB, 1989: 25). The 
IASB (1989) defines „understandability‟ as both user-specific and topic-specific. For 
the purposes of the current study, „understandability‟ can be defined as the ease with 
which users of information can perceive, interpret, and evaluate specific 
environmental topics in terms of their benefit or detriment to corporate performance. 
According to the researcher, „understandability‟ is facilitated when the economic 
direction or sign of information is clear.     
The IASB states that information is „relevant‟ “when it influences the economic 
decisions of users by helping them evaluate past, present of future events or 
confirming, or correcting, their past evaluations” (IASB, 1989: 24). Implicit in the 
IASB framework is that relevant information should have predictive and feedback 
value. For the purposes of the current study, „relevance‟ can be defined as the ability 
of information to convey expectations about future environmental conduct based on 
past and present performance.  From the researcher's viewpoint, „relevance‟ is 
achieved via the provision of forward- looking information in addition to historical 
information.     
The IASB states that information is „reliable‟ when “it is free from material error and 
bias and can be depended upon by users to represent faithfully that which it either  
purports to represent or could reasonably be expected to represent” (IASB, 1989: 24). 
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The IASB (1989) defines „reliability‟ in terms of faithful representation 
(correspondence or agreement between the measures or descriptions and the 
phenomena they represent), neutrality (freedom from bias), prudence (degree of 
caution in face of uncertainty), completeness (no omission of material information), 
and substance over form (substance of the phenomena regardless of their legal form). 
For the purposes of the current study, „reliability‟ can be defined as the credibility of 
information in terms of accuracy and veracity that builds users' confidence and trust in 
environmental disclosures. According to the researcher, „reliability‟ is assured 
through verification or auditing.  
 
2.2.3   Corporate Environmental Disclosure Initiatives in the UK 
There is a general rise in corporate environmental disclosures in the UK (KPMG, 
1999) and this rise is linked to the increase in mandatory disclosures and the stability 
of voluntary disclosures (Haron et al., 2004). Some of the events that have contributed 
to the development of environmental reporting in the UK include the appointment of a 
minister for corporate social responsibility in March 2000; the European Union's Fifth 
Action Programme on the Environment and its Towards Sustainability Report 1992; 
the European Union's Environmental Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS) 1993; 
the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW) Guidelines 
1993; the Association of British Insurers' (ABI) Guidelines; and the FTSE4Good 
Index 2001 (Idowu and Towler, 2004; Rizk, 2006). However, the content of 
environmental disclosures varies widely across companies since it is largely 
unregulated (Cormier and Magnan, 2003). Corporate environmental disclosure 
practices are characterized by their diversity due to “lack of mandatory regulation, 
sketchy adoption of voluntary guidelines, and variable quality of verification” 
(Hammond and Miles, 2004).    
An important constituent of the UK legal framework for environmental disclosure 
was the reporting requirements of the operating and financial review (OFR), which 
was incorporated into law by the Companies Act 1985 (ASB, 2005). The OFR was 
repealed based on the claims that it was unnecessary burdensome for companies 
(Williamson and Lynch-Wood, 2008). More recently, the UK government has 
 02 
emphasized the significance of environmental reporting, through the amendment of 
the Companies Act 2006, requiring companies to report on essential environmental 
issues in corporate annual reports and to follow the UK Government‟s Environmental 
Key Performance Indicators (KPI) - Reporting Guidelines (Sun et al., 2010). 
However, it is unlikely that the information needs of stakeholders will be satisfied  as 
the new reporting requirements are not supported by statutory guidelines and robust 
auditing requirements, which potentially undermine the integrity of the reported 
information (Williamson and Lynch-Wood, 2008). 
Nevertheless, current corporate environmental reporting in the UK is essentially a 
voluntary self-regulatory activity guided by several national and international 
environmental reporting initiatives and frameworks. Particularly influential in 
promoting the development of environmental reporting practices are the Global 
Reporting Initiative (GRI) and the Accountability AA1000 Assurance Standard. Other 
international standards and guidelines reinforcing environmental reporting have 
emerged which can be classified under three distinct but complementary categories, 
including codes of conduct (e.g. OECD guidelines, ILO declaration) which define 
standards of corporate behaviour; management standards (e.g. SA8000, ISO14000) 
which offer framework for implementing socially responsible practices; and 
screenings and rankings (e.g. Dow Jones sustainability index, FTSE4Good) whic h 
provide basis for responsible investing (Hopkins, 2003).  
 
2.3   THE EMERGENCE AND DEVELOPMENT OF CORPORATE  
         GOVERNANCE CODES IN THE UK     
Corporate governance has recently become one of the most distinctive features of 
modern corporations. Corporate governance simply refers to how a corporation is 
governed (NACD, 2006). The Cadbury Report defined corporate governance as “the 
system by which companies are directed and controlled” (Cadbury, 1992: para. 2.5). 
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) defined 
corporate governance as “a set of relationships between a company's management, its 
board, its shareholders and other stockholders. Corporate governance also provides 
the structure through which the objectives of the company are set and the means of 
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attaining those objectives and monitoring performance are determined” (OECD, 2004: 
11).  
Consistent with the OECD perspective, several attempts have been made to define 
corporate governance within the accounting literature. Demb and Neubauer (1992: 
187) stated that “Corporate Governance is the process by which corporations are 
made responsive to the rights and wishes of stakeholders”. Monks and Minow (1995: 
1) argued that “It is the relationship among various participants in determining the 
direction and performance of corporations”. While, Tricker (1994: xi) wrote that 
“Corporate governance addresses the issues facing board of directors such as the 
interaction with top management and relationships with the owners and others 
interested in the affairs of the company, including creditors, debt financiers, analysts, 
auditors, and corporate governance”. Corporate governance is also broadly defined as 
“the manner in which companies are controlled and in which those responsible for the  
direction of companies are accountable to the stakeholders of these companies” 
(Dahya et al., 1996: 71).   
Corporate governance structures define “the relationship between a firm and its 
stakeholders” (van der Laan Smith et al., 2005). Therefore, corporate governance is 
viewed as effectively outlining the rights and responsibilities of each group of 
stakeholders in the company (Ho and Wong, 2001). Under this perspective, the 
governance structure shifts from a principal-agent to a team production model, and 
the critical governance tasks become to ensure effective, coordination, cooperation 
and conflict resolution to maximize, rather than just control and to distribute the value 
created in ways that maintain commitment multiple stakeholders (Kochan and 
Rubinstein, 2000).  
The above definitions illustrate well what corporate governance is. It is concerned 
with both internal aspects of the company, such as internal controls and board 
structure, and external aspects such as the relationship with shareholders and other 
stakeholders. More recently, however, corporate governance has been linked to long-
term corporate sustainability that concerns various stakeholder groups. For example, 
Aras and Crowther (2008: 2) argued that “Corporate governance can be considered as 
an environment of trust, ethics, moral values and confidence – as a synergic effort of 
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all the constituents of society – that is the stakeholders, including government; the 
general public etc; professional/service providers – and the corporate sector”.  
Historically, corporate governance received little attention (Bury and Leblanc, 2007). 
The term corporate governance rarely existed before 1990s (Keasey et al., 2005b). 
However, corporate governance has tremendously attracted attention in recent years. 
Factors contributing to the increasing concern with corporate governance issues 
include unfriendly takeovers, institutional investors growing importance, increasing 
attention to directors' legal liability, pressure for more efficient and effective 
corporations, economic liberalisation, deregulation of industry and business, the 
demand for new corporate values and stronger adherence to natural laws (Aras and 
Crowther, 2008; Joyner and Payne, 2002; Leblanc and Gillies, 2005). Several major 
corporate scandals rocked international businesses throughout 2001-2003 and were 
followed by corporate collapses, such as Enron Corporation in the US, Coloroll, Polly 
Peck, BCCI and later Barings in the UK, Parmalat in Europe and HIH Insurance Ltd 
in Australia (Mallin, 2011; Mallin et al., 2005; O‟Sullivan et al., 2008). As a result, 
tighter regulations, codes, and principles of corporate governance came into force in 
response to these scandals (Aras and Crowther, 2008; Bury and Leblanc, 2007). 
Fombrun (2006) argues, however, that sound corporate governance is not just a matter 
of following a set of rules, but rather a continuous process of relevant strategy 
implementation aimed at maximizing long-term value creation.  
What constitutes good corporate governance may vary in the specific 
recommendations being made. However, most codes of best practices emphasize 
improving corporate governance practices and disclosure in five major areas: board 
structure, audit and financial controls, executive compensation, shareholders rights, 
and market for control (Fombrun, 2006). A wider perspective of good corporate 
governance is one that addresses such issues as sustainable value creation, goal 
achievement and socio-economic balance. Corporate governance ratings indicate that 
UK companies are generally credited with having the most progressive governance 
policies (Fombrun, 2006). 
There have been a number of reasons for the upsurging attention to corporate 
governance in the UK. Particularly important is the impetus given by several major 
corporate scandals that rocked businesses in the late 1980s and the subsequent 
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corporate collapses, such as Coloroll, Polly Peck, BCCI and later Barings in the UK 
(Keasey et al., 2005a; Mallin, 2011; Mallin et al., 2005). These scandals involved the 
use of creative accounting deterring evident calculation of shareholder value 
(Whittington, 1993), the weak link between excessive executive pay and corporate 
performance (Keasey and Wright, 1993), managerial expropriation of stakeholders' 
funds, the limited role of auditors and the short-term detrimental perspectives of 
economic performance adopted by the market for control and institutional investors 
(Keasey et al., 2005a). 
Other factors contributing to the increased emphasis on corporate governance issues 
include the dominant pattern of share ownership by situational investors in the UK; 
the search for reassurances by institutional investors as a means of protecting their 
increasingly diversified and overseas investments; the ease facilitated by 
technological advances with which institutional investors' views can be 
communicated globally on key aspects of investment such as corporate governance; 
the key role played by corporate governance in helping diverse businesses to obtain to 
external funds at the lowest possible cost; and the role played by good corporate 
governance in creating a more attractive investment environment by providing 
confidence in a country's stock market (Mallin et al., 2005).  
Significant progress had been made in recent years in developing corporate 
governance codes and principles in several countries. The UK was one of the pioneers 
in this area (NACD, 2006). The UK concern over corporate governance best practice 
led to the establishment of the UK's first corporate governance committee, that is, the 
Cadbury Committee in 1991 (Keasey et al., 2005a) and the publication of the 
Cadbury Report on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance in 1992 (Cadbury, 
1992). The Cadbury Report focused on those corporate governance aspects related to 
financial reporting and accountability (Cadbury, 1992) and relied heavily on 
“improved information to shareholders, continued self- regulation, more independent 
directors and a strengthening of auditor independence to improve accountability” 
(Keasey et al., 2005a: 25). 
The Cadbury Report (1992) mainly recommended that companies should appoint at 
least three independent non-executive directors; separate the roles of chairman and 
CEO; establish an audit committee composed of at least three independent non-
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executive directors and a remuneration committee responsible for recommending 
directors' remuneration; and consider having a nomination committee for ensuring  
transparent appointment process. A key feature of the Cadbury Code is directors' 
independence of management and freedom from any business or other relationship 
can compromise directors' independent judgment. Moreover, it emphasized the role of 
institutional shareholders in influencing company- level corporate governance (Keasey 
et al., 2005a). The corporate governance code was not mandatory but listed 
companies had to include a statement in their annual report outlining their compliance 
with the code as well as identifying and giving reasons for non-compliance. Although 
the Cadbury Report was successful in that its recommendations were generally 
adopted, such recommendations were criticized for incomprehensiveness of corporate 
governance standards, detailed prescriptions of corporate governance improvement, 
additional bureaucracy, too much accountability, ignoring non-financial aspects, and 
reliance on voluntary compliance of the Cadbury Code (Keasey et al., 2005a). 
The Greenbury Report (1995) focused on the determination of executive 
remuneration. The Greenbury Report's main recommendations re-emphasized the 
importance of independent non-executive directors, by requiring that remuneration 
committees consist exclusively of non-executive directors. The report's significant 
contributions were the provision for comprehensive remuneration-related disclosure 
and the association of executive remuneration with company performance (Keasey et 
al., 2005a; Mallin, 2011). Although the Greenbury Report provided a significant 
development in UK corporate governance structures, its recommendations were 
criticized for increased bureaucracy and unnecessary burden on companies (Keasey et 
al., 2005a).  
The Hampel Report (1998) reviewed the corporate governance recommendations laid 
down in both the Cadbury and Greenbury reports. The recommended corporate 
governance principles concerned directors, directors' remuneration, shareholders, and 
accountability and audit. The Hampel Report responded to the criticisms of both 
Cadbury and Greenbury, by placing more emphasis on the balance between business 
prosperity and accountability rather than on accountability only as well as on 
principles rather than on prescriptions, thereby reducing the burden on companies 
(Keasey et al., 2005a). 
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The Combined Code (1998) was published as a set of principles comprising the 
Cadbury, Greenbury and Hampel recommendations.  Listed companies were required 
to follow the rule of “comply or explain”, where a company should either report on 
compliance with the code provisions or provide explanations for non-compliance. The 
Code highlighted the importance of undertaking annual review of all internal controls 
including financial, operational, compliance controls and risk management. Although 
the Combined Code emphasized a comprehensive disclosure approach to corporate 
governance with greater flexibility by allowing for noncompliance by companies 
where adherence is infeasible or impractical, it may still - like previous reports - be 
criticized for that many institutional shareholders are applying a form-over-substance 
approach in handling corporate governance issues (Keasey et al., 2005a). 
The Turnbull Report (1999) was concerned with the management of internal controls 
and risks. It provides guidance for companies' internal control on how to effectively 
manage risk, rather than to eliminate it. The Turnbull Report emphasized the role of 
the board of directors in assessing the effectiveness of the internal control system on 
an annual basis. Although the Turnbull Report attempted to move away from the 
form-over-substance approach by encouraging companies to provide meaningful 
information to shareholders for risk assessment, it was criticized for increasing the 
burdens on companies by placing additional responsibility on the audit committee 
regarding non-financial risks such as technical, market and environmental risks 
(Keasey et al., 2005a). 
Directors' Remuneration Report Regulations (2002) came into force involving 
government intervention as opposed to previous self-regulation initiatives, where the 
framework adopted in the first Combined Code was established by committees largely 
made up of industrialists and institutions, indicating that self-regulation was unlikely 
to deliver accountability (Keasey et al., 2005a). These regulations provided for the 
detailed form and content of the remuneration report. Particularly important, however, 
is the requirement that shareholders should vote on the directors' remuneration report.  
Although such voting was advisory in nature, Directors' Remuneration Report 
Regulations succeeded in increasing shareholder engagement and activism (Keasey et 
al., 2005a; Mallin, 2011). Moreover, the government issued the Rewards for Failure 
(DTI, 2003); a consultative document on directors' severance payments. 
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The Myners Review (Myners, 2001) investigated institutional investment issues. The 
Review set out a set of principles which attempts to codify best practice for pension 
fund decision making. Although adherence to such principles was not mandatory, but 
reasons for non-compliance should be explained.  
The Smith Report (2003) was issued to review the role of the audit committee and to 
provide guidelines to help audit committees to increase their effectiveness.  The report 
highlighted the important role played by the audit committee in protecting 
shareholders' interests regarding financial reporting and internal control.  
 The Higgs Report (2003) was published as a revision to the principles of the 
Combined Code. The significant changes recommended by the Higgs Report were  
mainly concerned with the role and effectiveness of non-executive directors. 
Additional recommendations included the requirement that at least half of the board, 
excluding the chairman, should comprise independent non-executive directors; the 
identification and availability of a senior independent non-executive director for 
shareholders' contact; the nomination committee should not be chaired by the 
chairman; a CEO should not become the chairman of the company; in addition to 
details regarding both board- level and committee- level meetings, appointments and 
training of independent non-executive directors. The Higgs Report was criticized for 
“being too prescriptive” and “would threaten board unity and undermine the role of 
the chairman” (Keasey et al., 2005a: 38-39). 
The Combined Code (2003) was issued by the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) in 
July 2003 incorporating the recommendations of the previous reports. Listed 
companies were required to follow the rule of “comply or explain”, where a company 
should either report on compliance with the code provisions or provide explanations 
for non-compliance. The Code's recommendations are divided into two main parts; 
those for companies and others for institutional shareholders. Recommendations for 
companies emphasized the roles of the boards and board committees in building 
sound corporate governance structures. Particularly influential in carrying out these 
roles is the independence of non-executive directors who should bring their objective 
judgment to such roles (Mallin, 2011). However, recommendations for institutional 
shareholders stressed shareholder engagement and activism though shared dialogue 
with companies and considerable use of their votes. The new Combined Code (2003) 
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attempted to overcome the criticism of the Higgs Report by reducing the number of 
code provisions, dropping some of the accused recommendations and relaxing some 
of the recommendations for smaller companies (Keasey et al., 2005a). 
The Combined Code (2006) was issued by the Financial Reporting Council (FRC). 
This revised code “supersedes and replaces the Combined Code issued in 2003” 
(Combined Code, 2006: 1). The new version of the Combined Code - as with the 
previous Combined Codes - requires listed companies to follow the rule of “comply 
or explain”, where a company should either report on compliance with the code 
provisions or provide explanations for non-compliance. The Combined Code (2006) 
essentially includes the principles and provisions embedded in the previous code. 
Limited changes have been made including: allowing the chairman to serve on the 
remuneration committee given independence on appointment; providing shareholders 
with the option to withhold their votes on proxy appointment forms; and 
recommending that companies publish on their websites the details of proxies laid 
down at general meetings (Mallin, 2011).  
The Combined Code (2008) was issued by the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) to 
promote confidence in corporate reporting and governance. The Code supports the 
notion that “Good corporate governance should contribute to better company 
performance by helping a board discharge its duties in the best interests of 
shareholders” and “should facilitate efficient, effective and entrepreneurial 
management that can deliver shareholder value over the longer term” (Combined 
Code, 2008: 1). Changes made to the revised code include dropping the provision 
restricting a director to chair more than one FTSE 100 companies; and  for listed 
companies outside the FTSE 350, allowing the chairman to serve on the audit 
committee given independence on appointment (Mallin, 2011). 
Finally, the UK Corporate Governance Code (2010) was issued by the Financial 
Reporting Council (FRC) taking into account the recent significant decline in 
economic conditions. The new UK Corporate Governance - as with the previous 
Combined Codes - requires listed companies to follow the rule of “comply or 
explain”, where a company should either report on compliance with the code 
provisions or provide explanations for non-compliance. The main changes made to 
the UK Corporate Governance Code (2010) include: annual re-election of all directors 
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of FTSE 350 companies in order to increase accountability to shareholders; 
encouraging well-balanced boards where appointments should be based on merit 
against objective criteria and regard should be given to gender and other diversity; 
holding regular development reviews by the chairman with each director and 
externally facilitating board evaluation reviews in FTSE 350 companies at least every 
three years; explaining the company„s business model and emphasizing board 
responsibility for determining the nature and extent of significant risks; aligning 
performance-related pay to the company's long-term interests, risk policies and 
systems; and extending the chairman‟s responsibilities for ensuring a culture of 
openness and debate, and adequate time commitment by the non-executive directors.  
The development of corporate governance policy in the UK has undergone 
fundamental changes since the publication of the Cadbury Report. Although the 
government has issued some consultation documents and reports, the system of 
corporate governance in the UK is fundamentally self-regulatory. It appears that the 
approach of “comply or explain” works well for UK companies (Mallin, 2001). 
However, government intervention indicated that self-regulation was unlikely to 
deliver accountability and improved corporate governance (Keasey et al., 2005a). The 
development of codes of corporate governance in the UK can, therefore, be criticized 
in two respects (Dewing and Russell, 2004). First, the development process has been 
largely „ad hoc‟. Second, the codes of corporate governance lack an enforcement 
mechanism.  
The development of corporate governance in the UK has been based on limited UK 
research evidence regarding the relationship between governance, accountability and 
enterprise (Keasey et al., 2005a; short et al., 1999). Such research is specially 
important given that companies have modified their governance structures to comply 
with best practices recommendations and, hence, the necessity of investigating 
whether these modifications have led to improvements in accountability, enterprise 
and performance (Keasey et al., 2005a). Reviewing prior literature would be the next 
step in order to reveal whether corporate governance has enhanced accountability. Of 
particular interest to the current research is evaluating the extent to which corporate 
environmental disclosures, intended to satisfy the information needs of various 
stakeholders, have become matters of internal corporate governance.  
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2.4   EXAMINING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ENVIRONMENTAL 
        DISCLOSURE QUANTITY AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE  
For the purposes of the current study, prior studies examining the quantity of 
corporate environmental disclosure can be classified into two groups: the impact of 
corporate characteristics on environmental disclosure quantity and the impact of 
corporate governance on environmental disclosure quantity. These studies are 
presented in a chronological order to help trace the gradual evolution and 
development of any achievements or addition to the existing body of literature.   
 
2.4.1   Impact Of Corporate Characteristics On Corporate Environmental 
           Disclosure Quantity      
Trotman and Bradley (1981) suggested some reasons why companies provide social 
responsibility information and examined the effects of four variables (size, systematic 
risk, social constraints and management decision horizon) on the social responsibility 
disclosure practices. The sample used in this study consists of 207 Australian 
companies. Annual reports were examined and nonparametric statistics were 
employed including Mann-Whitney U test, Chi-Square test and Spearman Rank 
Correlations. Results indicated that companies which provide social responsibility 
information are on average larger in size, have a higher systematic risk and place 
stronger emphasis on the long term than companies which do not disclose this 
information. In addition, for those companies which disclose social responsibility 
information, a positive association was found between the amount of soc ial 
responsibility disclosure and the size of the company, the degree of social constraints 
faced by the company and the emphasis the company places on the long term in 
making decisions. 
Cowen et al. (1987) examined the relationship between a number of corporate 
characteristics (size, industry, profitability, the presence of a social responsibility 
committee) and specific types of social responsibility disclosures including 
environment, energy, fair business practices, human resources, community 
involvement, product safety and other disclosures. The study was based on a 
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comprehensive sample of 134 US companies drawn from ten different industries as 
reported in Ernst & Whinney's 1978 survey of the corporate social responsibility 
disclosures present in the annual reports of Fortune 500 companies. Both regression 
and statistics functions were utilized. Corporate size appeared to have a significant 
impact upon whether environment, energy, fair business practices, community 
involvement and other disclosures are made, but no influence over human resources 
or product disclosures. Industry category also appeared to have influenced energy and 
community involvement disclosures. The existence of a corporate social responsibility 
committee appeared to correlate with only human resources disclosures. No 
correlation was found between social responsibility disclosures and profitability.  
Freedman and Jaggi (1988) examined whether an association exists between the firm's 
environmental disclosure and its economic performance, and if such association 
exists, whether it is affected by the differences in firm's industry and size. The study 
was carried out on a sample of 108 US firms affected by environmental regulations 
and belonging to the industries of paper and pulp, oil refining, steel and chemicals. 
The annual statements and 10 Ks of these companies were examined for 1973 and 
1974 and a pollution index was developed to measure the extensiveness of 
disclosures. Ratios were used as surrogates for economic performance. The 
association between the two sets of variables was determined on the basis of 
correlation tests. The results for the total sample indicated that there is no association 
between the extensiveness of pollution disclosures and economic performance. 
However, when the sample was segmented by industry group, a significant positive 
correlation was detected for the oil refining industry. The results showed also that 
large firms with poor economic performance are likely to provide detailed pollution 
disclosures. The authors suggested the reason for the relationship may be that 
information on pollution performance is used to rationalize the relatively poor 
economic performance resulting from heavy pollution-related expenditures. 
Belkaoui and Karpik (1989) developed and empirically tested a positive model of the 
corporate decision to disclose social information in terms of both social performance 
and economic performance. Social disclosure was measured using a scale derived 
from Ernst and Ernst surveys. The independent variables used were social 
performance (as measured by a reputational index of organizational effectiveness), 
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economic performance (as measured by return on assets and stock price return), 
political visibility (as measured by size, capital intensive ratio and systematic risk) 
and monitoring and contracting cost variables (as measured by leverage and dividends 
to unrestricted retained earnings). A regression analyses was run for the year 1973 on 
a sample of 23 US companies. Results suggested the existence of significant and 
positive association of social disclosure with each of social performance and political 
visibility as measured by size and systematic risk, while the existence of significant 
and negative association of social disclosure with financial leverage.  
Patten (1991) examined the voluntary social disclosures included by corporations in 
their annual reports are related to either public pressure on firm profitability. Public 
pressure was measured using size and industry classification, while firm profitability 
was measured using return on assets and return on equity. The results of regression 
analysis on the level of social disclosure for 128 US firms in their 1985 annual reports 
indicated that size and industry classification are significant explanatory variables 
whereas profitability variables are not. The author argued that social disclosures are 
used as a means of addressing the exposure firms face with regard to the social 
environment and as such should be related more closely with public-pressure 
variables than profitability measures.  
Roberts (1992) used measures of stakeholder power, strategic posture toward social 
responsibility and economic performance to predict cross sectional variations in 
corporate social responsibility disclosure. Social disclosure is measured using a 
disclosure index published by the Council on Economic Priorities (CEP). Stakeholder 
power is measured by the percentage of outstanding common stock held by 
management and other shareholders holding 5% or more of the stock, corporate 
political action committee contributions and the degree to which the corporation relies 
on debt financing to fund capital projects. Strategic posture is measured using the 
average number of corporate public affairs staff employed and the corporate 
sponsorship of a philanthropic foundation. Economic performance is measured using 
return on equity and systematic risk. Control variables used were company age, 
industry classification and firm size. A sample of 130 US corporations were 
investigated in 1984, 1985 and 1986. Results indicated that measures of stakeholder 
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power, strategic posture and economic performance are significantly related to levels 
of corporate social disclosure. 
Hackston and Milne (1996) empirically investigated the relationship between the level 
of social and environmental disclosures and a number of corporate characteristics 
including size, industry and profitability. Content analysis was used to measure the 
level of social disclosures and an interrogation instrument (including the dimensions 
of disclosure theme, evidence, news type and amount), checklist and decision rules  
were developed. Company size is measured using market capitalization, sales and 
total assets. Profitability is measured by return on assets and return on equity. Industry 
is measured as a classification into high-profile and low-profile industries. The annual 
reports of 47 listed New Zealand companies were examined for 1992. Results showed 
that both size and industry are significantly associated with the amount of disclosure, 
while profitability is not. In addition, the results indicated that the size-disclosure 
relationship is much stronger for the high-profile industry companies than for the low-
profile industry companies. The study also provided some tentative evidence that dual 
and multiple overseas listings may be associated with greater social disclosure. 
Although this study has made some attempts to define the qualitative characteristics 
of social and environmental disclosures, it did not empirically examined the impact of 
corporate characteristics on these qualities of disclosure.  
Deegan and Gordon (1996) investigated environmental disclosure practices of 
Australian corporations, their trend across time and whether environmental 
disclosures are related to environmental groups' concern about particular industries' 
environmental performance and firm size effects. A sample of 197 Australian firms' 
annual reports was obtained from the Australian Graduate School of Management 
(ACSM) annual report file for 1991. The results of the study indicated that: (1) the 
amount of voluntary environmental disclosures in Australia is typically low, (2) the 
environmental disclosures are typically self- laudatory, (3) a general increase in 
environmental disclosures during the period 1988 to 1991. This increase is positively 
associated with increases in environmental group membership, (4) there is a positive 
correlation between environmental sensitivity and the level of corporate 
environmental disclosure, and (5) for firms in environmentally sensitive industries, 
there is a positive correlation between environmental disclosures and firm size.  
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Adams et al. (1998) identified factors that influence all types of social disclosures. 
These factors were company size, industrial grouping and country of domicile. A 
sample of 150 annual reports from six geographically-close and economically-similar 
European countries (namely France, Germany, The Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland 
and the UK) was examined using content analysis. It was found that super large 
companies are significantly more likely to disclose all types of corporate social 
information. Industry membership was found to be related to the decision to report 
environmental and some employee information, but not to ethical disclosures. In 
addition, while size and industry membership were important in all six countries, the 
amount and nature of information disclosed varies significantly across Europe.  
Gray et al. (2001) investigated the relationship between the level of social and 
environmental disclosures of the top 100 UK companies and a number of corporate 
characteristics including turnover, capital employed, numbers of employees and 
profit, over eight years from 1988 to 1995 inclusive. The influence of industry 
classification on the relationship between social and environmental disclosures and 
company size and profit is also examined. The data were drawn from the CSEAR 
(The Centre for Social and Environmental Accounting Research) Social and 
Environmental Disclosure Database. This database comprises the results of a content 
analysis of the social and environmental disclosures which are categorized into 
environmental, employee, community and customer disclosures, and distinguished as 
being either voluntary or mandatory.  
 Results of the regression analysis revealed that the relationship between disclosure 
and corporate characteristics varies according to the type of disclosure being 
examined. Environmental disclosure was significantly related to capital employed in 
seven of the eight years studied, to turnover and profit in four of the years examined 
and to the number of employees in only one year. Voluntary disclosure was 
significantly related to turnover in seven of the eight years, to capital employed in five 
years, to number of employees in four years and to profit in only two years. However, 
mandatory disclosure was significantly related to the number of employees and to the 
capital employed in only two of the eight years and was not significantly related to 
turnover in any of the eight years. The results for all forms of disclosure other than 
consumer provided very strong support that the relationship between social and 
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environmental disclosures and company size and profit changes from sector to sector 
highlighting the significant influence of industry affiliation. 
Salama (2003) empirically examined the relationship between some corporate 
characteristics (industry, profitability and size) and environmental disclosures (total 
disclosures, types of disclosures and areas of disclosure) in major UK companies. A 
sample of 169 firms was used. The annual reports of companies were content 
analyzed for the year 1999. Different methodological approaches and statistical 
analyses were employed. Results indicated that the extent of environmental disclosure 
in corporate annual reports is generally low or inadequate and that corporate size and 
industry membership significantly and positively influence environmental reporting 
practices, while prior profitability negatively influences corporate environmental 
disclosure in the UK. 
 García-Ayuso and Larrinaga (2003) examined factors influencing environmental 
disclosure based on a sample of 112 industrial firms listed on Madrid Stock 
Exchange. The factors examined are size, risk, profitability, environmental sensitivity, 
and media exposure. Content analysis was carried out for annual reports filled out 
between 1991 and 1995. As of the amount of environmental disclosure, empirical 
results showed that both environmental sensitivity and media coverage have some 
explanatory power, while size and risk do not seem to explain the cross-sectional 
differences in the extent of disclosure. However, the decision to disclose 
environmental information in annual reports was associated with size, risk, sensitivity 
analysis, and media coverage. 
Campbell (2004) investigated voluntary environmental disclosure in UK companies 
and its relationship to membership of environmental lobbying organizations and 
environmental sensitivity of the industry. The annual reports of 10 UK-based 
companies in five sectors of varying degrees of environmental sensitivity were 
content analyzed between 1974 and 2000. Findings showed an overall increase in 
disclosure volume over the period but with a marked upturn in the late 1980s. This 
was regressed against the memberships, over the sane period, of two UK-based 
environmental lobbying organizations and a strong correlation was found. The use of 
a "more" and "less" environmentally sensitive measure was used to test for cross-
sectional effects and this yielded a positive association between environmental 
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disclosure and the structural vulnerability of the five sectors to environmental liability 
and /or criticism. The author suggested that the conclusions allow for the possibility 
that differentials in the perceived need for social legitimacy may be one cause of both 
longitudinal and cross-sectional variability in disclosure volumes.  
Gao et al. (2005) investigated the patterns and determinants of corporate social and 
environmental disclosure (CSED) in Hong Kong (HK). The amount, content themes 
and location of CSED were examined through content analysis of 154 annual reports 
of 33 HK listed companies from 1993 to 1997. Independent variables included size 
and industry effects. There were five main findings of the study. First, HK companies 
have increased CSED between the five years examined. Second, size has a positive 
impact on the level of CSED in HK. Third, the three industry sectors (banking, 
property, utility) did not differ significantly in the amount of disclosure in a particular 
location of annual reports and in the amount of disclosure on "Community" and "Fair 
Business Practices". Fourth, the level of CSED is influenced by industry membership, 
with utility firms publishing the largest amount of CSED and property firms disclose 
the least. Finally, HK companies disclosed little information on those themes such as 
"Environment" and "Health and Safety", which are strongly sensitive to the 
environment, and no industry disclosed information on the "Energy" theme. 
Ho and Taylor (2007) examined the influence of corporate characteristics (size,  
profitability, industry membership, leverage, and liquidity) and country on triple 
bottom-line reporting (TBL). Twenty disclosure criteria were developed for each of 
the TBL disclosure areas: economic, social, and environmental. Disclosure 
information was examined in annual reports, stand-alone reports, and special website 
reports. Regression analysis was used to examine empirically the determinants of 
TBL disclosure practice. The empirical results, based on sample of 50 of the largest 
US and Japanese companies, showed a positive and significant association between 
both corporate size and country and TBL disclosure, negative association between 
corporate profitability, liquidity, and industry membership and TBL reporting, while 
there is no significant association between leverage and TBL reporting. Further 
analysis indicated that the results for the total TBL disclosure are primarily driven by 
non-economic disclosures. In addition, the extent of overall TBL reporting is higher 
for Japanese firms, with environmental disclosure being the key driver. This result 
 26 
could be attributed to the differences in national cultures, the regulatory environment, 
and other institutional factors between the United States and Japan. Despite this study 
extending the analysis of corporate social and environmental disclosure to other 
disclosure media over annual reports, it is criticized for using a small sample size. 
Branco and Rodrigues (2008) examined the factors influencing social responsibility 
disclosure (SRD) in both annual reports and web sites for Portuguese listed 
companies. Social responsibility disclosure referred in this study to disclosures in the 
following four categories: environmental, human resources, products and consumers 
and community involvement. They argued that, based on both legitimacy theory and a 
resource-based perspective, social responsibility disclosure is used by companies as a 
legitimacy tool to improve corporate image. They examined the following factors: 
degree of international activity, company size, industry, consumer proximity, 
environmental sensitivity, and media pressure. Profitability and leverage were used as 
control variables. The sample of 49 listed companies on the Portuguese Stock 
Exchange (Euronext – Lisbon) by the end of 2003 was content analyzed. Both the 
total disclosure level and the disclosure level in each category of social responsibility 
disclosure were examined separately. The empirical results revealed that only 
company size and media pressure are significantly associated with social 
responsibility disclosure, while other variables do not provide an explanation as to the 
level of such disclosure. Although this study used a clear theoretical framework and 
added to literature by analyzing both annual reports and internet disclosure, it suffered 
from a small sample size. 
Parsa and Kouhy (2008) noted that the literature was extremely focused on the  
disclosure of social information by large companies, so they examined the 
determinants of the disclosure of social information by small-and medium-sized 
companies in UK. Based on a random sample of 90 UK companies listed on the 
Alternative Investment Market (AIM), the annual reports for the selected companies 
were analyzed for three years (2001, 2002 and 2003). They used a correlation test to 
examine the relation between social reporting and some corporate characteristics. The 
empirical results indicated that the corporate age is not associated with social 
reporting, while industrial background, corporate size, and gearing,  are associated 
with the level of such disclosure. These results imply that small-and medium-sized 
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companies are similar to large companies in the impact of both corporate size and 
industry membership on social reporting, supporting the view that these companies 
also treat social reporting as a tool to establish and retain their reputation in an 
increasingly competitive business environment.  
Stanny and Ely (2008) examined factors influencing environmental disclosure about 
effects of climate change. Institutional investors are asking companies to disclose 
information about climate change through the Carbon Disclosure Project. They 
argued that companies that receive more scrutiny will increase their disclosure. 
Factors examined included corporate size, previous disclosure, industry, foreign sales, 
asset age, capital expenditure, Tobin‟s Q, leverage, profitability, and institutional 
ownership. A sample of US S&P 500 companies, identified in November 2006, was 
sent a questionnaire in February 2007. The empirical results of binary logit 
regressions revealed that corporate size, previous disclosure, and foreign sales are 
significantly associated with disclosure, while no significant association was found 
between disclosure and institutional ownership, Tobin‟s Q, profitability, leverage, 
industry, and asset age. 
Liu and Anbumozhi (2009) examined the factors affecting the disclosure level of 
corporate environmental information in Chinese listed companies on the basis of 
stakeholder theory. Factors examined were government power, shareholder power and 
creditor power, while controlling for size, age, location, learning capacity and return 
on equity. Regression analysis of a sample of 175 companies showed that government 
power (the environmental sensitivity of industry) is positively related with the level of 
environmental disclosure, while shareholder power (percent of floating stock  
possessed by the top 10 shareholders) and creditor power (debt/asset) are not 
associated with the level of disclosure. Firm‟s environmental sensitivity and size were 
found to be the major significant factors influencing their environmental disclosure 
efforts. The economic performance was not significantly related to the environmental 
disclosure activities. 
Reverte (2009) examined the determinants of corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
disclosure by Spanish listed companies. Based on a multi-theoretical framework the 
study examined the impact of corporate size, industry sensitivity, profitability, 
ownership concentration, international listing, media pressure, and leverage. A sample 
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of Spanish firms listed on the Madrid Stock Exchange and included in the IBEX35 
index was analyzed for the years 2005 and 2006 ending in 46 observations. Data on 
corporate social responsibility disclosure ratings come from the Observatory on 
corporate social responsibility (OCSR) focusing on the following three ratings: Total 
CSR score, CSR Content Rating and CSR Management Systems Rating. The empirical 
results indicated that corporate size, industry sensitivity, and media pressure are 
significantly associated with corporate social responsibility disclosure, while both 
profitability and leverage are not associated with such disclosure. The study implied 
that legitimacy theory is the most relevant theory to explain the corporate social 
responsibility disclosure practices of Spanish companies. 
Monteiro and Aibar-Guzman (2010) examined the influence of several firm 
characteristics on the extent of environmental disclosure in the annual reports of large 
Portuguese companies during the period 2002–2004. Using the content analysis 
technique, they developed an index in order to assess the presence of the 
environmental disclosures in companies‟ annual reports and their breadth. The 
selected explanatory variables were firm size, industry membership, profitability,  
quotation on the stock market, foreign ownership and environmental certification. A 
sample of 109 companies was drawn from the list of the 500 largest Portuguese 
companies by turnover in 2003. Regression analysis showed that firm size and the fact 
that a company is listed on the stock market are positively associated with 
environmental disclosure. However, the results revealed no statistically significant 
differences between the level of environmental information disclosed by sample firms 
with a foreign parent company and the domestically owned companies included in the 
sample. Finally, no significant relationship was found between environmental 
reporting and the fact that a company has obtained environmental certification. 
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Table 2.1 
Empirical Studies On the Impact Of Corporate Characteristics On  
Corporate Environmental Disclosure Quantity  
    
Analysis &General Result 
Time of 
Observation, 
Sample Size & 
Sample Type 
Variables  
Author(s) 
& Date 
Control 
Variable  
Independent 
Variable  
Dependent 
Variable  
 
Analysis 
1- Mann-Whitney U test 
2- Chi-Square test 
3- Spearman Rank Correlations  
 
General Result  
Results indicated that companies 
which provide social responsibility 
informat ion are on average, larger 
in size, have a higher systematic 
risk and place stronger emphasis 
on the long term than companies 
which do not disclose this 
informat ion.  
 
Time of 
Observation 
1978 
 
Sample Size  
207 Australian 
companies 
 
Sample Type  
The largest 
companies listed 
on the Australian 
Associated Stock 
Exchange 
 
------------- 
 
Size, Systematic 
risk, social 
pressures, and 
Management's 
decision horizon  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The level of social 
responsibility 
disclosures 
 
Trotman 
and 
Brad ley 
(1981) 
 
Analysis 
OLS Regression 
 
General Result  
Corporate size and industry 
category influenced a number of 
social responsibility disclosures 
while the presence of social 
responsibility committee was 
found to correlate with only 
human resources disclosure. No 
relationship was found between 
social responsibility disclosures 
and profitability. 
   
 
Time of 
Observation 
1978 
 
Sample Size  
134 US          
companies 
 
Sample Type  
Companies drawn 
from ten different 
industries as 
reported in Ernst & 
Whinney's 1978 
survey. 
 
 
-------------- 
 
Size, Industry 
profitability and 
social responsibility 
committee 
 
Types of social 
responsibility 
disclosures 
 
Cowen     
et al. 
(1987) 
 
Analysis 
1- Pearson product-moment       
     Correlation 
2- Spearman Rank Correlations  
 
General Result  
No significant association was 
found between extensiveness of 
pollution disclosures and 
economic performance except for 
the oil refining industry where a 
significant positive correlat ion was 
detected. Results also showed that 
for large firms, a significant 
negative correlation exists. 
 
 
Time of 
Observation 
1973 and 1974 
 
Sample Size  
108 US firms  
 
Sample Type  
Firms affected by 
environmental 
regulations and 
belonging to four 
highly polluting 
industries 
 
Size and 
Industry 
 
Economic 
performance 
 
The extent of 
pollution 
disclosures 
 
Freedman 
and Jaggi 
(1988) 
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Analysis &General Result 
Time of 
Observation, 
Sample Size & 
Sample Type 
Variables 
Author(s) 
& Date  
Control 
Variable  
Independent 
Variable  
Dependent 
Variable  
 
Analysis 
OLS Regression 
 
General Result  
Results suggested the existence of 
significant and positive association 
of social disclosure with each of 
social performance and political 
visibility as measured by size and 
systematic risk, while the 
existence of significant and 
negative association of social 
disclosure with financial leverage.  
 
 
Time of 
Observation  
1973  
 
Sample Size  
23 US companies 
           
Sample Type  
Companies 
included in both 
the Ernst & Ernst 
social disclosure 
survey and the 
survey conducted 
by Business and 
Society Revie. 
 
 
 
 
      
------------ 
 
Social performance, 
Economic 
performance, 
political visib ility 
(size, capital 
intensive ratio, 
systematic risk) and 
Monitoring & 
contracting cost 
variables (leverage 
and dividends to 
unrestricted retained 
earnings) 
 
Social disclosure 
 
Belkaoui 
and Karpik 
(1989) 
 
Analysis 
OLS Regression 
 
General Result  
Results indicated that size and 
industry classification are 
significant exp lanatory variables 
whereas profitability variables are 
not. 
 
Time of 
Observation  
1985 
 
Sample Size  
128 US companies 
           
Sample Type  
Companies drawn 
from eight industry 
classifications in 
the 1985 Fortune 
500 listing 
 
 
 
  
-------------- 
 
Public p ressure (as 
measured by size 
and industry 
classification) and 
Profitability  
 
Social disclosures 
 
Patten 
(1991) 
 
Analysis 
Logistic Regression 
 
General Result 
Results indicated that measures of 
stakeholder power, strategic 
posture and economic performance 
are significantly related to levels 
of corporate social disclosure. 
 
 
 
 
Time of 
Observation  
1984, 1985, 1986 
 
Sample Size  
130 US 
corporations 
           
Sample Type  
Major companies 
investigated by 
CEP drawn from 
large Fortune 500 
companies 
 
 
 
 
Company age, 
Industry 
classification 
and Firm size  
 
Stakeholder power, 
Strategic posture 
and Economic 
performance 
 
The level of 
corporate social 
disclosure 
 
Roberts 
(1992) 
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Analysis &General Result 
Time of 
Observation, 
Sample Size & 
Sample Type  
Variables  
Author(s) 
& Date  
Control 
Variable  
Independent 
Variable  
Dependent 
Variable  
 
Analysis 
1- Pearson correlations 
2- Spearman's rank correlations  
3- OLS Regression 
 
General Result  
Results showed that both size and 
industry are significantly 
associated with the amount of 
disclosure, while profitability is 
not. 
 
 
 
Time of 
Observation  
1992 
 
Sample Size  
47 New Zealand  
companies 
           
Sample Type  
Top 50 companies 
listed in New 
Zealand Stock 
Exchange based on  
a size ranking of 
market 
capitalizat ion 
  
 
--------------- 
 
Size, Industry type 
and Profitability 
 
The level of social 
and environmental 
disclosure 
 
Hackston 
and Milne 
(1996) 
 
Analysis 
1- Pearson product-moment       
     Correlations 
2- Spearman rank correlat ions 
 
General Result  
The amount of voluntary 
environmental d isclosure was 
found to be low in Australia but 
increases over time. A significant 
positive association was found 
between environmental d isclosures 
and each of environmental group 
membership, environmental 
sensitivity of the industry and firm 
size.   
 
 
 
 Time of 
Observation  
1991 
 
Sample Size  
197 Australian 
companies 
 
Sample Type  
Firms filed with 
the Australian 
Graduate School of 
Management 
(AGSM) 
  
-------------- 
 
Environmental 
group membership, 
Environmental 
sensitivity and Firm 
size  
 
The level of 
corporate 
environmental 
disclosure 
 
Deegan 
and 
Gordon 
(1996) 
 
Analysis 
ANOVA tests 
 
General Result  
Results indicated that company 
size is significantly associated with 
all types of social disclosures, 
while industry membership was 
found to be related to 
environmental and some employee 
disclosures only. In addition, the 
amount and nature of social 
informat ion disclosed varied 
significantly across countries. 
 
 
 
 
Time of 
Observation  
1992 
 
Sample Size  
150 European    
companies 
 
Sample Type 
The largest 25 
companies in each 
of six Western 
European countries 
  
-------------- 
 
Company size, 
Industry grouping 
and country of 
domicile  
 
Types of social 
disclosures 
 
Adams et 
al. (1998) 
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Analysis &General Result 
Time of 
Observation, 
Sample Size & 
Sample Type  
Variables  
Author(s) 
& Date  
Control 
Variable  
Independent 
Variable  
Dependent 
Variable  
 
Analysis 
OLS Regression 
 
General Result  
The results provided strong 
support that in the UK, corporate 
social and environmental 
disclosure is related to corporate 
characteristics of size, p rofit and 
industry affiliation.  
 
Time of 
Observation  
1988 – 1995 
inclusive 
 
Sample Size  
100 UK companies 
 
Sample Type  
Top 100 UK 
companies selected 
from the Times 
1000 
 
 
 
 
Industry 
classification 
 
Turnover, Capital 
employed, Number 
of employees and 
Profit 
 
Total social 
disclosure, Major 
areas of social 
disclosure and 
types of social 
disclosure 
 
Gray et al. 
(2001) 
 
Analysis 
1- OLS Regression 
2- TOBIT Regression 
3- LOGIT Regression 
4- Ordered PROBIT Regression 
 
General Result  
Results indicated that corporate 
size and industry membership 
significantly and positively 
influence environmental reporting 
practices, while prior profitability 
negatively influences corporate 
environmental d isclosure in the 
UK. 
 
 
Time of 
Observation  
1999 
 
Sample Size  
169 UK firms 
 
Sample Type  
The largest 200 
UK companies by 
market 
capitalizat ion 
  
------------ 
 
Industry,  
profitability and 
size 
 
 Total 
environmental 
disclosure, Types 
of environmental 
disclosure and 
Areas of 
environmental 
disclosure 
 
Salama 
(2003) 
 
Analysis 
1- Spearman's rank correlations  
2- OLS Regression 
 
General Result  
As of the amount of environmental 
disclosure, empirical results 
showed that both environmental 
sensitivity and media coverage 
have some exp lanatory power, 
while size and risk do not seem to 
explain the cross-sectional 
differences in the extent of 
disclosure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Time of 
Observation  
1991 - 1995 
 
Sample Size  
112 Spanish firms 
 
Sample Type  
Companies listed 
in Madrid Stock 
Exchange  
 
 
 
 
------------ 
 
Size, risk, 
profitability, 
environmental 
sensitivity, and 
media exposure 
 
The level of 
corporate 
environmental 
disclosure 
 
García-
Ayuso and 
Larrinaga 
(2003) 
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Analysis &General Result 
Time of 
Observation, 
Sample Size & 
Sample Type  
Variables  
Author(s) 
& Date  
Control 
Variable  
Independent 
Variable  
Dependent 
Variable  
 
Analysis 
1- t - tests 
2- OLS Regression 
 
General Result  
Results indicated an increase in the 
volume of voluntary 
environmental d isclosure over 27 
years, and a strong correlation of 
that disclosure to membership of 
environmental lobby groups. Also, 
a significant positive association 
was found between environmental 
disclosure and the environmental 
sensitivity of the industry.  
 
 
 
 
Time of 
Observation  
1974 - 2000 
 
Sample Size  
10 UK companies 
 
Sample Type  
Two companies 
from five sectors 
chosen from the 
FTSE 100 (by 
market value) 
 
  
------------ 
 
Membership of 
environmental 
lobbying 
organizations and 
Environmental 
sensitivity of the 
industry 
 
The volume of 
environmental 
disclosure 
 
Campbell 
(2004) 
 
Analysis 
1- Pearson Correlations 
2- ANOVA tests 
 
General Result  
The study found that industry 
difference has an impact on the 
amount, content themes and 
location of CSED and there is a 
positive correlation between 
company size and the level of  
CSED.  
 
 
 
 
 
Time of 
Observation  
1993 - 1997 
 
Sample Size  
33 Hong Kong 
companies 
 
Sample Type  
The Top 100 
companies listed  
on Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange 
  
------------ 
 
Size and Industry 
effects 
 
The amount, 
content themes 
and location of 
Corporate Social 
and 
Environmental 
Disclosure 
(CSED) 
 
Gao et al. 
(2005) 
 
Analysis 
OLS Regression 
 
General Result  
Results indicated that for total 
TBL disclosure (combining 
economic, social, and 
environmental categories), the 
extent of reporting is higher for 
firms with larger size, lower 
profitability, lower liquidity, and 
for firms with membership in  
the manufacturing industry. 
 
Time of 
Observation  
2003  
 
Sample Size  
50 US and 
Japanese 
companies 
 
Sample Type  
The largest 50 US 
and Japanese  
companies by 
market 
capitalizat ion  
 
------------ 
 
Size, profitability, 
industry 
membership, 
leverage, and 
liquid ity 
 
The extent of 
triple bottom-line 
reporting (TBL) 
 
Ho and 
Taylor 
(2007) 
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Analysis &General Result 
Time of 
Observation, 
Sample Size & 
Sample Type 
Variables  
Author(s) 
& Date 
Control 
Variable  
Independent 
Variable  
Dependent 
Variable  
 
Analysis 
1- t - tests 
2- W ilcoxon test 
3- OLS Regression 
 
General Result  
Empirical results revealed that 
only company size and media 
pressure are significantly 
associated with social 
responsibility disclosure, while 
other variables do not provide an 
explanation as to the level of such 
disclosure.  
 
 
 
 
 
Time of 
Observation  
2003  
 
Sample Size  
49 Portuguese 
companies  
 
Sample Type  
Companies listed 
in Portuguese 
Stock Exchange 
(Euronext – 
Lisbon)  
 
 
 
Profitability 
and leverage 
 
Degree of 
international 
activity, company 
size, industry, 
consumer 
proximity, 
environmental 
sensitivity, and 
media pressure 
 
The level of social 
responsibility  
Disclosure(SRD) 
and Types of 
social 
responsibility 
disclosure 
 
Branco and 
Rodrigues 
(2008) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Analysis 
1- Spearman's rank correlations  
2- Kruskal–Wallis test 
 
General Result  
Results indicated that the corporate 
age is not associated with social 
reporting, while industrial 
background, corporate size, and 
gearing, are associated with the 
level of such disclosure. 
 
  
Time of 
Observation  
2001-2003  
 
Sample Size  
90 UK companies  
 
Sample Type  
Random sample of 
companies listed 
on the Alternative 
Investment Market 
(AIM) 
 
 
 
  
------------ 
 
Corporate age, 
industrial 
background, 
corporate size, and 
gearing 
 
The level of social 
reporting 
 
Parsa and 
Kouhy 
(2008) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Analysis 
1- Tetrachoric correlat ion  
2-  Pearson correlat ion  
3-  LOGIT Regression 
 
General Result  
The empirical results of binary 
logit regressions revealed that 
corporate size, prev ious disclosure, 
and foreign sales are significantly 
associated with disclosure, while 
no significant association was 
found between disclosure and 
institutional ownership, Tobin‟s Q, 
profitability, leverage, industry, 
and asset age. 
 
Time of 
Observation  
2007  
 
Sample Size  
500 US companies  
 
Sample Type  
US S&P 
companies  
 
------------ 
 
Corporate size, 
previous disclosure, 
industry, foreign 
sales, asset age, 
capital expenditure, 
Tobin‟s Q, leverage, 
profitability, and 
institutional 
ownership 
 
The level of 
environmental 
disclosure 
 
Stanny and 
Ely (2008) 
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Analysis &General Result                                             
Time of 
Observation, 
Sample Size & 
Sample Type 
Variables  
Author(s) 
& Date 
Control 
Variable  
Independent 
Variable  
Dependent 
Variable  
 
Analysis 
1- Pearson correlation  
2-  OLS Regression 
   
General Result  
Firm‟s environmental sensitivity 
(government power)and size were 
found to be the major significant 
factors influencing their 
environmental d isclosure efforts. 
The economic performance was 
not significantly related to the 
environmental d isclosure 
activities. Shareholder power and 
creditor pressure showed no 
significant association. 
 
 
 
Time of 
Observation  
2006  
 
Sample Size  
175 Chinese 
companies  
 
Sample Type  
Chinese listed 
companies 
 
Size, age, 
location, 
learning 
capacity and 
return on 
equity 
 
Government power 
(environmental 
sensitivity of 
industry), 
shareholder power 
(percent of floating 
stock possessed by 
the top 10 
shareholders) and 
creditor pressure 
(debt/asset) 
 
The level of 
environmental 
disclosure 
 
Liu and 
Anbumozhi 
(2009) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Analysis 
1- Correlation 
2- OLS Regression 
   
General Result  
Results indicated that corporate 
size, industry sensitivity, and 
media pressure are significantly 
associated with corporate social 
responsibility disclosure, while 
both profitability and leverage are 
not associated with such 
disclosure.  
 
 
 
 
Time of 
Observation  
2005-2006  
 
Sample Size  
46 Spanish 
companies  
 
Sample Type  
Spanish firms 
listed on the 
Madrid Stock 
Exchange and 
included in the 
IBEX35 index  
 
 
 
------------ 
 
Corporate size, 
industry sensitivity, 
profitability, 
ownership 
concentration, 
international listing, 
media pressure and 
leverage 
 
Corporate social 
responsibility 
(CSR)  disclosure 
 
Reverte 
(2009) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Analysis 
1- Pearson correlation  
2-  OLS Regression 
   
General Result  
Results showed that firm size and 
the fact that a company is listed on 
the stock market are positively 
associated with environmental 
disclosure. 
 
Time of 
Observation  
2003  
 
Sample Size  
109 Portuguese 
companies  
 
Sample Type  
Companies drawn 
from the list of the 
500 largest 
Portuguese 
companies by 
turnover in 2003 
 
 
 
 
------------ 
 
Firm size, industry 
membership, 
profitability, 
quotation on the 
stock market, 
foreign ownership 
and environmental 
certification 
 
The level of 
environmental 
disclosure 
 
Monteiro 
and Aibar-
Guzman 
(2010) 
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2.4.2   Impact Of Corporate Governance On Corporate Environmental 
           Disclosure Quantity      
Halme and Huse (1997) examined the relations between corporate environmental 
reporting in annual reports and corporate governance variables, industry variables and 
country variables. Empirical evidence is gathered from large corporations in Finland, 
Norway, Spain and Sweden, a sample of 40 companies from each of the Scandinavian 
countries (except for Spain where only 20 Spanish firms where included in the 
sample). The annual reports for 1992 were content analyzed to explore the 
environmental reporting variables. The environmental disclosures were examined 
with the help of a three-class categorization in annual reports: little or no 
environmental information; a separate environmental section; and a separate  
environmental section together with an environmental policy and future action plans. 
Corporate governance variables identified by the study are ownership concentration 
and the number of board members.  
Results of the logistic regression analyses indicated that the extent of a corporation's 
environmental impact is positively related to environmental reporting. Industry 
appeared to be the most important factor in explaining environmental disclosure in 
annual reports. Corporations in industries which are traditionally considered to be 
polluting, reported most on the environment. Although the number of board members 
were positively related to corporate environmental reporting in some of the analyses, 
the number of board members varied considerably among the four countries studied, 
and the effect mentioned seemed to depend on variations between the countries. The 
overall research results did not indicate any significant relationship with ownership 
concentration or the number of board members. Similarly, Norwegian firms seemed 
more likely than firms in the other countries to have some environmental reporting. 
This may be related to the Norwegian legislation and tougher legal requirements 
imposed on Norwegian companies. However, after adjusting for industry and 
corporate governance variables, there were differences between the environmental 
reporting by corporations in the three Nordic countries, where Finnish companies 
showed less attention to the environment than their Norwegian and Swedish 
counterparts. 
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McKendall et al. (1999) examined the effects of corporate governance structures on 
the incidence of corporate illegality by analyzing the relationship between 
environmental violations and several dimensions of corporate board structure. 
Environmental violations, which include non-disclosure of corporate environmental 
information, were categorized as serious violations and non-serious violations. 
Corporate governance dimensions examined include outsider dominance, dual CEO-
Chairperson roles, stock ownership by officers and directors, social responsibility 
committees and attorneys on boards. The study also controlled for the following 
variables: industry profitability, firm profitability, organization size and industry 
concentration. Based on a sample of 150 US companies extracted from the 1000 
largest business firms listed in Ward's Business Directory, Tobit regressions were 
carried out. The sample companies were examined for 1985, 1986, and 1987. Results 
demonstrated that the value of stock owned by corporate officers and directors was 
positively and significantly associated with serious environmental violations. Outsider 
dominance, joint CEO-Chairpersons, social responsibility committees and attorneys 
on boards were not significantly related to environmental violations. These findings 
cast proposals. The control variables of size, industry profitability, firm profitability 
and industry concentration were all significantly and mostly negatively related to 
environmental violations including the non-disclosure of environmental information. 
These findings are consistent of most previous research suggesting a significant and 
positive correlation between such control variables and the disclosure of 
environmental information. 
Haniffa and Cooke (2002) examined the relationship between a number of corporate 
governance, cultural and firm-specific characteristics and the extent (range and scope) 
of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of Malaysian companies. The survey 
covered 167 companies that   published their annual reports during the year ended 31 
December 1995. Voluntary disclosure is measured by an index of disclosure. Three 
corporate governance variables were found to be significant are independent non-
executive director, chairperson and the proportion of family members on the board, 
but the relationship is negative. However, none of the cultural variables were found to 
be significant. Out of seventeen firm-specific variables used as control variables in the 
model, four were found to be significant and positively related to disclosure. These 
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are assets-in-place, ownership structure based on the proportion of shares held by top 
ten shareholders, foreign ownership and profitability.  
Chau and Gray (2002) examined the association of ownership structure with the 
voluntary disclosures – including environmental disclosures – of listed companies in 
Asian settings of Hong Kong and Singapore. The sample selected comprises only 
industrial companies including food & beverages, shipping & transportation, 
publishing & printing, electronics & technology, building materials & construction. 
Annual reports for 1997 were analyzed for a random sample of 60 Hong Kong 
companies and 62 Singapore companies. A voluntary disclosure checklist was 
developed and a voluntary disclosure index was calculated as the number of total 
voluntary disclosures divided by the maximum voluntary disclosure possible. The 
ownership variable was calculated by adding together the proportions of equity 
belonging to directors and to dominant shareholders to arrive at the proportion of 
firm‟s equity owned by insiders. This figure was then used to derive the proportion of 
a firm‟s equity owned by outsiders.  
A linear multiple regression analysis was used to test the association between the 
dependent variable of voluntary disclosure and the independent variable of ownership 
structure. In addition to ownership structure, a number of control variables such as 
firm size, leverage, size of auditors, profitability and multinationality, were also 
included in the analysis. Results showed that the extent of outside ownership is 
positively associated with voluntary disclosures – including environmental 
disclosures. In particular, the results also indicated that the level of information 
disclosure is likely to be less in insider of family-controlled companies, a significant 
feature of the Hong and Singapore stock markets.  
Gul and Leung (2004) examined the linkages between board outside directors on the 
board and voluntary corporate disclosures. The dependent variable, voluntary 
disclosures included environmental information items such as environmental 
measures and ISO or other awards. A disclosure index consisting of 44 discretionary 
items was developed to measure voluntary disclosures. Regression analyses of 
observations from 385 Hong Kong listed companies were carried out for 1996. 
Several control variables were added to the analyses including firm size, leverage, 
liquidity, profitability, auditor firm, audit committee, firm growth, listing status, 
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consolidated firms, equity, loss, equity market liquidity and finally industry type. 
Results showed that the extent to which managers will disclose more corporate 
information is likely to be affected by the composition and quality of the board of 
directors. More specifically, CEO duality was associated with lower voluntary 
disclosures, supporting the view that the position of chairman and CEO should be 
separated. Results also revealed that firms with a higher proportion of expert outside 
directors are associated with lower voluntary disclosures. More interestingly, it was 
found that the negative association between CEO duality and corporate disclosures is 
weaker when the firm has a higher proportion of expert outside directors suggesting 
that the expertise of non- executive directors moderates the CEO duality/corporate 
disclosures relationship. The disclosure levels were also positively correlated with 
firm size, profitability, the presence of audit committee, firm growth, listing status and 
equity financing and negatively associated with the proportion of shares held by 
directors and liquidity. 
Haniffa and Cooke (2005) examined whether the extent of Corporate Social 
Disclosure (CSD) in the annual reports of Malaysian listed companies changes over 
time and whether there is an association with three groups of variables: cultural, 
corporate governance and firm-specific (control) variables. Content analysis was 
adopted to achieve the objectives. A final sample of 139 companies listed in KLSE 
was examined in 1996 and in 2002. Descriptive analysis and parametric and non-
parametric tests indicated significant differences in the extent and variety of CSD for 
the two years despite minimal legislative guidance for such disclosures. Two different 
dependent variables were used in the regression models: CSDI (index) and CSDL 
(length) representing the variety and the extent of CSD respectively. The significant 
positive relationship between Malay directors and Malay shareholders with CSD 
practice in the annual reports of Malaysian companies suggests that disclosure cannot 
be culture free and is attributed primarily to government policy. Results  also indicated 
a significant negative relationship between the composition of non-executive directors 
and CSD while a significant positive relationship between chairs with multip le 
directorships and CSD. Foreign share ownership was found to be statistically 
significant based on CSDI but not when the dependent variable is CSDL. In addition, 
size, profitability and multiple listings were all statistically related to CSD. The 
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industry-CSD relationship seemed to be less significant with the interaction of other 
variables. Similarly, gearing as proxy for risk did not seem to impact CSD.  
Barako et al. (2006) investigated the extent to which corporate governance attributes, 
ownership structure and company characteristics influence voluntary disclosure 
practices including environmental disclosure. The sample consisted of all Kenyan 
companies (54) listed on Nairobi Stock Exchange (NSE), which were examined from 
1992 to 2001. A disclosure index was used to measure the level of voluntary reporting 
by companies. Corporate governance characteristics examined in this study are: board 
composition, board leadership structure and audit committee formation. Results 
suggested that the extent of voluntary disclosure (including environmental disclosure) 
is influenced by a firm's corporate governance attributes, ownership structure and 
company characteristics. The presence of an audit committee was found to be a 
significant factor that is positively associated with the level of voluntary disclosure 
and the proportion of non-executive directors on the board was found to be 
significantly and negatively associated with the extent of voluntary disclosure. The 
study also found that the levels of institutional and foreign ownership have a 
significantly positive impact on voluntary disclosure. Large companies and companies 
with high debt voluntarily disclosed more information. In contrast, board leadership 
structure, liquidity, profitability and type of external audit firm did not have a 
significant influence on the level of voluntary disclosure by companies in Kenya. 
Naser et al. (2006) examined factors influencing corporate social disclosure (CSD) in 
Qatar. They investigated the effect of firm size as measured by the firm‟s market 
capitalization and business risk as measured by the leverage and corporate growth, as 
well as ownership variables (government ownership, institutional ownership, and 
major shareholders). Content analysis was employed in the study and a checklist was 
developed including 15 content categories within four testable dimensions: theme, 
evidence, amount and location. The annual reports of a sample of 21 Qatari 
companies listed on the Doha Stock Exchange was analyzed for the year 1999/2000. 
Variations in corporate social disclosure by the sample of Qatari companies were 
found to be associated with the firm size as measured by the firm‟s market 
capitalization and business risk as measured by the leverage and corporate growth. 
However, the proportion of the institutional investors, dispersion of individual 
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investors and government ownership proved to have little impact on the level of CSD 
by the sample of Qatari companies.  
Ghazali (2007) examined the influence of ownership structure on corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) disclosure in Malaysian company annual reports. The factors 
examined include ownership concentration, director ownership, government 
ownership, company size, profitability and industry. A sample of 87 non-financial 
companies included in the Bursa Malaysia Composite Index was selected. The annual 
reports for the financial year 2001 were analyzed using a CSR disclosure checklist to 
measure the extent of CSR disclosure. Results from multiple regression analysis 
showed that two ownership variables, director ownership and the government as a 
substantial shareholder, which are common business attributes in Malaysia, have 
significant influence on CSR disclosure in annual reports. However the third  
ownership variable, ownership by the ten largest shareholders, was not statistically 
significant in explaining the level of CSR disclosure in annual reports. Both 
profitability and industry were not significant factors in explaining CSD. 
Hossain and Reaz (2007) examined the association between company specific 
characteristics and voluntary disclosure by 38 listed banking companies in India. 
Corporate social - and hence environmental - disclosure represented one category of 
voluntary disclosure. The empirical investigation revealed that corporate size and 
assets in-place are significantly associated with disclosure, while corporate age, 
multiple exchange listing, business complexity, and board composition (percentage of 
non-executive directors) are insignificant in explaining the level of disclosure. This 
study is criticized for the use of a single year and one specific industry sector. In 
addition, it examined the total level of disclosure as opposed to the level of disclosure 
within each disclosure category.  
Huafang and Jianguo (2007) examined the impact of ownership structure and board 
composition on voluntary disclosures (including environmental disclosures) of listed 
companies in China. A disclosure index was developed where the score equals the 
total number of points awarded for voluntary disclosure of strategic, business, 
financial and non-financial information. Ownership structure variables included 
blockholder, managerial, state, legal-person and foreign listing/shares ownership. 
Board composition variables included the proportion of independent directors and 
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CEO duality. Control variables included firm size, leverage, firm growth and auditor 
reputation. A sample of 559 firms covering 11 industry sectors was drawn from firms 
listed on Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) in 2002. Results of the regressio n analysis 
revealed that higher blockholder ownership and foreign listing/shares ownership are 
associated with increased disclosure. However, managerial ownership, state 
ownership and legal person ownership are not related to disclosure. An increase in 
independent directors increased corporate disclosure and CEO duality was associated 
with lower disclosure. The study also found that larger firms have greater disclosure, 
while firms with growth opportunities are reluctant to disclose information 
voluntarily. However, no significant relationship was found between voluntary 
disclosure and each of auditor reputation and leverage.  
Lim et al. (2007) examined the association between board composition and voluntary 
disclosure in the annual reports of 181 Australian companies. They developed a 
checklist of 67 voluntary items being classified as: strategic, non financial and 
financial information. The non financial information category is that of social and 
environmental disclosure, which has been examined separately. A two-stage 
multivariate analysis was used to deal with the problem of endogeneity. In the first 
stage they estimated the relation between the ratio of independent directors to total 
board size and firm characteristics that may be related to voluntary disclosure. In the 
second stage they investigated the effect of board composition, captured by the fitted 
values from the first stage, on the extent of voluntary disclosure. The results indicated 
a positive association between board composition and total voluntary disclosure. 
Furthermore, the results indicated that (a) boards composed largely of independent 
directors voluntarily disclose more forward looking quantitative and strategic 
information and (b) board structure has no bearing on non-financial and financial 
voluntary disclosure. Other drivers of voluntary disclosure of information in 
companies‟ annual reports were firm size, shareholder concentration, industry 
classification, management compensation and investment growth set.  
Rizk et al. (2008) used a sample of 60 Egyptian manufacturing companies to address 
the social and environmental reporting practices in the corporate annual report for the 
financial year 2002. They employed an un-weighted disclosure index consisting of 34 
information items covering environmental, energy, human resources, customer and 
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community involvement issues. The impact of private ownership, government 
ownership and industry membership on corporate social and environmental reporting 
were examined. A random sample of  Egyptian companies in the industrial sector 
were selected from nine high polluting industries including food, beverage and 
tobacco, ceramics, chemicals, cement, pharmaceuticals, building materials and 
construction, textiles, and mills and storage. Non-parametric tests, i.e. ANOVA tests, 
were used to test the developed hypotheses.  
The study concluded that the extent of corporate social responsibility is low. In 
addition, the nature of disclosures was found to be overwhelmingly descriptive.  
Findings indicated that industry membership is a statistically significant factor relative 
to the category of disclosure. In addition, government owned companies disclose 
more employee related information than private companies. On the other hand private 
companies were found to disclose customer related, environment related, and 
community related information more than governmental owned companies.  However, 
the study focused on the legal form of the company rather than the ownership 
percentages. The study recommended the use of a reasonably large sample that covers 
both the industrial and non-industrial sectors as well as a longitudinal analysis of the 
sample companies.  
Al Arussi et al. (2009) investigated the relationship between the extent of voluntary 
financial and environmental disclosures on the internet and each of ethnicity of CEO, 
leverage, level of technology, existence of dominant personalities, profitability and 
firm size. A sample of 201 Malaysian listed companies on the Bursa Malaysia's Main 
and Second Boards was analyzed for the financial year 2005. The sample was selected 
using the disproportionate stratified random sampling approach. Multivariate tests and 
linear regression analysis were undertaken to examine the hypotheses. The results 
indicated that level of technology, ethnicity of CEO and firm size are determinants of 
both internet financial and environmental disclosures. However, the existence of a 
dominant personality was found to negatively affect the level of financial disclosures 
but not environmental disclosures. Yet leverage and profitability did not show any 
significant relationship with either financial or environmental disclosures.  
Grüning and Bergerernst (2010) examined the association of disclosure and corporate 
governance for a sample of 6,580 firms listed in the US between 2003 and 2007. 
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Disclosure is measured by an innovative artificial intelligence approach in ten 
distinctive information dimensions (financial, customers, value chain, employees, 
R&D, strategy, governance, stock market, environment, society) and  corporate 
governance is measured by an aggregate index of 48 variables in 8 categories (board, 
audit, charter/bylaws, state of incorporation, ownership, executive and director 
compensation, progressive practices, director education). Several control variables 
were used including: size, ownership concentration, equity ratio, age, growth rate, 
leverage, capital intensity, loss, intangible assets, stock return, stock return volatility, 
issuer firm, type of auditor, market-to-book ratio, stock turnover, Tobin‟s Q, previous 
year disclosure and previous year corporate governance. Results indicated that well-
governed firms opt into a more comprehensive disclosure policy and provide a higher 
degree of disclosure. Yet, this relation is not homogenous across all corporate 
governance dimensions. For the categories audit, state of incorporation, ownership 
and progressive practices, a strong positive effect on corporate governance was 
detected, whereas for the director and executive compensation category revealed a 
negative effect. In a 3SLS modeling, corporate governance and disclosure were found 
to positively interact in increasing firm valuation in terms of Tobin‟s q. In general, a 
complementary relationship between disclosure and corporate governance structure, 
was documented but evidence has been provided that this relationship varies across 
different corporate governance dimensions.  
Michelon and Parbonetti (2010) investigated the effects of corporate governance, as 
being represented by three board characteristics (i.e. leadership, structure and 
composition) on sustainability disclosure, while controlling for some company-
specific characteristics. Sustainability disclosure was determined using content 
analysis of annual, sustainability, social and environmental reports of year 2003 of a 
sample of 114 European and American companies: 57 are listed in the Dow Jones 
Sustainability Index and the remaining 57 belong to the Dow Jones between the 
proportion of independent directors and the quantity of sustainability informa tion 
disclosed as well as between CEO duality and the level of sustainability disclosure. In 
addition, the relationship between the presence of a CSR committee or responsible 
and the level of disclosure is not confirmed by empirical evidence. However, a 
positive association was found between community influential and sustainability 
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disclosure. Accordingly, the study partially supports the idea that a sound governance 
increases voluntary disclosure. 
Peters and Romi (2011) examined the determinants of the voluntary reporting of 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emission accounting information. The two main variables of 
interest used in evaluating the relationship between corporate governance and GHG 
disclosures were the existence of an environmental committee on the board and a 
sustainability officer. However, further analysis employed additional variables: 
environmental committee size, diligence, expertise, and knowledge spillover as well 
as sustainability officer expertise. Several firm characteristics were controlled for 
including: environmental performance, cumulative number of previous disclosures, 
cross listing, inclusion on sustainability indices, oil industry, paper industry, 
petroleum industry, chemical industry, metals industry, CEO duality, institutional 
ownership, profitability, size, growth and leverage. GHG accounting disclosures were 
captured from the Carbon Disclosure Project's (CDP) GHG Emissions Questionnaire.  
Using a sample of firms participating in the Carbon Disclosure Project ( including all 
US firms in the FT500) from 2002 through 2006, a strong relationship between 
sustainability-oriented corporate governance characteristics and the voluntary 
disclosure of GHG information was documented. Specifically, the study found that 
GHG emission accounting disclosures are positively associated with the presence of 
environmental committees on boards of directors and corporate sustainability officers. 
Further analysis of specific committee and executive characteristics revealed that the 
size and diligence of the environmental committee and expertise of the sustainability 
officer are positively related to voluntary disclosure. Committee members with 
expertise in environmental sustainability were positively associated with disclosure. 
Finally, knowledge spillover from overlap between environmental committees and 
audit committees was found to significantly increase the likelihood of GHG emission 
accounting disclosures. 
Post et al. (2011) evaluated the relationship between boards of directors‟ composition 
and environmental corporate social responsibility (ECSR). ECSR was measured in 
two different ways. First, ECSR disclosures were used as reported in firms‟ annual 
reports, corporate environmental reports, corporate websites, and government 
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websites. ECSR disclosure measure comprised 26 items grouped into 3 categories: 
governance data, credibility data and environmental performance indicators. Second, 
data from the proprietary KLD STATS database, issued by Kinder, Lydenberg, 
Domini, Inc. (KLD) that provides annual ratings of the environmental, social and 
governance actions of more than 3,000 publicly traded companies. KLD measures 
firms‟ environmental actions in seven areas of strengths (beneficial products and  
services, pollution prevention, recycling, clean energy, communications, management 
systems, and other strengths) and in seven areas of concern (hazardous waste, 
regulatory problems, ozone depleting chemicals, substantial emissions, agricultural 
chemicals, climate change, and other areas of concern). Three KLD measures 
employed in the analyses are: KLD strengths, KLD concerns and Total KLD (the 
difference between strengths and concerns).  
Corporate governance characteristics examined are directors‟ insider/outsider status, 
gender, age, and education, while controlling for industry, slack resources and CEO 
duality. Using  a sample of 78 Fortune 1000 companies (consisting of the electronics 
firms found in the 2006 list of Fortune 1000 companies and the chemical firms found 
in the 2007 list of Fortune 1000 companies), the study found that a higher proportion 
of outside board directors is associated with more favorable ECSR disclosures and 
higher KLD strengths scores. Firms with boards composed of three or more female 
directors received higher KLD strengths scores. In addition, boards whose directors 
average closer to 56 years in age and those with a higher proportion of directors with 
Western European education were more likely to implement environmental 
governance structures or processes.  
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Table 2.2 
Empirical Studies On the Impact Of Corporate Governance On  
Corporate Environmental Disclosure Quantity      
 
Analysis &General Result 
Time of 
Observation, 
Sample Size & 
Sample Type  
Variables  
Author(s) 
& Date  
Control 
Variable  
Independent 
Variable  
Dependent 
Variable  
 
Analysis 
Logistic Regression 
 
General Result  
Results indicated that the extent 
of a corporation's environmental 
impact is positively related to 
environmental reporting. 
Significant positive correlation 
was found between industry and 
environmental reporting with 
corporations in polluting 
industries reported most on the 
environment. However, overall 
research results did not indicate 
any significant relat ionship with 
ownership concentration or the 
number of board members.  
 
 
 
 
Time of 
Observation  
1992 
 
Sample Size 
40 companies from 
each of Fin land, 
Norway and 
Sweden and 20 
companies from 
Spain. 
 
Sample Type  
The largest 
corporations from 
each of the 
Scandinavian 
countries 
 
 
-------------- 
 
Ownership 
concentration, Board 
size, Industry and 
Country. 
 
 
The extent of 
corporate 
environmental 
reporting 
 
Halme and 
Huse  
(1997) 
 
Analysis 
TOBIT Regression 
 
General Result  
Results demonstrated that the 
value of stock owned by 
corporate officers and directors 
was positively and significantly 
associated with serious 
environmental v iolations. 
Outsider dominance, jo int CEO-
Chairpersons, social 
responsibility committees and 
attorneys on boards were not 
significantly related to 
environmental v iolations. Finally, 
size, industry profitability, firm 
profitability and industry 
concentration were all 
significantly and mostly 
negatively related to 
environmental v iolations 
including the non-disclosure of  
environmental information. 
 
 
 
 
Time of 
Observation 
1985, 1986, 1987 
 
Sample Size  
150 US companies 
 
Sample Type  
The largest 
companies from the 
1000 largest 
business firms 
listed in Ward's 
Business Directory 
 
Industry 
profitability, 
Firm 
profitability, 
Organization 
size and 
Industry 
concentration. 
 
Outsider dominance, 
Dual CEO-
Chairperson roles, 
Stock ownership by 
officers and 
directors, Social 
responsibility 
committees and 
Attorneys on boards. 
 
Environmental 
violations 
including non-
disclosure of 
environmental 
informat ion 
 
McKendall 
et al. 
(1999) 
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Analysis &General Result 
Time of 
Observation, 
Sample Size & 
Sample Type  
Variables  
Author(s) 
& Date  
Control 
Variable  
Independent 
Variable  
Dependent 
Variable  
 
Analysis 
OLS Regression 
 
General Result  
Three corporate governance 
variables were found to be 
significant are independent non-
executive director, chairperson 
and the proportion of family 
members on the board, but the 
relationship is negative. None of 
the cultural variab les were found 
to be significant. However, four 
firm-specific variables were 
found to be significant and 
positively related to disclosure. 
These are assets-in-place, 
ownership structure based on the 
proportion of shares held by top 
ten shareholders, foreign 
ownership and profitability.  
 
Time of 
Observation 
1995 
 
Sample Size  
167 Malaysian 
companies 
 
Sample Type  
Companies listed in 
Kuala Lumpur 
Stock Exchange 
(KLSE) 
    
    ------------ 
 
Corporate 
characteristics: 
Size, Assets-in-
place, Industry type, 
Listing age, 
Complexity of 
business, Level of 
diversificat ion, 
Multiple listing 
status, Foreign 
activities, Gearing. 
 
Ownership 
structure: 
Top ten 
shareholders, 
Foreign ownership, 
Institutional 
investors, 
Profitability, Type 
of auditors. 
 
Corporate 
governance 
characteristics: 
Board composition, 
Cross directorships, 
Role duality, Family 
members on the 
board, Finance 
director on the 
board, Chairman 
with cross-
directorships, 
Chairperson is non-
executive director. 
 
Personal 
characteristics: 
Race of chairperson, 
Race of managing 
director, Race of 
finance director, 
Racial ownership 
structure, Racial 
composition of 
directors on board, 
Qualification of 
directors, 
Qualification of 
finance director. 
 
 
 
 
 
The extent of 
voluntary 
disclosure 
including 
environmental 
disclosure 
 
Haniffa 
and Cooke 
(2002) 
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Analysis &General Result 
Time of 
Observation, 
Sample Size & 
Sample Type  
Variables  
Author(s) 
& Date  
Control 
Variable  
Independent 
Variable  
Dependent 
Variable  
 
Analysis 
OLS Regression 
 
General Result  
Results showed that the extent of 
outside ownership is positively 
associated with voluntary 
disclosures – including 
environmental d isclosures. 
 
Time of 
Observation 
1997 
 
Sample Size  
60 Hong Kong 
companies and 62 
Singapore 
companies  
 
Sample Type  
Random sample of  
industrial 
companies listed on 
each of 
Hong Kong and  
Singapore Stock 
Exchanges 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Firm size, 
leverage, size of 
auditors, 
profitability and 
multinationality 
 
Ownership structure 
 
The extent of 
voluntary 
disclosure 
including 
environmental 
disclosure 
 
Chau and 
Gray 
(2002) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Analysis 
1-  t-tests 
2- W ilcoxon tests 
3- Pearson correlations 
4- 2SLS (Two-Stage  
     Least Squares)  
      Regression                   
 
General Result  
CEO duality was associated with 
lower voluntary disclosures and a 
higher proportion of expert 
outside directors was associated 
with lower voluntary disclosures. 
CEO duality /voluntary disclosure 
was weaker for firms with higher 
proportion of expert outside 
directors. Disclosure levels were 
also positively correlated with 
firm size, profitability, the 
presence of audit committee, firm 
growth, listing status and equity 
financing and negatively 
associated with the proportion of 
shares held by directors and 
liquid ity. 
 
 
 
 
Time of 
Observation 
1996 
 
Sample Size  
385 Hong Kong 
companies 
 
Sample Type  
All companies 
listed in Hong 
Kong Stock 
Exchange  
 
Firm size, 
Leverage, 
Liquidity, 
Profitability, 
Auditor firm, 
Audit 
committee, 
Firm growth, 
Listing status, 
Consolidated 
firms, Equity, 
Loss, Equity 
market liquidity 
and Industry 
type. 
 
CEO duality and 
Proportion of expert  
outside directors on 
the board 
 
Voluntary 
corporate 
disclosures 
including 
environmental 
disclosures 
 
Gul and 
Leung 
(2004) 
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Analysis &General Result 
Time of 
Observation, 
Sample Size & 
Sample Type  
Variables  
Author(s) 
& Date  Control 
Variable  
Independent 
Variable  
Dependent 
Variable  
 
Analysis 
1 t-test 
2- W ilcoxon test 
3- OLS Regression 
 
General Result  
Results suggested a significant 
positive relationship between 
Malay directors and Malay 
shareholders with CSD while no 
relationship existed between a 
Malay finance director & CSD. 
CSD was also found to have a 
significant negative relat ionship 
with non-executive directors and 
a significant positive relationship 
with chairs of mult iple 
directorships. Foreign share 
ownership was found to be 
statistically significant based on 
CSDI but not when the 
dependent variable is CSDL. 
Concerning firm-specific 
characteristics, size, profitability 
and mult iple listings were all 
statistically related to  
CSD, while industry type and 
gearing did not seem to impact 
CSD.  
 
Time of 
Observation 
1996 & 2002 
 
Sample Size  
139 Malaysian 
companies  
 
Sample Type 
All companies 
listed in Kuala 
Lumpur 
Stock Exchange 
(KLSE)  
   
------------- 
 
Malay dominated 
board of directors, a 
Malay finance 
director, Malay 
dominated 
shareholders, 
Composition of non-
executive directors, 
Chairperson with 
multip le 
directorships, 
Ownership by foreign 
shareholders, Size, 
Profitability, Gearing, 
Multiple listing and 
Industry type. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The variety and 
extent of corporate 
social 
disclosure(CSDI 
and CSDL 
respectively) 
 
Haniffa 
and Cooke 
(2005) 
 
Analysis 
1- Pearson correlation  
2- Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
     Regression with Panel-  
     Corrected Standard Errors  
      (PCSES) 
     
General Result  
Results indicated that audit 
committee is positively 
associated with voluntary 
disclosure and board composition 
is negatively associated with 
voluntary disclosure, while board 
leadership structure is not. 
Institutional shareholding and 
foreign ownership were found to 
be positively related with the 
extent of voluntary disclosures. 
Size and leverage were 
significantly and positively 
associated with voluntary 
disclosure practices, while 
liquid ity, profitability and type of 
external audit firm were not. 
 
Time of 
Observation 
1992 – 2001 
 
Sample Size  
54 Kenyan 
companies  
 
Sample Type 
All companies 
listed in Nairobi 
stock Exchange 
(NSE) 
 
Industry type 
 
Board composition, 
Board leadership 
structure, Board audit 
committee, 
shareholder 
concentration, 
Foreign ownership, 
Institutional 
ownership, Firm size, 
leverage, External 
auditor firm, 
Profitability and 
Liquidity. 
 
The level of 
voluntary 
disclosure 
including 
environmental 
disclosure 
 
Barako et 
al. (2006) 
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Analysis &General Result 
Time of 
Observation, 
Sample Size & 
Sample Type  
Variables  
Author(s) 
& Date  Control 
Variable  
Independent 
Variable  
Dependent 
Variable  
 
Analysis 
1- Pearson correlation  
2- OLS Regression 
 
General Result  
CSD was found to be associated 
with the firm size as measured by 
the firm‟s market capitalization 
and business risk as measured by 
the leverage and corporate 
growth. However, the proportion 
of the institutional investors, 
dispersion of individual investors 
and government ownership 
proved to have little impact on 
the level of CSD. 
 
 
 
Time of 
Observation 
1999/2000 
 
Sample Size  
21 Qatari 
companies listed 
on the Doha Stock 
Exchange  
 
Sample Type 
Companies listed 
on the Doha Stock 
Exchange  
 
 
 
------------- 
 
Firm size (market 
capitalizat ion), 
business risk 
(leverage and 
corporate growth) 
and ownership 
variables 
(government 
ownership, 
institutional 
ownership, and major 
shareholders) 
 
The level of 
corporate social 
disclosure (CSD) 
 
Naser et al. 
(2006) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Analysis 
OLS Regression 
 
General Result  
The two ownership variables, 
director ownership and the 
government as a substantial 
shareholder have significant 
influence on CSR d isclosure in 
annual reports. However the third 
ownership variable, ownership 
by the ten largest shareholders, 
was not statistically significant in 
explaining the level of CSR 
disclosure in annual reports . 
 
 
 
Time of 
Observation 
2001 
 
Sample Size  
87 Malaysian 
companies  
 
Sample Type 
Non-financial 
companies 
included in the 
Bursa Malaysia 
Composite Index 
 
------------- 
 
Ownership 
concentration, 
director ownership, 
government 
ownership, company 
size, p rofitability and 
industry 
 
The extent of 
corporate social 
responsibility 
(CSR) d isclosure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ghazali 
(2007) 
 
Analysis 
OLS Regression 
                  
General Result  
Results revealed that corporate 
size and assets in-place are 
significantly associated with 
disclosure, while corporate age, 
multip le exchange listing, 
business complexity, and board 
composition (percentage of non-
executive directors) are 
insignificant in exp lain ing the 
level of disclosure.                             
 
Time of 
Observation 
2002/2003 
 
Sample Size  
38 Indian 
companies  
 
Sample Type 
Indian banks listed 
on the Bombay 
Stock Exchange 
(BSE) and the 
National 
Stock Exchange 
(NSE)  
 
 
 
------------- 
 
Corporate size, 
corporate age, 
multip le exchange 
listing, business 
complexity, board 
composition 
(percentage of non-
executive directors) 
and  assets in-place 
 
The extent of 
voluntary 
disclosure 
 
 
Hossain 
and Reaz 
(2007) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 11 
Analysis &General Result 
Time of 
Observation, 
Sample Size & 
Sample Type  
Variables  
Author(s) 
& Date  Control 
Variable  
Independent 
Variable  
Dependent 
Variable  
 
Analysis 
1- Pearson correlation  
2- OLS Regression 
 
General Result  
Higher b lockholder ownership 
and foreign listing/shares 
ownership were found to be 
associated with increased 
disclosure, while managerial 
ownership, state ownership and 
legal person ownership were not 
related to disclosure. An increase 
in independent directors increased 
corporate disclosure and CEO 
duality was associated with lower 
disclosure. Also larger firms had 
greater disclosure, while firms 
with growth opportunities were 
reluctant to disclose informat ion 
voluntarily. However, both 
leverage and auditor reputation 
were not significant to voluntary 
disclosure.  
 
 
 
 
 
Time of 
Observation 
2002 
 
Sample Size  
559 Chinese firms   
 
Sample Type  
Firms listed on 
Shanghai Stock 
Exchange (SSE) 
 
Firm size, 
Leverage, 
Firm growth 
and Auditor 
reputation  
 
Ownership structure 
(including 
blockholder 
ownership, 
managerial 
ownership, state 
ownership, legal-
person ownership and 
foreign listing/shares 
ownership) 
and Board 
composition 
(including proportion 
of independent  
directors and CEO 
duality.   
 
The level of 
voluntary 
disclosure 
including 
environmental 
disclosure 
 
Huafang 
and 
Jianguo 
(2007) 
 
Analysis 
2SLS (Two-Stage Least Squares) 
Regression   
                  
General Result  
The results indicated a positive 
association between board 
composition and total voluntary 
disclosure. Furthermore, the 
results indicated that (a) boards 
composed largely of independent 
directors voluntarily disclose 
more forward looking quantitative 
and strategic informat ion and (b) 
board structure has no bearing on 
non-financial and financial 
voluntary disclosure. Other 
drivers of voluntary disclosure 
were firm size, shareholder 
concentration, industry 
classification, management 
compensation and investment 
growth set. 
 
 
 
 
Time of 
Observation 
2001 
 
Sample Size  
181 Australian 
companies  
 
Sample Type  
Firms included in 
the Australian Top 
500 companies for 
the last three-year 
period, 1999–2001 
 
Firm size, 
leverage, 
profitability, 
type of auditor, 
industry 
classification, 
shareholder 
concentration,   
management 
compensation 
and investment 
growth set 
 
 
Board composition 
 
The level of 
voluntary 
disclosure 
including 
environmental 
disclosure 
 
Lim et al. 
(2007) 
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Analysis &General Result 
Time of 
Observation, 
Sample Size & 
Sample Type  
Variables  
Author(s) 
& Date  Control 
Variable  
Independent 
Variable  
Dependent 
Variable  
 
Analysis 
ANOVA  tests 
                  
General Result  
Findings indicated government 
owned companies disclose more 
employee related information 
than private companies. On the 
other hand private companies 
were found to disclose customer 
related, environment related, and 
community related in formation 
more than governmental owned 
companies. In addit ion, industry 
membership was a statistically 
significant factor relative to the 
category of disclosure.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Time of 
Observation 
2002 
 
Sample Size  
60 Egyptian 
companies  
 
Sample Type  
A random sample 
of  Egyptian 
companies in the 
industrial sector 
selected from nine 
high polluting 
industries including 
food, beverage and 
tobacco, ceramics, 
chemicals, cement, 
pharmaceuticals, 
building materials 
and construction, 
text iles, and mills 
and storage. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
------------- 
 
Private ownership, 
government 
ownership and 
industry membership 
 
The extent of 
social and 
environmental 
reporting 
 
Rizk et al. 
(2008) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Analysis 
1- Multivariate tests 
2- Linear Regression   
                  
General Result  
The results indicated that level of 
technology, ethnicity of CEO and 
firm size are determinants of both 
internet financial and 
environmental d isclosures. 
However, the existence of a 
dominant personality was found 
to negatively affect the level of 
financial disclosures but not 
environmental d isclosures. Yet 
leverage and profitability d id not 
show any significant relationship 
with either financial or 
environmental d isclosures. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Time of 
Observation 
2005 
 
Sample Size  
201 Malaysian 
companies  
 
Sample Type 
Disproportionate 
stratified random 
sample of 
Malaysian listed 
companies on the 
Bursa Malaysia's 
Main and Second 
Boards  
 
------------- 
 
 
Ethnicity of CEO, 
leverage, level of 
technology, existence 
of dominant 
personalities, 
profitability and firm 
size 
 
The level of 
voluntary financial 
and environmental 
disclosures  
 
Al Arussi 
et al. 
(2009) 
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Analysis &General Result 
Time of 
Observation, 
Sample Size & 
Sample Type  
Variables  
Author(s) 
& Date  Control 
Variable  
Independent 
Variable  
Dependent 
Variable  
 
Analysis 
3SLS (Three-Stage Least 
Squares) Regression   
                  
General Result  
The results indicated a significant 
positive association between firm-
level corporate governance 
mechanis ms and disclosure. In 
addition, both corporate 
governance and disclosure were 
simultaneously positively  related 
to firm valuation in terms of 
Tobin‟s q. Overall, the results of 
the study are consistent with the 
view that corporate governance 
and disclosure are more 
complementary than substitutive 
mechanis ms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Time of 
Observation 
2003-2007 
 
Sample Size  
6,580 US firms  
 
Sample Type  
All US firms 
included in the ISS 
database for the 
period 2003 to 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Size, 
ownership 
concentration, 
equity ratio, 
age, growth 
rate, leverage, 
capital 
intensity, loss, 
intangible 
assets, stock 
return, stock 
return 
volatility, 
issuer firm, 
type of auditor, 
market-to-
book ratio, 
stock turnover, 
Tobin‟s Q, 
previous year 
disclosure and 
previous year 
corporate 
governance 
 
Board, audit, 
charter/bylaws, state 
of incorporation, 
ownership, executive 
and director 
compensation, 
progressive practices 
and director education 
 
Total disclosure 
and Areas of  
disclosure 
including 
financial, 
customers, 
value chain, 
employees, R&D, 
strategy, 
governance, stock 
market, 
environment, 
society 
 
Grüning 
and 
Ernstberger 
(2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Analysis 
1- Spearman's rank correlations  
2- OLS Regression 
 
General Result  
Results indicated that community 
influential is positively associated 
with the level of sustainability 
disclosure, while the proportion 
of independent directors, CEO 
duality and the presence of CSR 
committee are not. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Time of 
Observation 
2003 
 
Sample Size  
114European and 
American 
companies  
 
Sample Type  
57 companies listed 
in Dow Jones 
Sustainability Index 
and 57 companies 
belong to the Dow 
Jones Global Index 
 
 
Board size, 
Profitability, 
Size, Industry, 
Leverage, 
Market risk, 
Company age, 
Listing status, 
Country of 
origin and 
Corporate 
citizenship. 
 
Board composition 
(independent directors 
and community 
influential members), 
Board structure (CSR 
responsible and CSR 
committee), and 
Board leadership 
(CEO duality). 
 
The level of 
sustainability 
disclosure 
 
Michelon 
and 
Parbonetti 
(2010) 
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Analysis &General Result 
Time of 
Observation, 
Sample Size & 
Sample Type  
Variables  
Author(s) 
& Date  
Control 
Variable  
Independent 
Variable  
Dependent 
Variable  
 
Analysis 
1- Pearson Correlation  
2- OLS Regression 
 
General Result  
Results revealed that GHG 
emission accounting disclosures 
are positively associated with the 
presence of environmental 
committees on boards of directors 
and corporate sustainability 
officers. Furthermore, the size and 
diligence of the environmental 
committee and expertise of the 
sustainability officer were 
positively related to voluntary 
disclosure. Committee members 
with expertise in environmental 
sustainability were positively 
associated with disclosure. 
Finally, knowledge spillover from 
overlap between environmental 
committees and audit committees 
significantly was found to 
increase the likelihood of GHG 
emission accounting disclosures. 
 
 
 
 
Time of 
Observation 
2002-2006 
 
Sample Size  
500 US firms  
 
Sample Type  
All US firms 
participating in the 
Carbon Disclosure 
Project (including 
all US firms in the 
FT500) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Environmental 
performance, 
cumulat ive 
number of 
previous 
disclosures, 
cross listing, 
inclusion on 
sustainability 
indices, oil 
industry, paper 
industry, 
petroleum 
industry,  
chemical 
industry, metals 
industry, CEO 
duality, 
institutional 
ownership, 
profitability, 
size, g rowth and 
leverage 
 
Existence of an 
environmental 
committee on the 
board and a 
sustainability 
officer as well as 
environmental 
committee size, 
diligence, expert ise, 
knowledge spillover 
and sustainability 
officer expertise  
 
Voluntary 
reporting of 
greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emission 
accounting 
informat ion 
 
Peters and 
Romi 
(2011) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Analysis 
1- Pearson Correlation  
2- OLS Regression 
 
General Result  
The study found that a higher 
proportion of outside board 
directors is associated with more 
favorable ECSR d isclosures and 
higher KLD strengths scores. 
Firms with boards composed of 
three or more female directors 
received higher KLD strengths 
scores. In addition, boards whose 
directors average closer to 56 
years in age and those with a 
higher proportion of directors 
with Western European education 
were more likely to implement 
environmental governance 
structures or processes. 
 
 
 
 
Time of 
Observation 
2006 
 
Sample Size  
78 US firms  
 
Sample Type  
Electronics firms 
found in the 2006 
list of Fortune 1000 
companies and the 
chemical firms 
found in the 2007 
list of Fortune 1000 
companies  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Industry, slack 
resources and 
CEO duality 
 
Directors‟ 
insider/outsider 
status, gender, age, 
and education  
 
Environmental 
corporate social 
responsibility 
(ECSR) 
disclosures: 
Disclosed ECSR 
Governance, 
Disclosed ECSR 
Cred ibility,  
Disclosed 
environmental 
performance 
indicators,  Total 
disclosed ECSR 
score and Natural 
environment 
ratings data: KLD 
environmental 
Strengths, KLD 
environmental 
concerns, Total 
KLD 
 
Post et al. 
(2011) 
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2.5   EXAMINING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ENVIRONMENTAL 
        DISCLOSURE QUALITY AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE  
For the purposes of the current study, prior studies examining the qua lity of corporate 
environmental disclosure can be classified into two groups: the impact of corporate 
characteristics on environmental disclosure quality and the impact of corporate 
governance on environmental disclosure quality. These studies are presented in a 
chronological order to help trace the gradual evolution and development of any 
achievements or addition to the existing body of literature.   
 
2.5.1   Impact Of Corporate Characteristics On Corporate Environmental 
           Disclosure Quality  
Magness (2006) tested Ullmann's hypothesis that strategy posture, modified by 
financial performance, must be considered in light of stakeholder power in order to 
understand a company's social responsibility disclosure policy. The study used 
regression analysis to examine annual report disclosure of environmental information 
after a major accident in the mining industry. A broadly defined disclosure score was 
used to assess environmental disclosure at the end of 1995 for a sample of 44 
Canadian companies. The seven-point scoring factor was designed to include a variety 
of information categories such as monetary items versus and qualitative items as well 
as future-oriented financial items versus historical ones.  
Strategic posture was measured using press releases and the control variables of 
external funding, size and financial performance were included in the analyses. 
Results indicated that companies that maintain themselves in the public eye through 
press release activity disclose more information than other companies. However, there 
was no evidence to suggest that disclosure content is moderated by financial 
performance (ROA). Companies that obtained external financing one year after the 
accident made more disclosure than other companies. The significance of the external 
financing variable was evident when disclosure is restricted to discretionary or non-
financial items, but disappeared when the dependent variable represents mandatory 
financial items. Finally, environmental disclosure increased with company size.  
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García-Sánchez (2008) established a new methodology in the analysis of the 
corporate social information disclosed by companies. The dependent variable 
examined is the Informative Segments of Companies. That is, each segment groups 
those firms that issue the same contents or categories of information, and furthermore 
the characteristics of the information issued in each category – qualitative type, non-
monetary quantification, or monetary quantification – are identical. Corporate 
characteristics investigated include size, industry and profitability. The study used a 
sample of 32 companies out of the 35 largest Spanish companies that are quoted in the 
stock market, constituting the index IBEX35 of the Spanish stock exchange.  
Specifically, two groups or informative segments of companies were identified. The 
first segment is characterized by the disclosure of an elevated content of quantitative 
information about diverse items related to the environment, employees and other 
industrial relations, at the same time as disclosing monetary information about  
community relations. The second group is characterized by a smaller content of 
information disclosed with respect to the environment, employees and other industrial 
relations, expressed, in addition, in qualitative terms. Membership in the first 
informative segment of companies, that is, those which pay greater attention to the 
voluntary disclosure of corporate social information, is typical of the larger-sized 
Spanish companies whose economic activity is related to highly sensitive industry 
sectors. However, none of the profitability can be considered as a determinant of the 
level of corporate social information disclosed.  
Cooper and Zainudin (2009) analyzed the scope, quality and medium of reporting on 
environmental matters for 2005 using a sample of 315 listed firms drawn from nine 
countries, including developing countries and developed. Factors examined include 
country's economic development, country‟s accounting system, firm size, business 
sector membership, profitability and leverage. Quality is measured on two 
dimensions. First, the quality of information provided in terms of the nature and depth 
of disclosure, treating quantification and contextualization with targets as 
characteristics of higher quality, following an approach similar to that of Toms 
(2002). Second, the scope of disclosure in terms of the variety of different matters 
covered in either the annual report or, where relevant, the standalone report.  
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For each environmental indicator specified in the GRI (2002) guidelines, an 
information quality rating is assigned on the ordinal scale: 0 = no disclosure; 1 = 
qualitative disclosure only; 2 = non-monetary quantitative disclosure only; 3 = 
monetary quantitative disclosure. Both economic development and accounting system 
were found to be highly significant determinants of whether a standalone report is 
produced. Relative size was also found to be influential but environmental sensitivity 
as represented by sector appeared to be immaterial. However, larger firms were 
significantly more likely to produce a standalone report where they are also in a more 
sensitive sector. Finally, profitability had a weakly positive effect and leverage had a 
negative effect on the tendency to provide a supplementary report.  
Mio (2010) examined factors influencing the quality of sustainability, environmental 
and social reports of listed multi-utility Italian companies. The study presented an 
analysis for the link between the quality of reports and the following variables: level 
of clarification of the sustainability strategy, level of complexity, territoriality 
(extension of the market), degree of maturity and experience in sustainability 
communication, rate of growth (turnover and number of employees), degree of 
privatization and organizational structure and organizational arrangements to support 
social and environmental responsibility. The approach to measure quality of reports is 
based on comparing the degree of application of principles required by the main 
reporting models used in the world (Global Reporting Initiative Third Generation: 
GRI-G3; AA1000 SES Accountability 1000: AA1000). The assessment of application 
is based on a scale of 0-5 (0 for non-applied principles, 5 for fully respected 
principles).  
The principles assessed and the assessment criteria used are as follows: materiality, 
inclusiveness, context of sustainability, completeness, balance, comparability, 
accuracy, timelines, clarity, reliability. Both the level of the materiality of the reports 
and the inclusiveness of stakeholders were lower than other principles, even for 
sustainability reports from companies with a high level of compliance. The analysis 
showed that variables influencing the quality of reports are the complexity, the 
territoriality and number of employees and to limited extent the level of privatization. 
There were no correlation between the quality of reports and each of turnover and 
organizational structure. 
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Roy and Ghosh (2011) investigated the two-way association between economic 
performance and quality of discretionary environmental disclosure practices, 
controlling for industry and country. The study focused on seven Asian countries, 
namely, India, Japan, China, South Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia and Israel. Using 
content analysis, the study closely followed the scoring method of Clarkson et al. 
(2006) with necessary adjustments due to changes in reporting guidelines. First, 
certain environmental disclosure points are identified and then a score is assigned to 
each disclosure points using a „yes/no‟ or 0, 1 criterion. Then the total score of each 
individual disclosure points are added to get the aggregate score. The pre-identified 
disclosure points contain the qualitative aspect of objective disclosure, and thus, the 
index represents the quality of environmental disclosure.  
The result of primary research design suggested that economic performance and 
discretionary environmental disclosure quality are not simultaneously related and thus 
are not endogenous. The OLS regression revealed that sustainable environmental 
practices and the discretionary disclosures have negative or very low positive as well 
as insignificant association with the economic performance of the firm. Interestingly, 
the study showed that companies that belong to environmentally sensitive industries 
tend to disclose less objective information leading to lower quality disclosures. 
Similarly, companies that belong to countries having high relative emissions also 
showed a less informative and low quality of disclosure.  
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Table 2.3 
Empirical Studies On the Impact Of Corporate Characteristics On  
Corporate Environmental Disclosure Quality     
 
Analysis &General Result 
Time of 
Observation, 
Sample Size & 
Sample Type 
Variables  
Author(s) 
& Date 
Control 
Variable  
Independent 
Variable  
Dependent 
Variable  
 
Analysis 
1- Spearman's Rank Correlat ion 
2- OLS Regression 
 
General Result  
Results indicated that increases in 
corporate environmental disclosure 
are associated with: (1) companies 
pursuing an active strategy of 
stakeholder management through 
press releases, (2) companies 
having plans to access external 
financial markets and (3) large-
sized companies. However, there 
was no evidence to suggest that 
disclosure content is moderated by 
financial performance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Time of 
Observation  
1995 
 
Sample Size  
44 Canadian 
companies 
 
Sample Type  
Gold mining 
Canadian 
companies publicly 
traded and 
identified with a 
primary compustat 
SIC of 1040 (gold 
& silver ores)  
 
 
External 
funding, size 
and Financial 
performance 
 
Strategic posture (as 
measured by press 
releases)  
 
The quality level 
of environmental 
disclosure 
 
Magness 
(2006) 
 
Analysis 
1- Cluster analysis estimation   
     algorithms 
2- Discriminant analysis 
 
General Result  
Results indicated that both 
corporate size and industry 
membership are associated with 
corporate social d isclosure, while 
there is no association between 
profitability and such disclosure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Time of 
Observation  
2004 
 
Sample Size  
32 Spanish 
companies 
 
Sample Type  
The 35 largest 
Spanish companies 
quoted in the stock 
market (index 
IBEX35 of the 
Spanish stock 
exchange)  
 
 
 
 
     
------------- 
 
Size, industry and 
profitability  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Corporate social 
reporting content 
and characteristics 
 
García - 
Sánchez 
(2008) 
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Analysis &General Result 
Time of 
Observation, 
Sample Size & 
Sample Type 
Variables  
Author(s) 
& Date 
Control 
Variable  
Independent 
Variable  
Dependent 
Variable  
 
Analysis 
1-Wilcoxon test 
2- Logistic regression  
 
General Result  
Both economic development and 
accounting system were found to 
be highly significant determinants 
of whether a standalone report is 
produced. Relative size was also 
found to be influential but 
environmental sensitivity as 
represented by sector appeared to 
be immaterial. However, larger 
firms are significantly more likely 
to produce a standalone report 
where they are also in a more 
sensitive sector. Finally, 
profitability had a weakly positive 
effect and leverage had a negative 
effect on the tendency to provide a 
supplementary report. 
 
 
Time of 
Observation  
2005 
 
Sample Size  
315 firms  
 
Sample Type  
Listed firms drawn 
from n ine countries 
(UK, US, 
Germany, Japan, 
China, India, 
Indonesia, 
Malaysia and 
Australia), 
including 
developing 
countries and 
developed 
countries with 
different 
culturally -defined 
accounting 
systems, but all 
with exclusively or 
largely unregulated 
and voluntary 
regimes for such 
reporting 
 
 
 
 
 
------------- 
 
Country's economic 
development, 
country‟s 
accounting system, 
firm size, business 
sector membership, 
profitability and  
leverage 
 
The scope, quality 
and medium of 
environmental 
reporting  
 
 
Cooper and 
Zainudin 
(2009) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Analysis 
Correlation Analysis  
 
General Result  
The analysis showed that variables 
influencing the quality of reports 
are the complexity, the 
territoriality and number o f 
employees and to limited extent 
the level of privatization. There 
were no correlation between the 
quality of reports and each of 
turnover and organizational 
structure. 
 
 
Time of 
Observation  
2006 
 
Sample Size  
12 Italian 
companies 
 
Sample Type  
Multi-utility 
companies listed 
on the Italian Stock 
Exchange  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
------------- 
 
Level of 
clarification of the 
sustainability 
strategy, level of 
complexity, 
territoriality, degree 
of maturity and 
experience in 
sustainability 
communicat ion, rate 
of growth, degree of 
privatization and 
organizational 
structure and 
organizational 
arrangements to 
support social and 
environmental 
responsibility  
 
The quality of 
sustainability, 
environmental and 
social reporting 
 
 
Mio (2010) 
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Analysis &General Result 
Time of 
Observation, 
Sample Size & 
Sample Type 
Variables  
Author(s) 
& Date 
Control 
Variable  
Independent 
Variable  
Dependent 
Variable  
 
Analysis 
1- Hausman specification test 
2- OLS regression  
 
General Result  
Results suggested that economic 
performance and discretionary 
environmental d isclosure quality 
are not simultaneously related and 
thus are not endogenous. 
Sustainable environmental 
practices and the discretionary 
disclosures had negative or very 
low positive as well as 
insignificant association with the 
economic performance of the firm. 
Companies that belong to 
environmentally sensitive 
industries tended to disclose less 
objective informat ion leading to 
lower quality disclosures. 
Similarly, companies that belong 
to countries having high relative 
emissions also showed a less 
informat ive and low quality of 
disclosure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Time of 
Observation  
2004-2009  
 
Sample Size  
69 companies  
 
Sample Type 
Companies from 
seven Asian 
countries including 
India, 
Japan, China, 
South Korea, 
Malaysia, 
Indonesia and 
Israel  
 
 
Industry and 
country 
 
Economic 
performance 
 
The quality of 
discretionary 
environmental  
disclosure  
 
Roy and  
Ghosh 
(2011) 
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2.5.2   Impact Of Corporate Governance On Corporate Environmental 
           Disclosure Quality  
Adams (2002) examined the internal contextual factors and their impact on corporate 
social and ethical reporting. The internal contextual factors considered include aspects 
of the reporting process and attitudes to reporting, its impacts, legislation and audit. 
Process variables included corporate structure and governance procedures, extent and 
nature of stakeholder involvement, and extent of involvement of accountants. 
Attitudes variables included views on recent increase in reporting, reporting bad 
news, reporting in the future, regulation and verification, perceived costs and benefits 
of reporting and corporate culture. Interviews were carried out with three British 
companies and four German companies during 1998. All the companies were in the 
chemical and/or pharmaceutical business and were amongst the largest 400 companies 
listed in The Times 1000 (1995). 
A key finding of this study is that there are significant internal contextual variables 
which are likely to impact on the extensiveness, quality, quantity and completeness of 
corporate social and ethical reporting. The study found that the process of reporting 
appears to depend on country of origin, corporate size and corporate culture. Aspects 
of process which appear to be influenced by these variables are the degree of 
formality versus informality, the departments involved and the extent of engagement 
of stakeholders. Accountants were found to be neither involved in data collection nor 
considered appropriate people to be involved. The attitudes of interviewees were also 
likely to have an influence on the extent and nature of reporting. For example, the 
main motivation for corporate ethical reporting was to enhance corporate image and 
credibility with stakeholders. Public pressure was an important reason for 
developments and changes in reporting practice. Further, there was a general 
agreement that reporting bad news enhances corporate credibil ity and image. Finally, 
attitudes to audit vary between companies, with some companies not having an audit 
and others having audits of only limited scope.  
Cormier et al. (2005) suggested a multi-tiered theoretical framework that views a 
firm‟s decision to provide environmental disclosure as reflecting its responsiveness to 
different levels of influence: financial stakeholders‟ information needs, society‟s 
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environmental concerns which translate into public pressures and institutional 
constraints and processes which could be either company - or country - specific. 
Environmental disclosure is measured using a coding comprising thirty-nine items 
that are grouped into six categories: environmental expenditures and risks, laws and 
regulations, pollution abatement, sustainable development, land remediation and 
contamination (including spills), and environmental management. Quality rating is 
based on a score of one to three: three for an item described explicitly in monetary or 
quantitative terms, two when an item is described specifically and one for an item 
discussed in general. 
The influence of the following variables were examined: information costs (as 
captured by risk, reliance on capital markets, trading volume, concentrated ownership 
and foreign ownership); financial condition (as captured by market return and 
leverage); and media pressure (as proxied by media exposure). In addition, the study 
controlled for fixed assets age, firm size and SEC registrant. Environmental disclosure 
quality was analyzed during the 1992–1998 period among a sample of 55 of the large 
German firms that comprise the DAX 30/DAX 70 indices.  
Results indicated that information costs, as proxied by risk and ownership, are 
potentially important determinants of environmental disclosure strategy. Moreover, 
environmental disclosure quality was related to media pressure, while there was no 
relation between financial condition and environmental disclosure. Results also 
showed that environmental disclosure quality is conditioned by industry membership. 
In addition, fixed assets age, firm size determined the level of environmental 
disclosure by German firms in a given year. Finally, consistent with institutional 
theory predictions, there was evidence that imitation and routine determine 
environmental disclosure quality. Overall, results strongly suggest that environmental 
disclosure is multidimensional and is driven by complementary forces.  
Brammer and Pavelin (2006) examined the patterns in voluntary environmental 
disclosures made by a sample of large UK companies. The analysis distinguished 
between the decision to make a voluntary environmental disclosure and decisions - 
concerning the quality of such disclosures, examining how each type of decision is 
determined by firm and industry characteristics. Disclosure data were obtained from 
the "PIRC Environmental Reporting 2000" survey. The PIRC is an independent 
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research consultancy that conducts the most comprehensive study of environmental 
disclosure by listed companies in the UK. They identify six indicators of the quality 
of corporate environmental disclosure: disclosure of an environmental policy; 
existence of board- level responsibility for environmental matters; the description of 
environmental initiatives; reporting on environmental improvements; setting of 
environmental targets; and the presence of an environmental audit or assessment.  
Disclosure quantity is a dichotomous variable depending on whether or not a 
company participates in any of the six components of environmental disclosure 
identified in the PIRC‟s report, while disclosure quality is the number of the aspects 
identified by the PIRC apparent in the disclosure of each company. The initial sample 
of the study was FTSE All Share comprised approximately 700 companies while the 
final sample consisted of 447 companies. Probit and Ordered Probit methods of 
estimation were used for the models developed concerning the quantity and quality of 
environmental disclosures respectively.  
Results of the regression analysis revealed that industries with highly visible 
environmental issues and firm size have a highly significant positive effect on the 
likelihood that companies make environmental disclosures, and that highly leveraged 
companies are significantly less likely to make such disclosures. A significant 
negative relationship was found between the size of the largest shareholding in a 
company and the probability of environmental disclosure, while no significant 
relationship existed between the likelihood of making environmental disclosure and 
profitability, environmental performance, media visibility or the number of non-
executive directors. Concerning the quality of environmental disclosures, there 
existed strong evidence of cross-sector variation with higher quality disclosures for 
environmentally-sensitive industries, significant positive relationship to firm size and 
environmental performance, significant negative relationship to both leverage and the 
size of the largest shareholding and no significant role for media visibility, current 
profitability or the number of non-executive directors. 
Boesso and Kumar (2007) examined what factors in addition to the needs of financial 
markets drive voluntary disclosure practices – including those of environmental 
disclosure – of companies in Italy and in the United states. Information provided in 
the management discussion and analysis section of the annual reports of 72 companies 
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was content analyzed for 2002 to determine the volume and the quality of voluntary 
disclosures. The sample companies were chosen from companies listed on the 
Milano-Mercato Ordinario and the New York stock Exchange; 36 companies have 
received awards for the quality of their corporate communication and 36 companies 
have not. 
Seven specific perspective were identified as a framework for the study including 
investor, employee, customer, supplier, social and environmental, internal processes 
and innovation and leaning. Key performance indicators were identified for each of 
the seven perspectives and actual performance was captured using content analysis 
technique. Actual disclosures were classified according to the type of information 
(qualitative and quantitative), nature of information (financial and non-financial) and 
information on outlook (forward looking and historical). An index of disclosure 
quality was then developed by assigning different weights to different types of 
information. Factors examined were categorized as those related to investor‟s 
information needs (business complexity and industry instability & volatility) and 
within–company factors (corporate governance, stakeholder engagement, and 
intangible asset management). Moreover, company size and industry membership 
were controlled for in the study.   
The relationship was examined using the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression 
technique. Results provided some support to the effect that factors related to 
investors‟ information needs (business complexity and industry instability & 
volatility) influence the volume of voluntary disclosures. However, these factors 
appeared to have little impact on the quality of voluntary disclosures. Results also 
showed that factors such as company emphasis on stakeholder management and 
relevance of intangible asset affect the quality of voluntary disclosures in case of 
Italian companies but not in case of USA companies. In addition, the results 
confirmed that company size, and to a lesser extent the industry in which the company 
operates, influences voluntary disclosures made by companies.  
Brammer and Pavelin (2008) examined the patterns in the qua lity of voluntary 
environmental disclosures made by a sample of 477 large UK companies drawn from 
a diverse range of industrial sectors. The analysis distinguishes between five facets of 
quality of corporate environmental disclosure: disclosure of environmental policy, the 
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description of environmental initiatives, reporting on environmental improvements, 
settings of environmental targets, and the presence of an environmental audit or 
assessment. The study examined how the decisions firms face, regarding each facet of 
quality, are determined by firm and industry characteristics. Data concerning 
environmental disclosures were obtained from the PIRC Environmental Reporting 
2000 survey. The PIRC is an independent research consultancy that conducts the most  
comprehensive study of environmental disclosure by listed companies in the UK.  
Quality was hypothesized to be driven by the nature of a firm‟s business activities, its 
environmental performance, organizational size, media visibility and financial 
resources and the composition of both ownership and the main board.  Logit 
estimation method was used and logit regressions were run with and without cross-
sector variation. Results found the quality of environmental disclosure to be 
determined by a firm‟s size and the nature of its business activities. High quality 
disclosures were primarily associated with larger firms and those in sectors most 
closely related to environmental concerns. In contrast to several recent contributions, 
results indicated that the media exposure of companies plays no role in stimulating 
voluntary environmental disclosure.  
O‟Sullivan et al. (2008) investigated the role played by a firm‟s corporate governance  
framework in the decision to voluntarily disclose forward- looking information in the 
published financial reports of Australian companies in 2000 and 2002. The 2000 and 
2002 published annual reports were examined for the largest 300 publicly listed firms 
according to net profit for the year 2000, as identified in the Business Review Weekly 
(BRW). Voluntary disclosure of forward- looking information was recognized  
provided the projection can be classified in terms of the following four characteristics: 
direction (up, down or no change); type (income/profit, cash flow, sales/revenue); 
location (Directors‟ Report, CEO‟s/Managing Director‟s Report, Review of 
Operations, Chairman‟s Report, D&A and other); and nature (qualitative, 
quantitative).  
The first corporate governance category, board autonomy, reflects board 
independence, the absence of a dominant personality within the firm, the 
independence of the chair and non-executive director shareholdings. The second 
category relates to board committees and is comprised of the presence and 
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independence of a compensation committee, as well as the appointment of a 
nomination committee. The next category considers the ownership structure prevalent 
within the firm including institutional ownership, block shareholdings and 
concentration of shareholdings. The final measure of corporate governance pertains to 
the audit function including the appointment of audit committee, its independence, 
frequency of its meetings, audit firm size and auditor independence. A summary 
measure of corporate governance, which takes into account values calculated for the 
categories was developed. In addition, the study controlled for firm size, performance, 
information environment and leverage.  
Logistic regression analysis was employed. With respect to the year 2000, the 
corporate governance category, audit quality, consisting of the presence and 
independence of the audit committee, its meeting frequency, the use of a big 6 auditor 
and the auditor‟s independence, was positively associated with the disclosure of 
forward-looking information. The corporate governance category, board committees, 
consisting of the appointment and independence of a compensation committee and the 
creation of a nomination committee, and the overall efficacy of the corporate 
governance system were also positively associated with the disclosure of forward-
looking information. However, results revealed that corporate disclosure does not 
seem to be driven by the same factors in 2002 since in that year none of the 
governance categories is significantly associated with the firm‟s decision to publish 
forward-looking information in financial reports.  
Prado-Lorenzo et al. (2009) tested a stakeholder theory approach to analyzing 
corporate social disclosures and examined the effect that shareholder power and 
dispersed ownership structure have on the decision to disclose corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) information in the Spanish context. The study analyzed the level 
of contents, their quality and their objectivity through compliance with the rules for 
preparation of the GRI model. It also took into account whether the fulfillment of 
these rules has been certified by the GRI organization, and whether the data reflected 
have been verified or audited by entities independent of the firm. The variables 
examined included the presence of financial institution in the corporate ownership 
structure, the presence of a physical person that represents a dominant shareholder 
and the number of independent directors. Several factors have been controlled for 
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including government power (size, transport and communications sector, industrial 
sectors, energy sector and construction sector); creditors‟ power (debt-to-equity ratio); 
strategic posture (ISO14001 certification and OHSAS18001 certification) and 
economic Performance (ROA).  
The empirical results, based on a sample of 99 non-financial Spanish firms quoted on 
the Spanish continuous market, revealed only a limited association between the 
presence of a physical person that represents a dominant shareholder and corporate 
social disclosures. Results confirmed that the influence exerted by certain 
stakeholders (government and creditors), together with the strategic posture of the 
firm, have an important effect on the publication of a CSR report. On the contrary, 
economic performance had a null effect on this process. From the point of view of the 
shareholders, especially in an ownership structure defined by the presence of a main 
shareholder that exerts control over the firm, there was encouragement to adopt the 
GRI format as a CSR reporting model to be used by the firm for disclosing 
information. In contrast, financial institutions, investors that are unable to move funds 
quickly in and out without affecting share price, and dispersed shareholders seemed to 
be only interested in the financial performance of the firm, but not in its sustainable 
strategies or activities.  
Hassan (2010) investigated the impact of several factors on both the quantity and 
quality of corporate social disclosure in annual reports as well as stand-alone reports. 
The factors examined were classified as corporate characteristics (corporate size, type 
of activity, profitability and multinationality); media pressure; and corporate 
governance (board size, board composition, presence of social responsibility 
committee and block ownership). With respect to the annual reports, the quantity of 
corporate social disclosure was measured by the number of sentences, while the 
disclosure quality was measured using a two-point ranking system with value 1, for 
quantity and specific disclosure, and value 0, for general disclosure. However, in case 
of stand-alone reports, the quantity of corporate social disclosure was measured by the 
number of report pages, while the disclosure quality was measured as a two-point 
dummy variable, according to which a report is audited or not and prepared using 
reporting guidelines or not.  
 12 
The study analyzed a sample of companies comprising FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 for 
the years 2005 and 2006. Empirical analysis indicated that corporate social disclosure 
is associated with corporate size, industry, media pressure, board size, corporate 
social responsibility committee and ownership diffusion. However, results suggested 
that these factors are more associated with the quantity of disclosure than its quality. 
An exception is media pressure which was not associated with the quality of corporate 
social disclosure. 
Rupley et al. (2011) investigated the relationship between specific aspects of 
multistakeholder governance and the quality of voluntary environmental disclosure.  
Four related measures of environmental disclosure quality employed were 
compliance, pollution prevention, product stewardship and ecological sustainability.  
These environmental strategies move progressively from the lowest quality level of 
compliance to the highest quality level of sustainable development, implying - as 
argued by the authors - an increasingly integration of environmental stewardship into 
organizational culture. A disclosure index, initially based on the Global Reporting 
Initiative‟s (GRI) framework, was used to capture the strategic implications of 
environmental behavior.    
Environmental disclosure data were collected from both firms‟ stand-alone corporate 
reports and annual or 10-K reports. The study examined the role of environmental 
legitimacy (as proxied by environmental media coverage), the influence of 
institutional investor ownership (including both long-horizon and short-horizon 
institutional ownership) and the influence of multi-stakeholder governance (including 
board independence, gender diversity, multiple directorships, separation of the CEO 
from the board chair position and the existence of a corporate social responsibility 
committee). Moreover, the study controlled for firm size, profitability, industry 
sensitivity, regulation sensitivity and presence of a separate corporate environmental 
report. 
Based on a sample of 127 US firms drawn from the Dow Jones Global Index over a 
three-year period (2000, 2003 and 2005), the final data set included 361 firm-year 
observations. The sample firms were drawn from five industries; chemical, oil and 
gas, electrical utilities, pharmaceutical and biotech and food and beverage. Using both 
univariate and regression analyses, results suggested that voluntary environmental 
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disclosure quality is positively associated with board independence, gender diversity, 
and multiple directorships while negatively associated with environmental media. In 
addition, the percentage of directors serving on multiple boards is positively related to 
three levels of voluntary environmental disclosure quality individually examined (i.e. 
compliance, pollution prevention and product stewardship) and board independence 
and diversity are each positively related to at least one level of voluntary 
environmental disclosure quality.   
Cormier et al. (2011) examined the informational contribution of social and 
environmental disclosures for investors. The study investigated whether social 
disclosure and environmental disclosure quality have a substituting or a 
complementing effect in reducing information asymmetry between corporate 
managers and stock market participants. The factors examined as possible 
determinants of social and environmental disclosures were environmental 
performance, free float (ownership dispersion), analyst following, leverage, 
profitability, firm size, board independence, board size, audit committee size and 
environmental media exposure.  
Environmental disclosure items grouped into two broad dimensions. On one hand, 
there is disclosure about environmental debts, risks and litigations, which captures 
four components of the content grid: expenditure and risk; compliance with laws and 
regulations; pollution abatement; and land remediation and contamination. On the 
other hand, there is disclosure about environmental management practices that relates 
to sustainable development and environmental management grid captions. The quality 
rating is based on a score from one to three. Three points are awarded for an item 
described in monetary or quantitative terms, two are awarded when an item is 
described specifically (qualitative), and one is awarded for an item discussed in 
general (indicative).  
The sample comprised 137 large Canadian companies included in Toronto Stock 
Exchange S&P/TSX Index for the year 2005. Using regression analysis, results of the 
regression coefficients indicated that environmental performance, environmental news 
exposure and firm size are key drivers of both environmental and social disclosures. 
Analyst following, board size and, to a lesser extent, leverage are significantly related 
to environmental disclosure. However, no significant relationship is detected between 
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the quality of environmental disclosures and each of free float (ownership dispersion), 
profitability, board independence and audit committee size.  
Marshall et al. (2011) examined the association between specific aspects of corporate 
governance and the quality of voluntary environmental information disclosed by 
firms. Three specific governance related factors examined are institutional investor 
type (including both long-horizon and short-horizon institutional ownership), 
shareholder proposal outcomes (including withdrawn, disqualified and voted) and 
board composition (including external board representation). The study employed a 
sample of 183 firms drawn from five industries (chemicals, oil and gas, utilities, 
pharmaceutical and biotech, and food and beverage) from the Dow Jones Global 
index over a three-year period (2000, 2001 and 2002). Four related measures of 
environmental disclosure quality were used: compliance, pollution prevention, 
product stewardship and ecological sustainability. An index of disclosure quality 
based on four progressive levels of environmental strategy and management was 
developed. Disclosure items were grouped into eight different forms of disclosure 
relating to the four levels of environmental strategy. Environmental disclosure data 
were collected from both firms‟ stand-alone corporate reports and annual or 10-K 
reports.  The study controlled for firm size and profitability.  
Results indicated no evidence of a relation between pension fund equity percentage or 
long-horizon institutional ownership and any of the measures of voluntary 
environmental disclosure quality. However, investment fund equity or short-horizon 
institutional ownership was negatively related to all four levels of disclosure. The 
study also documented a consistently positive relationship between withdrawn 
resolutions and the quality of voluntary environmental disclosure in terms of 
compliance, pollution prevention and product stewardship. While resolution 
disqualification was found to be marginally significant and positively related to only 
product stewardship level of voluntary environmental disclosure quality, the study 
was unable to document a relation between the number of resolutions that are 
ultimately voted on and any of all four levels of disclosure. Board composition was 
unrelated to all four measures of voluntary environmental disclosure quality. 
Nevertheless, firm size and profitability were significantly and positively related to all 
four measures of voluntary environmental disclosure quality. 
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Table 2.4 
Empirical Studies On the Impact Of Corporate Characteristics On  
Corporate Environmental Disclosure Quality     
 
Analysis &General Result 
Time of 
Observation, 
Sample Size & 
Sample Type 
Variables  
Author(s) 
& Date 
Control 
Variable  
Independent 
Variable  
Dependent 
Variable  
 
Analysis 
Descriptive data from Interviews 
 
General Result  
The study found that the process 
of reporting appears to depend on 
country of origin, corporate size 
and corporate culture. Aspects of 
process influenced by these 
variables are the degree of 
formality versus informality, the 
departments involved and the 
extent of engagement of 
stakeholders. Accountants were 
found to be not involved in data 
collection. Enhancing corporate 
image and credib ility with 
stakeholders was the main 
motivation of reporting. Bad news 
was found to enhance corporate 
credibility and image. Finally, 
some companies had a social and 
environmental audit while others 
having audits of only limited 
scope. 
 
 
Time of 
Observation 
1998 
 
Sample Size  
3 British 
companies and 4 
German companies 
 
Sample Type  
Chemical and 
pharmaceutical 
companies from 
the largest 400 
companies listed in 
the Times 1000 
(1995) 
 
-------------- 
 
Corporate structure 
and governance 
procedures; Extent 
and nature of 
stakeholder 
involvement; 
Extent of 
involvement of 
accountants; Views 
on recent increase 
in reporting, 
reporting bad news, 
reporting in the 
future, regulation 
and verificat ion; 
Perceived costs and 
benefits of 
reporting; and 
Corporate culture. 
 
The 
extensiveness, 
quality, quantity 
and completeness 
of corporate 
social and ethical 
reporting 
 
Adams 
(2002) 
 
Analysis 
OLS Regression 
                  
General Result  
Results indicated that informat ion 
costs, as proxied by risk and 
ownership, are potentially 
important determinants of 
environmental d isclosure strategy. 
Moreover, environmental 
disclosure quality was related to 
media pressure, while there was 
no relation between financial 
condition and environmental 
disclosure. Results also showed 
that environmental disclosure 
quality is conditioned by industry 
membership. In addition, fixed 
assets age, firm size determined 
the level of environmental 
disclosure by German firms in a 
given year. 
 
Time of 
Observation 
1992–1998  
 
Sample Size  
55 German 
companies 
 
Sample Type  
Large German 
firms that 
comprise the DAX 
30/DAX 70 
indices 
 
Fixed assets 
age, firm size 
and SEC 
registrant 
 
Information costs 
(as captured by risk, 
reliance on capital 
markets, trading 
volume, 
concentrated 
ownership and 
foreign ownership); 
financial condition 
(as captured by 
market return and 
leverage); and 
media pressure (as 
proxied by media 
exposure) 
 
The level and 
quality of 
environmental 
disclosure 
 
Cormier et 
al. (2005) 
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Analysis &General Result 
Time of 
Observation, 
Sample Size & 
Sample Type 
Variables  
Author(s) 
& Date 
Control 
Variable  
Independent 
Variable  
Dependent 
Variable  
 
Analysis 
Probit and Ordered Probit  
Regression 
 
General Result  
The likelihood of making 
voluntary environmental 
disclosure is positively associated 
with highly sensitive industries, 
larger firms and less-leveraged 
companies; is negatively 
associated with the size of the 
largest shareholding; and has no 
significant relationship to 
profitability, environmental 
performance, media visib ility or 
the number of non-executive 
directors. The same results were 
reached concerning the quality of 
environmental d isclosures except 
for environmental performance 
which was found to be 
significantly and positively 
related to the quality of such 
disclosures. 
 
Time of 
Observation 
2000 
 
Sample Size  
447 UK companies  
 
Sample Type  
FTSE All Share 
after certain 
exclusions 
 
 
 
------------- 
 
Industry type, 
Environmental 
performance, Firm 
size, Organizat ional 
visibility, Company 
ownership, 
Profitability, 
Leverage and Board 
composition. 
 
The level and 
quality of 
voluntary 
environmental 
disclosure 
 
Brammer 
and Pavelin 
(2006) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Analysis 
1- Correlation Analysis 
2- OLS Regression 
                  
General Result  
Results provided some support to 
the effect that factors related to 
investors‟ informat ion needs 
(business complexity and industry 
instability & volat ility) influence 
the volume of voluntary 
disclosures. However, these 
factors appeared to have little 
impact on the quality of voluntary 
disclosures. Results also showed 
that factors such as company 
emphasis on stakeholder 
management and relevance of 
intangible asset affect the quality 
of voluntary disclosures in case of 
Italian companies but not in case 
of USA companies. In addition, 
the results confirmed that 
company size, and to a lesser 
extent the industry in which the 
company operates, influences 
voluntary disclosures made by 
companies. 
 
 
Time of 
Observation 
2002 
 
Sample Size  
72 Italian and US 
companies  
 
Sample Type  
Companies 
selected from 
those listed on the 
Milano-Mercato 
Ordinario and the 
New York stock 
Exchange  
 
 
Company size 
and industry 
membership 
 
Investor‟s 
informat ion needs 
(business 
complexity and 
industry instability 
& volatility) and 
within–company 
factors (corporate 
governance, 
stakeholder 
engagement, and 
intangible asset 
management) 
 
 
The volume and 
quality of 
voluntary 
disclosures 
 
Boesso and 
Kumar 
(2007) 
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Analysis &General Result 
Time of 
Observation, 
Sample Size & 
Sample Type 
Variables  
Author(s) 
& Date 
Control 
Variable  
Independent 
Variable  
Dependent 
Variable  
 
Analysis 
1- Correlation Analysis 
2- Logit Regression 
                  
General Result  
Results found the quality of 
environmental d isclosure to be 
determined by a firm‟s size and 
the nature of its business 
activities. High quality 
disclosures were primarily 
associated with larger firms and 
those in sectors most closely 
related to environmental 
concerns. However, results 
indicated that the media exposure 
of companies plays no role in 
stimulat ing voluntary 
environmental d isclosure.  
 
 
 
 
Time of 
Observation 
2000 
 
Sample Size  
447 UK companies  
 
Sample Type  
FTSE All Share 
after certain 
exclusions 
 
 
 
------------- 
 
Nature of a firm‟s 
business activities, 
its environmental 
performance, 
organizational size, 
media visib ility and 
financial resources 
and the composition 
of both ownership 
and the main board  
 
The quality of 
voluntary 
environmental 
disclosures 
 
Brammer 
and Pavelin 
(2008) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Analysis 
1- Mann-Whitney tests 
2- Logistic regression 
                  
General Result  
With respect to the year 2000, 
audit quality, consisting of the 
presence and independence of the 
audit committee, its meet ing 
frequency, the use of a big 6 
auditor and the auditor‟s 
independence, was positively 
associated with the disclosure of 
forward-looking in formation. 
Board committees, consisting of 
the appointment and 
independence of a compensation 
committee and the creation of a 
nomination committee, and the 
overall efficacy of the corporate 
governance system were also 
positively associated with the 
disclosure of forward -looking 
informat ion. However, results 
revealed that corporate disclosure 
does not seem to be driven by the 
same factors in 2002. 
 
 
 
 
Time of 
Observation 
2000 and 2002 
 
Sample Size  
183 Australian 
companies 
 
Sample Type  
The largest 300 
publicly listed 
firms according to 
net profit for the 
year  
 
 
Firm size, 
performance, 
informat ion 
environment 
and leverage 
 
Total corporate 
governance and its 
categories: board 
autonomy, board 
committees, 
ownership structure 
and audit function  
 
 
Voluntarily 
forward-looking 
disclosure 
 
O‟Sullivan 
et al. 
(2008) 
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Analysis &General Result 
Time of 
Observation, 
Sample Size & 
Sample Type 
Variables  
Author(s) 
& Date 
Control 
Variable  
Independent 
Variable  
Dependent 
Variable  
 
Analysis 
1- VARIMAX rotation 
2- OLS Regression 
                  
General Result  
Results revealed only a limited 
association between the presence 
of a physical person that 
represents a dominant shareholder 
and corporate social disclosures. 
In an ownership structure defined 
by the presence of a main 
shareholder that exerts control 
over the firm, there was 
encouragement to adopt the GRI 
format as a CSR reporting model 
to be used by the firm for 
disclosing information. In 
contrast, financial institutions, 
investors that are unable to move 
funds quickly in and out without 
affecting share price, and 
dispersed shareholders seemed to 
be only interested in the financial 
performance of the firm, but not 
in its sustainable strategies or 
activities.  
 
 
Time of 
Observation 
Not specified 
 
Sample Size  
99 Spanish 
companies  
 
Sample Type  
Non-financial 
Spanish firms 
quoted on the 
Spanish 
continuous market  
 
 
 
Government 
power (size, 
transport and 
communicat ions 
sector, 
industrial 
sectors, energy 
sector and 
construction 
sector); 
creditors‟ power 
(debt-to-equity 
ratio); strategic 
posture 
(ISO14001 
certification and 
OHSAS18001 
certification) 
and economic 
Performance 
(ROA) 
 
Presence of 
financial institution 
in the corporate 
ownership 
structure, presence 
of a physical person 
that represents a 
dominant 
shareholder and  
number of 
independent 
directors 
 
The level and 
quality of 
corporate social 
disclosure 
(Validation, 
Information 
disclosed and GRI 
format) 
 
Prado-
Lorenzo et 
al. (2009) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Analysis 
1- Mann-Whitney tests 
2- Kruskal–Wallis test 
3- Correlation Analysis 
4- OLS Regression 
5- Poisson Regression 
  
General Result  
Empirical analysis indicated that 
corporate social d isclosure is 
associated with corporate size, 
industry, media pressure, board 
size, corporate social 
responsibility committee and 
ownership diffusion. However, 
results suggested that these 
factors are more associated with 
the quantity of disclosure than its 
quality. An exception is media 
pressure which was not associated 
with the quality of corporate 
social disclosure. 
 
 
Time of 
Observation 
2005 and 2006 
 
Sample Size  
317 UK companies  
in 2005 and 327 in 
2006 
 
Sample Type  
FTSE 100 and  
FTSE 250 
 
------------- 
 
Corporate 
characteristics 
(corporate size, 
type of activity, 
profitability and 
multinationality); 
media pressure; and 
corporate 
governance (board 
size, board 
composition, 
presence of social 
responsibility 
committee and 
block ownership) 
 
The quantity and 
quality of 
corporate social 
disclosure 
 
Hassan 
(2010) 
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Analysis &General Result 
Time of 
Observation, 
Sample Size & 
Sample Type 
Variables  
Author(s) 
& Date 
Control 
Variable  
Independent 
Variable  
Dependent 
Variable  
 
Analysis 
1- Pearson Correlation  
2- OLS Regression 
                  
General Result  
Results suggested that voluntary 
environmental d isclosure quality 
is positively associated with 
board independence, gender 
diversity, and multiple 
directorships while negatively 
associated with environmental 
media. In addition, the percentage 
of directors serving on mult iple 
boards is positively related to 
three levels of voluntary 
environmental d isclosure quality 
individually examined (i.e . 
compliance, pollution prevention 
and product stewardship) and 
board independence and diversity 
are each positively related to at 
least one level of voluntary 
environmental d isclosure quality.  
  
 
 
 
Time of 
Observation 
2000, 2003 and 
2005 
 
Sample Size  
127 US firms  
 
Sample Type  
Firms drawn from 
the Dow Jones 
Global Index and 
from five 
industries; 
chemical, oil and 
gas, electrical 
utilit ies, 
pharmaceutical 
and biotech and 
food and beverage 
 
 
Firm size, 
profitability, 
industry 
sensitivity, 
regulation 
sensitivity and 
presence of a 
separate 
corporate 
environmental 
report 
 
Environmental 
media coverage, 
institutional 
investor ownership 
(long-horizon and 
short-horizon 
institutional 
ownership) and 
multi-stakeholder 
governance (board 
independence, 
gender diversity, 
multip le 
directorships, 
separation of the 
CEO from the 
board chair position 
and the existence of 
a corporate social 
responsibility 
committee) 
 
Total quality of 
voluntary 
environmental 
disclosure and 
Types of 
voluntary 
environmental 
disclosure quality 
(compliance, 
pollution 
prevention and 
product 
stewardship) 
 
Rupley et 
al. (2011) 
 
Analysis 
1- Correlation Analysis  
2- OLS Regression 
                  
General Result  
Results indicated that 
environmental performance, 
environmental news exposure and 
firm size are key drivers of both 
environmental and social 
disclosures. Analyst following, 
board size and, to a lesser extent, 
leverage are significantly related 
to environmental disclosure. 
However, no significant 
relationship is detected between 
the quality of environmental 
disclosures and each of free float 
(ownership dispersion), 
profitability, board independence 
and audit committee size. 
 
 
 
Time of 
Observation 
2005 
 
Sample Size  
137 Canadian 
companies  
 
Sample Type  
Companies 
included in 
Toronto Stock 
Exchange 
S&P/TSX Index  
 
------------- 
 
 
Environmental 
performance, free 
float (ownership 
dispersion), analyst 
following, leverage, 
profitability, firm 
size, board 
independence, 
board size, audit 
committee size and 
environmental 
media exposure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The quality of 
social and 
environmental 
disclosures  
 
Cormier et 
al. (2011)   
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Analysis &General Result 
Time of 
Observation, 
Sample Size & 
Sample Type 
Variables  
Author(s) 
& Date 
Control 
Variable  
Independent 
Variable  
Dependent 
Variable  
 
Analysis 
1- Spearman Correlat ion  
2- OLS Regression 
                  
General Result  
Results indicated no evidence of a 
relation between pension fund 
equity percentage or long-horizon 
institutional ownership and any of 
the measures of voluntary 
environmental d isclosure quality. 
However, investment fund equity 
or short-horizon institutional 
ownership was negatively related 
to all four levels of disclosure. 
The study also documented a 
consistently positive relationship 
between withdrawn resolutions 
and the quality of voluntary 
environmental d isclosure in terms 
of compliance, pollution 
prevention and product 
stewardship. While resolution 
disqualificat ion was found to be 
marginally significant and 
positively related to only product 
stewardship level of voluntary 
environmental d isclosure quality, 
the study was unable to document 
a relat ion between the number of 
resolutions that are ultimately 
voted on and any of all four levels 
of disclosure. Board composition 
was unrelated to all four measures 
of voluntary environmental 
disclosure quality. Nevertheless, 
firm size and profitability were 
significantly and positively 
related to all four measures of 
voluntary environmental 
disclosure quality. 
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2.6   EXAMINING ENVIRONMENTAL DISCLOSURE QUALITY:  
       MEANING, DIMENSIONS AND METRICS 
The measurement of disclosure quality is a controversial topic in academic literature. 
Disclosure quality measurement is considered a difficult task. This difficulty can be 
attributed to the unresolved theoretical debate around the concept of quality itself, and 
consequently, the difficulty of determining a clear and accepted disclosure quality 
measurement. In addition to the definition of quality, issues concerning reliability, 
statistical inaccuracy and source data examined are also highlighted in the literature 
(Hammond and Miles, 2004). However, it can be argued that measurement depends 
largely on the researcher's definition of quality as fits with the purposes of the study.  
Attempts have been made to distinguish different types of disclosure and hence to 
capture the distinct qualitative characteristics of the disclosed information. For 
example, Wiseman (1982) utilized an indexation procedure based on whether 
disclosure was monetary or quantitative; specific non-quantitative; or in general 
terms. Guthrie and Matthews (1985) extended the assessment to include whether the 
statements reflect well, badly or neutrally on the reporting entity. To these 
classifications Gray et al. (1995b) added an assessment of whether the disclosure is 
verified by an independent third party or not. Academic quality assessment has further 
progressed towards a more comprehensive analysis of disclosure, suggested by 
Beattie et al. (2004), through examining both the topic (relative amount and spread 
across topics) and the type (time orientation, financial/non-financial and 
quantitative/qualitative attributes) of disclosure. 
In addition to previous studies examining the relationship between environmental 
disclosure quality and each of corporate characteristics and corporate governance, 
prior studies examining environmental disclosure quality dimensions and metrics 
(despite examining disclosure quality in general or relating quality to other variables), 
are also reviewed. This will permit an in-depth exploration of quality definition and 
measurement issues as presented in the literature. Prior studies are presented in a 
chronological order to help trace the gradual evolution and development of any 
achievements or addition to the existing body of literature.   
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Wiseman (1982) evaluated the quality and accuracy of environmental disclosures 
made in corporate annual reports. An indexing procedure was used to measure the 
contents of the disclosures. A rating sheet was developed to measure the extent of 
disclosure. The items on the rating sheet were classified into four categories. Category 
one represented items directly related to economic factors. Category two represented 
items relating to environmental litigation. Category three included pollution 
abatement items. Category four represented other environmentally related items 
which did not fall into any of the previous categories. Rating of the disclosures was 
based on the presence or absence and the degree of specificity of each of the 
information items. A score of three was assigned to an item if it was present in the 
disclosure and was described in monetary or quantitative terms. A score of two was 
assigned to an item if it was presented in the disclosure with company specific 
information in non-quantitative terms. One was assigned to items mentioned only in 
general terms. A zero was assigned if the item was not present in the disclosure. 
Guthrie and Matthews (1985) measured the nature and extent of social responsibility 
disclosure in the annual reports of Australian companies. The following dimensions 
were used: Theme, Evidence, Amount, and Location. A method of recording and 
quantification of the four dimensions was used. However, these methods did not 
attempt to capture the qualitative features or characteristics of the data. Of particular 
link to quality measurement is the method of quantification, where data are classified 
into monetary, non-monetary and declarative. Moreover, a new category was 
introduced into the measurement process, that of news type. In other words, the 
assessment included whether the statements reflect well, badly or neutrally on the 
reporting entity. 
Freedman and Stagliano (1992) examined the quality of social disclosures in the 
annual reports of US companies. The content of the disclosure was analyzed using a 
four element index that attempts to assess disclosure quality. These four elements are: 
time frame (past, present, future); effect (significant or not); monetary versus non-
monetary; and reference to specific action, person, event, or place. The authors argue 
that the importance of disclosure should be based on what is included in the statement 
rather than how much is said. Accordingly, social disclosures were scored by 
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assigning a single point to each disclosure. If the report commentary involved future 
implications, or the disclosure was monetary, two points were given.  
Patten (1995) analyzed the variability of social disclosure in annual reports. 
Disclosures examined were recorded based on the information items and categories 
identified. Disclosures were then classified as to whether they contained quantitative 
information. If quantitative information was included, it was further classified as to 
whether it was monetary or non-monetary in nature. In this regard, such assessment 
reveals a measure of disclosure quality rather than just disclosure quantity.   
Gray et al. (1995b), in examining the methodological themes of constructing a 
research database of social and environmental reporting by UK companies, identified 
three quality assessment categorizations. These categories are “evidence”, “news” and 
“auditability”. The “Evidence” category refers to deciding whether the nature of the 
disclosed information is monetary, non-monetary quantitative, or declarative. As to 
“news”, it reveals whether the news communicated by the disclosure is good, bad, or 
neutral. Finally, “auditability” is concerned with whether the information disclosed is 
verified by an independent third party or not. The authors argued that attempting to 
assess the quality of the data communicated can partially mitigate the loss of 
information resulting from the traditional methods of capturing the quantity of 
disclosure. 
Gamble et al. (1995) developed a weighting scheme to evaluate the quality of 
environmental disclosures in annual reports and 10K. The assignment of weights was 
based upon the objective of environmental disclosures which is to provide 
stakeholders with information that will allow them to evaluate the long- and short-
term environmental concerns of an entity in terms of risk, current and prospective 
cash flow requirements, and consistency with societal environmental concerns.  
Environmental concerns of an entity should be disclosed in the form of: (1) a policy 
statement regarding plans to produce, transport, store, and sell goods and/or services 
in the most environmentally safe manner; (2) statements regarding remediation for 
past actions, legal compliance, and plans for environmental improvements in 
operations; (3) the total monetary amount committed to such plans; (4) the monetary 
amount spent to date; (5) the monetary amount expected to be spent in each of the 
next ten years; (6) the types of environmentally- oriented assets that have and/or will 
 11 
be acquired and the monetary amount associated with each type of asset; and (7) the 
results of the environmental audit. Based upon the previous objective, the following 
scheme was used to assess the quality of environmental disclosures in annual reports: 
Journal entry (JE) =1; Footnote (FN) =2; Environmental violation and/or remediation 
(V) =3-5; Short qualitative disclosure (SQD) =4-6; and Extended qualitative 
disclosure (EQD) =7-10.  
In terms of the evaluation scheme, the lowest score is assigned to the least informative 
and the highest to the most informative disclosure. Journal entry (JE) is assigned the 
least score because its informational content is limited to past actions. Footnote (FN) 
is more informative because it discloses actual and expected future cash flow 
consequences of past environmental actions. Environmental violation and/or 
remediation (V) is more informative than FN because important environmental 
information is separately disclosed. Short qualitative disclosure (SQD) is more 
informative than V because at a minimum it contains information regarding an entity's 
environmental policy, legal compliance and restrictions, and changes in 
environmental regulations, in addition to operating and capital environmental 
expenditures and the effect of environmental matters on other aspects of operations. 
Extended qualitative disclosure (EQD) is the most informative because it provides the 
same basic information contained in SQD as well as information regarding plans for 
environmental improvements in operations such as the monetary amount expected to 
be spent in each of the next five years, the types of environmentally-oriented assets 
that have and/or will be acquired and the monetary amount associated with each type, 
and the results of the environmental audit. 
Robertson and Nicholson (1996) suggested a three- level scoring system based on a 
qualitative hierarchy of social responsibility disclosure: from “General Rhetoric” to 
“Specific Endeavors” to “Implementation and Monitoring”. The first level, “General 
Rhetoric”, is corporate recognition of the value of social responsibility and reference 
to it in company documents. Disclosures at this level are somewhat vague and 
meaningless as they are not backed by specific objectives and actions. The second 
level, “Specific Endeavors”, consists of corporate social responsibility initiatives 
specifically tied to the company and its operating environment. The third level, 
“Implementation and Monitoring”, of social responsibility programmes is 
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characterized by activities such as annual environmental audits or reviews. This level 
is consistent with an overall corporate goal setting approach.  
Walden and Schwartz (1997) used a four-element index to assess the quality of 
environmental disclosure in annual reports. The four elements or quality assessments 
are: (1) Effect - significant or not significant; (2) Quantification - monetary or not 
monetary; (3) Specificity - specific as to actions, persons, events, or places, or not 
specific; and (4) Time frame - past, present, or future. Significance effects were based 
on location within annual report, where disclosures found in the letter to shareholders 
and financial sections were deemed significant. The remaining three elements of 
disclosure were judged based on the presence or absence of each type of disclosure 
and the degree of specificity for each environmental disclosure theme. Each element 
of the index which was present in the disclosure received one point. If the disclosure 
involved the future, or the disclosure was monetary, it received two points for each. If 
the disclosure involved the current reporting period, it received one point. No points 
were given if the disclosure involved the past or the element was not present. 
Therefore, each environmental disclosure could receive a minimum of zero points and 
a maximum of six points based on the four-element index for quality assessment.  
Hughes et al. (2001) examined the quality of environmental disclosures made in 
corporate annual reports. An indexing procedure, mostly similar to that used by 
Wiseman (1982) was employed to measure the contents of the disclosures. Content 
was classified as quantitative, descriptive, vague or immaterial. Quantitative refers to 
an environmental impact clearly defined in monetary terms or actual physical 
quantities. Descriptive denotes that the impact on the company or its policies was 
clearly evident. Vague means disclosures were limited to passing comments of 
environmental effects within discussions of other topics. Immaterial refers to those 
disclosures that stated environmental issues were immaterial to the financial condition 
and results of the corporation. Quantitative disclosures carried a weight of four, 
descriptive – three, vague – two, and immaterial – one. A zero was assigned if the 
item was not present in the disclosure.  
Raar (2002) developed a weighting and ranking system to evaluate the quantity and 
quality of environmental disclosure in annual reports. Disclosure items were 
measured by monetary, non-monetary, qualitative discussion or a combination of all 
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three. Any given category of disclosure contained a nominal variable, “Did the report 
include any information relating to this category?”, an ordinal variable, “how much?”, 
and a continuous variable, “how was it measured?”. The ranking system, consisting of 
seven points, was then used to evaluate the quality of disclosure as follows: 
1=monetary, 2=non-monetary, 3=qualitative only, 4=Qualitative and monetary, 
5=qualitative and non-monetary, 6=monetary and non-monetary, 7=qualitative, 
monetary and non-monetary. 
For the variable “how was it measured?” the perceived order of importance was 
attained as follows. The lowest score in this ranking is 1; as information based on 
monetary information alone would be insufficient for stakeholders to make informed 
decisions relating to environmental issues of the firm, was considered to be the least 
informative. The highest score is 7; a firm providing a combination of discussion on 
environmental goals and objectives, and outcomes in qualitative, non-monetary and 
monetary terms, was considered to be more meaningful to help stakeholder decisions 
by linking disclosure, environmental performance and economic performance.  
Toms (2002) designed a pilot questionnaire survey sent to fund managers and analysts 
to test the perceived importance of qualitative environmental disclosures. The results 
showed that the low rating was given to “non-quantified information” and the high 
rating was for “externally monitored environmental report”. The rating from high 
rating to low rating was as follows: (1) Externally monitored environmental report, 
(2) Quantified environmental performance in annual report, (3) Specified policies, (4) 
Publication of an environmental policy, (5) Volume of information available in 
reports, and (6) Non-quantified information. Based on the survey results and along the 
lines suggested by Robertson and Nicholson (1996), each of which increased the 
credibility of the information, a rating method for corporate environmental disclosures 
was employed and empirically tested. The rating scale included assigning the 
following values to varying degrees of disclosure: 0 for “No disclosure”, 1 for 
“General rhetoric”, 2 for “Specific endeavor; policy only”, 3 for “Specific endeavor; 
policy specified”, 4 for “Implementation and monitoring; use of targets, results not 
published”, and 5 for “Implementation and monitoring; use of targets, results 
published”. 
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Hooks et al. (2002(, in identifying the information gap in the annual reports of New 
Zealand companies, assessed the quality of disclosure from an accountability 
perspective. A disclosure index was developed using the ideas and opinions of some 
experts representing broad stakeholder groups. Weightings for each information item 
were allocated according to the relative importance of those disclosures from an 
accountability perspective. Accordingly, the following categories were used: 0 = The 
item should not be disclosed, 1 = Disclosure is of minor importance, 2 = Disclosure is 
of intermediate importance, 3 = Disclosure is very important, 4, 5 = Disclosure is 
essential. In this regard, the index measures a stakeholder-oriented disclosure quality.     
Milne et al. (2003) examined triple bottom line reporting using a benchmark tool 
produced by the UNEP/SustainAbility group. The benchmark tool comprises 50 
reporting items, grouped under the five sections of (1) Management Policies and 
Systems, (2) An Input/Output Inventory, (3) Finance, (4) Stakeholder Relations and 
Partnerships, and (5) Sustainable Development. 48 of the 50 reporting items are 
scored on a scale of 0-4. Two are scored as either 0 or 1. This rating scale is based on 
the principle that the more complete and comprehensive the information relating to a 
given reporting item, the higher the score it receives. Essentially each item is being 
classified into one of 5 possible and mutually exclusive categories as follows: 0=No 
coverage; 1=Minimum coverage, little detail; 2=Detailed and honest, including 
company shortcomings and commitments; 3=Commitment to and progress towards 
sustainable development in core business; 4=Commitment to and progress towards 
„triple bottom line‟ of sustainable development in core business plus benchmarking 
against competition and/or best practice in other sectors. 
Beretta and Bozzolan (2004) proposed a framework for the analysis of a category of 
voluntary disclosure - that is risk disclosure - that assesses both the quantity and 
quality of the disclosure. The framework considers four different but complementary 
dimensions: the content of information disclosed; the economic sign attributed to 
expected impacts; the type of measures used to quantify and qualify the expected 
impacts; and the outlook orientation of the disclosure. The content of disclosures is 
expressed in the form of disclosure categories. The economic sign communicates the 
direction of the expected impact of risks upon the future performance of the firm 
while the type of measure used reveals the qualitative or quantitative nature of 
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disclosure, using either monetary or non-monetary scales. Another dimension of 
analysis is the outlook orientation which reflects both the time orientation of the 
information disclosed and the managerial approach to the management of risks.  
As far as quantity of communication is concerned, two aspects have to be balanced: 
the absolute number of pieces of information disclosed (quantity) and the relevance or 
weight it has inside the overall voluntary communication (density). As far as the 
quality of communication is concerned, three properties are complementary: the 
economic sign of the expected impacts and the type of measures used (both of which 
refer to the depth) and the outlook orientation of the disclosure (outlook profile). The 
four indices of the proposed dimensions are used to profile the characteristics of 
disclosure offered by each company. In addition, the indices are synthesized in an 
overall measure of disclosure quality. However, this measure can be criticized for 
aggregating quantity and quality into one single measure of disclosure quality. In 
other words, the measure is based on the notion that the quality of disclosure partially 
depends on the quantity of information disclosed.  
Beattie et al. (2004) indicated that there are two principle ways of measuring 
disclosure: the use of subjective analyst disclosure quality ranking and the use of 
researcher-constructed disclosure indices where the amount of disclosure is used as a 
proxy for disclosure quality. Given the limitations and weaknesses of these two 
approaches, the study introduced a methodology for generating a rich descriptive 
profile of a company‟s narrative disclosures. A comprehensive four-dimensional 
framework for the content analysis of narratives, based on the coding of topic and 
three type attributes, was developed. The topic analysis is based on the Jenkins report 
(AICPA, 1994). The type analysis captures the time orientation, financial/non-
financial and quantitative/qualitative attributes of the disclosed information.  
Moreover, the study made a preliminary attempt to identify some of the attributes of 
quality and develop a tentative summary measure of disclosure quality.  Two 
dimensions of disclosure quality suggested were the relative amount of disclosure and 
the spread of disclosures across topics. The standardized residuals from a regression 
of the number of text units on size and complexity were proposed as a measure of the 
relative amount of disclosure (as defined as the actual amount relative to the expected 
amount). A range of measures of the spread were suggested including the Herfindahl 
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index or a concentration measure calculated at both the main topic level and the sub-
topic level as well as a count the number of non-empty sub-topics. The higher the 
Herfindahl index, the poorer the spread while a higher number of non-empty sub-
topics indicates a better spread. The four quality proxies proposed were then 
combined to create a composite measure of disclosure quality. 
Hammond and Miles (2004) conducted interviews with corporate representatives and 
quality assessors who raised a range of characteristics of quality corporate social 
reporting including: quantitative disclosure, third party verification, establishment of 
and reporting against appropriate targets, „„warts and all reporting‟‟, the adoption of 
reporting guidelines and standards, the ability to accurately assess performance from 
disclosure, clear statement of vision from chief executive, good coverage of 
significant issues, wide access, reporting of normalized data and the achievement of 
awards/accolades. The study concluded that corporations adopt less comprehensive 
definitions of quality than quality assessors; quality assessors adopt more stringent 
definitions of quality than academics; methodological problems of quality assessment 
highlighted in the academic literature are experienced by quality assessors; and that 
benchmarking and award schemes are important drivers of corporate social reporting.  
Al-Tuwaijri et al. (2004) proposed qualitative disclosure measures for assessing the 
quality of corporate environmental disclosures. First, an analysis was carried out that 
incorporates disclosures of four key environmental indicators: (1) the total amount of 
toxic waste generated and transferred or recycled; (2) financial penalties resulting 
from violations of 10 federal environmental laws; (3) Potential Responsible Party 
(PRP) designation for the cleanup responsibility of hazardous-waste sites; and (4) the 
occurrence of reported oil and chemical spills. Second, qualitative disclosure 
measures denoted weights for different disclosure items, based on the perceived 
importance of each item to various user groups. The greatest weight (+3) is assigned 
to quantitative disclosures related to the four environmental indicators described. The 
next highest weight (+2) is assigned to non-quantitative but specific information 
related to these indicators. Finally, general qualitative disclosures receive the lowest 
weight (+1). Firms that do not disclose information for a given indicator receive a 
score of zero for that indicator. An adjustment was made to the disclosure measure to 
capture the transparency property of the firm‟s environmental disclosure by 
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measuring the firm‟s disclosure to investors conditioned on its polluting activity 
reported to environmental regulators. 
Chapman and Milne (2004) examined triple bottom line reporting using a benchmark 
tool produced by the UNEP/SustainAbility group. The benchmark tool comprises 50 
reporting items, grouped under the five sections of (1) Management Po licies and 
Systems, (2) An Input/Output Inventory, (3) Finance, (4) Stakeholder Relations and 
Partnerships, and (5) Sustainable Development. 48 of the 50 reporting items are 
scored on a scale of 0-4. Two are scored as either 0 or 1. This rating scale is based on 
the principle that the more complete and comprehensive the information relating to a 
given reporting item, the higher the score it receives. Essentially each item is being 
classified into one of 5 possible and mutually exclusive categories as follows: 0=No 
coverage; 1=Minimum coverage, little detail; 2=Detailed and honest, including 
company shortcomings and commitments; 3=Commitment to and progress towards 
sustainable development in core business; 4=Commitment to and progress towards 
„triple bottom line‟ of sustainable development in core business plus benchmarking 
against competition and/or best practice in other sectors.  
Hasseldine et al. (2005) used the rating method for assessing corporate environmental 
disclosure quality as that employed by Toms (2002). However, the data set was 
extended to create a quality-adjusted measure of disclosure quantity. Quality scores 
were first identified by sentence according to the scheme described by Toms (2002). 
The best example was used to score the signal of each company. The quality score for 
every sentence in each report was then added to compute an aggregate measure. The 
following categories were used in the 0–5 qualitative scale. No disclosure=0; general 
rhetoric=1; specific endeavour; policy only=2; specific endeavour or intent, policy 
specified=3; implementation and monitoring, use of targets references to outcomes, 
but quantified results not published=4; implementation and monitoring; use of targets, 
quantified results published=5. Some further refinement was made. Lead in sentences, 
without reference to the environment in themselves, but introducing environmental 
content, were counted as zeros. Policy specification (3) and implementation and 
monitoring statements (4) were distinguished further so that statements of intent were 
scored at 3 and statements of achievement were scored at 4. The 0–5 qualitative scale 
list reflected these refinements. 
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Van der Laan Smith et al. (2005) used a multi-method approach to measure the 
quality of the corporate social disclosure in annual reports of US companies. 
Following Patten (1995), the authors used the presence of numeric data in social 
disclosure as a proxy to assess disclosure quality. The numeric information variable 
identified financial as well as non-financial information items. Numeric data - as 
argued by the authors - provide additional information to the reader. This disclosure 
quality measure was corroborated by a qualitative assessment of disclosure quality 
categorizing the information provided as proactive or reactive, as discussing future 
events or past events and as informational or promotional. According to the study, 
social disclosure that was proactive, discussed future events and informational is 
considered as being higher quality disclosures than social disclosure that was reactive, 
historical, or promotional in nature. 
Van Staden and Hooks (2007) developed an index of 5-point scale to assess the 
quality of environmental disclosure. First, environmental disclosure items were 
arranged into the following six categories: the entity, management policy and 
systems, environmental impacts, stakeholders, financial impacts, and general. Most of 
the disclosures were then scored on the 5-point scale using the following criteria:  0 
Not disclosed, no discussion of the issue; 1 Minimum coverage, little detail-general 
terms. Anecdotal or briefly mentioned; 2 Descriptive: the impact of the company or 
its policies was clearly evident; 3 Quantitative: the environmental impact was clearly 
defined in monetary terms or actual physical quantities; and 4 Truly extraordinary; 5 
Benchmarking against best practice. This resulted in a total possible score of 100.  
Gibson and O‟Donovan (2007) simply analyzed the quality of environmental 
disclosures in annual reports in terms of the nature of the information provided. The 
information was separated into the three categories, namely financial, quantifiable non 
financial and descriptive. Financial disclosure is included in the financial statements 
including notes to the accounts (e.g. provision for future clean up costs). Quantifiable 
Non Financial disclosure is included in the annual report but not part of the financial 
statements (e.g. graphs or tables indicating emissions to the air or water). Descriptive 
disclosure refers to narrative and pictorial forms of disclosure (e.g. often textual 
references in directors‟ report or stand alone social and environmental sections of the 
report). The total amount of environmental information disclosed (number of pages) 
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in each annual report and in each category was aggregated. The total length of each 
annual report and each disclosure category was then expressed as a percentage of the 
total number of pages in the report.  
Raar (2007) examined the quality of environmental and social information disclosed 
in the annual reports drawing heavily on Raar (2002). Disclosure items were 
measured by monetary, non-monetary, qualitative discussion or a combination of all 
three. A ranking system, consisting of seven points, was used to evaluate the quality 
of disclosure as follows: 1=monetary, 2=non-monetary, 3=qualitative only, 
4=Qualitative and monetary, 5=qualitative and non-monetary, 6=monetary and non-
monetary, 7=qualitative, monetary and non-monetary. For information quality 
definitions, the highest ranking was given to firms who made the effort to combine 
measurements, for example, qualitative prose; non-monetary measurement, for 
example, tones of waste; and also use of monetary terms. The basis for this ranking 
was that firm‟s could more readily provide benchmarks in monetary or non-monetary 
terms, and then use this to compare with actual performance. The study claims that 
this approach is considered to be of more value to the user.  
Grüning (2007) investigated corporate disclosure quality in annual reports. Disclosure 
was first grouped into seven categories. For each of the seven communication 
dimensions a comprehensive list of items that could potentially be considered in 
disclosure is used. For each item the quality of information provided is evaluated 
using a scoring model. The scale consists of five values with 1 point for minimal 
information and 5 points for detailed and forecast information. If there is no 
information available for a particular item, no points will be allocated. For each item 
there is a clear definition for what information to assign the different values as 
follows: 1 point: general description; 2 points: qualitative information; 3 points: 
additional qualitative information on future development; 4 points: additional growth 
rate development, including forecast; 5 points: additional prognosis on future 
development and time series analysis of past data. As the information quality scales 
for each communication dimension should be equal to obtain comparable results data 
have to be rescaled to fit into an interval between 0 and maximum points. Hence, the 
maximum points represent the observed best practice for each dimension after 
rescaling. 
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Beretta and Bozzolan (2008) proposed a framework for the analysis of a category of 
voluntary disclosure - that is forward-looking disclosure - that assesses the quality of 
the disclosure. The study contended the need for an adoption of a multidimensional 
disclosure framework that jointly considers not only the “quantity” of disclosure (how 
much is disclosed) but also the “richness” of disclosure (what and how it is disclosed). 
The “quantity” dimension is measured by the relative number of disclosed items, 
adjusted for size and industry.  “Richness” is defined as a function of the coverage of 
and dispersion among the different topics that qualify a firm‟s business model (width) 
and of the insights disclosed on the future performance of the firm (depth).  
“Width” depends both on the coverage of relevant topics (or subtopics) of the 
framework and on the dispersion of disclosure across different topics (or subtopics). 
Coverage is measured by the percentage of topics (subtopics) filled in by at least one 
piece of information out of the total number of topics (subtopics) considered. The 
wider the variety of topics disclosed the better. Dispersion of disclosure refers to how 
concentrated disclosed items are. “Depth” synthesizes the economic sign, type of 
measure, and outlook profile of disclosed information. The economic sign (positive, 
negative, not disclosed) communicates the economic direction of the impact 
(observed or expected) on the firm‟s performance of the disclosed items. The type of 
measures (financial versus non-financial; quantitative versus qualitative; not 
disclosed) qualifies the content of a disclosure. The outlook profile reflects the time 
orientation of the information disclosed as well as management‟s orientation to action.  
Clarkson et al.‟s (2008) developed an index to measure the quality of voluntary 
environmental disclosures based on indicators from the internationally accepted GRI 
Guidelines with the help of an expert in environmental reporting, a member of the 
GRI Steering Committee from its inception. According to the Guidelines, quality 
reporting reflects a balance of information reported (both positive  and negative) as 
well as comparable, accurate, and reliable information. Environmental disclosures are 
categorized into seven broad categories. The first four categories represent hard 
disclosures and the remaining three categories represent soft disclosures. The relative 
weighting of hard compared to soft disclosures reflect the GRI‟s focus on hard 
disclosures. Hard disclosure items assess the environmental commitment of 
companies in an objective manner. These categories score environmental disclosures 
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on aspects of governance structure and management systems, credibility, 
environmental performance indicators and environmental spending. Companies 
committing themselves to environmental protection are able to score higher on hard 
disclosures compared to those companies with less true commitment to protect the 
environment. On the other hand, soft disclosure items mostly refer to claims by 
management about their environmental initiatives. These categories represent vision 
and strategy claims, environmental profile and environmental initiatives, all of which 
could be copied by companies with no true commitment to protect the environment.  
Plumlee et al. (2009) proposed an index to examine the quality of a firm‟s voluntary 
environmental disclosures. Following the approach of Clarkson et al. (2008), the 
Global Reporting Initiative‟s (GRI) framework, which provides voluntary 
environmental reporting standards, is the basis of the index developed. The standards 
are based on a set of reporting principles important to analysts and investors, 
including transparency, materiality, relevance, and reliability. The content and 
structure of the quality index follows GRI standards, including sections on: firm 
vision and environmental strategy, environmental governance structure, 
environmental management systems, and environmental results. The index relied on 
GRI reporting standards to identify environmental indicators relevant for firm 
reporting. Multiple relevant aspects of each indicator were identified to improve the 
ability of the index to capture quality. Each indicator and aspect was identified as 
either present or absent; indicators were not evaluated as being positive or negative.  
Moroney et al. (2009) adapted the Clarkson et al. (2008) environmental disclosure 
index to measure disclosure quality, which uses the GRI as its base. The GRI 
Guidelines offer a detailed listing of core performance indicators to aid in the 
preparation of sustainability reports comprising economic, environmental and social 
elements. Clarkson et al. (2008) index reflects the spirit of the GRI guidelines. The 
scoring model contains equally weighted disclosure items. Seven categories are used 
with four categories comprising hard disclosures and three categories comprising soft 
disclosures. „Hard‟ disclosures assess the environmental commitment of companies in 
an objective manner. They include governance structure and management systems, 
credibility, environmental performance indicators and environmental spending. „Soft‟ 
disclosures include the management‟s claims about their environmental initiatives, 
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such as vision and strategy, environmental profile and environmental initiatives. Most 
items in Clarkson et al. (2008) index relate to hard disclosures as reflected in the GRI 
guidelines because these disclosures indicate a stronger commitment by companies to 
protect the environment. However, the Clarkson et al. (2008) index was developed for 
use in a US context, where some of the items classified as being voluntary could be 
classified as mandatory within the Australian regulatory framework. But results were 
found not to be sensitive to the inclusion of these items in the analysis. The item “The 
presence of independent verification or assurance on environmental information 
disclosed” was removed when measuring voluntary environmental disclosure because 
this study‟s aim is to investigate whether environmental assurance enhances the 
quality of voluntary environmental disclosures.  
Bozzolan et al. (2009) proposed a framework for the analysis of a category of 
voluntary disclosure - that is forward-looking disclosure - that assesses the quality of 
the disclosure. The framework considers different quality dimensions: the content and 
the characteristics of information disclosed. Two different measures of forward-
looking disclosures were used. The quantity of forward-looking disclosure provided 
by the company is defined in absolute terms by counting the number of sentences 
including forward-looking information. The second measure, expressed in relative 
terms, is the number of sentences containing forward- looking information divided by 
the maximum extent of forward-looking disclosures offered by the company.  
Disclosure was analyzed according to its characteristics: the economic sign that 
communicates the direction of the expected impact upon the future performance of the 
firm and the measures used in order to quantify/qualify the expected impact. A 
sentence is codified as financially verifiable forward- looking information when it 
contains the expected impact on future performance and a measure of this impact. 
Each disclosed sentence was associated with a vector that can take five different 
values: 
 (0, 0, 0) if the sentence does not contain forward-looking information;  
 (1, 0, 0) if the sentence contains forward- looking information but does not 
offer indication of the expected impact and does not disclose a measure;  
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 (1, 1, 0) if the sentence contains forward-looking information and offers 
indication on the expected impact but does not disclose a measure; 
 (1, 0, 1) if the sentence contains forward- looking information and discloses a 
measure but does not offer indication of the expected impact on future 
performance; 
 (1, 1, 1) if the sentence contains forward- looking information, its expected 
impact of future performance disclosing also a measure. 
As a result, the score for the disclosure offered by each is the sum of the vectors 
representing the score for each sentence.   
Moneva and Cuellar (2009), in analyzing the value relevance of different types of 
financial and non-financial environmental disclosures, introduced an important issue 
that affects the quality and homogeneity of environmental information, namely, 
whether the disclosure of the measurements employed is voluntary or obligatory. 
Environmental disclosures were classified into five items: policy, environmental 
management systems, environmental assets, environmental expenditures and 
environmental liabilities and contingencies. Two additional exogenous financial 
measures were included, namely investment in R&D activities and the age of the 
assets of the firm. In order to separate the disclosure into voluntary and mandatory, 
the study differentiated between a period in which the information is voluntary and 
another in which it is obligatory, establishing the assumption that the introduction of 
mandatory reporting mechanisms may ensure relative uniformity in reporting 
practices and provide minimum disclosure.  
Mouselli and Hussainey (2010) adopted the measure of disclosure quality developed 
in Hussainey et al. (2003). Their measure of disclosure quality is the number of future 
orientated statements in corporate annual report narrative sections that contain 
earnings-related topics. The disclosure measure focuses on earnings indicators 
because the authors claim that these indicators increase the stock market‟s ability to 
foresee future earnings change. The disclosure score was estimated in three steps. In 
the first step, the narrative sections of annual reports were searched for future 
orientated information using a list of thirty- five keywords. In the second step, the 
relevant information to the stock market in assessing the firm‟s future earnings were 
 662
identified using a list of twelve keywords related to earnings indicators. Finally, QSR 
N6 was used to count the number of sentences that include both at least one future 
orientated keyword and at least one earnings indicator.  
Sun et al. (2010) examined the quality of corporate environmental disclosure in the 
annual reports of UK companies. Disclosure scores are given to different 
environmental information items based on the degree to which companies are 
disclosing the core KPIs in accordance with the UK Government‟s Environmental 
Key Performance Indicators (KPI) – Reporting Guidelines for UK Business.  
Accordingly, disclosures were classified as follows: 0 = no quantification; 1 = general 
quantification; 2 = data that could be derived to meet Government Guidelines; and 3 = 
disclosure that meets Government Guidelines. In this regard, the study - as argued by 
the authors - is reflecting on the recent claim by the UK government that 
environmental reporting is a significant element of corporate reporting. 
Plumlee et al. (2010) examined the quality of a firm‟s voluntary environmental 
disclosures for a sample of US firms across five industries.  Voluntary environmental 
disclosure quality is measured using a disclosure index similar to the index used in 
Clarkson et al. (2008) that is consistent with the Global Reporting Initiative disclosure 
framework. In addition to overall disclosure quality, the study also considered the 
type (i.e. hard/soft) and the nature (i.e. positive/neutral/negative) of the disclosure in 
the analysis of a firm‟s voluntary environmental disclosures.  Disclosure items were 
classified as Hard (Soft) based on whether that are objective (subjective). However, 
classifying disclosures as positive/neutral/negative is based on the general type of 
environmental information rather than a classification of the firm response. The 
authors argue that the good/bad/neutral classification, that is based on whether the 
disclosure reflect increases/decreases/no change relative to prior earnings, makes it 
difficult to determine how the information disclosed should be classified without a 
baseline to use as comparison.  
Delmas and Blass (2010) used a methodology for the analysis of the content of 
environmental disclosure in corporate annual reports and websites as that developed 
by Brammer and Pavelin (2006). It consists of the aggregation of the following seven 
indicators to represent the quality of companies‟ corporate environmental disclosure: 
(1) Does the firm publish an environmental or sustainability report?; (2) If yes, is it 
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according to the Global Reporting Initiative guidelines?; (3) Has the CEO/president 
signed the environmental policy?; (4) Transparency and ease of obtaining information 
measured using the number of clicks from home page needed in order to read the 
environmental information or policy. (5) Does the firm have specific and clear goals 
and improvement targets? (6) Does the firm report actual performance numbers or just 
relative numbers? (7) Are the firm‟s reported numbers verified by a third party?  
In addition, the environmental reporting score measurement of the Pacific Social 
Index, developed by the Roberts Environmental Center (REC) at Claremont McKenna 
College, was used. The REC combines qualitative and quantitative measurements to 
examine the quality of environmental reporting using measures similar to the ones 
used in the previous analysis. These include the description of environmental issues 
and initiatives to address these issues, the existence of measurement metrics, explicit 
numerical goals and recognition from third parties. The score is based on the 
percentage of issues that were covered and how well they were covered.  
Eugster and Wagner (2011) used a direct measure of the voluntary disclosure quality 
of a company. An annual value reporting rating, conducted by the Department of 
Banking and Finance of the University of Zurich, was used as a measure of voluntary 
disclosure quality. The disclosure quality was assessed using a scorecard with over 
100 questions aggregated into 35 items in 9 sub- indices/categories, which are thought 
to be important for the decision-making process of an investor. The total score of the 
ranking is a straightforward summation of the checklist with 35 items, which are 
graded (1 = no information; 6 = very high information quality) based on the  
information content and quality. The currently required disclosure level was specified 
on the checklist that assessors use to rate companies. The ratio of the number of 
reached points over the number of total reachable points was used as a measure of 
voluntary disclosure quality. 
Glaum et al. (forthcoming, 2011) measured disclosure quality with data from a yearly 
annual-report competition. In order to assess the quality of disclosures, data from an 
assessment of financial reports that takes place annually in Germany within the 
framework of a competition for “the best annual report” were used. On the basis of a 
comprehensive check list including more than 300 criteria, each annual report is 
assessed by analysts who have been specially trained for this evaluation. In the course 
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of the evaluation it is determined whether the information has actually been reported  
by the companies and in how much detail it has been reported. In other words, the 
quantity and the detail of the information published by the company are decisive for 
the quality rating. Individual items on the check list are weighted with factors that 
were determined in the course of interviews with and questionnaire surveys.  
To supplement the information supplied by the annual report, which is in large part 
related to the past, the management report is thus obliged to provide future-oriented 
details that are potentially of great interest to investors and analysts. The quality of the 
reports is judged not only on the quantity of information provided, but also on 
whether reports contain only general verbal information or comparative information, 
quantitative ranges of values or precise point estimates. As in all scoring and ranking 
procedures, data from annual-report contests are based in part on subjective 
judgments and weighting. However, the authors claim that, in comparison with 
alternative measures, they have two advantages: they enable direct measurement of 
quality, and they are consistently gathered by independent scientists over relatively 
long periods of time. 
Magness and Bewley (2011), in examining environmental reporting, used the 
disclosure-rating tool developed and used in the Clarkson et al. (2008) study. This 
tool was based upon the Global Reporting Initiative, a reporting framework developed 
by a joint group consisting of the Coalition of Environmentally Responsible 
Economies and UN Environmental Program. This GRI-based disclosure scale has a 
total of 45 items, each of which is assigned to one of seven categories. Categories 
include four sections of hard disclosure items including information related to 
governance, credibility, environmental performance indicators, and environmental 
spending. The authors argued that hard disclosure are types of information that are 
more likely to be used as quality signals because they cannot be easily mimicked by 
low quality companies without incurring considerable cost. The remaining sections 
include information about environmental vision, profile, and initiatives. These three 
sections are classified as soft information disclosures because they include broad 
claims that lack substantiation and can therefore be easily mimicked by other 
companies. 
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Acerete et al. (2011) investigated mandatory rather than voluntary environmental 
information in Spain. Environmental items analyzed included: Note about accounting 
criteria; Note about environmental items (Description of environmental assets; 
Measurement of environmental assets, Amortization of environmental assets, Annual 
environmental investment, Environmental expenditures, Description of environmental 
provisions, Measurement of environmental provisions, Transfer to environmental 
provisions, Application of environmental provisions, Environmental contingencies, 
Environmental liabilities); Environmental information in management reports. The 
items in the checklist enable focusing on qualitative features of the information. An 
environmental disclosure index was constructed for the concessionaires for each year. 
Each environmental reporting item is scored one if it was reported in the notes to the 
financial statements and zero if not. The index is computed by adding the scores of 
each item dividing this by the sum by the maximum number of items. If there is no 
information available about an item, but it is specifically mentioned in the notes to the 
financial statements, it is scored 0.5. This index allows assessment of the evo lution of 
the environmental reporting of the companies.  
Siddique et al. (2011) defined the quality of disclosure in terms of relevance or what 
to report. Relevant environmental disclosure constitutes: a) information on the impact 
of organizational activities on natural environment and b) the consequences of the 
community perception of such impact on financial and operational activities of the 
organization. This definition is guided by Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) G3 
guidelines; Global Climate Disclosure Framework; and Climate Disclosure Standard 
Board Framework. A list of relevant environmental disclosure included: (1) 
Disclosure on strategy (identifying challenge; identifying business impact; setting 
performance target) and (2) Disclosure on impact and performance (material, water 
and energy use; pollution: emission/effluents and waste; product and service; 
transport; Compliance to environmental regulation). The list implies that 
environmental information is relevant when it provides information on the company's 
impact on natural environment including use of resources and pollution, and the 
company's strategy in identifying risks and opportunities results from such impact.  
Liu et al. (2011) investigated environmental disclosure using the methods and 
criterions of international environmental performance evaluation. Environmental 
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disclosure level is evaluated by using index method. Full score is 100. The first part is  
75, in 25 indexes. All indexes are equally-weighted. The highest score of each index 
is 3. Each index is valued score of 0, 1 and 3. 0 represents no disclosure information, 
1 represents only a little description of the index, 3 represents the index is detailed 
described. The full score of the second part is 25. Disclosure forms including 
Environmental disclosure (social responsibility report) reports and environmental 
information descriptions. If a listed company discloses the independent corporate 
environmental report, it can earn 10. Otherwise, it gets 0. Within the regulation of 
paragraph description, if there is an independent description, it is recorded the score 
of 3. By this kind of analogizes; the highest description of each paragraph is 15.  
Clarkson et al. (2011) adopted the same voluntary environmental disclosure index 
developed by Clarkson et al. (2008). They developed a voluntary environmental 
disclosure quality index based on the Global Reporting Initiative framework and the 
advice of a GRI expert. The standards are based on a set of reporting principles 
important to analysts and investors, including transparency, materiality, relevance, 
and reliability. The content and structure of the quality index follows GRI standards, 
including sections on: firm vision and environmental strategy, environmental 
governance structure, environmental management systems, and environmental results. 
The first four categories represent hard disclosures and the remaining three categories 
represent soft disclosures. The relative weighting of hard compared to soft disclosures 
reflect the GRI‟s focus on hard d isclosures.  
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Table 2.5 
Empirical Studies On Corporate Disclosure Quality Measurement     
Type of Quality Measure Type of Disclosure  Author(s) & Date  
Researcher-constructed 
disclosure index 
Environmental disclosures Wiseman (1982) 
Researcher-constructed 
disclosure index 
Social responsibility 
disclosure 
Guthrie and 
Matthews (1985) 
Researcher-constructed 
disclosure index 
Social disclosures 
Freedman and 
Stagliano (1992) 
Researcher-constructed 
disclosure index 
Social disclosure Patten (1995) 
Researcher-constructed 
disclosure index 
Social and environmental 
reporting 
Gray et al. (1995b) 
Researcher-constructed 
disclosure index 
Environmental disclosures Gamble  et al. (1995) 
Researcher-constructed 
disclosure index 
Social responsibility 
disclosure 
Robertson and 
Nicholson (1996) 
Researcher-constructed 
disclosure index 
Environmental disclosure 
Walden and 
Schwartz (1997) 
Researcher-constructed 
disclosure index 
Environmental disclosures Hughes et al. (2001) 
Researcher-constructed 
disclosure index 
Environmental disclosure Raar (2002) 
Researcher-constructed 
disclosure index 
Environmental disclosure Toms (2002) 
Researcher-constructed 
disclosure index 
General disclosure Hooks et al. (2002( 
Analyst disclosure quality 
ranking  
Trip le bottom line reporting Milne et al. (2003) 
Researcher-constructed 
disclosure index 
Risk disclosure 
Beretta and 
Bozzo lan (2004) 
Researcher-constructed 
disclosure index 
Voluntary disclosure Beattie et al. (2004) 
Researcher-constructed 
disclosure index 
Social reporting  
Hammond and 
Miles (2004) 
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Type of Quality Measure  Type of Disclosure Author(s) & Date  
Researcher-constructed 
disclosure index 
Environmental disclosure 
Al-Tuwaijri et al. 
(2004) 
Analyst disclosure quality 
ranking  
Trip le bottom line reporting 
Chapman and Milne 
(2004) 
Researcher-constructed 
disclosure index 
Environmental disclosure 
Hasseldine et al. 
(2005) 
Researcher-constructed 
disclosure index 
Social disclosure 
Van der Laan Smith 
et al. (2005) 
Researcher-constructed 
disclosure index 
Environmental disclosure 
Van Staden and 
Hooks (2007) 
Researcher-constructed 
disclosure index 
Environmental disclosure 
Gibson and 
O‟Donovan (2007) 
Researcher-constructed 
disclosure index 
Environmental and social 
disclosure 
Raar (2007) 
Researcher-constructed 
disclosure index 
General disclosure Grüning (2007) 
Researcher-constructed 
disclosure index 
Forward-looking disclosure 
Beretta and 
Bozzo lan (2008) 
Researcher-constructed 
disclosure index 
Voluntary environmental 
disclosures 
Clarkson et al. 
(2008) 
Researcher-constructed 
disclosure index 
Voluntary environmental 
disclosures 
Plumlee et al. 
(2009) 
Researcher-constructed 
disclosure index 
Environmental disclosure 
Moroney et al. 
(2009) 
Researcher-constructed 
disclosure index 
Forward-looking disclosure 
Bozzo lan et al. 
(2009) 
Researcher-constructed 
disclosure index 
Environmental disclosures 
Moneva and Cuellar 
(2009) 
Researcher-constructed 
disclosure index 
General disclosure 
Mouselli and 
Hussainey (2010) 
Researcher-constructed 
disclosure index 
Environmental disclosure Sun et al. (2010) 
Researcher-constructed 
disclosure index 
Voluntary environmental 
disclosures 
Plumlee et al. 
(2010) 
Analyst disclosure quality 
ranking  
Environmental disclosure 
Delmas and Blass 
(2010) 
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Type of Quality Measure  Type of Disclosure Author(s) & Date  
Analyst disclosure quality 
ranking  
Voluntary disclosure 
Eugster and  
Wagner (2011) 
Analyst disclosure quality 
ranking  
General disclosure 
Glaum et al. 
(forthcoming, 2011) 
Researcher-constructed 
disclosure index 
Environmental reporting  
Magness and 
Bewley (2011) 
Researcher-constructed 
disclosure index 
Mandatory environmental 
disclosure 
Acerete et al. (2011) 
Researcher-constructed 
disclosure index 
Environmental disclosure 
Siddique et al. 
(2011) al. 
Researcher-constructed 
disclosure index 
Environmental disclosure Liu et al. (2011) 
Researcher-constructed 
disclosure index 
Voluntary environmental 
disclosure 
Clarkson et al. 
(2011) 
 
 
2.7   DISCUSSION OF PRIOR RESEARCH: LITERATURE GAP 
Corporate environmental reporting has been widely discussed by academic research 
for more than four decades. The development of environmental accounting and 
reporting has created a space for the researchers to study how organizations can 
benefit from this interaction with the society, i.e. the value relevance of environmental 
activities (Gray, 2010). With the growing importance of the environmental issues in 
the business transactions, companies started implementing a focused strategic 
management approach in environmental practices (Roy and Ghosh, 2011). These 
corporate practices induce researchers to quantify the value relevance of this 
environmental management system. 
A considerable body of literature from a wide range of theoretical backgrounds 
concluded that environmental disclosures are an important phenomenon employed by 
corporations (Gray et al., 2001) and are influenced by a variety of explanatory factors. 
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Adams (2002) indicated that an understanding of the factors which influence 
disclosure is necessary for improving accountability and specifically: 
 The extensiveness of reporting, 
  The quality and quantity of reporting by individual companies,  
 The completeness or comprehensiveness of reporting (by understanding the   
reasons for non-disclosure), and  
 The disclosure of critical analysis of the (potential) role of legislation in 
achieving improvements in the abovementioned areas.  
However, the assessment of environmental disclosures quality remains a rather 
controversial issue. Several attempts have been made in the accounting literature to 
measure disclosure quality. Two approaches of quality assessment commonly 
employed are the use of subjective analyst disclosure quality rankings and the use of 
researcher-constructed disclosure indices (Beatti et al., 2004). Each of the two 
approaches, and even the different measures developed under each approach, may 
have their respective strengths and weaknesses in capturing the necessary data for 
addressing stakeholders' interests and satisfying their information needs. Nevertheless,  
the growing importance of narrative disclosures in financial reporting gives the 
question of disclosure quality measurement a different perspective, while bearing in 
mind that disclosure quantity generally has an implication in determining disclosure 
quality (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2008). Such perspective shifts the issue of disclosure 
quality from volumetric measurement to semantic assessment. This shift in disclosure 
quality assessment is argued to have the advantages of permitting the benchmarking 
of current disclosure practices, allowing comparisons to be made among different 
companies, industries and countries and allowing changes over time to be monitored 
as well as permitting more powerful investigation of narrative disclosure issues 
(Beatti et al., 2004). 
Prior literature regarding the relationship between corporate environmental disclosure 
and each of corporate governance mechanisms and corporate characteristics suffers 
from a number of well-known limitations that contribute to the inconsistency and 
inconclusiveness of existing findings. While these studies draw conclusions as to 
organizations' environmental commitment based largely on the amount of disclosure, 
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they rarely considered the actual content of what is being disclosed. Overcoming the 
limitations inherent in previous studies would significantly enhance research in this 
area. Following is a detailed analysis and critical evaluation of empirical studies 
investigating the impact of corporate characteristics and corporate governance 
mechanisms on the quantity and quality of corporate environmental disclosure as well 
as disclosure quality assessment issues. Analysis of previous studies is aimed at 
identifying any gaps in the literature and presenting a preliminary introduction to the 
present study. Accordingly, these studies are analyzed and evaluated in terms of their 
contribution to the present study and the relationship between previous studies and the 
present study is highlighted. 
First, and most important, is the limited prior research specifically investigating the 
relationship between each of the quantity and the quality of corporate environmental 
disclosure and corporate governance. Although previous research has acknowledged 
that good corporate governance is associated with increased transparency and credible 
disclosure (see Ajinkya et al., 2005; Cormier et al., 2010; Dunstan, 2008; Gul and 
Leung, 2004), little attention has been dedicated to the impact of corporate 
governance mechanisms on environmental disclosure practices. Prior empirical 
studies into factors which are influential in determining the extent and quality of 
corporate social and environmental reporting has primarily been concerned with the 
impact of corporate characteristics (such as size, industry grouping and financial 
performance) or general contextual factors (such as the social, political and economic 
context), while relatively little prior work has examined the internal contextual factors 
(corporate governance mechanisms) influencing disclosure practices (Adams, 2002).  
The principles of corporate governance established by the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) set out a framework for good practice, and 
constitute a set of voluntary recommendations for corporations in all the major areas 
of business ethics, including environment and information disclosure. A company 
implementing OECD guidelines on corporate disclosure should consider undertaking 
a certain amount of environmental reporting (OECD, 2004). Accordingly, corporate 
governance plays an important role in determining the disclosure required for 
satisfying the information needs of various stakeholders as it is the board of directors 
that manages information disclosure in annual reports (Gibbins et al., 1990; Haniffa 
 602
and Cooke, 2005). Hence, it is possible that failure to include corporate governance 
characteristics could account for the inconsistency and inconclusiveness 
characterizing the results of corporate social and environmental disclosure studies 
(Gul and Leung, 2004). The main objective of the present study is to empirically 
examine the relationship between corporate governance and the quantity and quality 
of corporate environmental disclosures in UK companies, while controlling for 
corporate characteristics. 
In addition, the majority of previous studies have adopted an aggregated  view of 
environmental disclosures rather than disaggregating disclosures into main themes or 
categories (Campbell, 2004). Although these studies included some sort of 
classification scheme of environmental disclosures, they did not separately identify 
such disclosure groupings or individually incorporate them into empirical analyses  
(see for example, Brammer and Pavelin, 2006; Deegan and Gordon, 1996; Deegan 
and Rankin, 1996; García-Ayuso and Larrinaga, 2003; Post et al., 2011; Stanny and 
Ely, 2008). While a composite or summary measure, that collapses different 
disclosure categories into a single value, is useful in associating disclosure quantity 
with other variables of interest, the analysis of the different disclosure categories 
provide deeper understanding of and richer insights into disclosure quantity (see 
Beattie et al., 2004), thereby help to comprehensively profile the disclosure strategies 
adopted by the company (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004). Aggregated measures shift 
attention away from what is and what is not being reported in terms of the different 
themes or items being reported (Chapman and Milne, 2004). Accordingly, the current 
study distinguishes between the different categories or areas of activity to which the 
environmental disclosure relates including environmental policies, environmental 
product and process-related, regulatory compliance, environmental auditing, 
sustainability and other environmentally-related information. 
There is no prior research to date into the relationship of corporate environmental 
disclosure and corporate governance that uses comprehensive governance indicators 
or that thoroughly examines the relationship in a complete manner. These studies 
have been limited to the effects of firm ownership and board structure as explanatory 
factors. More specifically, they examined different ownership forms, the proportion of 
independent directors, board size, role duality and the existence of an audit 
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committee. According to Ho and Wong (2001) however, previous studies that 
examine the impact of corporate governance on environmental disclosure analyzed 
the effect of one single corporate governance attribute and very few of them examined 
different governance attributes in a single study (e.g. Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; 
Rupley et al., 2011). Based on the idea that the corporate governance system is the 
result of a series of interrelated characteristics, all of which are relevant to ensure 
sound governance, environmental disclosure should be analyzed in the context of a 
collection of corporate governance mechanisms. Conducting extensive field work is 
thus important to better understand, document and operationalize corporate 
governance variables (Zahra and Pearce II, 1989). Therefore, the present study 
provides a comprehensive representation of corporate governance by incorporating 
several corporate governance mechanisms into examining the impact on corporate 
environmental disclosure practices.  
Although some studies have examined the relationship between corporate voluntary 
disclosure and corporate governance, very few of them have been conducted in the 
UK. Only two UK studies (Brammer and Pavelin, 2006; 2008) - as far as I am aware - 
have specifically investigated the impact of corporate governance on voluntary 
environmental disclosure. Therefore, prior UK studies to date have not 
comprehensively addressed the potential impact that corporate governance variables 
may have upon environmental disclosure practices. The findings of the studies 
conducted in other countries are not at all relevant to be generalized to the UK 
community. There are quite striking differences across these countries. Differences 
exist with respect to culture; accounting systems; banking and finance systems; 
government and legislative systems; and the attitudes of society towards the 
legitimate roles of companies and the extent to which they should be held responsible 
for the environmental impacts of their activities (Gray et al., 1996; Guthrie and 
Parker, 1990; Patten, 1995). It is therefore considered useful to expand corporate 
environmental responsibility disclosure literature by providing further UK evidence 
on the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and environmental 
disclosure practices. The present study examines such relationship within the British 
context. 
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A second major criticism of previous literature on corporate environmental 
responsibility disclosures is that the results tend to be inconsistent and/or 
inconclusive. Inconsistency may be attributed to (a) a lack of theory, (b) diversity of 
empirical databases examined and (c) the absence of a single conceptual framework to 
analyze the required relationships (Belkaoui and Karpik, 1989). A major flaw lies in 
the lack of any explicit comprehensive environmental responsibility theory 
underpinning the analysis performed and sufficient to explain why corporations 
engage in social responsibility endeavors (Roberts, 1992). The probability of still 
insufficiently specified theories exist (Gray et al., 2001). The diversity of empirical 
databases examined refers to the use of different samples of firms, the focus on 
different years and different time spans, the use of different control variables, and the  
use of different dimensions and proxies for the dependent and independent variables  
(Gray et al., 1996). Finally, failure to analyze the required relationships within a 
single conceptual framework contributes to the diversity of the results.  Research on 
corporate social responsibility lacks a dominant paradigm because different 
researchers have heterogeneous backgrounds and thus are influenced by different 
values and ideologies (Orlitzky et al., 2011). 
Inconclusiveness of previous research showing controversial and mixed results may 
be attributed to several reasons including differences in socio economic and political 
environments between countries, organizational structures, construction of the 
informational items in disclosure indices and sampling error (Ahmed and Courtis, 
1999). An example would be the mixed evidence that board structure affects 
environmental disclosure. Halme and Huse (1997) found that board of director factors 
are positively related to differences in corporate environmental reporting. Barako et 
al. (2006) found that board composition is negatively associated with voluntary 
environmental disclosure as did Haniffa and Cooke (2005). However, Brammer and 
Pavelin (2006) found no significant relationship at all between the likelihood of 
making voluntary environmental disclosure and the number of non-executive 
directors. In fact, the few studies in this area have provided counterintuitive and 
unexpected results (Cheng and Courtenay, 2006). Existing evidence regarding the 
influence upon the propensity for firms to make voluntary environmental disclosures 
suffers from well-known limitations (Patten, 2002; Ullmann, 1985) that contribute to 
the inconclusiveness of existing findings (Gray et al., 2001). These limitations 
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concern the dimensions, types and proxies of each of the dependent variables and 
independent variables, the different control variables and their proxies, the sample 
size and type, the years and time spans, and the method of estimating relationships. 
Most earlier studies used the volume of disclosure as the dependent variable (Cowen 
et al., 1987; Patten, 1991; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Halme and Huse, 1997, Gul and 
Leung, 2004; Huafang and Jianguo, 2007) instead of a scoring system (Magness, 
2006). While volume of discussion may reflect the emphasis management places on a 
particular topic, it fails to capture the subtle issues inherent in management strategy 
(Neu et al., 1998). Focusing on the quantity of disclosures, however, does not mean 
that such disclosures are of higher quality so as to reflect the true state of the 
company's disclosure strategies (Ho and Wong, 2001). Hence, more disclosures do 
not necessarily imply more quality disclosures. Even most of the few studies that 
differentiated between the quantity and quality of disclosures (e.g. Magness, 2006; 
Mio, 2010) did not employ corporate governance characteristics as explanatory 
variables of environmental disclosures. Still the very few studies investigating the 
quality of environmental disclosure and incorporating corporate governance measures 
into the analysis (e.g. Brammer and Pavelin, 2008) failed to explicitly distinguish 
between the qualitative characteristics of the information disclosed. 
Another point to be considered in the quantity versus quality issue of environmental 
disclosures would be the independent focus upon each individual indicator of quality 
rather than an aggregated measure of quality. This would permit insight into whether 
indicators are complements or substitutes, as well as revealing the extent to which 
each is associated with particular corporate governance characteristics (Brammer and 
Pavelin, 2006). Therefore, a more refined and detailed measure and classification base 
that distinguish between various degrees and dimensions of environmental reporting 
should be used. The analysis of the different quality dimensions provide deeper 
understanding of and richer insights into disclosure quality (see Beattie et al., 2004), 
thereby help to comprehensively profile the disclosure quality strategies adopted by 
the company (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004). Using content analysis, the present study 
attempts to develop a broadly defined disclosure quality index in line with the 
international accounting standards framework that captures the distinct nature of 
disclosure items and that distinguishes the different types of information content. The 
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development of an overall index encompassing the different qualitative characteristics 
of the information disclosed would be a major contribution of the present study that 
overcomes one critical limitation of prior research.  
Previous studies are often criticized for their samples. The samples analyzed have 
tended to be small and homogeneous. In other words, the samples included a small 
number of companies to be examined and restricted in diversity in both the size of the 
companies and their industrial composition (Brammer and Pavelin, 2006). Such 
samples ignore the contribution of boards in different types of firms to corporate 
performance (Zahra and Pearce II, 1989) and, hence, to disclosure practices. 
Specifically, empirical studies have focused upon the largest companies (e.g. Adams, 
2002; Gray et al., 2001; Guthrie and Parker, 1990), or those companies belonging to 
environmentally sensitive or high profile industries (e.g. Freedman and Jaggi, 1988; 
Gamble et al., 1995; Neu et al., 1998). The results of such studies are therefore less 
reliable and certainly cannot be generalized over the whole population. Accordingly, 
the sample used in the present study is the FTSE All-Share Index, which is the 
broadest index of UK listed companies. The use of a large and industrially diverse 
sample permits a more comprehensive exploration of the impact of the different 
corporate governance characteristics upon corporate environmental disclosures.  
In addition, the importance of time seems to be overlooked in existing literature. 
Almost all prior studies examining the determinants of corporate environmental 
disclosure are mainly cross-sectional in nature investigating the relationship over one 
year only (e.g. Adams, 2002; Brammer and Pavelin, 2006) except for very few studies 
(e.g. Barako et al., 2006; Campbell, 2004; Gray et al., 2001). No literature to date - as 
far as I am aware - has conducted any systematic longitudinal analysis of corporate  
environmental disclosure and corporate governance mechanisms within the UK. If 
such relationships exist, they may well only be revealed over time as they may prove 
to be unstable from year to year (Gray et al., 2001) or even from event to another 
within the year. Therefore, a longitudinal study on a yearly basis that can trace the 
disclosure practices over several years may help provide insights into the relationship 
in question. Moreover, it will help trace the trend of disclosure and the impact of 
corporate governance against the background of environmental and economic 
development in the country (Haniffa and Cooke, 2005). In an attempt to address the 
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empirical deficit in UK environmental disclosure studies, the present study sets out to 
define its sample both in longitudinal and cross-sectional perspective, over 2004-2007 
inclusive, so as to provide a contribution to the literature on determinants of 
environmental reporting of UK companies. Longitudinal analysis would help to 
resolve issues concerning causality and shed more light on the evolving pattern of the 
environmental disclosures (Brammer and Pavelin, 2006). 
Finally, a major concern is that many earlier studies use a method of estimation, 
typically Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), which is unsuitable for categorical censored 
data such as those typically gleaned from content analysis (Brammer and Pavelin, 
2006). In addition OLS fail to control adequately for firm size, industry and other 
significant determinants of disclosure decisions (Patten, 2002). Therefore, GLS 
regression is undertaken to further test the research hypotheses and to attest the 
reliability of the main OLS regression results. Finally, sensitivity analysis using 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) pooled regression with robust standard error is carried 
out to check the sensitivity and, hence, the robustness of the main regression analysis. 
The main objective of the current study is to empirically examine the relationship 
between corporate governance and each of the quantity and the quality of corporate 
environmental disclosures in the UK, while controlling for some corporate 
characteristics as well as an in-depth exploration of quality identification and 
assessment issues. The major contribution or originality of the current research is its 
being the first study, to the best of my knowledge, to empirically address corporate 
environmental disclosure quality assessment in line with the international accounting 
standards framework. It negates the traditional belief of quantity representation of 
quality and shifts disclosure quality perspective from volumetric measurement to 
semantic assessment. Such research investigating issues as environmental disclosure 
quality identification and assessment that are still relatively unexplored is quite 
essential. In this respect, the study is expected to fill an existing gap in corporate 
environmental disclosure literature.  
Consequently, it intends to systematically extend prior research within a UK context 
and to overcome the limitations inherent in prior research. The current study 
contributes to two streams of literature, the disclosure literature and corporate 
governance literature, by providing updated documentary and empirical evidence on 
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the association between corporate governance mechanisms and each of the quantity 
and quality of environmental disclosure practices in the annual reports of UK 
companies, while controlling for corporate characteristics. In doing so, it (a) 
distinguishes between the different categories or areas of activity to which the 
environmental disclosure relates; (b) incorporates several corporate governance 
mechanisms as possible explanatory variables for the quantity and quality of 
corporate environmental disclosure practices of UK companies; (c) develops a 
broadly defined disclosure quality index in line with the international accounting 
standards framework that captures the distinct nature of disclosure items and that 
distinguishes the different types of information content; (d) examines the annual 
reports of a large and industrially diverse sample, that is, FTSE All-Share Index; (e) 
conducts both longitudinal and cross-sectional analysis over 2004-2007 inclusive; and 
(f) employs several types of regression models and statistical analyses, including 
descriptive statistics; Pearson and Spearman correlations; and OLS, GLS and  pooled 
OLS regressions.  
 
2.8   CONCLUSION   
This chapter provides a review of the pertinent prior literature on corporate 
environmental disclosures and the relationship of the quantity and the quality of such 
disclosures to corporate governance mechanisms. It commences with an overview of 
corporate environmental disclosure practices. Based on both prior literature and 
international standards and guidelines, corporate environmental disclosure is taken to 
comprise disclosures relating to the company‟s environmental policies, environmental 
product and process-related, compliance with environmental laws and standards, 
environmental auditing, sustainability and other environmentally-related information 
Environmental disclosure quality is defined in terms of a well-supported framework 
elaborated by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) to reflect on a 
generally accepted notion of disclosure quality as fits with the purpose of the current 
study. Current corporate environmental reporting in the UK is essentially a voluntary 
activity guided by several national and international environmental reporting 
initiatives and frameworks. These frameworks of standards and guidelines can be 
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classified under three distinct but complementary categories, including codes of 
conduct; management standards; and screenings and rankings. 
The concept of corporate governance is introduced to encompass both internal aspects 
of the company, such as internal controls and board structure, and external aspects 
such as the relationship with shareholders and other stakeholders. The development of 
corporate governance policy in the UK has undergone fundamental changes since the 
publication of the Cadbury Report. Although the government has issued some 
consultation documents and reports, the system of corporate governance in the UK is 
fundamentally self-regulatory. However, corporate governance has been recently 
linked to long-term corporate sustainability that concerns various stakeholder groups.  
The chapter then explores prior literature on the quantity and quality corporate 
environmental disclosure and their association with corporate governance 
mechanisms. Previous studies are divided into the following three streams of studies 
that are relevant to the present study: prior studies examining the relationship between 
environmental disclosure quantity and each of corporate characteristics and corporate 
governance; prior studies examining the relationship between environmental 
disclosure quality and each of corporate characteristics and corporate governance; and 
prior studies examining environmental disclosure quality identification and  
assessment issues.  
The chapter concludes with a discussion highlighting possible reasons for the failure 
of prior research to establish consistent and conclusive results and identifying any 
gaps in the existing literature. Of particular interest is the assessment of environmental 
disclosure quality which still remains a rather controversial issue. Calls have been 
made for a shift in the issue of disclosure quality from volumetric measurement to 
semantic assessment. The current study would attempt to respond to such calls. 
Consequently, the present study intends to systematically extend prior research within 
a UK context and to overcome the limitations inherent in prior research. In doing so, 
the current study contributes to two streams of literature, the d isclosure literature and 
corporate governance literature, by providing updated documentary and empirical 
evidence on the association between corporate governance mechanisms and each of 
the quantity and quality of environmental disclosure practices in the annual reports of 
UK companies, while controlling for corporate characteristics.  
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However, proceeding with the current study, following pertinent literature review and 
the consequent identification of gaps in the existing literature, requires the adoption of 
a theoretical framework within which an analysis of the relationship in question is 
undertaken. Such a theoretical framework depicts the conceptual structure for 
supporting the study's argument and providing the necessary guidance in explaining 
the relationship between corporate environmental disclosure and corporate 
governance mechanisms. The next chapter presents the different theories that help 
explain each of environmental disclosure and corporate governance practices, along 
with a detailed discussion of the theoretical framework adopted by the present study. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
3.1   INTRODUCTION 
Reviewing pertinent prior literature reveals that different theoretical frameworks have been 
used to explain and analyze each of environmental disclosure practices and corporate 
governance mechanisms. In addition, literature employs several theories as guidance in 
explaining the relationship between environmental disclosure and corporate governance. 
Research on corporate social responsibility - and its association with corporate governance - 
lacks a dominant paradigm because different researchers have heterogeneous backgrounds 
and thus are influenced by different values and ideologies (Orlitzky et al., 2011; Parum, 
2005). However, it should be noted that a theory will not tell us what to do, but it will tell us 
what it is possible to do and what is not possible to do. In that way it removes countless 
things from consideration when we are confronted with the necessity of choosing or acting 
(Chambers, 1996). 
Although there is much variation in the theoretical perspectives being adopted, prior research 
from a wide spectrum of theoretical backgrounds has acknowledged that good corporate 
governance is associated with increased transparency and credible disclosure (see Ajinkya et 
al., 2005; Cormier et al., 2010; Dunstan, 2008; Gul and Leung, 2004). Hence, corporate 
governance is considered an important mechanism in determining the disclosure required for 
satisfying the information needs of various stakeholders as it is the board of directors that 
manages information disclosure in annual reports (Gibbins et al., 1990; Haniffa and Cooke, 
2005). 
The present study examines the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and 
the quantity and quality of corporate environmental disclosure practices in UK companies' 
annual reports. Corporate environmental responsibility can be seen as strategy adopted by a 
company to satisfy the environmental expectations of diverse stakeholders. According to the 
stakeholder theory, environmental reporting helps organizations in communicating the 
environmental dimensions of their activities, products and services. Environmental disclosure 
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is therefore regarded as part of the dialogue between the company and its stakeholders (Gray 
et al., 1995a). According to the agency theory, however, disclosure can help mitigate various 
principal-agent conflicts through sound corporate governance systems. 
Based on stakeholder-agency theory, the study's argument can be put forward as follows. 
Companies are increasingly considering the importance of demonstrating commitment to 
environmental responsibility, through the provision of complete and qualified environmental 
disclosure as means of managing their relationships with stakeholders. In this respect, sound 
systems of corporate governance are serving as accountability mechanisms, by which 
companies are made responsive to the rights and needs of stakeholders, through reducing 
information asymmetry. Therefore, it can be argued that the quantity and quality of corporate 
environmental disclosure directed to various stakeholders are enhanced when managers' 
opportunistic manipulation is monitored by corporate governance mechanisms.  
The reminder of the chapter is devoted to providing a theoretical framework of evidences that 
support the above argument. In doing so, it reviews the different theories that help explain 
each of environmental disclosure and corporate governance practices, followed by an analysis 
and critique of the different theoretical perspectives employed. Next is a detailed discussion 
of the theoretical framework adopted by the present study to examine the required 
relationship, justifying the choice of such framework. More specifically, the study would rely 
on the stakeholder-agency theory that would fit with the nature and scope of the empirical 
work. 
 
3.2 THEORIES OF CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTAL DISCLOSURE AND 
        CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
Social and environmental disclosure literature has indicated that there is much variation in the 
theoretical perspectives being adopted (Deegan, 2002), the absence of a  single conceptual 
framework to analyze the required relationships (Belkaoui and Karpik, 1989), the lack of any 
explicit comprehensive social and environmental responsibility theory underpinning the 
analysis performed (Roberts, 1992) and the existing probability of insufficiently specified 
theories (Gray et al., 2001). However, three prominent theories have dominated the 
explanations of social and environmental disclosure practices. These are stakeholder theory, 
 021
legitimacy theory and political economy theory. Both legitimacy and stakeholder theories 
have their roots in the political economy theory (Deegan, 2002). All of these theories are 
linked to the notion of the existence of a social contract between the organisation and society, 
whereby a firm is being held responsible and accountable to its entire stakeholders (Gray et 
al., 1996). Therefore, it has been argued that these theories are overlapping and 
complementary rather than competing as such (Gray et al., 1995a). In addition, signaling 
theory has been introduced as a possible explanation of voluntary disclosure practices, of 
which environmental disclosure is a significant category.  
Similarly, corporate governance does not have an accepted theoretical base or a common 
paradigm (Parum, 2005). Corporate governance has been explained and analyzed using 
different theoretical frameworks such as agency theory, stakeholder theory, legitimacy theory 
and stewardship theory. Reviewing corporate governance literature, however, it can be 
noticed that agency theory and stakeholder theory are the dominant theories. Stakeholder 
theory has a broader perspective than agency theory as it extends the concept of principal to 
include all interested parties rather than only shareholders. A further theoretical development 
embracing an even broader perspective than both theories has been the stakeholder-agency 
theory, as developed by Hill and Jones (1992). The integration of the stakeholder concept 
with agency theory has widened the principal-agent paradigm of financial economics.  
The main distinction between these theories is in the perspective from which they are viewed 
and examined. Following is a discussion of each of these theories and how they have been 
used in the literature. Overview of the different theoretical perspectives will be succeeded by 
an analysis and critique of these perspectives, justifying the choice of the theoretical 
framework adopted by the present study to examine the relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms and the quantity and quality of corporate environmental disclosure 
practices in UK companies' annual reports.  
 
3.2.1 Political Economy Theory 
Political economy theory has been used in accounting literature as a plausible explanation of 
corporate social and environmental disclosure practices. The term „political economy‟ refers 
to “the social, political and economic framework within which human life takes place” (Gray 
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et al., 1996: 47). Taking into consideration this broader socio-political perspective that may 
have an impact on corporate behaviour and on the choice of what information to be disclosed 
by a company, political economy theory can widen the level of analysis when explaining  
corporate social and environmental disclosure practices (Deegan and Unerman, 2006).  
Political economy theory “suggests that corporate disclosure is a proactive process of 
information provided from management's perspective, designed to set and shape the agenda 
of debate and to mediate, suppress, mystify and transform social conflict. This theory 
recognizes the potential for management to tell its own story or refrain from doing so, 
according to its own self- interest” (Guthrie and Parker, 1989: 351). The authors extend their 
discussion of the political economy perspective to include the accounting reports as the 
perceived media to exercise such disclosure. According to Guthrie and Parker (1990: 166),  
accounting reports “serve as a tool for constructing, sustaining, and legitimizing economic 
and political arrangements, institutions, and ideological themes, which contribute to the 
corporation's private interests. Disclosures have the capacity to transmit social, political, and 
economic meanings for a pluralistic set of report recipients”.  
The argument underlying the political economy perspective is that power conflict, inequality 
of power and the role of government lie at the heart of the structure of society which shapes 
all that goes on within it (Cooper and Sherer, 1984). The political environment could affect 
the development of accounting both directly and indirectly. Belkaoui (1983, 1985) argues that 
the political atmosphere, in general, and political rights and civil liberties, in particular, have 
significant influence on the development of accounting practices. In addition, the  political 
environment affects accounting in an indirect way through its effect on the national culture  
and the economy. The form of government influences national culture, which in turn 
influences the business and accounting environment.  
The political economy theory explanations of corporate social and environmental disclosure 
are concerned with the socio-political economic structure and associated power inequalities 
with emphasis on the existence of conflict of interests (Adams et al., 1995; Cooper and 
Sherer, 1984; Tilt, 1994) Under this perspective, corporate management declares their own 
conceptions and reiterate the surrounding social situation through their control over the 
reporting process (Adams et al., 1995; Guthrie and Parker, 1989, 1990). Accordingly, a 
corporation discloses social and environmental aspects that reflect its own beliefs, norms, 
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values and perceptions, which in turn benefits its self- interest while ignoring other aspects 
that are of interest to the society (Adams et al., 1995; Guthrie and Parker, 1990).  
Based on the above discussion, it can be inferred that management may, therefore, provide 
voluntary social and environmental information for two purposes. First, management may 
make disclosures to protect their self- interests in order to foster, sustain and legitimise 
relationships by portraying an impression of being socially responsible. Second, management 
may release social or environmental information in order to avoid further regulatory 
intervention. 
Two variants of political economy theory, identified by Gray et al. (1996) are „Classical‟ 
political economy and „Bourgeois‟ political economy. The Classical Marxian political 
economy emphasizes the importance of structural conflict, inequality and the role of the 
government, while the Bourgeois political economy tends to take these things as given, and 
are thus largely ignored where the world is broadly perceived as pluralistic (Gray et al., 
1996). Based on traditional roots of Classical political economy, Bourgeois political economy 
adopts a wider set of features incorporating ideas from the radical dimension such as notions 
of social justice and community harmony. Therefore, Gray et al. (1996) argue that Classical 
political economy has little to say concerning corporate social and environmental disclosure 
practices where much of this practice can be explained with the aid of Bourgeois political 
economy. Guthrie and Parker (1990) supported this view, arguing that Bourgeois political 
economy offered a number of valuable insights into explaining corporate social and 
environmental disclosure practices. Classical political economy theory has been asserted as 
offering insights by those trying to explain mandatory social disclosure rules, thus indicating 
the role of the government in handling structural conflict and inequality by imposing 
restrictions on companies while Bourgeois political economy theory is principally useful in 
explaining the absence of corporate social and environmental disclosure practice (Gray et al., 
1996).  
There have been several attempts to explain corporate social and environmental disclosure in 
light of Bourgeois political economy theory. However, the theory was not consistently 
supported. Examples of studies supporting the political economy explanations of the 
disclosure patterns include Guthrie and Parker (1989) and Guthrie and Parker (1990). 
Similarly, Adams et al. (1998) argued that relatively high social disclosure made by UK 
companies might be a result of attempting to prevent further social regulations by portraying 
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an impression of being socially responsible and thus, supporting a political economy 
explanation. In addition, Williams (1999) provide further support to political economy theory 
by arguing that firms voluntarily provide social and environmental information in response to 
the pressures of the social, political and economic systems that surround them.  
 
3.2.2 Legitimacy Theory 
Legitimacy theory has been widely used in the social and environmental disclosure literature 
as providing valuable insights into such disclosure practices. Legitimacy is defined by 
Lindblom (1994: 2) as: “a condition or a status which exists when an entity's value system is  
congruent with the value system of the larger social system of which the entity is a part. 
When a disparity, actual or potential, exists between the two value systems, there is a threat 
to the entity's legitimacy”. The argument underlying legitimacy theory is that organisations 
can only survive if they are operating within the framework of the society's norms and values. 
To maintain their legitimacy, companies may disclose social and environmental information 
voluntarily (O'Donovan, 1999) to legitimise their activities, that is, to obtain the society's 
impression of being socially responsible. Accordingly, corporate social and environmental 
disclosure aims to legitimise company behaviour by providing information intended to  
influence the society‟s perceptions about the company.  
Based on legitimacy theory, social and environmental disclosures are a means used by the 
company to influence the public policy process, either directly by addressing public and/or 
legislative concerns, or indirectly by projecting company's image as socially aware (Patten, 
1992). According to Guthrie and Parker (1989), legitimacy theory argues that the corporate 
disclosures are made as reactions to environmental pressures (economical, social, and 
political) and to legitimate the company's existence and actions. Hence, legitimacy theory 
suggests that the corporate environmental reporting is a function of the level of political and 
social pressure with which companies face concerning their environmental performance (Cho 
and Patten, 2007). In response to these pressures, firms react by disclosing more 
environmental information in order to preserve their image of being a legitimate company 
and to avoid the negative consequences caused by legitimacy crises (De Villiers and Van 
Staden, 2006). 
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Therefore, legitimacy theory emphasizes the importance of societal acceptance in ensuring a 
company‟s existence and survival (Ghazali, 2007). The author argues that an underlying 
assumption of legitimacy theory is the belief that a company‟s actions can have an impact on 
the surrounding environment in which it operates, and in case a company‟s activities are 
perceived to have detrimental or negative effects on the environment, the society may 
adversely react by boycotting the company‟s product or pressuring for government 
intervention. In this instance, firms legitimate their activities through various means, 
including communication with relevant stakeholders (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990). Corporate 
social and environmental disclosure, in particular, is provided as a means to justify the 
company‟s continued existence (Ghazali, 2007). This view of legitimacy has been recently 
extended to include what is called „environmental legitimacy‟, defined as “the generalized 
perception or assumption that a firm‟s corporate environmental performance is desirable, 
proper, or appropriate” (Bansal and Clelland, 2004: 94). Environmental legitimacy may 
influence how a firm chooses to express its environmental commitment and, hence, 
management‟s decisions regarding environmental disclosure  (Aerts and Cormier, 2009; 
Rupley et al., 2011). 
The notion behind legitimacy theory relates to the concept of „social contract‟ (Patten, 1992). 
The existence of an organisation is threatened if it is regarded as violating the implied social 
contract. This is usually believed to take place whenever the society members are not 
satisfied with the behaviour of the concerned company (Milne and Patten, 2002). Failure to 
comply with society expectations leads to revocation of the contract (Deegan and Rankin, 
1996). Alternatively, a pressure group might empower better  performance from the firm 
through putting pressure on it to meet expectations through legislation (Buhr, 1998). 
Therefore, Legitimacy theory forms a sort of stress on the corporations to react to the 
society's expectations (Guthrie and Parker, 1989). These society's expectations are satisfied 
by additional disclosure of social and environmental information (Wilmshurst and Frost, 
2000). 
Lindblom (1994) argues that an organisation may employ four legitimating strategies when 
faced with different legitimating threats. Thus, the organisation may: 
1. Seek to educate and inform its stakeholders about changes in the organisation's 
performance; 
 026
2. Seek to change stakeholders' perceptions about the organisation's performance without 
changing the performance itself;  
3. Manipulate perception by deflecting attention from the issues of concern to other 
related but appealing issues; 
4. Seek to change external expectations about its performance.  
It can be noticed that disclosure can play an important role in each of these four strategies. As 
long as legitimising activities are an effort to change negative perceptio ns, it is argued that 
any effective corrective action has to be accompanied by public disclosure (Cormier and 
Gordon, 2001; Deegan et al., 2000). Choice of an appropriate strategy is based on perceptions 
of society expectations, or terms of the social contract and how the society perceives the 
company is acting or responding (Deegan et al., 2002). Moreover, O'Donovan (2002) argues 
that the choice of the strategy, and disclosure reaction, largely depends on whether the 
intention of the action is to gain, maintain, or repair its legitimacy within the society. 
Numerous studies have employed legitimacy theory in social and environmental disclosure 
literature. A great deal of which have consistently supported the explanatory power of 
legitimacy theory (e.g. Deegan and Gordon, 1996; Deegan and Rankin, 1996; Gray et al., 
1995a; Patten, 1992). These studies found that a strong driving force of disclosure practices is 
the desire to legitimise organisational activities and to enhance corporate image (Clarke and 
Gibson-Sweet, 1999; Deegan and Rankin, 1996). Moreover, the increasing concern about 
society increased the level of social responsibility information in annual reports, which is 
believed to be legitimacy evidence supporting corporate reaction to society to gain its 
approval for the company's existence and growth (Deegan and Rankin, 1996; Patten, 1992). 
However, some studies failed to provide evidence that support legitimacy theory but rather 
might question the theory's ability to provide explanations as to corporate social and 
environmental disclosure practices (e.g. Campbell et al., 2003; Guthrie and Parker, 1989; 
O'Dwyer, 2002). Previous research concluded that legitimacy theory was inadequate to fully 
explain corporate social reporting indicating that “a relationship between legitimacy theory 
and disclosure was only marginally supported for environmental issues, unconfirmed for 
energy and community issues and subject to contradictory evidence for human resources 
issues” (Guthrie and Parker, 1989, p.351). In addition, Wilmshurst and Frost (2000) contend 
 027
that prior research has not provided consistent support for legitimacy theory and concluded 
that legitimacy theory provides limited explanation for the decision to disclose environmental 
information. Furthermore, Campbell et al. (2003) found that legitimacy theory has not 
provided an appropriate measure of the effect of disclosure changes in the perception of the 
relevant publics in isolation from other influences and events in the society.  
 
3.2.3 Stakeholder Theory  
Stakeholder theory has been widely employed in accounting literature as providing strong 
justification for both corporate social and environmental disclosure practices and corporate 
governance mechanisms. Stakeholder theory involves the recognition and identification of 
the relationship between the company's behavior and the impact on its stakeholders (Ansoff, 
1965). Therefore, “the corporation's continued existence requires the support of the 
stakeholders and their approval must be sought and the activities of the corporation adjusted 
to gain that approval. The more powerful the stakeholders the more the company must adapt” 
(Gray, et al., 1995a: 53). According to Gray et al. (1996), the organization has many 
stakeholders, hence, it owes accountability to all its stakeholders, referring to the wide range 
of responsibilities assigned to corporate decision-makers. In addition, the more important the 
stakeholder to the organization, the more effort will be made to manage and manipulate this 
relationship. Managing such relationship can be done by providing more information through 
voluntary social and environmental disclosures, to gain the support and approval of these 
stakeholders. 
The historical context of the current stakeholder theory was formed through three major 
developments in the intellectual, political and economic life of the 1970s and 1980s  (Hendry, 
2001). One of these was the introduction of a new economic theory of the firm, in which the 
firm was defined as a nexus of contracts, of which the principal-agent contract between 
shareholders and managers is a primary one. The interpretation of the principal-agent 
relationship, which is sometimes referred to as “stockholder theory”, was reinforced by the 
second key development of the period, the rise of the free-market private-property economic 
policies characteristic of the 1970s and 1980s. Earlier debates existed about the legitimate 
role of management, challenging the concept of the social responsibility of business by 
arguing that the moral responsibility of managers was to serve the interests of shareholders, 
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which generally will be to make as much as money as possible. The third key development of 
the period was the rapid growth of capital markets and takeover activity. This led to both 
legal and political engagement between managers and shareholders. The managers, who were 
rewarded on the basis of short-term stock market returns, were ready to embrace the new 
principal-agent concept and declare allegiance to their shareholders‟ objectives (Hendry, 
2001). 
Stakeholder theory first appeared, in the context of these developments, as a defense of the 
social responsibilities of the business and as a declaration that managers must have moral 
responsibilities to other interested parties, not just to its shareholders (Hendry, 2001). These 
interested parties are the stakeholders who have an interest or a stake in the corporation and 
who are a critical factor in determining the corporation‟s success or failure. Based on 
stakeholder theory, a variety of stakeholders are involved in the organization and each of 
them deserves some return for their involvement (Crowther and Jatana, 2005). Freeman 
(1984) had done a great effort in laying the foundation or groundwork for the development of 
the stakeholder theory in the early 1980s.  
Stakeholder theory begins with the assumption that values are a necessary part of doing 
business and rejects the separation of ethics and economics (Freeman, 1994). According to 
Freeman et al. (2004), stakeholder theory “asks managers to articulate the shared sense of the 
value they create and what brings its core stakeholders together. It also pushes managers to be 
clear about how they want to do business, specifically what kinds of relationships they want 
and need to create with their stakeholders to deliver on their purpose”. An organisation's 
activity is embedded in a network of stakeholder relationships (Darnall et al., 2010). 
Stakeholder theory development has centered around two related streams: (1) defining 
stakeholder concept, and (2) classifying stakeholders into categories that provide an 
understanding of individual stakeholder relationships (Rowley, 1997).  
Several attempts have been made as to stakeholders' definition. Freeman (1984: 25) defines a 
stakeholder as “any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of 
the firm‟s objectives”. Hill and Jones (1992: 133) define stakeholders as “constituents who 
have a legitimate claim on the firm”. This legitimacy is established through the existence of 
an exchange relationship. Gray et al. (1996: 33) define a stakeholder as “any human agency 
that can be influenced by, or can itself influence, the activities of the organization in 
question”. These definitions provide the core boundaries of what constitutes a stake. An 
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organization is, therefore, likely to have many stakeholders such as shareholders, customers, 
suppliers, employees, creditors, competitors, public interest groups, local communities, 
governmental bodies, stock markets, industry bodies, national and international society and 
the general public. Each of the stakeholders can be seen as supplying the firm with critical 
resources and in exchange each expects its interests to be satisfied (Hill and Jones, 1992). 
Stakeholders‟ classification can take various forms. For example, internal or external; 
primary or secondary; owners or non owners of the firm; owners of the capital or owners of 
less tangible assets; actors or those acted upon; those existing in a voluntary or an involuntary 
relationship with the firm; and resource providers to or dependents of the firm. Different 
stakeholders influence organizations in different ways; some stakeholders have more 
influence over organizations than others. This depends on: (1) the structural nature of the 
organization/stakeholder relationship; (2) the contractual forms existing; and (3) the 
institutional support available (Friedman and Miles, 2002). A useful differentiation, however, 
has been made between primary and secondary stakeholders (Freeman, 1984; Mitchell et al., 
1997). 
A primary stakeholder group is one without whose continuing participation the corporation 
can not survive as a going concern. Primary stakeholders have a direct economic stake in the 
organization (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). Accordingly, primary stakeholders include 
those who are directly related to an organization and have the ability to impact its bottom line 
directly such as shareholders, creditors, managers and employees, customers, suppliers, 
regulatory stakeholders and community stakeholders. Shareholders provide the firm with 
capital and in exchange, they expect receiving a satisfactory risk-adjusted return on their 
investments and realizing appreciation in stock market value over time. Creditors provide the 
firm with finance and in exchange expect their loans to be repaid on schedule. Managers and 
employees provide the firm with time, skills, and human capital commitments. In exchange, 
they expect fair income and adequate working conditions. Customers supply the firm with 
revenues and expect value for money in exchange. Suppliers provide the firm with inputs and 
seek fair prices and dependable buyers in exchange. Regulatory stakeholders, mainly 
governmental bodies, are interested in influencing business by exerting political, legal, social, 
and governmental pressures on companies to act in an environmentally responsible 
behaviour. Community stakeholders include local community groups, environmental 
organizations and other political lobbies. Local communities provide the firm with locations, 
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a local infrastructure, and perhaps favorable tax treatment, and in exchange, they expect 
corporate citizens who enhance and/or do not damage the quality of environment (Clarkson; 
1995; Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Freeman, 1984; Henriques and Sadorsky, 2008; Hill and 
Jones, 1992; Mitchell et al., 1997; Waddock and Graves, 1997). 
Secondary stakeholders are those who influence or affect, or are influenced or affected by the 
corporation, but they are not engaged in transactions with the corporation and are not 
essential for its survival. Secondary stakeholders are not directly involved in the firm‟s 
economic transactions (Mitchell et al., 1997). Secondary stakeholders can benefit or damage 
a firm through their influence on primary stakeholders. Accordingly, secondary stake holders 
include the general public and media. The general public, as taxpayers, provides the firm with 
a national infrastructure, and in exchange, they expect corporate citizens, who enhance and/or 
damage the quality of environment and do not violate the rules of the game established by the 
public through their legislative agents. The media, through mass communication technology,  
can influence society‟s perception of a company. Hence, it can mobilize public opinion in 
favor of or against a corporation‟s environmental performance (Clarkson; 1995; Donaldson 
and Preston, 1995; Freeman, 1984; Henriques and Sadorsky, 2008; Hill and Jones, 1992; 
Mitchell et al., 1997; Waddock and Graves, 1997). 
The main advantage of stakeholder theory is providing a means of dealing with multiple 
stakeholders with multiple conflicting interests. It has been argued that the satisfaction of 
interests of the different stakeholders is achieved using system centered theory (Freeman, 
1984). Stakeholder theory offered a new perspective in the context of corporate social 
responsibility research by suggesting that the needs of shareholders cannot be met without 
satisfying the needs of other stakeholders (Foster and Jonker, 2005; Jamali, 2008). Hence, 
stakeholder theory provides a useful framework to evaluate corporate social and 
environmental reporting activities (Snider et al., 2003). Stakeholder theory has two different 
categories (Gray et al., 1996; Deegan, 2000). The first category relates to the ethical or 
normative branch (which is prescriptive) and the second category relates to the managerial 
branch (which is descriptive).  
The ethical or normative perspective of stakeholder theory argues that all stakeholders have 
certain minimum rights that must not be violated and should be met regardless of the power 
of the stakeholders involved. Accordingly, and in conformity with the concept of social 
contract, all stakeholders have a right to be provided with information about the 
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organization's impact on them, regardless of whether or not such information would be 
utilized (Deegan, 2000). Taking into account the notion of rights to information, Gray et al. 
(1996: 38) define accountability as “the duty to provide an account (by no means necessarily 
a financial account) or reckoning of those actions for which one is held responsible”. They 
argue that such accountability involves two responsibilities or duties: (a) the responsibility to 
undertake certain actions; and (b) the responsibility to provide an account of those actions.  
The accountability model developed by Gray et al. (1996) hypothesizes a two-way 
relationship between the management of an organization and stakeholders. Applying the 
accountability model necessitates the existence of a reporting system of the organisation's 
activities. Hence, the need for additional information to voluntarily disclose social and 
environmental performance to inform stakeholders about the extent to which managers' 
responsibility have been fulfilled (Gray et al., 1991) as is implied by the corporate 
governance principal of disclosure and transparency. Under the accountability model, the 
argument is that the principal can choose to ignore the information provided by the agent, 
who nevertheless, is still required to provide an account (Gray et al., 1991) to fulfill the 
principles of best practice of corporate governance.  
The normative stakeholder theory can be further distinguished into three different kinds 
(Hendry, 2001). The first kind maintains that in a just society a business should be managed 
in the interests of all stakeholders not only shareholders. Any consideration of the actual state 
of the laws and institutions is relevant only to the extent that these laws and institutions 
conform to the ethical ideals of a just society. Normative stakeholder theory of the second 
kind maintains that the laws and institutions of society should be modified to reflect the 
greater managerial responsibility toward stakeholders. The second kind may appear as a 
corollary to the first kind, in that structuring an ideal society settings permits comparison with 
existing realities and suggesting modifications. The third kind of normative stakeholder 
theory maintains that managers should not only take the interests of all stakeholders into 
account, but also consult those stakeholders and allow their participation in the decision 
making processes of the firm (Hendry, 2001). 
The second category of stakeholder theory relates to the managerial branch. Unlike the 
normative ethical branch of stakeholder theory, the managerial perspective of stakeholder 
theory argues that organizations will tend to satisfy the information demands of those 
stakeholders who are important to the organization's ongoing survival. Some stakeholders 
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have more influence over the organization than others (Friedman and Miles, 2002). Whether 
a particular stakeholder receives information will be dependent upon how powerful that 
stakeholder is perceived to be (Deegan, 2000). Mitchell et al. (1997) argued that stakeholder 
identification and salience is a function of stakeholders' possessing one or more relationship 
attributes: power, legitimacy and urgency.  
A stakeholder's power to influence corporate management is viewed as a function of the 
stakeholder's degree of control over resources required by the organization (Ullmann, 1985). 
Power, in this sense, means the ability to use resources to make an event happen or to secure 
a desired outcome. For example, UK Corporate Governance Code (2010) of corporate 
governance gives shareholders the legitimate right to cast a vote, thereb y influencing 
company policy and hence protecting their investment. Another important notion of power in 
the corporate environmental responsibility literature is the political power by which 
governments - or other stakeholders using their resources to pressure government - create 
legislation, make regulations, or bring lawsuits against corporations or by which to adopt new 
laws or regulations or to take legal action against a company. A stakeholder group achieves 
legitimacy if it has a legitimate standing in a society or legitimate claims on the firm. The 
urgency attribute incorporates both the notion of time sensitivity - the pressing need on the 
part of the stakeholder that its concerns/claims be given immediate attention and the notion of 
criticality - the belief on the part of the stakeholder that its claims are critical and highly 
important (Mitchell et al., 1997). 
According to Ullmann (1985), the more critical the stakeholder resources are to the continued 
viability and success of the organization, the more powerful the stakeholders and the greater 
the probability that the stakeholder demands will be incorporated within the organization's 
operations. Some of these demands may relate to the provision of environmental informatio n 
that is directly related to the expectations of particular stakeholder groups. Donaldson and 
Preston (1995: 67) also argued that the stakeholder theory is managerial in that “it does not 
simply describe existing situations or predict cause-effect relationships; it also recommends 
attitudes, structures and practices that, taken together, constitute stakeholder management. 
Stakeholder management requires, as its key attribute, simultaneous attention to the 
legitimate interests of all appropriate stakeholders, both in the establishment of organizational 
structures and general policies and in case-by-case decision making”. However, managerial 
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stakeholder theory does not imply that all stakeholders should be equally involved in the 
decision-making process. 
Based on the above discussion, it is worth mentioning that normative approach of  
stakeholder theory, which relates to the accountability cannot be powerful in providing 
explanations for corporate social and environmental disclosure undertaken by organisations 
(Gray et al., 1996) and thus, cannot provide prediction as to managerial behaviour in terms of 
practices (Deegan, 2002). Under the managerial approach of stakeholder theory, however, 
corporate social and environmental disclosure can be seen as part of the dialogue between the 
organization and its stakeholders (Gray et al., 1995a). Hence, such disclosure is regarded as a 
means by which stakeholders are managed to gain support and approval for the organization's 
continued existence (Gray et al., 1995a) as well as to distract stakeholders' opposition and 
disapproval (Gray et al., 1996) rather than to discharge accountability (Deegan, 2002).  
Nevertheless, since accountability in this model is based on management's self-perceptions of 
the significance of particular stakeholders, the information needs of important but less 
powerful individuals and groups may be overlooked. Therefore, stakeholder theory can help 
with providing indicative interpretation as to which stakeholder groups are considered by the 
organisation to be more powerful and important and, accordingly, the organisation would 
seek to influence through disclosure practices (Gray et al., 1996). 
The stakeholder theory has been presented and used in three different and distinct ways as to 
methodologies, types of evidence, and criteria of appraisal. Donaldson and Preston (1995: 65) 
argued that stakeholder theory has been advanced and justified in the literature explicitly or 
implicitly “on the basis of its descriptive accuracy, instrumental power, and normative 
validity”. The descriptive or empirical approach is used to describe and/or explain specific 
corporate characteristics and behaviors. For example, it has been used to describe the nature 
of the firm, the way managers think about managing, how board members think about the 
interests of corporate constituents, and how corporations are actually managed. The 
instrumental approach is used to identify the connections, or lack of connections, between 
stakeholder management and the achievement of traditional corporate objectives. This theory 
has been widely used in studies of corporate social responsibility, suggesting that adherence 
to stakeholder principles and practices achieves conventional corporate performance 
objectives. The normative approach is used to interpret the function of the corporation, 
including the identification of moral or philosophical guidelines for the operation and 
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management of corporations. Normative concerns dominated the classic stakeholder theory 
and continued to dominate in its most recent versions (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). 
Descriptive stakeholder theory proposes stakeholder answers to questions of fact; 
instrumental stakeholder theory proposes stakeholder-oriented answers as to how managers 
meet specific objectives, which may or may not have ethical elements; and the normative 
stakeholder theory draws on ethical percepts to propose stakeholder-oriented answers to 
questions of corporate governance (Hendry, 2001). Briefly stated, the three theories address 
the questions of what happens? What happens if? And what should happen? respectively 
(Jones, 1995). In other words, “Proponents of stakeholder theory strive to describe what 
managers actually do with respect to stakeholder relationships, what would happen if 
managers adhered to stakeholder management principles, and what managers should do vis-a-
vis dealing with firm stakeholders” (Jones, 1995: 406).  
Donaldson and Preston (1995) argued that the underlying epistemological issue in the 
literature is the problem of justification: Why should the stakeholder theory be accepted or 
preferred over alternative theories? The answer to this question is related to the distinct 
purpose that the theory is intended to serve. Descriptive justifications attempt to show that the 
concepts underlying the theory correspond to observed reality, instrumental justifications 
attempt to show evidence of the connection between stakeholder management and corporate 
performance, while normative justifications attempt to explain underlying concepts such as 
individual or group rights, social contract, or and corporate social responsibility (Donaldson 
and Preston, 1995). They concluded that normative aspects underpin stakeholder theory in all 
of its three forms. 
Regarding the explanation of corporate social and environmental disclosure practices, it can 
be concluded, that stakeholder theory explains the observable relationships in the real world 
based on its descriptive aspect (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). Using the managerial branch 
of the stakeholder theory, corporate social and environmental disclosure is regarded as a 
means by which stakeholders are managed to gain support and approval for the organization's 
continued existence (Gray et al., 1995a) as well as to distract stakeholders' opposition and 
disapproval (Gray et al., 1996). Stakeholder theory recognizes that there are a broad range of 
stakeholders who are interested in the environmental behaviour of companies and, 
consequently, demand information regarding the impact of their activities on the environment 
(Moneva and Llena, 2000). To the extent that firms recognize the rights of their stakeholders‟ 
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interests, they tend to voluntarily report more environmental information in order to meet 
their requests (Monteiro and Aibar-Guzmán, 2010).  
Various stakeholders are demanding more disclosure of corporate environmental information 
due to their interest in the environmental issues and its related costs and liabilities 
(Mastrandonas and Strife, 1992). In respond to this demand, many corporations are issuing 
voluntary separate environmental reports apart from the traditional annual financial reports. 
Moreover, environmental issues are taken into consideration of stakeholders' risk and return 
(Neu et al., 1998). Furthermore, stakeholders are increasingly demanding that environmental 
disclosure truly and fairly represents companies' past and future achievements (Gray, 2000). 
Therefore, developing stakeholder theory provides structure for the environmental issues of 
the relationship between stakeholders and business corporations (Joseph, 2007).  
 
3.2.4 Signaling Theory 
Signaling theory has been employed as a possible explanation of voluntary disclosure 
practices, of which environmental disclosure is a significant category. The concept of 
signaling was first introduced in 1973 by Spence, based on the seminal work of Akerlof in 
1970. Signaling is a reaction to information asymmetry where managers have more 
information than stakeholders have. Signaling theory shows how information asymmetry can 
be reduced when the party with more information signals it to others (Morris, 1987). 
Signaling theory recognizes the separation of ownership and management and holds that 
market pressures motivate managers to disclose information. Managers, having more 
information about the company than other stakeholders, may send signals to interested parties 
so as to distinguish themselves from other companies. Hence, voluntary disclosure can be 
regarded as a means of signaling such information. 
Signaling theory predicts that healthy firms are likely to disclose more information than 
distressed firms (Ross, 1979). However, when information is costless, managers will disclose 
both good and bad information, as stakeholders would put the worst interpretation on non 
disclosure (Grossman, 1981). Furthermore, managers voluntarily disclose both good and bad 
news, as the good news signals quality and bad news is  signaled to reduce the reputation 
costs incurred for non disclosure in the relevant time and, therefore, to prevent a decline in 
 036
the firm's share price (Skinner, 1994).  Even companies with no information may have 
incentives to continue with disclosing in order to distinguish themselves from companies with 
bad news. Hence, it can be argued that the extent and quality of the signaled information play 
an important role as the firm faces a trade-off between reducing the value of its informational 
advantage and raising financing at better terms. 
Nevertheless, managers may choose to follow a non disclosure policy. Non disclosure, 
especially in a highly competitive environment, aims to protect the company from adverse 
effects of hiding or mitigating the severity of bad news (Ockabol and Tinker, 1993). 
Moreover, Dye (1985) indicated that even a company with good news may choose to 
withhold information. On the other hand a company with bad news may choose to disclose 
this news if the company is worried about the competitors' reaction to this information. 
Possible reasons for non disclosure may be that managers do not have information to disclose 
(Penno, 1997) or uncertainty about the effect of disclosure on the manager's performance 
(Nagar, 1999). 
However, in order to signal successfully, managers should use credible signals (Eccles et al., 
2001). Otherwise, the firm would be penalized if it provides misleading information (Hughes, 
1986). An attempt to falsely signal quality results in no subsequent disclosures being seen as 
credible. Farrel and Gibbons (1989), examined how signaling is affected by the presence of 
different stakeholders, such as investors and competitors. They argued that when a company 
is more concerned with its relationship with investors than potential competitors, it will signal 
truthfully. On the other hand, if the company is more concerned about preventing market 
entrance, it will adopt a strategy of non verifiable claims, whereby signals will not be 
credible. In a similar vein, Newman and Sansig (1993) draw attention to the difficulty of the 
signaling process when many parties or multiple users are involved. 
Signaling theory has been used in many studies to explain disclosure decisions by managers. 
However, the theory has been criticized in many respects. The main criticism is made as to 
the assumption of signaling theory that managers are acting in their own interest. 
Furthermore, a number of authors criticize the assumption of equal distribution of power. 
They argue that it is not individuals who exercise power but institutions (Gray et al., 1996). 
Finally, an attention is drawn as to the empirical difficulty of the signaling process when 
many parties or multiple users are involved (Newman and Sansig, 1993). 
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3.2.5 Agency Theory 
Agency theory has been dominantly used in accounting literature to explain and analyze 
corporate governance practices. Agency theory was introduced during the 1970s as a new 
economic theory of the firm, in which the firm was defined as a nexus of contracts, of which 
the principal-agent contract between shareholders and managers is a primary one. Agency 
theorists such as Jensen and Meckling (1976) sought to determine the form of contracts that 
would maximize shareholder utility. The new economics was quickly absorbed into the 
practice of corporate governance, as being dominated by a concern with the agency 
relationship between shareholders and managers and with the regulations and contractual 
terms through which conflicts arising from such relationship might be addressed (Hendry, 
2001; Jensen and Murphy, 1990). 
An agency relationship is defined as one in which one or more persons (the principal) engage 
another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating 
some decision-making authority to the agent (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Ross, 1973). A key 
assumption of agency theory is that the interests of principals and agents diverge. Two 
problems exist in agency relationships. First, the agent and the principal have conflicting 
goals. Second, the principal and the agent have different propensities to accept risk (Jones, 
1995). In addition, the author suggested two reasons for agent failure to adequately pursue the 
interests of the principal; moral hazard and adverse selection. „Moral hazard‟ exists due to a 
lack of effort on the part of the agent. „Adverse selection‟ exists when the agent does not 
behave in the manner preferred by the principal (see also Heath and Norman, 2004).  
According to agency theory, the separation of ownership and management results in agency 
costs which are categorized as: (a) monitoring costs, incurred by principal to reduce agent 
actions that are not in the principal's interests; (b) bonding costs, incurred by the agent to 
guarantee that the agent does not undertake actions that are not in the principal's interests; and 
(c) residual loss, incurred because monitoring and bonding may not fully align agent behavior 
and principal interests (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Agency theory is based on assumptions 
regarding information asymmetry, opportunism, and possible conflict of interests (Halme and 
Huse, 1997). Thus, there is a need to control or monitor managers to ensure that their efforts 
maximize shareholders' wealth. Agency costs are incurred in order to reduce or eliminate the 
effects of agency conflicts, which exist when managers or agents undertake opportunistic 
actions to maximize their own interests. 
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Agency theory is the most recognized and prominent perspective that has guided research on 
corporate boards (Zahra and Pearce II, 1989). Within the framework of corporate governance 
mechanisms, agency theory suggests that managers are more likely than stockholders to 
emphasize corporate social and environmental concerns because they have no residual claim 
on a firm‟s income (Graves and Waddock, 1994). In other words, agents might show devoted 
concern for the environment because they are not spending their own money (Halme and 
Huse, 1997). Furthermore, agents are more likely than principles to pursue non-profit goals, 
e.g. environmental protection, in order to secure their positions (Wang and Coffey, 1992). 
Therefore, environmental disclosures can be function of corporate governance in the sense 
that managers who have better access to a firm‟s information than shareholders can make 
credible disclosure to enhance firm value by reducing agency costs, as disclosure is one of 
monitoring devices used to reduce such costs (Craswell and Taylor 1992).   
 
3.2.6 Stakeholder-Agency Theory 
Stakeholder-agency theory, a further theoretical development embracing a broader 
perspective than agency theory and stakeholder theory, has been developed by Hill and Jones 
(1992). The integration of the stakeholder concept with agency theory has widened the 
principal-agent paradigm of financial economics to develop stakeholder-agency theory which 
is considered to be a generalized theory of agency. Stakeholder-agency theory attempts to 
explain the nature of the implicit and explicit contractual relationships that exist between a 
firm's stakeholders. Specifically, this paradigm “helps explain the following: (1) certain 
aspects of a firm's strategic behaviour; (2) the structure of management-stakeholder contracts; 
(3) the form taken by the institutional structures that monitor and enforce contracts between 
managers and other stakeholders; and (4) the evolutionary process that shapes both 
management-stakeholder contracts and the institutional structures that police those contracts” 
(Hill and Jones, 1992: 131). 
Under stakeholder-agency theory, the firm is viewed as a nexus of contracts between resource 
holders or stakeholders. Stakeholder-agency theory encompasses the implicit and explicit 
contractual relationships between all stakeholders. Therefore, the theory expands agency 
relationship to include other stakeholders. Accordingly, managers can be seen as the agents 
of all other stakeholders. Stakeholders differ among themselves with respect to their stake in 
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the firm, to their importance, and to their power towards the managers. This distinction is 
important because stakeholders with a high stake will demand more comprehensive incentive 
mechanisms and governance structures in order to safeguard their investments in the firm.  
Hill and Jones (1992) indicate that this approach can be viewed as a modification of agency 
theory, which assumes efficient markets and rejects the idea of power differentials between 
managers and stakeholders. However, stakeholder theory admits the existence of market 
inefficiencies and accommodates theories of power or resource dependency theory that 
implicitly assumes inefficient markets which recognize the existence of unequal resource 
dependencies (power differentials) between managers and stakeholders. Some of the 
strategies pursued by managers with respect to stakeholders are regarded as an attempt to 
make use of these power differentials. As a result, new incentive structures and institutional 
mechanisms evolve to monitor and enforce the terms of implicit contracts between managers 
and stakeholders. These incentive structures and institutional mechanisms reduce transaction 
costs to the point where further reductions in such costs are balanced by the costs of 
developing more complex institutional structures to reduce them (Friedman and Miles, 2002). 
Moreover, integration of agency theory with stakeholder theory gives attention to the special 
role of managers towards all stakeholders. The information asymmetry between managers 
and other stakeholders expands the management's role to include a duty of safeguarding the 
welfare of the corporation and of balancing the conflicting claims of multiple stakeholders to 
achieve this goal. This can be secured through a number of institutional structures or 
governance mechanisms (such as the board directors, the market for corporate control and the 
legal superstructure of society) that have emerged for the monitoring and enforcing the terms 
of implicit contracts (Hill and Jones, 1992).  
On the one hand, monitoring mechanisms overcome the problem of information asymmetry 
that exists between managers and stakeholders. Managers are in a position to conceal or 
distort the information released or disclosed to stakeholders. Stakeholders, in turn, use their 
own monitoring mechanisms to gather and analyze additional information, the costs of which 
may be prohibitive. However, monitoring mechanisms achieve economies of scale in 
information gathering and analysis, primarily through the employment of specialists, the 
consequence of which is a reduction in utility loss. Monitoring mechanisms include: (a) 
legislative structures requiring annual disclosures; (b) information-selling organizations such 
 040
as stock analysts‟ services and consumer reports; (c) non-profit monitoring organizations 
such as labor unions (Hill and Jones, 1992).  
On the other hand, enforcement mechanisms are employed by stakeholders prior to any 
resource exchange in an attempt to prevent management from benefiting at the expense of 
stakeholders. The effectiveness of such devices depends on their credib ility (Schelling, 1960), 
so that the benefits of reducing the utility loss from management opportunism outweigh the 
costs involved in putting these mechanisms into effect. Enforcement mechanisms include: (a) 
law, imposing legal penalties, such as laws against insider trading, antitrust regulations and 
pollution regulations; (b) exit, from the exchange relationship, involving a threat to withdraw 
resources from the firm if management fails to serve stakeholder interests; and (c) voice, as 
articulated by labor unions, consumer unions, and special- interest groups having a legitimate 
claim to represent shareholder interests, where publicity can severely damage managerial 
reputation (Hill and Jones, 1992; Hirschman, 1970; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).  
Finally, Hill and Jones (1992) contend that, unlike earlier theories, the stakeholder-agency 
paradigm explicitly focuses on the causes of conflict between managers and stakeholders. In 
addition, stakeholder-agency theory embraces and highlights the concepts underlying the 
adjustment mechanisms that realign management and stakeholder interests in case of conflict 
of such interests. Managing these conflicts necessitates the use of voluntary disclosure, 
particularly environmental disclosure, by managers to communicate with stakeholders and to 
acquire their support (Watson et al., 2002). Different stakeholders have different priorities 
and need different information. Moreover, their ability to get information is different. 
Therefore, effective use of disclosure policy, in terms of both quantity and quality, may help 
in building trust with the shareholders and other stakeholders. Hence, stakeholder-agency 
theory may provide some useful insights to the current research.  
 
3.2.7 Discussion, Analysis, And Critique  
Different theoretical frameworks have been used in the accounting literature to explain and 
analyze each of environmental disclosure practices and corporate governance mechanisms. 
Three prominent theories have dominated the explanations of social and environmental 
disclosure practices. These are stakeholder theory, legitimacy theory and political economy 
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theory. In addition, signaling theory has been introduced as a possible explanation of 
voluntary disclosure practices, of which environmental disclosure is a significant category. 
Reviewing corporate governance literature, however, it can be noticed that agency theory and 
stakeholder theory are the dominant theories. The main distinction between these theories is 
in the perspective from which they are viewed and examined.  
All of the three socio-political theories of corporate social disclosure are linked to the notion 
of the existence of a social contract between the organisation and society, whereby a firm is 
being held responsible and accountable to its entire stakeholders (Gray et al., 1996). They 
suggest that the extent of social and environmental disclosure is dependent on the exposure to 
public pressure in the social and/or political environment in the form of social or regulatory 
changes (Patten, 2002), Therefore, it has been argued that these theories are overlapping and 
complementary rather than competing as such (Gray et al., 1995a). These theories, however, 
“are not as yet fully fledged theories ... but provide useful frameworks within which to study 
the developing practice of CSR” (Gray et al., 1996: 49). Accordingly, there has been a 
tendency by some researchers to rely upon more than one theory in providing an explanation 
for managerial behaviour (Fiedler and Deegan, 2002). 
Political economy theory shares much with stakeholder theory and legitimacy theory. Both 
legitimacy and stakeholder theories have their roots in the political economy theory (Deegan, 
2002). In much of the applications, legitimacy theory and stakeholder theory tend to reflect a 
bourgeois political economy (Gray et al., 1995a; Gray et al., 1996). The differences between 
legitimacy theory and political economy theory lie in how the means and motivations are 
viewed, with both theories giving perspectives as to the means to organisational legitimacy 
(Buhr, 1998). Legitimacy theory borrows some insights from stakeholder theory. This mainly 
relates to identifying the relevant stakeholders. While legitimacy theory focuses on the whole 
society, the focus of stakeholder theory is rather directed towards particular groups which are 
deemed to be more powerful in influencing the future of the company (Deegan, 2002).  
However, attempts to explain corporate social and environmental disclosure in light of 
Bourgeois political economy theory revealed that the theory was not consistently supported. 
The political economy theory explanations of corporate social and environmental disclosure 
are concerned with the socio-political economic structure and associated power inequalities 
with emphasis on the existence of conflict of interests (Adams et al., 1995; Cooper and 
Sherer, 1984; Tilt, 1994) Under this perspective, corporate management declares their own 
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conceptions and reiterate the surrounding social situation through their control over the 
reporting process (Adams et al., 1995; Guthrie and Parker, 1989, 1990). Accordingly, a 
corporation discloses social and environmental aspects that reflect its own beliefs, norms, 
values and perceptions, which in turn benefits its self- interest while ignoring other aspects 
that are of interest to the society (Adams et al., 1995; Guthrie and Parker, 1990).  
Similarly, prior literature has questioned the explanatory power of legitimacy theory 
(O‟Dwyer, 2002) and has suggested that there is a need for integrating legitimacy theory with 
other dimensions to provide a complementary understanding of the contents of social and 
environmental disclosures (Bebbington et al., 2008). Previous research concluded that 
legitimacy theory was inadequate to fully explain corporate social reporting indicating that “a 
relationship between legitimacy theory and disclosure was only marginally supported for 
environmental issues, unconfirmed for energy and community issues and subject to 
contradictory evidence for human resources issues” (Guthrie and Parker, 1989: 351). In 
addition, Wilmshurst and Frost (2000) contend that prior research has not provided consistent 
support for legitimacy theory and concluded that legitimacy theory provides limited 
explanation for the decision to disclose environmental information. I t is observed that firms 
refer to legitimacy theory through voluntary disclosures as a fear from violating the social 
contract (Joseph, 2007).  
Furthermore, legitimacy theory focuses on society and compliance with societal expectations 
as embedded in the social contract. However, society is clearly made up of various groups 
having unequal power or ability to influence organisations and other groups. Given that 
legitimacy theory is dealing with perceptions, the theory has not provided an appropriate 
measure of the effect of disclosure changes in the perception of the relevant publics in 
isolation from other influences and events in the society (Campbell et al., 2003). Therefore 
the theory has not provided an attention to the conflict of interests of the different 
stakeholders, assuming that environmental disclosure is likely to sufficient in terms of 
quantity and quality, which is questionable as it might not actually be the case.  
Stakeholder theory, however, explicitly acknowledges this fact. The insights pro vided by 
stakeholder theory can help in identifying which groups might be relevant to particular 
management decisions. Therefore, stakeholder theory can help with providing indicative 
interpretation as to which stakeholder groups are considered by the organisation to be more 
powerful and important and, accordingly, the organisation would seek to influence through 
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disclosure practices (Gray et al., 1996). The stakeholder theory's main advantage is providing 
a means of dealing with multiple stakeholders with multiple conflicting interests. Stakeholder 
theory offered a new perspective in the context of corporate social responsibility research by 
suggesting that the needs of shareholders cannot be met without satisfying the needs of other 
stakeholders (Foster and Jonker, 2005; Jamali, 2008). Hence, stakeholder theory provides a 
useful framework to evaluate corporate social and environmental reporting activities (Snider 
et al., 2003). 
Regarding the explanation of corporate social and environmental disclosure pract ices, it can 
be concluded, that stakeholder theory explains the observable relationships in the real world 
based on its descriptive aspect (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). Using the managerial branch 
of the stakeholder theory, corporate social and environmental disclosure is regarded as a 
means by which stakeholders are managed to gain support and approval for the organization's 
continued existence (Gray et al., 1995a) as well as to distract stakeholders' opposition and 
disapproval (Gray et al., 1996). 
Signaling theory has been used in many studies to explain disclosure decisions by managers. 
However, the theory has been criticized in many respects. The main criticism is made as to 
the assumption of signaling theory that managers are acting in their own intere st. 
Furthermore, a number of authors criticize the assumption of equal distribution of power. 
They argue that it is not individuals who exercise power but institutions (Gray et al., 1996). 
Finally, an attention is drawn as to the empirical difficulty of the signaling process when 
many parties or multiple users are involved (Newman and Sansig, 1993). Its applicability is 
questioned especially when investors are less sophisticated and/or when data are unavailable 
(Abd-Elsalam and Weetman, 2003). 
Agency theory ignores the fact that managers have significant motives to conceal adverse 
information or manipulate results in order to maximize their benefits (Ghazali, 2004). 
Okcabol and Tinker (1993) indicate that this theory fails to account for non-financial 
motivations for suppressing disclosure. Moreover, Crowther and Jatana (2005) consider 
agency theory as a cause of failure in corporate governance. They indicate that there may be 
no relationship between the principal and agent. In other words, there is no requirement or 
even expectation that a shareholder will remain shareholder for extended period of time. This 
highlights the wider concept of stakeholder theory, where there are other stakeholders that 
represent the principal under this theory even if the shareho lder has not keep shares for 
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extended period of time. In addition, the authors indicated another deficiency of agency 
theory, where managers under share option schemes may be considered also as principals.  
Both agency theory and signaling theory are derived from a pure economic approach. Unlike 
the socio-political approach, which takes into consideration the relationship with society and 
other organizations, a pure economic approach suffers from several limitations. It is based on 
the desire for income and avoiding loss (Bedford, 1973). Consequently, it concentrates on 
profit maximization as the primary goal of the organization (Huse and Rindova, 2001) 
ignoring the other organisational goals. Focusing on monetary or wealth considerations limits 
the scope of relevant environmental disclosure as well as its intended purpose (Cormier et al., 
2005). In addition, a pure economic approach concentrates on only two groups of 
stakeholders; i.e. managers and shareholders, and pays no attention to other interested part ies 
in the society, such as creditors, suppliers, government, taxation authorities and consumer 
groups. This approach has also been criticized in that “the economic domain cannot be 
studied in isolation from the political, social and institutional framework within which the 
economic takes place” (Gray et al., 1995a: 52). Furthermore, economic theories are based on 
the assumption of efficient capital markets, which practically might not always be the case. 
This is in addition to the fact that many potential users of environmental information may not 
evolve in these markets at all (Cormier et al., 2005).   
In contrast, social-political theories provide a more comprehensive perspective on 
environmental disclosure as they explicitly recognize that an organization's economic activity 
takes place within the society's political, social and institutional framework (Cormier and 
Gordon, 2001; Deegan et al., 2002; Gray et al., 1995a; O‟Donovan, 2002; O‟Dwyer, 2002; 
Patten, 1991; Roberts, 1992). Most interesting and informative insights into social and 
environmental disclosure are drawn from the use of these theoretical perspectives, which 
argue that environmental disclosure is a way to legitimize an organization's operations and a 
means to manage its stakeholders in order to gain support and approval for the organization's 
continued existence (Cormier et al., 2005; Gray et al., 1995a). In practice, environmental 
disclosures are being used by companies to determine the companies‟ relationships with 
society in general and the environmental pressure groups in particular (Gray et al., 1995c). 
Moreover, there is evidence that firms will react to outside events to enhance corporate image 
and respond to stakeholders' demands; for example, firms modified their disclosure practices 
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following major environmental disasters such as Bhopal and Exxon Valdez oil spill, 
(Blacconiere and Patten, 1994; Walden and Schwartz, 1997).  
A significant contribution to literature has been made by Hill and Jones (1992) to develop 
stakeholder-agency theory. The integration of the stakeholder concept with agency theory has 
widened the principal-agent paradigm of financial economics. Hill and Jones (1992) contend 
that, unlike earlier theories, the stakeholder-agency paradigm explicitly focuses on the causes 
of conflict between managers and stakeholders. In addition, stakeholder-agency theory 
embraces and highlights the concepts underlying the adjustment mechanisms that realign 
management and stakeholders interests in case of conflict of such interests. Managing these 
conflicts necessitates the use of voluntary disclosure, particularly environmental disclosure, 
by managers to communicate with stakeholders and to acquire their support (Watson et al., 
2002). Different stakeholders have different priorities and need different information. 
Moreover, their ability to get information is different. Therefore, effective use of disclosure 
policy, in terms of both quantity and quality, may help in building trust with the shareholders 
and other stakeholders. Hence, stakeholder-agency theory may provide some useful insights 
to the current research.  
 
3.3   THE ROLE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN DETERMINING 
        CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTAL DISCLOSURE    
Based on the discussion of the different theoretical perspectives, stakeholder-agency theory 
provides an appropriate justification and suitable conceptual framework for the present study 
expecting corporate governance mechanisms to have a significant effect on corporate 
environmental reporting practices in the UK. Stakeholder-agency theory is adopted as the 
study's theoretical framework because the study seeks to understand to what extent the 
variables of interest may influence organizational actions in responding to various 
stakeholder groups. Hence, stakeholder-agency theory may provide some useful insights to 
the current research. 
The present study explores the relationship between corporate governance and environmental 
disclosure. The study argues that there is a need to consider the relationship between a 
company and its stakeholders, as defined by corporate governance structures, when forming 
 046
the environmental policy of an organization. Corporate governance systems are expected to 
affect environmental disclosure by addressing diverse stakeholders. Hence, corporate 
governance is considered an important mechanism in determining the disclosure required for 
satisfying the information needs of various stakeholders as it is the board of directors that 
manages information disclosure in annual reports (Gibbins et al., 1990; Gul and Leung, 2004; 
Haniffa and Cooke, 2005). 
Corporate environmental responsibility can be seen as strategy adopted by a company to 
satisfy the environmental expectations of diverse stakeholders. According to the stakeholder 
theory, environmental reporting helps organizations in communicating the environmental 
dimensions of their activities. Environmental disclosure is therefore regarded as part of the 
dialogue between the company and its stakeholders (Gray et al., 1995a). According to the 
agency theory, however, disclosure can help mitigate various principal-agent conflicts 
through sound corporate governance systems.  
Based on stakeholder-agency theory, the study's argument can be put forward as follows. 
Companies are increasingly considering the importance of demonstrating commitment to 
environmental responsibility, through the provision of comprehensive and high-quality 
environmental disclosure as means of managing their relationships with stakeholders. In this 
respect, sound systems of corporate governance are serving as accountability mechanisms, by 
which companies are made responsive to the rights and needs of stakeholders, through 
reducing information asymmetry. Therefore, it can be argued that the quantity and quality of 
corporate environmental disclosure directed to various stakeholders are enhanced when 
managers' opportunistic manipulation is monitored by corporate governance mechanisms.  
The stakeholder concept serves as a key to environmental responsibility. Although only 
owners have the right to change the business's objectives, every stakeholder can influence 
business conduct (Sternberg, 1997). The author argues that every stakeholder can contribute 
to the economic success or wellbeing of a business by choosing whether or not, and to what 
extent, to support that particular business. Stakeholders should ensure that their individual 
choices accurately reflect their views as to how business should be conducted. When each 
potential stakeholder dutifully and strategically bestows or withholds his economic support 
according to his moral values, including those of environmental responsibility, then the 
operation of the market forces will automatically lead businesses to reflect those values 
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(Sternberg, 1997). Hence, environmental responsibility is embedded and reflected in such 
principled stakeholding. 
Corporate disclosure, in general, is viewed as a means of influencing perceptions regarding 
the future prospects of the firm in the minds of various stakeholders (Brammer and Pavelin, 
2006). The authors argue that disclosing value-relevant information to interested parties 
reduces information asymmetries between the firm and its stakeholders. Environmental 
disclosure, in particular, is regarded as a means of responding to specific stakeholders' 
demands for information. Managers are motivated to make such disclosures since failure to 
provide this necessary information may reduce their discretion over future investment 
opportunities (Shane and Spicer, 1983; Watts and Zimmerman, 1978). Since stakeholder-
agency theory is based on the notion of accountability, any response by management must be 
accompanied by disclosure. If the stakeholder-agency theory correctly describes the 
disclosure decision process, then an effective disclosure policy requires management to keep 
track of different stakeholder- informational needs; consider the relative importance of 
different stakeholder groups; and tailor environmental disclosure accordingly.  
Stakeholder-agency theory suggests that organizational survival and success is contingent on 
satisfying both its economic (e.g. profit maximization) and non-economic (e.g. corporate 
social and environmental performance) objectives by meeting the needs of the company‟s  
various stakeholders and addressing their concerns (Pirsch et al., 2007). Under this 
perspective, corporate environmental disclosure is regarded as a means by which stakeholders 
are managed to gain support and approval for the organization's continued existence (Cormier 
et al., 2005; Gray et al., 1995a) and to distract stakeholders' opposition and disapproval (Gray 
et al., 1996) as well as to discharge accountability (Deegan, 2002).  In addition, corporate 
environmental disclosure represents a strategy to respond to the expectations of various 
stakeholders and society in general (Gray et al., 1995a; Guthrie and Parker, 1989). In order to 
successfully implement this strategy, the quantity and quality of such environmental 
information must be sufficient. Companies disclose voluntary information regarding the 
environmental dimensions of their activities as a means of demonstrating the overall creation 
of value and being accountable to stakeholders and society in general (Freeman and 
Velamuri, 2006).  
Similarly, corporate governance has been addressed as an important mechanism of 
accountability (Aguilera et al., 2006). In this respect, the board of directors acts as a link 
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between the company and its stakeholders. Hence, board of directors and other corporate 
governance mechanisms may represent a valuable source of accountability. Transparency, 
being a key element of accountability, is a significant indicator of the standard of corporate 
governance in an economy (Ho and Wong, 2001). According to Gul and Leung (2004), 
corporate transparency has been directly linked to strong corporate governance. Sound 
governance systems, designed and administered to protect stakeholders interests, would 
accurately disclose relevant information, thereby increasing company transparency and 
directors' accountability. 
Therefore, corporate governance is viewed as effectively outlining the rights and 
responsibilities of each group of stakeholders in the company (Ho and Wong, 2001). 
Similarly, Demb and Neubauer (1992: 187) stated that “Corporate Governance is the process 
by which corporations are made responsive to the rights and wishes of stakeholders”. Monks 
and Minow (1995: 1) argued that “It is the relationship among various participants in 
determining the direction and performance of corporations”. While, Tricker (1994: xi) wrote 
that “Corporate governance addresses the issues facing board of directors such as the 
interaction with top management and relationships with the owners and others interested in 
the affairs of the company, including creditors, debt financiers, analysts, auditors, and 
corporate governance”. Under this perspective, the governance structure shifts from a 
principal-agent to a team production model, and the critical governance tasks become to  
ensure effective, coordination, cooperation and conflict resolution to maximize, rather than 
just control and to distribute the value created in ways that maintain commitment multiple 
stakeholders (Kochan and Rubinstein, 2000).  
A stakeholder model relevant to corporate governance is developed by Turnbull (1997). 
Based on stakeholder-agency theory, he argued that: (a) the purpose of the firm is to create 
wealth or value for its stakeholders; (b) maximizing total wealth creation by the firm is the 
responsibility of directors and managers; (c) the key to achieving the firm's purpose is 
encouraging board representation by significant stakeholders and giving them a direct voice 
in the governance and control; (d) recognition of both implicit and explicit contractual 
relationships in a firm; and finally (e) the control of the firm is shared between various 
stakeholders through multiple boards to remove conflicts of interest and so agency costs. In 
line with this argument, some authors propose stakeholders engagement, or the representation 
of diverse stakeholders on corporate boards, in order to safeguard the interests of corporate 
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stakeholders and to ensure that their concerns are considered in corporate decision-making 
(Freeman and Evan, 1990; Jones and Goldberg, 1982). Corporate emphasis on stakeholder 
engagement affects both the volume as well as the quality of voluntary disclosures (Boesso 
and Kumar, 2007). Therefore, corporate governance concerns the way external stakeholders 
monitor the management of corporations (Monks and Minow, 1995) and hence, enhance 
corporate disclosure. 
The breakdown of the governance relation between shareholders, the board and the senior 
executives was at the heart of major corporate scandals that rocked international businesses 
throughout 2002 (Heath and Norman, 2004). They argued that this breakdown was due to the 
failure of these firms and their shareholders to protect themselves against agency problems. 
In other words, by exploiting information asymmetries and conflicts of interest on the board, 
senior executives were able to act against shareholders' interests. Therefore, UK Corporate 
Governance Code (2010), formerly known as the Combined Code, regulates the rights of 
shareholders and other stakeholders, the duties of boards and board members and the duties 
that mangers have to the board and the shareholders. One of the most basic rights of 
shareholders that it regulates is the information disclosure, essentially about the financial 
performance of the firm, but also potentially about its social and environmental policies and 
activities (Heath and Norman, 2004). 
The extent to which corporate governance and corporate social and environmental disclosure 
are converging depends on views on corporate governance (Kolk and Pinkse, 2010). 
Corporate governance structures, defining the relationship between a company and its 
stakeholders, incorporate either one of two corporate worldviews, contractarianism and 
communitarianism (van der Laan Smith et al., 2005). The communitarian perspective, as 
opposed to the contractarian perspective, of corporate governance structures holds that a 
corporation is a social organization having social responsibilities that go beyond achieving 
economic efficiency. Under this perspective, firms have social and environmental 
responsibilities towards all their stakeholders, rather than only towards shareholders. 
Consequently, as the authors argue, managers in communitarian societies are more likely to 
demonstrate social responsibility and, hence, provide social and environmental disclosure as 
part of strategically managing stakeholder relationships. This strategy can be referred to as 
„governance-by-disclosure‟, where a growing variety of such initiatives can be identified 
particularly in the global environmental domain (Gupta, 2008). 
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Corporate environmental disclosure provides information on the impact of a corporation's 
activities to a broad range of stakeholders. The stakeholder concept is intended to “broaden 
management's vision of its roles and responsibilities beyond the profit maximization 
functions to include interests and claims of non-stockholding groups” (Mitchell et al., 1997:  
855) and, hence, to include more wider social and environmental functions. Under this 
approach, the long-term survival of the corporation requires the support and approval of all 
its stakeholders, which, in turn, requires a dialogue between the management of a corporation 
and its stakeholders (Dierkes and Antal, 1985). This argument is in line with the principles 
stipulated by the UK Corporate Governance Code (2010), formerly known as the Combined 
Code. From a stakeholder-agency perspective, environmental disclosure is thus seen as part 
of the dialogue between the company and its stakeholders (Gray et al., 1995a).  
The development of the best practice recommendations by the UK Corporate Governance 
Code (2010), formerly known as the Combined Code, closely linked good corporate 
governance to the concept of corporate social and environmental responsibility 
accountability. One way to demonstrate good governance is to use the annual report to 
disclose information - including environmental information – to various stakeholders (Gibson 
and O'Donovan, 2007). The OECD and the securities regulators of many countries have 
considered corporate governance and corporate disclosure as inseparable issues (OECD, 
2004; UK Corporate Governance Code, 2010). Good corporate governance provides the 
foundations of good corporate social and environmental disclosure by establishing value-
creating relationships with all stakeholders (Welford, 2007). Similarly, Gibson and 
O'Donovan (2007) reported on the importance of good corporate governance practice in 
relation to environmental protection escalate, as demonstrated by the introduction of separate 
environmental sustainability reports, the advent of triple bottom line reporting, changes in 
environmental legislation and the occurrence of major environmental incidents.  
A firm‟s corporate governance structures or contractual arrangements aimed at reducing 
agency costs and its disclosure decisions or informational environment evolve simultaneously 
over time and, therefore, the interaction between both plays an important role in reducing 
agency costs (Armstrong et al., 2010). Corporate governance mechanisms are designed to 
align the interests of mangers with those of stakeholders, while corporate disclosure serves as 
an indirect mechanism of corporate governance (Grüning and Ernstberger, 2010). The 
authors argue that sound disclosure reduces information asymmetry by providing information 
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to stakeholders and outside directors, which enables them to enhance the monitoring of a 
firm‟s management and, hence, reduce agency costs. 
The board of directors is regarded as having a great influence on the environmental 
performance of the company (Greeno, 1993). Boards of large UK companies are devoting 
more time to the governance of corporate social and environmental responsibility 
(Mackenzie, 2007). This argument is consistent with the UK Corporate Governance Code 
(2010) requirement that the boards set standards and values for companies and ensure they 
meet their social obligations. In addition, the UK Companies Act 2006 requires the board of 
directors to consider the impact of the company's operations on the community and the 
environment (S. 172). Therefore, adoption of various corporate governance mechanisms or 
internal control devices such as non-executive directors, separation of the roles of the 
chairman and chief executive, audit committees and corporate social responsibility 
committees, enhances monitoring quality and reduces benefits from withholding information, 
which, in turn, improves disclosure quality in financial statements (Forker, 1992).  
Accordingly, providing quality disclosures is arguably dependent upon sound corporate 
governance mechanisms as being responsive to the needs of various stakeholder groups. A 
company with an effective corporate governance system, therefore, will provide access to 
relevant and high quality information in an attempt to invite new forms of stakeholder 
engagement (Eccles et al., 2001). Consistent with this notion, Beekes and Brown (2006) 
found that better-governed firms do make more informative disclosures. Similarly, 
Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) and Ajinkya et al. (2005) found that well-governed firms are 
more likely to provide higher quality voluntary management earnings forecasts. Moreover, 
Rupley et al. (2011) found environmental disclosure quality, in particular, to be positively 
associated with corporate governance mechanisms such as board independence and board 
expertise. Disclosure quality can, in turn, affect information asymmetry by changing the 
trading behaviour of uninformed investors and reducing incentives for private information 
searches (Chang et al., 2008).  
Assessing the quality of corporate social and environmental disclosure  is “problematic given 
the diversity of practice that has evolved through a lack of mandatory regulation, sketchy 
adoption of voluntary guidelines, and variable quality of verification” (Hammond and Miles, 
2004). Nevertheless, an important element in assessing environmental disclosure quality is 
environmental assurance which enhances the perceived credibility of such disclosures 
 052
(Moroney et al., 2009; Coram et al., 2009) by providing more reliable environmental 
information to stakeholders (GRI, 2006).  Stakeholders are increasingly demanding that 
environmental disclosure truly and fairly represents companies' past and future achievements 
(Gray, 2000), where credible environmental information can be viewed as a central element 
in corporate responsibility, accountability and governance (Cumming, 2001; Kaler, 2002).  
However, the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on corporate disclosure may be 
complementary or substitutive (Grüning and Ernstberger, 2010; Ho and Wong, 2001). If it is 
complementary, the stakeholder-agency theory predicts a greater extent of disclosures since 
the adoption of more governance mechanisms will strengthen the internal control of 
companies and ensure an intensive monitoring device to reduce opportunism and information 
asymmetry (Leftwitch et al., 1981; Welker, 1995). This leads to improvement in corporate 
disclosure quantity and quality (Ho and Wong, 2001). In other words, effective governance 
mechanisms should increase the likelihood of providing enhanced disclosures by 
management, which implies a complementary relation between both mechanisms (Grüning 
and Ernstberger, 2010). Hence, a positive relationship between corporate governance and 
corporate disclosure is expected. On the other hand, if the relationship is substitutive, more 
governance mechanisms will not be accompanied by more disclosures since one corporate 
governance mechanism may substitute another one. In this regard, there would be a trade off 
between the costs and benefits of additional disclosure where managers strategically decide 
on the appropriate level of corporate governance and disclosure (Grüning and Ernstberger, 
2010). Hence, the adoption of additional corporate governance mechanisms may not affect 
disclosure level or even reduce the need for enhanced disclosure. Despite this theoretical 
debate, Hill (1999) argues that no one single mechanism is a governance solution and 
suggests the desirability of having a system of overlapping checks and balances. Therefore, it 
can be argued that employing several corporate governance mechanisms is essential to the 
proper functioning of a corporation and would ultimately result in comprehensive and high 
quality disclosure. 
Hill and Jones (1992) contend that, unlike earlier theories, the stakeholder-agency theory 
explicitly focuses on the causes of conflict between managers and stakeholders. In addition, 
stakeholder-agency theory embraces and highlights the concepts underlying the adjustment 
mechanisms that realign management and stakeholders interests in case of conflict of such 
interests. Managing these conflicts necessitates the use of voluntary disclosure, particularly 
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environmental disclosure, by managers to communicate with stakeholders and to acquire their 
support (Watson et al., 2002). Different stakeholders have different priorities and need 
different information. Moreover, their ability to get information is different. Therefore, 
effective use of disclosure policy, in terms of both quantity and quality, may help in building 
trust with shareholders and other stakeholders. Hence, stakeholder-agency theory may 
provide some useful insights to the current research.  
Last, and not least, it can be simply stated as follows. The codes of corporate governance 
primarily concern the accountability issue analyzing how to ensure that top management is 
properly oversight by stakeholders. Similarly, corporate environmental disclosure concerns 
the accountability issue attempting to satisfy the environmental information needs of 
stakeholders. Since both corporate governance and corporate environmental disclosures are 
based on the notion of accountability, then the two concepts are intimately linked because a 
better accountability of top management turns into an increasing level of stakeholders' 
environmental information satisfaction. Accordingly, corporate governance is expected to 
affect corporate environmental disclosure by addressing diverse stakeholders.  
Based on the above discussion, the present study claims that environmental disclosure may be 
a function of corporate governance characteristics. In other words, it investigates the effect of 
corporate governance mechanisms, after controlling for company-specific characteristics, on 
the quantity and quality of corporate environmental disclosures in the annual reports of UK 
companies. Stakeholder-agency theory is adopted as the study's theoretical framework 
because the study seeks to understand to what extent the variables of interest may influence 
organizational actions in responding to various stakeholder groups. Corporate governance 
structures define the relationship between a company and its stakeholders as the company is a 
legal entity expected to fulfill certain environmental responsibilities (van der Laan Smith et 
al., 2005). Therefore, environmental disclosures quantity and quality can be function of 
corporate governance in the sense that managers who have better access to a firm‟s 
information than stakeholders can make comprehensive and credible disclosure to enhance 
firm value by reducing agency costs; environmental disclosure being one of monitoring 
devices used to reduce such costs.  
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The following figure depicts the suggested theoretical framework of the current study: 
 
Figure 3.1 
 Suggested Theoretical Framework  
 
 
 
 
At the heart of the analysis is corporate environmental disclosure. Figure 3.1 portrays the 
relationship between corporate governance and environmental disclosure, as controlled by 
corporate characteristics. Based on stakeholder-agency theory, it is argued that corporate 
environmental disclosure directed to various stakeholders is enhanced when managers'  
opportunistic manipulation is monitored by corporate governance mechanisms. As shown in 
the figure, stakeholders link to the company either through engagement or dialogue. 
Stakeholders' engagement with the company takes place through participating in corporate 
governance systems and ownership structures. Stakeholders' dialogue with the company takes 
place partially through environmental disclosure where companies report on their 
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environmental performance. These links allow a correspondence between stakeholders' 
expectations and company‟s behavior, thereby enhancing the quantity and quality of 
environmental disclosure. Accordingly, corporate governance mechanisms adopted by the 
company give an indication about how stakeholders‟ interests are considered at the board 
level, as reflected in environmental disclosure practices.  
Figure 3.1 highlights an important element in the existing linkage among the considered 
variables, that is, accountability. Both governance and environmental disclosure are based on 
the notion of accountability. A better accountability of top management turns into an 
increasing level of stakeholders' environmental information satisfaction. It is the board of 
directors who decides the definition of the accountability of the company, thereby affecting 
the environmental disclosures reported to stakeholders. In addition, by establishing external 
links with stakeholders, directors attract valuable resources vital to the companies‟ viability  
(Michelon and Parbonetti, 2010).  
An information gap, also referred to as information asymmetry, exists between directors and 
stakeholders due to absence of information or manipulation of the disclosed information, 
resulting in failure to satisfy stakeholders' expectations towards the firm's disclosure (Hooks 
et al., 2002). Voluntary disclosures, including environmental disclosure, diminish 
informational asymmetries between a firm and its stakeholders (Brammer and Pavelin, 2008). 
It reduces the information gap as it provides stakeholders with relative confidence that the 
stock transactions occur at a fair price which increase stock liquidity (Diamond and 
Verrecchia, 1991; Kim and Verrecchia, 1994). In addition, voluntary disclosure reduces 
uncertainty and, hence, reduces the information asymmetry which, in turn, reduces the cost of 
external financing (Healey and Palepu, 2001). Such “stakeholder reporting can also be 
viewed as a significant strategic tool that is used by management to improve communication 
with a company‟s stakeholders, providing a  foundation for trust and openness” (Boesso and 
Kumar, 2007: 278-279). Accordingly, enhancing the quantity and quality of environmental 
disclosure is considered to be an effective means of reducing the information gap.  
The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) states that “A primary goal of reporting is to contribute 
to an ongoing stakeholder dialogue. Reports alone provide little value to inform stakeholders 
or support a dialogue that influences the decisions and behavior of both the reporting 
organization and its stakeholders” (GRI, 2002: 9). Alternatively, accountability supports 
stakeholders' relationship with the firm by providing information for different decisions. 
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Therefore, accountability narrows the information asymmetry between the management and 
different stakeholders, and in between the different categories of stakeholders (Lev, 1989). 
Figure 3.1 highlights this important linkage, where accountability would increase the 
awareness towards the complexity of information disclosures and, hence, would reduce the 
information gap or asymmetry.  
Based on the above considerations and given the absence of significant corporate governance 
variables in environmental disclosure studies, important relationships should exist among 
different mechanisms of accountability. Therefore, the present study aims at empirically 
examining the impact of corporate governance mechanisms, after controlling for company-
specific characteristics, on the quantity and quality of corporate environmental disclosures in 
the annual reports of UK companies. The study is based on stakeholder-agency theory as a 
basic motive for the efforts made to reduce the information gap by reaching stakeholders' 
expectations about environmental disclosure through sound corporate governance structures.  
 
3.4   CONCLUSION  
This chapter presents the different theoretical frameworks that have been used in the 
accounting literature to explain and analyze each of environmental disclosure practices and 
corporate governance mechanisms. Although there is much variation in the theoretical 
perspectives being adopted, prior research from a wide spectrum of theoretical backgrounds 
has acknowledged that good corporate governance is associated with increased transparency 
and credible disclosure (see Ajinkya et al., 2005; Cormier et al., 2010; Dunstan, 2008; Gul 
and Leung, 2004). Three prominent theories have dominated the explanations of social and 
environmental disclosure practices. These are stakeholder theory, legitimacy theory and 
political economy theory. In addition, signaling theory has been introduced as a possible 
explanation of voluntary disclosure practices, of which environmental disclosure is a 
significant category. Reviewing corporate governance literature, however, it can be noticed 
that agency theory and stakeholder theory are the dominant theories. The main distinction 
between these theories is in the perspective from which they are viewed and examined.  
All of the three socio-political theories of corporate social disclosure are linked to the notion 
of the existence of a social contract between the organisation and society, whereby a firm is 
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being held responsible and accountable to its entire stakeholders (Gray et al., 1996). They 
suggest that the extent of social and environmental disclosure is dependent on the exposure to 
public pressure in the social and/or political environment in the form of social or regulatory 
changes (Patten, 2002), Therefore, it has been argued that these theories are overlapping and 
complementary rather than competing as such (Gray et al., 1995a). These theories, however, 
“are not as yet fully fledged theories ... but provide useful frameworks within which to study 
the developing practice of CSR” (Gray et al., 1996: 49). Accordingly, there has been a 
tendency by some researchers to rely upon more than one theory in providing an explanation 
for managerial behaviour (Fiedler and Deegan, 2002). 
Unlike the socio-political approach, which takes into consideration the relation with society 
and other organizations, a pure economic approach, from which both agency theory and 
signaling theory are derived, suffers from several limitations. It concentrates on profit 
maximization as the primary goal of the organisation ignoring the other organisational goals. 
Focusing on monetary or wealth considerations limits the scope of relevant environmental 
disclosure as well as its intended purpose (Cormier et al., 2005). In addition, a pure economic 
approach concentrates on only two groups of stakeholders; i.e. managers and shareholders, 
and pays no attention to other interested parties in the society. This approach has also been 
criticized in that “the economic domain cannot be studied in isolation from the political, 
social and institutional framework within which the economic takes place” (Gray et al., 
1995a: 52). Furthermore, economic theories are based on the assumption of efficient capital 
markets, which practically might not always be the case. This is in addition to the fact that 
many potential users of environmental information may not evolve in these markets at all 
(Cormier et al., 2005).   
However, unlike earlier theories, the stakeholder-agency paradigm explicitly focuses on the 
causes of conflict between managers and stakeholders (Hill and Jones, 1992). In addition, 
stakeholder-agency theory embraces and highlights the concepts underlying the adjustment 
mechanisms that realign management and stakeholders interests in case of conflict of such 
interests. Managing these conflicts necessitates the use of voluntary disclosure, particularly 
environmental disclosure, by managers to communicate with stakeholders and to acquire their 
support (Watson et al., 2002). Different stakeholders have different priorities and need 
different information. Moreover, their ability to get information is different. Therefore, 
effective use of disclosure policy, in terms of both quantity and quality, may help in building 
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trust with shareholders and other stakeholders. Hence, stakeholder-agency theory may 
provide some useful insights to the current research.  
There is a need to consider the relationship between a company and its stakeholders, as 
defined by corporate governance structures, when forming the environmental policy of an 
organization. Corporate governance systems are expected to affect environmental disclosure 
by addressing diverse stakeholders. Hence, corporate governance is considered an important 
mechanism in determining the disclosure required for satisfying the information needs of 
various stakeholders as it is the board of directors that manages information disclosure in 
annual reports (Gibbins et al., 1990; Gul and Leung, 2004; Haniffa and Cooke, 2005).  
The codes of corporate governance primarily concern the accountability issue analyzing how 
to ensure that top management is properly oversight by stakeholders. Similarly, corporate 
environmental disclosure concerns the accountability issue attempting to satisfy the 
environmental information needs of stakeholders. Since both corporate governance and 
corporate environmental disclosures are based on the notion of accountability, then the two 
concepts are intimately linked because a better accountability of top management turns into 
an increasing level of stakeholders' environmental information satisfaction. Accordingly, 
corporate governance is expected to affect corporate environmental d isclosure by addressing 
diverse stakeholders.  
The present study examines the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and 
the quantity and quality of corporate environmental disclosure practices in UK companies' 
annual reports. Based on stakeholder-agency theory, the study's argument can be put forward 
as follows. Companies are increasingly considering the importance of demonstrating 
commitment to environmental responsibility, through the provision of complete and qualified 
environmental disclosure as means of managing their relationships with stakeholders. In this 
respect, sound systems of corporate governance are serving as accountability mechanisms, by 
which companies are made responsive to the rights and needs of stakeholders, through 
reducing information asymmetry. Therefore, it can be argued that the quantity and quality of 
corporate environmental disclosure directed to various stakeholders are enhanced when 
managers' opportunistic manipulation is monitored by corporate governance mechanisms, 
thereby reducing the information expectation gap.  
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However, this argument needs to be examined empirically. Therefore, the empirical part of 
the study is concerned with examining the validation of this theoretical argument. The 
theoretical framework is carried through the thesis with the aim of revisiting it in light of the 
results of the empirical study. The next chapter presents the research methodology along with 
the development of the research hypotheses. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1   INTRODUCTION 
Reviewing the relevant literature and outlining the proposed theoretical framework for 
the study help in making the necessary methodological choices and constructing the 
appropriate research design. Based on stakeholder-agency theory, the main objectives 
of the present study is to empirically examine the relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms and the quantity and quality of corporate environmental 
disclosure practices in UK companies' annual reports and to provide an in-depth 
investigation of environmental disclosure quality identification and assessment. The 
methodology to be followed in the study's empirical investigation is justified in light 
of the philosophical and methodological viewpoints adopted by the current research. 
The methodology shows the linkage between the two empirical studies to be 
undertaken in the current research and highlights the critical importance of 
investigating issues as environmental disclosure quality identification and assessment 
that are still relatively unexplored.  
This chapter explains in detail the methodology employed by the present study based 
on the purpose and objectives of the study. It commences with explaining the research 
philosophy or the methodological viewpoint of the research and how this verifies the 
choice of methods to be used in carrying out the study. Research design, then, 
provides a description of the research methods employed, while providing 
substantiation for using the content analysis method in undertaking the research. 
Quantitative analysis, using content analysis of a sample of UK companies' annual 
reports, is used to examine the quantity and quality of corporate environmental 
disclosure practices and their association with corporate governance mechanisms. In 
doing so, the study distinguishes between the different categories or areas of activity 
to which environmental disclosure relates as well as between the different types of 
environmental information content.  
 284
4.2   RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY 
Bogdan and Taylor (1975: 1) define the term „methodology‟ as “the process, 
principles, and procedures by which we approach problems and seek answers”. The 
research process involves a number of steps that can be viewed as layers of a research 
onion. The research onion consists of six layers namely, research philosophies, 
approaches, strategies, choices, time horizons, techniques and procedures (Saunders et 
al., 2007). Each layer includes different set of choices that the researcher is required 
to choose among as fits with the purpose of the research. In other words, any research 
should be based on specific philosophical assumptions that are either implicitly or 
explicitly expressed which lead to the choice of the methodology adopted (Gill and 
Johnson, 1997). Figure 4.1 depicts the research onion.  
 
Figure 4.1 
The Research Onion  
 
   Source: Adopted from Saunders et al. (2007: 102) 
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The first layer of the research process is research philosophy. The term research 
philosophy refers to the development of knowledge and the nature of that knowledge 
(Saunders et al., 2007). Methodological choices of any research are mainly 
determined by the philosophical assumptions of ontology (realism v. nominalism), 
epistemology (positivism v. anti-positivism), human nature (determinism v. 
voluntarism) and methodology (nomothetic v. ideographic) (Burrell and Morgan, 
1979; Morgan and Smircich, 1980). These four assumptions are related to the nature 
of social science. Two polars of methodological choices, based on these assumptions, 
are the objective and subjective dimensions (Burrell and Morgan, 1979).  
„Ontology‟ is concerned with assumptions about what constitutes social reality 
(Blaikie, 1993). In other words, it is the theory of being (Marsh and Stoker, 2002). 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) identified two contrasting ontological positions, namely 
realism and nominalism. Realism considers the social world as a compound of real 
and tangible structures, while nominalism regards the social world as being made up 
of names, concepts and labels that give a structure to reality. The nominalism 
assumption considers the social world as being external to individual recognition. 
Accordingly, no objective reality exists in case of nominalism, and therefore, this 
ontological position requires the construction of research objectives (Iskander, 2008).  
„Epistemology‟ is concerned with assumptions about what constitutes knowledge of 
social reality (Blaikie, 1993). In other words, it is the theory of knowledge (Marsh and 
Stoker, 2002). Burrell and Morgan (1979) identified two contrasting epistemological 
positions, namely positivism and anti-positivism. Positivism seeks to explain and 
predict what happens in the social world, by searching for regularities and causal 
relationships between its constituent elements (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). 
Accordingly, theory is used to generate hypotheses that can be examined. Therefore, 
the role of research is to test theories and further develop these theories if possible 
(Bryman and Bell, 2007; Saunders et al., 2007). On the other hand, anti-positivism 
advocates that it is necessary for the researcher to understand the differences between 
humans as social actors (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). While under positivism the 
research can produce generalizations, anti-positivism argues that generalisability is 
not of crucial importance (Bryman and Bell, 2007; Saunders et al., 2007). 
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„Human nature‟ assumptions are concerned with the relationship between human 
beings and their environment. Burrell and Morgan (1979) identified two contrasting 
human nature positions, namely determinism and voluntarism. Determinism 
postulates that humans and their activities are completely determined by the situation 
or environment in which they are located. Voluntarism, on the other hand, assumes 
that humans are completely autonomous and free willed who create the environment 
rather than being determined by it.  
„Methodology‟ is concerned with the methods used to investigate and learn about the 
social world. Burrell and Morgan (1979) identified two contrasting methodological 
positions, namely nomothetic and ideographic. The nomothetic approach emphasizes 
the importance of basing research upon systematic protocol and technique and  
involves a rigorous and scientific testing of the hypotheses. On the other hand, the 
ideographic approach assumes that one can only understand the social world by 
obtaining first hand knowledge of the subject under investigation. It involves the 
analysis of subjective data that the researcher generates by participating or getting 
inside the situations (Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Gill and Johnson, 1997; Belkaoui, 
2004).  
In addition to the four assumptions regarding the nature of social science, two further 
assumptions are related to the nature of society, namely radical change and regulation. 
Radical change is concerned with assumptions about the way organizational affairs 
should be conducted and provides suggestions as to how these affairs may be 
conducted in order to make fundamental changes to the normal order of things. On the 
other hand, regulation explains the way organizational affairs are regulated and 
provides suggestions as to how they may be improved within the current framework. 
Accordingly, radical change adopts a critical perspective on organizational life, while 
the regulatory perspective is less judgmental and critical. In other words, radical 
change addresses organizational problems from the viewpoint of the existing state of 
affairs, while regulation approaches them within the existing state of affairs (Burrell 
and Morgan, 1979; Saunders et al., 2007). 
Based on the two polars of assumptions regarding the nature of social science; the 
objective and subjective dimensions and two assumptions regarding the nature of 
society; radical change and regulation dimensions, research paradigms can be used to 
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distinguish between different visions of accounting research (Belkaoui, 2004). 
„Paradigm‟ is a way of examining social phenomena from which understandings and 
explanations can be gained (Saundres et al., 2007). Burrell and Morgan (1979) 
distinguish between four research paradigms for the analysis of social theory; namely 
radical humanist, radical structuralist, interpretive, and functionalist. Figure 4.2 
depicts the four research paradigms.   
 
 
Figure 4.2 
Four Paradigms For The Analysis Of Social Science 
 
The Sociology Of Radical Change                
Radical 
Humanist 
Radical 
Structuralist 
       Subjective                                                                                     Objective         
Interpretive Functionalist 
The Sociology Of Regulation 
                                        Source: Adopted from Burrell and Morgan (1979: 22)  
 
 
 288
The radical humanist paradigm, located at the top left corner, represents the subjective 
and radical change dimensions. This paradigm adopts a critical perspective on 
organizational life and is concerned with changing the existing status. In addition, it 
implies a subjective approach to social science; nominalism, anti-positivism, 
voluntarism and ideographic.  
The radical structuralist paradigm, located at the top right corner, also seeks 
fundamental change to the existing state but lends itself to the objective approach to 
social science; realism, positivism, determinism, and nomothetic.  
The interpretive paradigm, located at the bottom left corner, represents the regulatory 
approach which seeks to explain organizational affairs and offers suggestions for 
improvement by discovering irrationalities. Its concern is to understand and explain 
what is going on rather than achieving change. Moreover, this paradigm implies a 
subjective approach to social science; the nominalist, anti-positivist, voluntarist and 
ideological positions.  
The functionalist paradigm, located at the bottom right corner, represents the 
regulatory approach and the objective dimension. This paradigm assumes that 
organisations are rational entities, in which rational explanations provide rational 
solutions to rational problems (Saunders et al., 2007). In addition, it implies an 
objective approach to social science; realism, positivism, determinism, and 
nomothetic.  
 
4.3   RESEARCH APPROACH 
Moving to the second layer of the research process, research approaches are classified 
into deductive and inductive (Saunders et al., 2007). Sekaran (2003: 27) defines 
deduction as “the process by which we arrive at a reasoned conclusion by logical 
generalization of a known fact” while induction is defined as “a process where we 
observe certain phenomena and on this basis arrive at conclusions”. 
The deductive approach begins with the development of testable hypotheses and ends 
with examining the outcome of the inquiry, which leads to either confirming the 
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theory or modifying the theory in the light of the findings (Robson, 2002). This, in 
turn, requires the collection of quantitative data, or even qualitative data, to test the 
developed hypotheses using a highly structured methodology to facilitate replication 
of the findings (Gill and Johnson, 2002). Therefore, the deductive approach aims at 
testing the theory underlying the phenomena being examined.  
The inductive approach, on the contrary, begins with the collection and then the 
analysis of data, the result of which would lead to the formulation of a theory. 
Consequently, the theory would follow data rather than vice versa in case of the 
deductive approach (Saunders et al., 2007). Therefore, the inductive approach aims at 
building the theory underpinning the phenomena being examined.  
Bryman and Bell (2007) indicate that the deductive approach is related to quantitative 
research that follow objectivism; ontological realism and epistemological positivism. 
In contrast, the inductive approach is related to qualitative research that follow 
subjectivism; ontological nominalism and epistemological anti-positivism.  
 
4.4   METHODOLOGICAL CHOICES 
At one extreme is the objective approach, where the nomothetic methodology is a 
product of realist ontology and positivist epistemology (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). 
The realist ontology assumes that reality of the social world exists externally 
(Easterby-Smith et al., 1991), independent of an individual's perceptions and 
appreciations. The positivist epistemology underpins this approach where what 
happens in the social world is sought to be explained and predicted by searching for 
laws, causal relationships and regularities between its constituent elements (Burrell 
and Morgan, 1979). In this regard, valid knowledge is that which is observable and 
measurable and, hence, is deemed objective and independent (Hussey and Hussey, 
1997). Reality should, thus, be measured objectively rather than subjectively 
examined (Easterby-Smith et al., 1991). The human nature assumption underlying the 
nomothetic methodology is determinism, where humans and their activities are 
completely determined by the situation or environment in which they are located 
(Burrell and Morgan, 1979). Therefore, following the nomothetic methodology, the 
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researcher is independent of the phenomena being studied (Easterby-Smith et al., 
1991). 
All of the assumptions of a nomothetic methodology, thus, normally lead to the use of 
quantitative methodologies as the researcher attempts to search measurable 
observations to investigate things (Bogdan and Taylor, 1975; Creswell, 1998; Hussey 
and Hussey, 1997) and thus, obtaining second-hand knowledge or secondary data of 
the phenomena being studied. Generally, the quantitative researcher works 
deductively, for example, specifying subject categories in advance prior to starting the 
empirical research rather than developing them from subjects (Creswell, 1998). 
Accordingly, the researcher concentrates on measurement of the subject under 
investigation rather than gaining participants' interpretation (Easterby-Smith et al., 
1991; Hussey and Hussey, 1997). 
At the other extreme is the subjective approach, where the ideographic methodology, 
is a product of nominalist ontology and anti-positivist epistemology (Burrell and 
Morgan, 1979). Accordingly, an ideographic methodology assumes that something is 
real when it is socially constructed (Hines, 1988) in the minds of the actors or 
participants involved in the situation (Creswell, 1998). The nominalist ontology 
assumes that reality is not external to individual recognition (Hussey and Hussey, 
1997) and is socially constructed rather than objectively determined (Easterby-Smith 
et al., 1991). The anti-positivist epistemology advocates that it is necessary for the 
researcher to understand the differences between humans as social actors (Burrell and 
Morgan, 1979). In this regard, knowledge can be identified through what is 
experienced by respondents and, hence, is deemed subjective and not independent of 
observation (Morgan and Smircich, 1980). The human nature assumption 
underpinning the ideographic methodology is voluntarism, where humans are 
completely autonomous and free willed who create the environment rather than being 
determined by it (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). Therefore, following the ideographic 
methodology, the researcher is not independent of the phenomena being studied but 
rather interacts with participants through spending time in the field (Creswell, 1998).  
All of the assumptions of an ideographic methodology, thus, normally lead to the use 
of qualitative methodologies as the researcher attempts to rely on and investigate 
things from the participants' own viewpoints (Bogdan and Taylor, 1975; Creswell, 
 291
1998; Hussey and Hussey, 1997) and thus, obtaining first-hand knowledge or primary 
data of the phenomena being studied. Generally, the qualitative researcher works 
inductively, for example, developing categories from subjects rather than specifying 
them in advance prior to starting the empirical research (Creswell,  1998). 
Accordingly, the researcher concentrates on meaning and interpretation given by 
participants rather than measurement of the subject under investigation (Easterby-
Smith et al., 1991; Hussey and Hussey, 1997). 
However, Laughlin (1995) suggests the choice of some form of „middle-range‟ 
methodological position, rather than following one of the extreme forms. He argues 
that the extreme or pure forms of the philosophical assumptions of ontology, 
epistemology, human nature and methodology do not exist. Adopting a middle-range 
position allows the researcher to employ a variety of research methods, such as using 
both quantitative and qualitative methods, to undertake the empirical investigations 
(also see Silverman, 1997). In a similar vein, Burrell and Morgan (1979) argue that 
although, the distinction between the two methodological positions may be very clear 
at the philosophical level, however, when reaching research design issues such as the 
use of quantitative or qualitative, this division breaks down. This provides more 
perspectives on and deeper understanding of the phenomena under investigation. 
Moving to the choice of the research paradigm, the researcher can start with recalling 
the research objective and the relative uses of each of the  four research paradigms 
used in the analysis of social theory; namely radical humanist, radical structuralist, 
interpretive, and functionalist. If the objective of the research is to examine the 
existing status of the phenomena under investigation, then the radical humanist and 
radical structuralist paradigms would be irrelevant to the study. The interpretive 
paradigm, however, suffers from a number of limitations; where it postulates that the 
researcher can understand the phenomena being investigated through mere 
subjectivity and without interference, it fails to be an inquiry of change, and it creates 
the illusion of pure theory by using a monological reasoning (Belkaoui, 2004). The 
functionalist paradigm is the dominant paradigm in the business and management  
research (Saunders et al., 2007). It assumes the separation between theory and 
observations used to test the theory, employing the hypothetic-deductive approach 
and quantitative methods in data collection and analysis (Belkaoui, 2004). 
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However, a number of authors argue that a uniquely correct paradigm can not exist 
(See Gioia and Pitre 1990; and Jackson, 1999). They criticize the separate distinction 
between the four research paradigms. In this regard, they highlight the difficulty of 
identifying a single paradigm as they can not be regarded as mutually exclusive 
domains. Accordingly, transition zones can be seen between the four paradigms 
(Gioia and Pitre 1990). Due to the blurred nature of these transition zones, it is 
possible to construct bridges that link apparently disparate concepts together in these 
zones. These transition zones constitute multiparadigm approaches. They state that 
“multiparadigm approaches offer the possibility of creating fresh insights because 
they start from different ontological and epistemological assumptions and therefore 
can tap different facets of organizational phenomena and can produce markedly 
different and uniquely informative theoretical views of events under study” (p.591).  
 
4.5 PHILOSOPHICAL ASSUMPTIONS AND METHODOLOGICAL 
        CHOICES UNDERPINNING THE CURRENT RESEARCH STUDY   
Based on stakeholder-agency theory, the main objectives of the present study is to 
empirically examine the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and 
the quantity and quality of corporate environmental disclosure practices in UK 
companies' annual reports and to provide an in-depth investigation of environmental 
disclosure quality identification and assessment. Firstly, the study aims at a 
descriptive documentation of the quantity of environmental disclosure practices as 
well as their association to corporate governance mechanisms, each of which is 
quantitatively measured, in the UK context over a period of four years. Secondly, the 
study aims at a descriptive documentation of the quality of environmental disclosure 
practices as well as their association to corporate governance mechanisms, each of 
which is quantitatively measured, in the UK context over a period of four years. In 
doing so, the study distinguishes between the different categories or areas of activity 
to which environmental disclosure relates as well as between the different types of 
environmental information content.  
The current research argument is based on stakeholder-agency theory which is 
considered to be part of the positive accounting theory (descriptive theory), as 
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opposed to normative accounting theory (prescriptive theory) (Gaffikin, 2007). 
Positive accounting theory is also referred to as neo-empirical research, due to its 
reliance on empiricism or the systematic use of empirical evidence to establish theory 
from best practices (Henderson et al., 1992). Accordingly, the study attempts to 
provide predictions and derive generalisable conclusions regarding corporate 
environmental disclosure practices and corporate governance mechanisms in the UK. 
In doing so, the study involves developing hypotheses and testing these hypotheses. 
Basically, an objective rather than a subjective truth is sought in examining the 
required relationship, relying mainly on measurable observations. Hence, an attempt 
is made to search for universal laws and regularities governing corporate 
environmental disclosure practices. To fulfill these research objectives, the current 
study adopts an objective methodological position of philosophical assumptions.  
Ontologically, the current study adopts a realism position. This ontological closeness 
to realism is in line with neo-empirical research or positive accounting theory, which 
adopts a strong realist or objective position. According to the researcher, an objective 
reality exists, out there in a social world, independent of any human involvement and 
ready to be discovered and ascertained rather than subjectively constructed (Morgan 
and Smircich, 1980). In this regard, the current research's primary attention is given to 
the objective measurement of the observations comprising the phenomena under 
investigation; environmental disclosure and corporate governance.  
Epistemologically, the study also takes a positivism position. This epistemological 
closeness to positivism is in line with neo-empirical research or positive accounting 
theory, which relies on empiricism or objective positivism. According to the 
researcher, knowledge of the social phenomena being studied can be obtained 
primarily, however not exclusively, by searching for laws, causal relationships and 
regularities between the constituents of the social world. Knowledge is thus seen as 
mainly objective to arrive at a description of reality. In this regard, the current study's 
knowledge about the phenomena under investigation; environmental disclosure and 
corporate governance, is gathered through quantitative measurement using content 
analysis of a sample of UK corporate annual reports. 
Regarding the human nature assumptions, the current study assumes determinism. 
Accordingly, human beings are mainly considered as conditioned by their external 
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circumstances. In this regard, the current research seeks objectively measurable and 
observable human behaviour.  
The choice of methodology is directly dependent on the ontological, epistemological 
and human nature assumptions of the researcher. The philosophical assumptions 
discussed above reveal that the current study generally follows an objective position. 
This implies that the study is inclined towards an objective nomothetic methodology, 
where quantitative research methods are made use of. Therefore, the study seeks a 
quantitatively measured description and exploration of the perceived reality of 
environmental disclosure and corporate governance. 
However, when it comes to choosing the research paradigm, it follows that the 
transition zones that constitute multiparadigm approaches (Gioia and Pitre 1990) 
would be suitable for the current study. The authors argue that “multiparadigm 
approaches offer the possibility of creating fresh insights because they start from 
different ontological and epistemological assumptions and therefore can tap different 
facets of organizational phenomena and can produce markedly different and uniquely 
informative theoretical views of events under study” (p.591).  
The objective of the current study is to examine the existing status of environmental 
disclosure practices in the annual reports of listed UK companies and to provide an in-
depth investigation of environmental disclosure quality identification and assessment. 
Specifically, it attempts to explain the variation in the quantity and quality of current 
environmental disclosure practices by a number of corporate governance mechanisms. 
The study is not concerned with achieving fundamental change. Therefore, the 
transition zone linking the radical humanist and radical structuralist paradigms, that 
share the value for activism and change (Gioia and Pitre, 1990), would be irrelevant to 
the current study.  
On the other hand the transition zone that links both of interpretive and functionalist 
paradigms provides an opportunity to benefit from the broader integrated theoretical 
framework; stakeholder-agency theory, adopted by the current study. Moreover, it 
allows for providing a descriptive analysis of environmental disclosure practices and 
its association to corporate governance mechanisms. Based on the above discussion, it 
is argued that the interpretive-functionalist transition zone is the appropriate research 
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paradigm to the current study. Furthermore, this paradigm fits with the objective 
research philosophy and methodological position adopted by the current study. 
The appropriateness of a research approach "derives from the nature of the social 
phenomena to be explored" (Morgan and Smircich, 1980: 491). As the current study 
is based on the multiparadigm in the interpretive- functionalist transition zone, it 
doesn't aim at developing a theory but rather seeks to describe the environmental 
disclosure practices in UK companies'  annual reports and to investigate the 
relationship between the quantity and quality of such disclosure and a number of 
corporate governance mechanisms. Therefore, the deductive approach, also referred to 
as the hypothetico-deductive approach, is considered to be more suitable to the 
present study. The hypothetico-deductive approach has been employed heavily in the 
disclosure literature (e.g. Haniffa and Cooke, 2005; Barako et al., 2008). This 
approach involves five sequential stages: deducing a hypothesis from the theory; 
expressing the hypothesis in operational terms; testing the operational hypothesis; 
examining the specific outcome of the inquiry (confirming the theory or indicating the 
need for modification); and finally modifying the theory, if necessary (Robson, 2002; 
Saunders et al., 2007). 
Consequently, the current study is using the survey method to gather the required 
data. The survey technique is the research strategy usually associated with the 
deductive approach (Saunders et al., 2007) and, hence, it aims to test a theory (Gill 
and Johnson, 2002). The survey technique is often used in descriptive or explanatory 
research, where it facilitates answering the „what‟ question in the form of „how many‟ 
or „how much‟ (Yin, 2003). Surveys portray a broad picture of what several actors are 
reporting or thinking of (Neuman, 1997). Accordingly, they allow the collection of a 
considerable amount of data from a sizable population in an economical way and give 
the researcher more control over the research process (Saunders et al., 2007). This, in 
turn, requires the choice of a data collection method; quantitative, qualitative or even 
both, to test the developed hypotheses using a highly structured methodology to 
facilitate replication of the findings (Gill and Johnson, 2002).  
A key underlying assumption is whether quantitative or qualitative research methods 
would be appropriate. Jick (1979) argues that despite constituting alternative research 
strategies, quantitative and qualitative methods are rather seen as complementary,  
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with quantitative methods tending to provide breadth to the study as opposed to the  
depth and detail provided by qualitative methods (Patton, 2002). Accordingly,  neither 
method is superior to the other but both are legitimate and useful for different 
purposes. Quantitative research considers objectivity an essential aspect of research 
while qualitative research acknowledges research subjectivity. 
In line with the objective research philosophy and methodological position and the 
consequent interpretive-functionalist multiparadigm and its associated deductive 
approach adopted by the current study, investigating the study's research questions 
and, hence, achieving its objectives requires the use of objective research methods. 
Therefore, it is believed that quantitative research methods would be appropriate to 
test the developed hypotheses deduced from the stakeholder-agency theory employed 
by the study. Using the survey strategy and employing quantitative methods, the 
research seeks to gather the required data based on a longitudinal time horizon, using 
the research technique of content analysis. 
Consequently, the current study would include two different, but complementary, 
quantitative empirical research analyses. The differentiation is based on the 
phenomenon being analyzed for achieving the research objectives. First, quantitative 
analysis, using content analysis of a sample of UK companies' annual reports 
(secondary data), will be undertaken to examine the quantity of corporate 
environmental disclosure practices and their association with corporate governance 
mechanisms, over a period of four years. Second, quantitative analysis, using content 
analysis of a sample of UK companies' annual reports (secondary data), will be 
undertaken to examine the quality of corporate environmental disclosure practices and 
their association with corporate governance mechanisms, over a period of four years. 
Based on the above discussion of the philosophical assumptions and methodological 
choices, Figure 4.3 depicts the steps involved in the current research process.  
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Figure 4.3 
The Current Research Process 
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4.6 QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH METHODS   
It has been argued that it would be appropriate for the current study to employ 
quantitative research methods as fits with the objective research philosophy and 
methodological position adopted by the current study. Quantitative research 
emphasizes “the measurement and analysis of causal relationships between variables” 
(Denzin and Lincoln, 1994: 4), by “manipulating data through sophisticated 
quantitative approaches such as multivariate statistical analysis” (Morgan and 
Smircich, 1980: 498). Patton (2002: 14) argues that this method requires “the use of 
standardized measures so that the varying perspectives and experiences of people can 
be fit into a limited number of predetermined response categories to which numbers 
are assigned” and results in “a broad, generalizable set of findings”.    
Although quantitative research methods are considered to be fast and economical as 
statistics can be aggregated from large sample sizes, they are rather inflexible and 
artificial (Easterby-Smith et al., 1991). The results of quantitative methods often 
reflect meanings that emerged from the beliefs and perceptions of the researcher 
rather than from those of the participants (Sarantakos, 1998). Moreover, the 
researcher does not provide effective understanding of the processes or the 
importance people attach to behaviour despite the wide  coverage of the range of 
situations (Easterby-Smith et al., 1991). Nevertheless, a quantitative approach 
enhances research reliability through greater inherent objectivity, thereby increasing 
the representativeness and generalisability of findings (Hussey and Hussey, 1997; 
Sarantakos, 1998).  
In line with the objective research philosophy and methodological position and the 
consequent interpretive-functionalist multiparadigm and its associated deductive 
approach adopted by the current study, investigating the study's research questions 
and, hence, achieving its objectives requires the use of objective research methods. 
Therefore, it is believed that quantitative research methods would be appropriate to 
test the developed hypotheses deduced from the stakeholder-agency theory employed 
by the study. The quantitative methods used reflect the „what‟ of the phenomenon 
under investigation (Yin, 2003). As the intension of this research is to gain an 
understanding of corporate environmental disclosure practices (What), the study was 
designed to include quantitative research methods.  
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4.7 EXAMINING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE QUANTITY AND 
        QUALITY OF ENVIRONMENTAL DISCLOSURE AND CORPORATE 
        GOVERNANCE  
The empirical study aims at quantitatively examining the quantity and quality of 
corporate environmental disclosure practices and their association with corporate 
governance mechanisms in the annual reports of UK listed companies. This section 
presents the research design employed in the conduct of the current study's 
quantitative analysis. The design is largely dependent upon the research's 
philosophical assumptions and, hence, methodological choices, which, in turn, 
dependent upon the research questions that need to be investigated. The section 
commences with the development of testable hypotheses. It then considers sample 
selection and time horizon, research method and instrument, definition and 
measurement of key variables, model specification and statistical tests used in the 
study.  
 
4.7.1   Hypotheses Development 
Reviewing disclosure literature, it can be observed that voluntary environmental 
disclosure practices are a sophisticated phenomenon that may be driven by various 
factors. In addition to firm characteristics, the current study examines several 
attributes of corporate governance and ownership structure as possible determinants 
of voluntary environmental disclosure. Based on prior research, the study will focus 
primarily on identifiable and measurable corporate governance characteristics to 
explain the extent to which companies disclose environmental information and the 
quality of such information.  
In order to operationalize this objective, corporate governance mechanisms are 
manifested and classified into the following three groups: (1) Board Characteristics: 
board independence, role duality, board size, board meetings, directors' qualifications 
and experience including educational background, community influence and cross-
directorships; (2) Board Committees Characteristics: the presence of corporate 
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environmental responsibility (CER) committee or responsible, audit committee 
independence, remuneration committee independence, nomination committee 
independence; and (3) Ownership Structure: ownership concentration, institutional 
ownership.  
The key advantage to using this setting is the existence of multiple, yet 
complementary corporate governance mechanisms that act as monitoring mechanisms 
enforcing management to act in the best interest of stakeholders which, in turn, might 
affect the disclosure decision. Taken together, these governance mechanisms 
influence the emphasis placed on environmental issues and the manner in which the 
role of a corporation and its stakeholders are defined in a society. This, in turn, is 
reflected in corporate environmental disclosure practices. Following is a detailed 
discussion and theoretical justification underlying the choice of each corporate 
governance variable. From these variables, testable hypotheses are developed.  
 
4.7.1.1   Board Characteristics 
The board of directors plays an important role in corporate governance practices 
(Bhagat and Bolton, 2008; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002) and this role may be directly 
linked to companies‟ environmental attention (Halme and Huse, 1997). It is the board 
of directors that manages information disclosure in annual reports and therefore 
disclosure may be a function of board members (Gibbins et al., 1990; Haniffa and 
Cooke, 2005). Accordingly, board characteristics are expected to impact 
environmental disclosure decisions. Board characteristics examined in the current 
study include board independence, role duality, board size, board meetings, directors' 
qualifications and experience including education, community influence and cross-
directorships. 
 
4.7.1.1.1   Board Independence 
The proportion of independent non-executive directors on the board is viewed as a 
major factor influencing corporate voluntary disclosure in general (Barako et al., 
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2006; Ho and Wong, 2001) and social and environmental disclosure in particular 
(Brammer and Pavelin, 2008; Haniffa and Cooke, 2005). Independent non-executive 
directors are more concerned with corporate social responsibility (Ibrahim et al., 
2003; Webb, 2004) and, hence, social and environmental disclosure. The focus on 
board independence is grounded in the agency theory and complemented by the 
stakeholder perspective. As representatives of stakeholders, independent non-
executive directors are perceived as a tool for monitoring management behavior 
(Dixon et al., 2005; Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990), resulting in more information 
disclosure. Fama and Jensen (1983) argued that higher proportion of independent non-
executive directors increases board effectiveness in monitoring managerial 
opportunism and, consequently, increases voluntary disclosures. In a similar vein, 
Forker (1992) argued that inclusion of non-executive directors on corporate boards 
enhances the quality of financial disclosure and reduces the benefits from withholding 
information. Furthermore, independent directors may show more objectivity and may 
consider diverse stakeholders in making their deliberations and recommendations 
Zahra and Pearce II (1989). Accordingly, they provide outside perspectives, including 
the propensity to provide transparent information to a wide range of stakeholders,  to 
help attain the company's strategic goals (Rupley et al., 2011).  
However, empirical evidence on the relationship between board independence and 
corporate environmental disclosures is limited. Although Brammer and Pavelin 
(2006) were unable to confirm a significant relationship, evidence of the existence of 
a positive association between the proportion of independent non-executive directors 
and each of the quantity and quality of corporate environmental disclosures is 
documented by Post et al. (2011) and Rupley et al. (2011) respectively. Even the 
relationship between board independence and voluntary disclosure in general is 
mixed. While Barako et al. (2006) and Haniffa and Cooke (2002) found negative 
relationship, Huafang and Jianguo (2007), Lim et al. (2007) and Cheng and 
Courtenay (2006) documented a positive association between the proportion of 
independent non-executive directors and voluntary disclosure, with Ho and Wong 
(2001) didn't conclude a significant relationship at all.  
Following the argument that independent non-executive directors provide the 
necessary checks and balances for enhancing board effectiveness  and act as a sound 
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mechanism to diffuse agency conflicts between managers and owners (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983), they help ensure that companies are pursuing, and strongly aligned 
with, stakeholders' interests (Haniffa and Cooke, 2005; Zahra et al., 1993). Better 
alignment with stakeholders' interests, which should be manifested in increased 
transparency, brings greater expectation of comprehensive and high-quality 
environmental information dissemination (Brammer and Pavelin, 2008; Cheng and 
Courtenay, 2006; Williamson, 1984). Hence, the following hypotheses are proposed: 
H1a : There is a positive relationship between the quantity of corporate environmental 
disclosure and the proportion of independent non-executive directors on the board. 
H1b : The relationship between the quantity of corporate environmental disclosure 
and the proportion of independent non-executive directors on the board would differ 
among different categories of disclosure. 
H1c : There is a positive relationship between the quality of corporate environmental 
disclosure and the proportion of independent non-executive directors on the board. 
H1d : The relationship between the quality of corporate environmental disclosure and 
the proportion of independent non-executive directors on the board would differ 
among different categories of disclosure. 
 
4.7.1.1.2   Role Duality 
There is widespread acknowledgement that role duality, where the chief executive 
officer (CEO) is also the chairman of the board, may constrain board independence 
and compromise its effectiveness as a governance mechanism (Adams et al., 2005; 
Millstein, 1992). Agency theory argues for the separation of management and control 
and, hence, suggests that the two roles of CEO and chairman should be separated as to 
provide necessary checks and balances over management's performance (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983). Role duality may impair board effectiveness because the CEO will be 
able to control board meetings and select agendas and board members (Haniffa and 
Cooke, 2002). It can significantly hinder the boards' important function of monitoring, 
disciplining and compensating senior managers and enables the CEO to engage in 
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opportunistic behavior because of his dominance over the board (Barako et al., 2006). 
Combining the two roles also makes it difficult for a board to replace a poorly 
performing CEO (Shivdasani and Zenner, 2004).  
This argument can be extended to stakeholders' rights to information disclosure and, 
hence, is in line with stakeholder-agency theory. Board oversight and governance 
roles, and the consequent impairment by role duality, may also include the 
dissemination of corporate information to stakeholders (Gul and Leung, 2004). 
Placing too much power in the hands of one person entails the possibility of 
restricting information flow (McKendall et al., 1999) and withholding unfavorable 
information from reaching stakeholders (Ho and Wong, 2001). Furthermore, Forker 
(1992) argues that a dominant personality poses a threat to monitoring quality and is 
detrimental to the quality of disclosure. Separating the CEO and chairman roles is, 
therefore, in the stakeholders' interest.  
No empirical evidence to date on the relationship between corporate environmental 
disclosure and role duality was able to confirm a significant association between the 
two variables (Al Arussi et al., 2009; Michelon and Parbonetti, 2010; Rupley et al., 
2011). The reasoning behind these results can be attributed to Fama and Jensen (1983) 
argument that any adverse consequences resulting from role duality can be eliminated 
by market discipline. However, studies examining the relationship between role 
duality and corporate voluntary disclosure in general produced somewhat inconsistent 
results. Haniffa and Cooke (2002) and Barako et al., (2006) found no significant 
association between the two variables. But Forker (1992) asserted a negative 
relationship between role duality and disclosure as did Gul and Leung (2004) and 
Huafang and Jianguo (2007).  
Based on the above argument, separating the CEO and chairman roles makes the 
board of directors more likely to be effective in monitoring management's 
performance, ensuring a high level of transparency and, therefore, reducing 
information asymmetry between management and stakeholders (Gul and Leung, 
2004; Rupley et al., 2011). Accordingly, firms with role duality are expected to be 
less likely associated with comprehensive and high-quality disclosure. Hence, the 
following hypotheses are proposed: 
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H2a : There is a negative relationship between the quantity of corporate 
environmental disclosure and role duality. 
H2b : The relationship between the quantity of corporate environmental disclosure 
and role duality would differ among different categories of disclosure. 
H2c : There is a negative relationship between the quality of corporate environmental 
disclosure and role duality. 
H2d : The relationship between the quality of corporate environmental disclosure and 
role duality would differ among different categories of disclosure. 
 
4.7.1.1.3   Board Size 
The size of the board, as an important corporate governance mechanism, has been a 
subject of theoretical debate. According to agency theory, a larger board has greater 
monitoring capacities (John and Senbet, 1998; Zahra and Pearce II, 1989) and, thus, is 
regarded as an effective governance tool in monitoring management's performance. 
Large boards are more likely to have greater representation of experienced 
independent directors (Welford, 2007; Xie et al., 2003) and, hence, are more likely to 
reduce management opportunism by diverting attention to corporate social and 
environmental responsibilities (Sun et al., 2010). From a stakeholder perspective, 
however, it is argued that larger boards increase the diversity of board composition. A 
larger board size enhances a company's ability to understand and address the diversity 
of various stakeholder's interests (Pearce II and Zahra, 1992; Welford, 2007), which 
ultimately leads to greater transparency and more information disclosure (Laksmana, 
2008; Williams, 2002). Moreover, it allows greater balance and, hence, enhances 
decision making while increasing harmony between a firm‟s stakeholders (Ho and 
Williams, 2003). Larger boards improve information-processing capabilities and the 
quality of advice given to corporate management, resulting in better representation of 
stakeholders‟ interests, as they are not susceptible to managerial domination as 
smaller boards (Zahra and Pearce II, 1989). 
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Large and diverse boards have traditionally facilitated the governance function of the 
board (Goodstein et al., 1994). They draw from a broader range of experience and 
skills covering all financial, legal and industry-specific knowledge and adding to the 
pool of talent that governs the organization (Pearce II and Zahra, 1992; Welford, 
2007; Xie et al., 2003; Zahra and Pearce II, 1989). In addition, large and diverse 
boards help companies to secure critical resources and reduce environmental 
uncertainties or lack of information about the environment (Pfeffer, 1987; Pearce II 
and Zahra, 1992; Goodstein et al., 1994), thereby enhancing corporate performance 
(Chaganti et al., 1985; Dalton et al., 1999).  
Some arguments support the idea that large boards can be dysfunctional (Khanchel, 
2007). Jensen (1993) suggests that board size hinders the ability of the board to 
pursue long-term strategic goals. Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) argue that larger 
boards may be plagued with agency conflicts and monitoring problems. However, this 
argument may be valid only for boards that are too large or excessively sized. This 
due to the lack of coordination associated with a large board, which slows down the 
decision making process and decreases board efficiency (Jensen, 1993; Lipton and 
Lorsch, 1992; Yermack, 1996). Nevertheless, such difficulties may be offset by 
increased board's monitoring capacities (John and Senbet, 1998) and ability to draw 
on a large diverse board. In addition, they may be partly mitigated through the use of 
subcommittees that may improve coordination (Goodstein et al., 1994). 
Empirical evidence on the relationship between board size and corporate 
environmental disclosures is quite limited. Although Halme and Huse (1997) and 
Michelon and Parbonetti (2010) were unable to confirm a significant relationship, 
evidence of the existence of a positive association between board size and corporate 
environmental disclosure is documented by Cormier et al. (2011). In a similar vein, 
Cormier et al. (2010) found board size to be negatively related to information 
asymmetry and, thus, positively related to voluntary disclosure, assuming such 
relationship to be an inverted “U” shape, with an optimal board size existing midway. 
Below this optimal board size, there is a positive relation between board size and 
information asymmetry followed by a negative relationship. 
Based on a stakeholder-agency perspective, the current study follows the argument 
that a larger board promotes more effective decision making and enhances 
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information-processing capabilities (Ho and Williams, 2003). Greater representation 
of the wider interests of stakeholders by large boards indicates a higher level of 
environmental attention (Halme and Huse, 1997) and, hence, brings greater 
expectation of environmental information dissemination. Consistent with this view, it 
can be argued that increasing the number of directors on the board could provide 
better communication with diverse stakeholders through comprehensive and high-
quality environmental disclosure. Accordingly, the following hypotheses are derived: 
H3a : There is a positive relationship between the quantity of corporate environmental 
disclosure and board size. 
H3b : The relationship between the quantity of corporate environmental disclosure 
and board size would differ among different categories of disclosure. 
H3c : There is a positive relationship between the quality of corporate environmental 
disclosure and board size. 
H3d : The relationship between the quality of corporate environmental disclosure and 
board size would differ among different categories of disclosure. 
 
4.7.1.1.4   Board Meetings 
Another measure of board effectiveness is the number of meetings held in a year. 
Meeting frequency reflects the diligence and vigilance of the board in carrying their 
monitoring duties (Persons, 2006). Consistent with agency theory, board meeting 
frequency is an element of strong corporate governance (Khanchel, 2007). If a firm is 
efficient in setting the frequency of its board meetings, it will attain economies in 
agency costs (Vafeas, 1999). In other words, board activity, as represented by meeting 
frequency, influences the board's ability to act as an effective monitoring mechanism 
in mitigating agency conflicts (Xie et al., 2003). Increased monitoring is expected to 
result in reduced information asymmetry and lower agency costs, thereby increasing 
disclosures (Nelson et al., 2010). Therefore, boards should increase meetings 
frequency if the situation requires significant supervision and control (Shivdasani and 
Zenner, 2004). 
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From a stakeholder perspective, frequent board meetings would enhance board 
effectiveness (Conger et al., 1998) and, hence, its ability to address stakeholders 
interests which, in turn, may positively affect disclosure decisions. Frequent board 
meetings would facilitate better communication and information sharing among 
directors (Shivdasani and Zenner, 2004) and would allow better workload distribution 
and committee assignments, leading to more effective board decisions and increased 
transparency (Laksmana, 2008). Frequency of meetings is also argued to be 
associated with the quality of reporting (Laksmana, 2008). In addition, an active 
board that meets more often is able to devote more time to issues such as social and 
environmental responsibility. Therefore, board effectiveness could be compromised if 
the number of meetings is small. Infrequent meetings reduce the ability of boards to 
build their collective strength (Demb and Neubauer, 1992).     
Empirical findings highlight the need for a better understanding of all elements that 
determine board effectiveness including board meetings (Van den Berghe and Levrau, 
2004). Although not previously addressed in environmental disclosure research, 
Laksmana (2008) documents that a board having more time to meet leads to increased 
transparency. Particularly, the study provided evidence that board meeting frequency 
is positively associated with the extent of voluntary disclosure of compensation 
practices. However, Cormier et al. (2010) did not confirm any relationship between 
board meetings and voluntary corporate governance disclosure. Similarly, Nelson et 
al. (2010) found insignificant relationship between board meetings and the nature and 
extent of statutory executive stock option disclosures by Australian listed companies.  
Based on the above argument, board meetings frequency increases board monitoring, 
enhances board effectiveness, promotes transparency and, in turn, reduces information 
asymmetry, in addition to the possibility of devoting more time to issues such as 
social and environmental responsibility. Consistent with this argument, boards that 
meet more frequently are more likely to provide enhanced environmental disclosure. 
The study, therefore, expects environmental disclosure to be positively related to the 
number of board meetings. Hence, the following hypotheses are developed: 
H4a : There is a positive relationship between the quantity of corporate environmental 
disclosure and board meetings frequency.  
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H4b : The relationship between the quantity of corporate environmental disclosure 
and board meetings frequency would differ among different categories of disclosure. 
H4c : There is a positive relationship between the quality of corporate environmental 
disclosure and the board meetings frequency.  
H4d : The relationship between the quality of corporate environmental disclosure and 
board meetings frequency would differ among different categories of disclosure. 
 
4.7.1.1.5   Directors' Qualifications and Experience 
Directors' qualifications and experience, reflecting the educational background, 
values, skills and expertise of directors, is argued to be a major factor influencing the 
governance of the firm. Directors are not homogeneous in terms of specific skills, 
knowledge and expertise  (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990; Kesner, 1988). 
Accordingly, Mallin and Michelon (2011) and Michelon and Parbonetti (2010) argue 
that the distinctive qualifications and experience of board members contribute 
differently to board functioning and priorities. From an agency perspective, board 
performance is of higher quality when its members have more experience (Fama 
1980; Fama and Jensen 1983). As the knowledge and experience possessed by board 
members increases, the more likely these members will be better equipped to carry 
out their governance roles and help the company in meeting its strategic objectives 
(Peters and Romi, 2011) by providing counsel and advice to management (Zahra and 
Pearce II, 1989). Such relationships exist due to directors' ability to raise and interpret 
issues of interest to the board such as social and environmental responsibility issues 
and the related disclosure.  
A stakeholder theory argues for the presence of experienced and well qualified 
independent directors on the board to ensure board effectiveness. According to Pfeffer 
and Salancik (1978), they represent channels for communicating information and 
assist in obtaining support from important stakeholders. Directors with different 
education, expertise and skills are more likely to resist managerial domination and 
represent stakeholders' interests (Zahra and Pearce II, 1989). They are more likely to 
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act in shareholders' best interests and understand the wider responsibilities to other 
stakeholders (Welford, 2007). Having directors with and with multiple perspectives 
covering all financial, legal and industry-specific knowledge improve the quality of 
decisions taken by the firm, including disclosure decisions (Welford, 2007; Zahra and 
Pearce II, 1989). These benefits are likely to be stronger if the board members possess 
environmental expertise, who can effectively evaluate environmentally innovative 
strategies, including the provision of enhanced environmental disclosure (Peters and 
Romi, 2011).  
The current study argues that directors' qualifications and experience are a function of 
three factors, namely education, community influence, and cross-directorships of 
board members.  In order to analyze the effect that diversity in background knowledge, 
skills and expertise of directors has on environmental disclosure, the study considers 
directors with business, accounting, and/or finance educational backgrounds; 
community influential directors; and directors with multiple directorships. Consistent 
with the above arguments, this diversity in background and expertise is likely to affect 
board governance roles and, ultimately, the provision of environmental accounting 
disclosure. Specifically, the current study examines whether the increase in the 
proportion of directors on the board with business, accounting, and/or finance 
education; community influence; and cross-directorships is associated with 
comprehensive and high-quality environmental disclosure. Following is a discussion 
of each of the elements of directors' qualifications and experience and how it is 
expected to enhance environmental disclosure practices, succeeded by the formulation 
of the relevant hypotheses.  
 
4.7.1.1.5.1   Education 
Educational background of directors can be a significant factor in determining 
corporate disclosure. Education can be identified as an institutional consequence 
influencing accounting systems and practices (Gray, 1988). An educated manager can 
have a broader perspective and superior pattern of thinking and, thus, is more likely 
understand the wider interests of various stakeholders (Akhtaruddin and Abdur Rouf, 
2011; Welford, 2007). Merchant et al. (1995) argue that western-educated directors 
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may adopt innovative ideas and values that could significantly affect their disclosure 
behavior. Wallace and Cooke (1990) also argued that an increase in the education 
level may increase awareness of corporate accountability. Therefore, directors having 
an accounting and/or business educational background may be more likely to disclose 
more information to demonstrate accountability (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). In 
addition, the educational background of directors can determine their approach to 
environmental disclosure as reactive or proactive (Peters and Romi, 2011). 
Accordingly, the current study argues that an increase in the proportion of directors on 
the board with business, accounting, and/or finance education is accompanied by 
enhanced environmental disclosure. Currently, no empirical evidence exists on the 
relationship between directors' education and a direct measure of corporate 
environmental disclosure. However, in the context of voluntary disclosure in general, 
although Haniffa and Cooke (2002) found insignificant relationship, Akhtaruddin and 
Abdur Rouf (2011) documented a positive association between board members 
qualified in business and accounting and the extent of voluntary disclosure. The 
current study hypothesizes that: 
H5a : There is a positive relationship between the quantity of corporate environmental 
disclosure and the proportion of directors on the board with business, accounting, 
and/or finance education. 
H5b : The relationship between the quantity of corporate environmental disclosure 
and the proportion of directors on the board with business, accounting, and/or 
finance education would differ among different categories of disclosure. 
H5c : There is a positive relationship between the quality of corporate environmental 
disclosure and the proportion of directors on the board with business, accounting, 
and/or finance education. 
H5d : The relationship between the quality of corporate environmental disclosure and 
the proportion of directors on the board with business, accounting, and/or finance 
education would differ among different categories of disclosure. 
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4.7.1.1.5.2   Community Influence 
Community influential directors are defined as directors with experience and linkages 
who provide support and service to the company in terms of networking and 
reputation, through connections with various stakeholders, beyond the competitive 
environment of the firm (Hillman et al., 2000; Mallin and Michelon, 2011; Michelon 
and Parbonetti, 2010). Specifically, they facilitate information acquisition and 
processing by establishing contacts with stakeholders, thereby help absorb 
environmental uncertainty and enhance corporate performance in general (Zahra and 
Pearce II, 1989) and corporate social performance in particular (Mallin and Michelon, 
2011). In addition, they are “less likely to tolerate environmental irresponsibility 
because their interests are more closely aligned with the interests of the community at 
large” (Kassinis and Vafeas, 2002: 401). Examples of community influential directors 
are politicians, academicians, military officers, members of clergy and religious 
leaders, and members of social or community organizations as well as members of 
professional bodies and regulators (Baysinger and Zardkoohi, 1986; Hillman et al., 
2000) or holding a combination of any of these positions and memberships. By 
bringing valuable non-business perspectives, community influential directors enhance 
board awareness about stakeholders‟ needs and expectations, in addition to taking 
such needs and expectations into consideration while addressing disclosure decisions 
(Hillman et al., 2000; Mallin and Michelon, 2011; Michelon and Parbonetti, 2010). 
This brings attention to the vital role played by community influential directors in 
orienting corporate disclosure towards satisfying the wider interests of stakeholders 
and leads to the expectation that their presence on the board might promote 
environmental disclosure. Accordingly, the current study argues that an increase in 
the proportion of community influential directors on the board is accompanied by 
enhanced environmental disclosure. Empirically, Michelon and Parbonetti (2010) 
found that the proportion of community influential directors on the board positively 
affects sustainability, environmental, and strategic disclosure. The current study 
hypothesizes that: 
H6a : There is a positive relationship between the quantity of corporate environmental 
disclosure and the proportion of directors on the board with community influence. 
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H6b : The relationship between the quantity of corporate environmental disclosure 
and the proportion of directors on the board with community influence would differ 
among different categories of disclosure. 
H6c : There is a positive relationship between the quality of corporate environmental 
disclosure and the proportion of directors on the board with community influence. 
H6d : The relationship between the quality of corporate environmental disclosure and 
the proportion directors on the board with community influence would differ among 
different categories of disclosure. 
 
4.7.1.1.5.3   Cross-Directorships 
Cross-directorships is another aspect of directors' qualifications and experience that 
exists when directors serve on more than one board. From an agency perspective,  
cross-directorships are used by directors as a signal of decision expertise (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983). Multiple directorships enable directors to draw on their wider 
experience and expertise in monitoring management and improving board 
effectiveness (Kosnik, 1987), under the assumption that diversity in expertise can 
improve board monitoring, oversight and decision making (Browder, 1995; 
Laksmana, 2008; Useem, 1993) thereby enhancing overall corporate performance 
(Weir et al., 2002). Consistent with a stakeholder perspective, however, cross-
directorships may help directors gain the necessary skills and experience needed to 
understand and address the wider environmental responsibilities towards various 
stakeholders. Dahya et al. (1996) highlight the importance of multiple directorships in 
promoting increased information transparency as they offer insights and comparisons 
based on knowledge of other organizations. Consequently, Haniffa and Cooke (2002) 
argue that cross-directorships have important implications for disclosure practices 
through greater access to information. In addition, Rupley et al. (2011) argue that 
multiple directorships increase the overall quality of environmental disclosure as a 
result of greater exposure to other companies' environmental reporting. Accordingly, 
the current study argues that an increase in the proportion of directors on the board 
with cross-directorships is accompanied by enhanced environmental disclosure. 
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Empirically, Haniffa and Cooke (2005) found a positive association between cross-
directorships and the extent of corporate social and environmental disclosure and 
Rupley et al. (2011) results strongly support that environmental disclosure quality is 
positively associated with board expertise as measured by multiple directorships. The 
current study hypothesizes that: 
 H7a : There is a positive relationship between the quantity of corporate 
environmental disclosure and the proportion of directors on the board with cross-
directorships. 
H7b : The relationship between the quantity of corporate environmental disclosure 
and the proportion of directors on the board with cross-directorships would differ 
among different categories of disclosure. 
H7c : There is a positive relationship between the quality of corporate environmental 
disclosure and the proportion of directors on the board with cross-directorships. 
H7d : The relationship between the quality of corporate environmental disclosure and 
the proportion of directors on the board with cross-directorships would differ among 
different categories of disclosure. 
 
4.7.1.2   Board Committees Characteristics  
Board effectiveness depends not only on the composition of the board as a whole, but 
also on the structure of its committees. Corporate governance principles recommend 
that boards should enhance their monitoring and control functions by forming 
committees that are responsible for particular duties (UK Corporate Governance 
Code, 2010). Kesner (1988) indicates that significant board decisions originate at the 
committee level. Board committees enable subgroups of directors to comprehensively 
consider the details of specific issues of interest that the full board would not have 
time to address (Lorsch and MacIver, 1989). Accordingly, board's oversight and 
monitoring roles are enhanced through the establishment of specialized committees 
(Zahra and Pearce II, 1989). Similarly, board committees are associated with 
improved corporate governance (Forker 1992; Davis 2001). Despite this fact, 
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however, there is a lack of empirical evidence on the impact of board subcommittees‟ 
structure on corporate performance – and corporate disclosure - in the UK context 
(Weir et al., 2002). Board committees characteristics examined in the current study 
include the presence of corporate environmental responsibility (CER) committee or 
responsible, audit committee independence, remuneration committee independence 
and nomination committee independence. 
 
4.7.1.2.1   Corporate Environmental Responsibility (CER) Committee Presence 
The presence of a corporate environmental responsibility (CER) committee or 
responsible at board level may demonstrate the board's commitment towards 
environmentally responsible behaviour and indicate the firm's willingness to balance 
the often conflicting interests of stakeholder groups (Monks and Minow, 1995). Board 
CER committee is typically in charge of reviewing CER issues; identifying non-
financial risks and monitoring risk management; establishing policies and standards; 
monitoring compliance with and performance against company CER policies; 
reviewing company reporting on CER; and overseeing philanthropic activity 
(Mackenzie, 2007). The presence of a CER committee should convey a message to 
the organization about the desirability, importance and the high priority given to 
environmental responsibility issues (Cowen et al., 1987; McKendall et al., 1999) 
including environmental disclosure practices (Cowen et al., 1987; Rupley et al., 
2011).  
Consistent with agency theory, CER committees will undertake more proactive 
environmental strategies (Peters and Romi, 2011). Social and environmental 
responsibility committees help companies in determining and identifying the major 
societal and environmental concerns that are likely to influence corporate 
performance (Kohls, 1986). “Failure to perform this important social responsibility 
role may undermine shareholders' long-term interest” (Zahra and Pearce II, 1989: 
303). In addition, firms with a CER committee are more likely to disclose 
environmental information because the committee members will require management 
to demonstrate accountability by ensuring that the firm is following well-established 
environmental reporting guidelines and recommendations. Therefore, the presence of 
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such committee can be considered an effective monitoring device for enhancing 
environmental disclosure provided to stakeholders (Michelon and Parbonetti, 2010).  
From a stakeholder perspective, however, the existence of a CER committee or a 
person responsible for environmental issues at the board level indicates an active 
strategic posture of the company with respect to stakeholders (Michelon and 
Parbonetti, 2010; Ullmann, 1985). As the CER committee is responsible for ensuring 
the quality of the company's environmental reporting policies, the establishment of 
such committee can be regarded as a means of addressing stakeholders' interests and 
responding to their expectations (Michelon and Parbonetti, 2010; Peters and Romi, 
2011). Similarly, Rupley et al. (2011) argue that the existence of a CSR committee, 
which brings greater awareness of wider stakeholders' interests indicating strong 
board governance, is positively associated with the quality of environmental 
disclosure. 
Empirical evidence on the relationship between the existence of corporate 
environmental responsibility (CER) committee on the board and environmental 
disclosure is quite limited. Although McKendall et al. (1999), Michelon and 
Parbonetti (2010) and Rupley et al. (2011) were unable to confirm a significant 
relationship, evidence of the existence of a positive association between the presence 
of a CER committee on the board and corporate environmental disclosures is 
documented by Peters and Romi (2011). In a similar vein, Hassan (2010) found that 
the presence of corporate social responsibility (CSR) committee is associated with the 
quantity and quality of corporate social disclosure. 
In line with the above argument and consistent with a stakeholder-agency perspective, 
the existence of corporate environmental responsibility (CER) committee on the board 
acts as an effective monitoring device and a sound means of addressing broader 
stakeholders' interests. Accordingly, the current study argues that the presence of a 
board-level CER committee is associated with a greater propensity to provide 
enhanced environmental disclosure. Hence, the following hypotheses are formulated: 
H8a : There is a positive relationship between the quantity of corporate environmental 
disclosure and the presence of a CER committee. 
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H8b : The relationship between the quantity of corporate environmental disclosure 
and the presence of a CER committee would differ among different categories of 
disclosure. 
H8c : There is a positive relationship between the quality of corporate environmental 
disclosure and the presence of a CER committee. 
H8d : The relationship between the quality of corporate environmental disclosure and 
the presence of a CER committee would differ among different categories of 
disclosure. 
 
4.7.1.2.2   Audit Committee Independence 
The presence of an audit committee on the board represents an additional internal 
governance mechanism that is expected to improve the company's performance (Weir 
et al., 2002). Audit committees are defined as being “responsible for overseeing the 
financial reporting process and ensuring the objectivity of the external audit” (Uzun et 
al., 2004: 36). More importantly, independence of the audit committee members can 
significantly contribute to the committee's effectiveness  (Xie et al., 2003), as it 
enables the committee to carry out its responsibilities objectively (Abbott et al., 
2004). An effective audit committee helps the board to meet its statutory and fiduciary 
responsibilities (Weir et al., 2002). From a stakeholder-agency perspective, it is 
argued that audit committees act as monitoring mechanisms that improve the audit 
attestation function of corporate financial reporting (Bradbury, 1990), reducing 
agency costs (Ho and Wong, 2001) and hence enhancing the quality of such reporting 
(Bradbury et al., 2006; Collier, 1993; Cotter and Silvester, 2003; Nelson et al., 2010). 
Accordingly, audit committees can improve the quality of information flow between 
managers and shareholders (Barako et al., 2006). Audit committees are, therefore, 
expected to improve the credibility of information disclosed (McMullen, 1996), 
thereby safeguarding stakeholders' interests. Furthermore, Forker (1992) argued that 
audit committees with independent directors may improve internal control and, thus, 
disclosure quality.   
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No empirical evidence to date exists on the relationship between audit committee 
independence and corporate environmental disclosure. However, in the context of 
voluntary disclosure in general, a positive association exists between the presence of 
an audit committee and voluntary disclosure practices as documented by Ho and 
Wong (2001) and Barako et al. (2006). Similarly, O‟Sullivan et al. (2008) found that 
the existence of an audit committee and its independence are positively associated 
with voluntary disclosure of forward- looking information. Yet, examining statutory 
executive stock option disclosures, Nelson et al. (2010) found that audit committee 
independence contributes to improved disclosures by Australian listed companies. 
The insight in these studies is that independent directors on audit committees are 
important in handling agency problems and managing broader stakeholders' interests, 
which, in turn, improves disclosure practices. Following this line of thinking, and 
taking into consideration that the audit function may comprise environmental audit in 
addition to the financial one, it can be argued that the independence of board-level 
audit committee is expected to enhance environmental disclosure. Hence, the 
following hypotheses are proposed: 
H9a : There is a positive relationship between the quantity of corporate environmental 
disclosure and audit committee independence. 
H9b : The relationship between the quantity of corporate environmental disclosure 
and audit committee independence would differ among different categories of 
disclosure. 
H9c : There is a positive relationship between the quality of corporate environmental 
disclosure and audit committee independence. 
H9d : The relationship between the quality of corporate environmental disclosure and 
audit committee independence would differ among different categories of disclosure. 
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4.7.1.2.3   Remuneration Committee Independence 
UK Corporate Governance Code (2010) recommends that companies should establish 
board committees, which act as monitoring mechanisms, thereby enhancing corporate 
governance. A remuneration committee, also called compensation committee, is 
responsible to the board for assessing management‟s performance and recommending 
appropriate remuneration packages of directors (Nelson et al., 2010; Uzun et al., 
2004). Without such committee, directors will award themselves excessive 
remuneration which, being unrelated to performance, would be detrimental to firm 
value (Bruce and Buck, 2005). From an agency perspective, independent 
remuneration committees can help alleviate agency problems by constructing and 
implementing incentive schemes designed to align the goals of senior management 
with those of shareholders (Uzun et al., 2004). From a stakeholder perspective, 
however, it is argued that independent remuneration committees are likely to make 
objective decisions by supporting greater disclosure (Laksmana, 2008). A more 
independent remuneration committee is less aligned to management and hence, is 
more likely to encourage more transparent disclosures (Nelson et al., 2010). 
Similarly, Main and Johnson (1993) argue that the existence of a remuneration 
committee should ensure that remuneration is closely related to performance. This 
argument is particularly valid given the independence of the committee members. 
Empirical evidence addressing this issue indicated strong performance-pay link (Daily 
et al., 2003; Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Main et al., 1996). Furthermore, a company's 
executive pay policy includes “providing effective reward and incentive to existing 
staff, supporting their retention, and attracting new talent by providing the company 
with a positive profile in executive labor markets” (Bruce and Buck, 2005: 119). 
These functions suggest that managers will act in the best interests of stakeholders in 
order to receive considerable pay and retain their position in the firm. Therefore, the 
independence of a remuneration committee helps to mitigate agency problems and to 
ensure better alignment to stakeholders' interests, which in turn improves corporate 
disclosure. 
No empirical evidence to date exists on the relationship between remuneration 
committee independence and corporate environmental disclosure. However, in the 
context of voluntary disclosure in general, Laksmana (2008) found that compensation 
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committees with the authority to exercise independent oversight of management 
provide more voluntary disclosure of executive compensation practices. Similarly, 
O‟Sullivan et al. (2008) found that the presence of a remuneration committee and its 
independence are positively associated with voluntary disclosure of forward- looking 
information. Yet, examining statutory executive stock option disclosures, Nelson et 
al. (2010) found that compensation committee independence contributes to improved 
disclosures by Australian listed companies.  
Based on the above argument, the independence of the remuneration committee 
members is a necessary requirement for handling agency problems and managing 
broader stakeholders' interests. Increased monitoring of management and better 
alignment with stakeholders' interests is expected to result in reduced information 
asymmetry and lower agency costs, thereby increasing disclosures (Nelson et al., 
2010). Following this line of reasoning, and taking into consideration that 
remuneration setting links pay to performance including environmental performance, 
it can be argued that the independence of board- level remuneration committee is 
expected to enhance environmental disclosure. Hence, the following hypotheses are 
proposed: 
H10a : There is a positive relationship between the quantity of corporate 
environmental disclosure and remuneration committee independence. 
H10b : The relationship between the quantity of corporate environmental disclosure 
and remuneration committee independence would differ among different categories of 
disclosure. 
H10c : There is a positive relationship between the quality of corporate environmental 
disclosure and remuneration committee independence. 
H10d : The relationship between the quality of corporate environmental disclosure and 
remuneration committee independence would differ among different categories of 
disclosure. 
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4.7.1.2.4   Nomination Committee Independence 
Enhancing corporate governance can be accomplished through the existence of board 
committees acting as monitoring mechanisms as recommended by the principles of 
UK Corporate Governance Code (2010). These principles also recognize that 
effective monitoring requires that committees be independent of management. A 
nomination committee is suggested as a way to help ensure a formal and transparent 
procedure for the appointment of new directors to the board. In doing so, nomination 
committees review gathered information to enable the assessment and selection of 
candidates for nomination to membership on the board (Carson, 2002; Uzun et al., 
2004). The authors also argue that nomination committees “are central to the effective 
functioning of the board over time” (Uzun et al., 2004: 36-37). Without a nomination 
committee, firms tend to appoint fewer independent directors and more gray directors, 
who are not truly independent, giving rise to conflicts of interest (Shivdasani and 
Yermack, 1999). Board nomination committees have grown in number and power 
sufficiently well to exert influence in the nomination and selection of directors 
(Kesner, 1988). The presence of such monitoring committees as nomination 
committees is found to be positively related to factors associated with the benefits of 
monitoring (John and Senbet, 1998), particularly given their independence. 
Accordingly, consistent with stakeholder-agency theory, nomination committee 
independence helps to resolve agency conflicts and align to stakeholders' interests. 
Currently, no empirical evidence exists on the relationship between nomination 
committee independence and corporate environmental disclosure. Nevertheless, in the 
context of voluntary disclosure in general, Cheung et al. (2010) found that companies 
with board- level committees including a nomination committee tend to more 
transparent and O‟Sullivan et al. (2008) found that the presence of a nomination 
committee is positively associated with voluntary disclosure of forward- looking 
information. These results should encourage nomination committees to reflect 
carefully on possible representation of independent directors.    
Consistent with the above argument, the independence of nomination committee 
members results in increased monitoring and accountability to stakeholders, thus 
promoting greater reporting transparency (Carson, 2002; O‟Sullivan et al., 2008) 
Following this line of thinking, and taking into consideration the wider stakeholders' 
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interests in environmental information, it can be argued that the independence of 
board-level nomination committee is expected to enhance environmental disclosure. 
Hence, the following hypotheses are proposed: 
H11a : There is a positive relationship between the quantity of corporate 
environmental disclosure and nomination committee independence. 
H11b : The relationship between the quantity of corporate environmental disclosure 
and nomination committee independence would differ among different categories of 
disclosure. 
H11c : There is a positive relationship between the quality of corporate environmental 
disclosure and nomination committee independence. 
H11d : The relationship between the quality of corporate environmental disclosure and 
nomination committee independence would differ among different categories of 
disclosure. 
 
4.7.1.3   Ownership Structure 
Concentration and type of ownership have been suggested as significant factors in 
explaining variability in voluntary disclosure practices. Variations in ownership 
structures may affect the relationship between a company and its stakeholders and 
influence the level and quality of corporate social and environmental disclosure (van 
der Laan Smith et al., 2005), as determined by the level of monitoring managerial 
behaviour (Eng and Mak, 2003). In this regard, “the relative power between managers 
and shareholders will then determine the dominating values” (Halme and Huse, 1997: 
141). Ownership Structures examined in the current study include ownership 
concentration and institutional ownership. 
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4.7.1.3.1   Ownership Concentration 
Agency theory suggests that agency conflicts resulting from the separation of 
ownership and control (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) are greater when shares are 
widely held (ownership dispersion) than when they are closely held (ownership 
concentration) (Fama and Jensen, 1983). To mitigate the severity of conflicts 
associated with ownership dispersion, mangers may be willing to voluntarily disclose 
more information, as small owners rely upon such disclosures for information 
concerning the firm‟s activities (Brammer and Pavelin, 2008). Thus, voluntary 
disclosure can be viewed as a means by which managers demonstrate that they act in 
the best interests of the owners (Craswell and Taylor, 1992). In case of ownership 
dispersion, shareholders have little direct authority over managers and hence inability 
to effectively monitor management and a consequent degree of information 
asymmetry (Brammer and Pavelin, 2006). This situation, which brings an adverse 
investor reaction, provides an incentive for a firm to disclose environmental 
information to shareholders (Brammer and Pavelin, 2006; Ullmann, 1985).  
Alternatively, ownership concentration, which is associated with less agency 
conflicts, decreases the likelihood of voluntary disclosure. In addition, substantial 
shareholders may represent a key stakeholder group who have power (O‟Sullivan et 
al., 2008) and therefore can obtain the required information from alternative sources 
other than corporate disclosure (Berthelot et al., 2003). Similarly, Cormier et al. 
(2005) argue that closely-held ownership is not expected to be responsive to public 
disclosure since the dominant shareholders typically have access to the information 
they need. Furthermore, Reverte (2009) argues that companies with diffused 
ownership are more likely to improve their financial reporting policy by providing 
corporate social and environmental disclosure, while companies with concentrated 
ownership are less motivated to disclose additional information on their social and 
environmental performance. 
A stakeholder perspective, however, suggests that when a company is widely held the 
issue of accountability becomes important as there is a greater likelihood that the 
shares of these companies are being held by a wide variety of stakeholders (Ghazali, 
2007). Greater accountability brings the need for additional information to voluntarily 
disclose social and environmental performance to inform stakeholders about the 
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extent to which managers' responsibility have been fulfilled (Ghazali, 2007; Gray et 
al., 1991). Hence, in case of ownership dispersion, higher accountability of top 
management turns into an increasing level of stakeholders' environmental information 
satisfaction.  
Empirical evidence of the relationship between ownership concentration and 
corporate environmental disclosure is quite limited, yet, consistent. Ownership 
concentration has been found to be statistically significant and negatively associated 
with environmental disclosure in annual reports as documented by Brammer and 
Pavelin (2006) as to the quantity of such disclosure and by Brammer and Pavelin 
(2008) and Cormier et al. (2005) as to the quality of such disclosure. Both Reverte 
(2009) and Prado-Lorenzo et al. (2009) found ownership concentration to have 
negative relationship to corporate social responsibility disclosure, although the latter 
revealed only limited association. However, in the context of voluntary disclosure, 
evidence of such relationship is mixed. Haniffa and Cooke (2002) found a positive 
relationship between ownership concentration and voluntary disclosure while Barako 
et al. (2006) found a negative relationship with concentration as measured by the 
proportion owned by the top 20 shareholders.   
Based on the above arguments, a dispersed ownership is associated with increased 
monitoring and oversight of management's behavior and higher accountability 
towards stakeholders that is manifested in increased dissemination of environmental 
information. Following these arguments, it may be expected that ownership 
concentration decreases the likelihood of providing enhanced corporate environmental 
disclosure. Hence, the following alternative hypotheses are tested: 
H12a : There is a negative relationship between the quantity of corporate 
environmental disclosure and ownership concentration. 
H12b : The relationship between the quantity of corporate environmental disclosure 
and ownership concentration would differ among different categories of disclosure. 
H12c : There is a negative relationship between the quality of corporate environmental 
disclosure and ownership concentration. 
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H12d : The relationship between the quality of corporate environmental disclosure and 
ownership concentration would differ among different categories of disclosure. 
 
4.7.1.3.2   Institutional Ownership 
Concerning the type of ownership, it can be argued that different shareholders may 
demand different disclosures. A substantial fund in the UK capital market comes from 
institutional investors such as pension funds, mutual funds, banks and insurance 
companies, owning around 80 per cent of the UK stock market (Mallin et al., 2005). 
Consistent with agency theory, institutional investors have strong incentives to 
monitor corporate disclosure practices and influence corporate values due to their 
large ownership stake (Barako et al., 2006). In addition, it is generally argued that 
institutional investors are more sophisticated, powerful and have more technical 
expertise to monitor managers effectively (Guan et al., 2007). For instance, 
institutional shareholders can use management's requirement for further financing to 
impose their own interests, through their monitoring role in the process of raising 
equity capital (Hillier and McColgan, 2006). Furthermore, institutional shareholders 
have been under increasing pressure to use their voting power to encourage good 
governance practices in their investee companies (UK Corporate Governance Code, 
2010). Thus, managers may voluntarily disclose information to meet the expectations 
of large shareholders  (Carson and Simnett, 1997) and their requests for 
comprehensive and reliable disclosures.  
Furthermore, it is argued that institutional shareholders are active owners who have 
strategic and other long-term objectives for their investment apart from short-term 
financial returns (Anderson et al., 2003; Monks and Minow, 1995; Welford, 2007). 
Consequently, they may consider environmental issues to be important as a means of 
long-term value creation (Halme and Huse, 1997; Prado-Lorenzo et al., 2009; 
Welford, 2007). In line with stakeholder theory, institutional investors are 
“demanding more transparency and accountability and are increasingly making good 
corporate governance part of their investment criteria” (Welford, 2007: 49-50). 
Empirically, Emerson et al. (2005) document that long-term investors consider such 
factors as environmental growth potential, climate change, environmental liabilities, 
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and environmental operating license in their investments appraisal. However, in the 
absence of environmental reporting standards, long-term investors depend on 
corporate disclosures of voluntary environmental information (Rupley et al., 2011). 
Accordingly, the authors argue that institutional long-horizon shareholders are 
positively associated with the quality of voluntary environmental disclosures.  
No empirical evidence, if any, to date has confirmed the relationship between the 
percentage of institutional ownership and corporate environmental disclosure. Rupley 
et al. (2011) found no evidence of a relation between institutional shareholders and 
any of the measures of voluntary environmental disclosures. However, in the context 
of voluntary disclosure, institutional ownership was found to be positively associated 
with voluntary disclosure practices in the annual reports of Kenyan companies 
(Barako et al., 2006).  
Based on the above arguments about the monitoring potential of institutional 
shareholders and their demand for environmental information transparency, it can be 
expected that institutional shareholdings increase the likelihood of providing 
enhanced corporate environmental disclosure. Hence, the following hypotheses are 
proposed: 
H13a : There is a positive relationship between the quantity of corporate 
environmental disclosure and institutional ownership. 
H13b : The relationship between the quantity of corporate environmental disclosure 
and institutional ownership would differ among different categories of disclosure. 
H13c : There is a positive relationship between the quality of corporate environmental 
disclosure and institutional ownership. 
H13d : The relationship between the quality of corporate environmental disclosure and 
institutional ownership would differ among different categories of disclosure. 
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4.7.2   Sample Selection  
The starting point of the sample selected for the present study is the FTSE All-Share 
Index. The FTSE All-Share index is the broadest index of UK listed companies, 
representing over 98% of the UK market capitalization (Brammer and Pavelin, 2006). 
An important justification for choosing these companies is that they cover a broad 
range of business activities and account for almost all of the UK economic output. 
The use of a large and industrially diverse sample permits a more comprehensive 
exploration and analysis of the relationship in question (Brammer and Pavelin, 2006). 
In addition, the inclusion of both high-profile and low-profile companies representing 
several industries with different degrees of environmental sensitivity potentially  
allows greater generaliziability of the results.  
The study sets out to define its sample both in longitudinal and cross-sectional 
perspectives. Therefore, the annual reports of the sample companies are examined 
from 2004 till 2007 inclusive; a period of four years, that have witnessed an 
increasing awareness of corporate governance and transparency, using up to date data; 
the most recent data at the time of conducting the study. An important motivation for 
choosing this time horizon is the emergence of recent corporate reform demanding a 
richer disclosure environment and stronger corporate governance practices.  
Specifically, the selected time frame preceded a number of major corporate scandals 
that rocked international businesses throughout 2001-2003 and the subsequent 
corporate collapses. These incidents were followed by the issuance of the Combined 
Code of corporate governance in 2003, the first UK corporate governance code that 
involved government intervention as opposed to previously self- regulation initiatives. 
It was amended in 2006, 2008, and 2010; the current version of which is referred to as 
the UK Corporate Governance Code (2010). Moreover, the study's time horizon is 
synchronized with key changes to disclosure regulations in the Companies Act (2006) 
which may have impacted corporate environmental disclosure practices. This is in 
addition to the primary reasoning behind using time series data; that is investigating 
whether environmental disclosure practices and the different related disclosure 
categories differ over years. Furthermore, an extended time frame helps determining 
the significant variables that explain the variation in the extent and quality of 
environmental disclosure and its components among the investigated companies.  
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At the date of the study, 2007, the FTSE All-Share index comprised approximately of 
700 companies. They are drawn from a wide spectrum of business activities. Firms 
belonging to the financial sector, including banks, insurance companies, investment 
trusts, unit trusts and real estate companies, are excluded from the sample because 
they are subject to different disclosure and statutory requirements  that may 
significantly affect their accounting policies, disclosure decisions and corporate 
governance structures. In addition, firms with unpublished annual reports and/or 
missing data on DataStream and elsewhere (e.g. as a result of deletions caused by 
subsequent mergers) are deleted to assure comparability of the results. This procedure 
leaves a final sample of 229 attainable companies, for which complete data were 
readily available across all years of the sampling period. Therefore the study, covering 
a period of four years, is based on a comprehensive sample companies of drawn from 
15 different industries and 33 industrial sectors, resulting in a total of 916 firm-year 
observations. A list of the sample companies included in the current study, along with 
the industrial sectors to which they belong, is shown in Appendix A.  
Sample companies are active in sixteen major industries: Aerospace industry, 
Agriculture industry, Chemical industry, Computer industry, Construction industry 
Defense industry, Energy industry, Entertainment industry, Food industry, Hospitality 
industry, Information industry, Manufacturing industry, Mass media industry, 
Telecommunications industry, and Water industry. Table 4.1 shows the selection 
procedures of sample companies, while industrial sectors represented in the sample 
are shown in Table 4.2. 
 
Table 4.1 
Selection Procedures of Sample Companies 
UK Listed Companies Number of Companies 
FTSE All-Share index companies 691 
(-)  Financial companies 232 
(-)  Companies with missing annual reports 121 
(-)  Companies with missing data  109 
Sample companies 229 
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Table 4.2 
 Industrial Sector Representation of Sample Companies 
Sector Number of sample 
companies 
Sector Percentage of 
sample companies 
Aerospace & Defence 7 3.06 
Airlines & Airports 1 0.44 
Automobiles & Parts 2 0.87 
Beverages 3 1.31 
Chemicals 6 2.62 
Computer Software & Services 15 6.55 
Construction & Building Materials 12 5.24 
Diversified Industrials 1 0.44 
Electricity 4 1.75 
Electronic & Electrical Equipment 10 4.37 
Engineering & Machinery 11 4.80 
Food & Drug Retailers 4 1.75 
Food Producers & Processors 8 3.49 
Forestry & Paper 1 0.44 
Gas Distribution 1 0.44 
General Retailers 17 7.42 
Health 3 1.31 
Housing Goods & Textiles 3 1.31 
Information Technology Hardware 6 2.62 
Leisure Entertainment & Hotels 5 2.18 
Media & Photography 18 7.86 
Mining 5 2.18 
Oil & Gas 9 3.93 
Packaging 3 1.31 
Personal Care & Household Products 3 1.31 
Pharmaceuticals 9 3.93 
Restaurants Pubs & Breweries 5 2.18 
Support Services 34 14.85 
Telecommunications Services 5 2.18 
Tobacco 2 0.87 
Transport 5 2.18 
Travel & Leisure 7 3.06 
Water 4 1.75 
Total 229 100 
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4.7.3   Research Method And Instrument 
The dependent variables, corporate environmental disclosure quantity and quality, are 
measured using content analysis of annual reports of UK listed companies. A 
disclosure index is developed for each of the dependent variables to help measure the 
quantity and quality of environmental disclosure. Three procedures are undertaken in 
order to develop the disclosure indices. First, a checklist or scoring sheet of 
environmental disclosure items is constructed as a measuring instrument by selecting 
the relevant informational items to be included in the checklist. Second, a coding 
process is carried out to assign each environmental informational item in the annual 
report to one of the checklist items using predetermined decision rules. Third, quantity 
and quality scores are calculated for each disclosure category as well as for total 
environmental disclosure, from which disclosure indices are computed to permit 
further analysis. Through these procedures, both the validity and reliability of the 
disclosure measurement need to be ascertained. 
 
4.7.3.1   Content Analysis 
Content analysis is a research method that has been widely used in conducting 
research in different areas of social sciences for many years (Krippendorff 1980). In 
an accounting disclosure context, content analysis has been extensively used in 
examining corporate social and environmental disclosure practices (see Abbott and 
Monsen, 1979; Campbell, 2004; Cormier et al., 2005; Deegan and Gordon, 1996; 
Gray et al., 1995a; Guthrie and Mathews, 1985; Hackston and Milne, 1996; Haniffa 
and Cooke, 2005; Magness, 2006; Rupley et al., 2011). Content analysis can be 
simply defined as “a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences 
from data according to their context” (Krippendorff, 1980: 21). Abbott and Monsen 
(1979: 504) also define content analysis as “a technique for gathering data that 
consists of codifying qualitative information in anecdotal and literary form into 
categories in order to derive quantitative scales of varying levels of complexity”.  
The main advantages of content analysis method relate to reliability,  systematicity, 
objectivity, external validity and volume of data. A distinguishing characteristic of 
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content analysis is that data are coded and measured in a reliable and systematic 
manner (Krippendorff, 1980). Data collected using content analysis are considered 
quantitative in nature due to the requirement that systematic counting procedures be 
followed, which deems the method more objective (Marshall and Rossman,  1999). 
The quantity of disclosure is an indicative of the importance that is placed on the item 
being disclosed by the reporting company (Campbell, 2003; Krippendorff, 1980; 
Unerman, 2000). External validity of content analysis is enhanced as the act of 
measurement does not interfere with the behaviour of the phenomenon being 
measured (Krippendorff, 1980). In addition, content analysis can cope with, and 
hence permits the analysis of, large volumes of data as those comprised within annual 
reports (Krippendorff, 1980). 
Generally, content analysis is concerned with both the quantitative and qualitative 
aspects of disclosures (Monteiro and Aibar-Guzmán, 2010). Environmental disclosure 
content analysis involves the construction of a classification scheme and establishing 
a set of decision rules for coding, measuring and recording the data being examined 
(Milne and Adler, 1999). Specifically, content analysis method requires answering 
questions of where? (determining the documents used in analysis, i.e. annual reports); 
what? (defining environmental disclosure and its categories i.e. checklist); and how? 
(processing or codifying the data and calculating scores, i.e. coding process and 
disclosure index). Following is a detailed answer to each of the above questions.  
 
4.7.3.2   Annual Reports 
The annual report is a formal document published by companies and is used as a 
communication media or sampling unit. Krippendorff (1980: 57) defines sampling 
units as “those parts of observed reality or of the stream of source language 
expressions that are regarded independent of each other”. The vast majority of social 
and environmental disclosure literature used the annual report as the primary source 
of corporate disclosure. The annual report is a secondary data source (Hussey and 
Hussey, 1997) that is employed in the current study to examine the environmental 
disclosure practices of UK companies over a period of four years; 2004 till 2007 
inclusive.  
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Various justifications have been put forward throughout the disclosure literature for 
the extensive focus on annual reports. Annual reports are the most important media 
through which an organisation reveals corporate information to the public (Adams et 
al., 1998; Botosan, 1997; Hines, 1988) and a main channel of corporate 
communication of social and environmental information (Gibson and O‟Donovan, 
2007; Gray et al., 1995b; van der Laan Smith et al., 2005; Wiseman, 1982). In 
addition, annual reports are characterized by their high degree of credibility (Neu et 
al., 1998; Tilt, 1994), availability, accessibility and wide distribution (Campbell, 
2000; Tilt, 1994; Wilmshurst and Frost, 2000; Unerman, 2000), formality and 
statutory nature (Buhr, 1998; Hackston and Milne, 1996; Hines, 1988; Wilmshurst 
and Frost, 2000), consistency (Tilt, 1994) as well as usefulness to various 
stakeholders (Buhr, 1998; Deegan and Rankin, 1997; Neu et al., 1998; Tilt, 1994). 
In addition, the presentation of financial information and social and environmental 
information within the same report is an important element in demonstrating how the 
company reconciles possible conflict between the financial and social objectives and 
interests of different stakeholders (Gray, et al., 1995b). Halme and Huse (1997) argue 
that annual reports are likely to reflect corporate environmental concerns by 
addressing environmental issues and interests of various stakeholders. In this regard, 
using annual reports as a channel of communication with stakeholders is consistent 
with the principles of stakeholder theory (van der Laan Smith et al., 2005). 
Accordingly, and in line with the above arguments and disclosure literature, the 
annual report would be used by the current study as the most reliable source for 
corporate environmental information. 
Moreover, it is virtually impossible to monitor all available communication media of 
corporate social and environmental disclosure over a number of years (Gray et al., 
1995b). Complete and consistent identification of all these corporate communication 
forms of disclosure over a long period of time is likely to be problematic (Hammond 
and Miles, 2004; Unerman, 2000). Accordingly, Unerman (2000) argues that even 
though several disclosure media are available, a limit must be put on the range of 
documents to be examined in any particular research in order to ensure completeness 
and consistency of data Investigation and analysis of all possible corporate 
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environmental disclosure media prove to be pragmatically, financially and technically 
infeasible (Hanafi, 2006).  
 
4.7.3.3   Checklist  
Conducting content analysis research requires a clear and accurate definition of the 
phenomena under investigation. This necessitates specific identification of the main 
categories of environmental disclosure along with the relevant informational items 
within each of these categories, all of which being incorporated in what is called a  
checklist. Disclosure checklists are extensive lists of selected items which may be 
disclosed in company reports. A checklist of environmental disclosure items listed by 
disclosure category is constructed to capture corporate environmental disclosure 
practices in annual reports. The checklist is composed of different sections showing 
the different categories or areas to which each environmental disclosure information 
belongs. 
As a starting point, a preliminary checklist that contains the expected environmental 
information items is prepared based on prior studies that have extensively examined 
environmental disclosure practices (e.g. Burritt, 1997; Clarkson et al., 2008; Cormier 
and  Magnan, 2003; Cormier et al., 2011; Cormier et al., 2005; Gray et al., 1995b; 
Hackston and Milne, 1996; Wiseman, 1982). The checklist is then adjusted to fit with 
the best practices as identified by the guidelines and recommendations of the Global 
Reporting Initiative (GRI, 2006). However, the GRI provides relatively general 
guidelines rather than specific measures of environmental performance. Accordingly, 
in designing the checklist, an attempt has been made to identify operational measures 
of GRI guidelines that help capturing environmental disclosures in annual reports.  
The checklist was also updated following a pilot study of annual reports of 50 
randomly selected companies from different industrial sectors in the sample 
population for the year 2007. The sample annual reports were content analyzed to get 
grasp of what themes or categories are common in UK annual reports, given the 
different contexts involved in constructing the research instrument or the checklist; 
including UK, New Zealand, US, Canada, Germany, and France, although each of 
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which is a Western context. The results of the pilot study revealed that the checklist 
developed is applicable to the UK context as almost all of the environmental themes 
in annual reports fell within one of the categories already established. However, there 
are few information items among the GRI guidelines that rarely, if ever, disclosed by 
companies, which can be regarded as inapplicable items. Inapplicable items are 
excluded from the analysis as companies should not be penalized for non-disclosure 
of these items (Chau, and Gray, 2002; Cooke, 1989). Examples of such disclosures 
include information about linking executive compensation to environmental 
performance and adoption of GRI reporting guidelines.  
In this regard, content validity of the research instrument is achieved through careful 
definition of the research phenomena under investigation; corporate environmental 
disclosure practices in UK listed companies.  In addition to the extensive review of 
environmental disclosure literature and reporting guidelines, content validity is also 
attested through the use of a panel of expert judges. Three UK academics have been 
asked to refine the preliminary checklist, one of them has considerable practical 
accounting and auditing experience with UK listed companies. The reliability of the 
checklist is enhanced through the use of well-established decision rules, based on 
those rules developed by the UK Center of Social and Environmental Research 
(CSEAR) and guidelines on performance indicators developed by the Global 
Reporting Initiative (GRI, 2006). The reliability and validity of the research 
instrument will be presented in detail in sections 4.7.3.4.3 and 4.7.3.5.3 respectively.  
Accordingly, the resulting checklist is deemed rigorous and viable in capturing 
environmental disclosure practices in UK companies' annual reports. The final 
checklist consists of 34 environmental information items distributed over six broadly 
defined categories. The six corporate environmental disclosure categories identified 
include: (1) Environmental Policies (12 items); (2) Product and Process-Related 
Environmental Issues (8 items); (3) Compliance with Environmental Laws and 
Standards (4 items); (4) Environmental Auditing (1 item); (5) Sustainability (2 items); 
and (6) Other Environmentally-Related Information (7 items). Each of these six 
categories or themes is further subdivided into a set of distinctive informational items 
or topics. Table 4.3 shows the checklist comprising the different environmental 
disclosure categories and items. 
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Table 4.3 
Corporate Environmental Disclosure Checklist 
 
 (1) Environmental Policies  a, b, c, d, e 
 Actual statement of environmental policies; 
 Departments or positions for environmental and/or safety management; 
 Past, current or future estimates of capital and operating expenditures for 
environmental protection or remediation; 
 Environmental investment and investment appraisal; 
 Financing for pollution control equipment and facilities; 
 Research and development expenditures for pollution abatement;  
 Environmental impact studies; 
 Environmental contingent liabilities and provisions; 
 Conservation of natural resources; 
 Energy saving and conservation; 
 Health and safety policies; 
 Aesthetics policies and landscaping.   
 
(2) Product and Process-Related Environmental Issues a, b, c, d 
 Pollution emissions and effluent discharges; 
 Waste; 
 Packaging; 
 Recycling; 
 Products and product development; 
 Efficient use of materials in the manufacturing process; 
 Energy efficiency of products; 
 Product safety. 
  
 
 
a
 adapted from Burritt (1997)
 
b
 adapted from Clarkson et al. (2008)
 
c
 adapted from Gray, et al. (1995b).  
d
 adapted from Hackston and Milne (1996).             
e
 adapted from W iseman (1982). 
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(3) Compliance with Environmental Laws and Standards  a, b, d, e 
 Discussion of environmental regulations and requirements; 
 Compliance with pollution laws and regulations; 
 Compliance with health and safety standards and regulations; 
 Compliance status with environmental and/or health and safety standards such 
as ISO, EMAS, BS OHSAS and PAS.  
 
(4) Environmental Auditing a, b, c 
 Internal and/or external verification, review, scoping, audit and assessment of 
environmental performance and/or environmental disclosure. 
  
(5) Sustainability a, b, c 
 Any mention of sustainability; 
 Any mention of sustainable development.  
 
 (6) Other Environmentally-Related Information a, b, c, d, e 
 Receiving awards for environmental protection or safety excellence; 
 Environmental protection e.g. pest control; 
 Wildlife conservation; 
 Supporting anti- litter campaigns; 
 Environmental education and training;  
 Environmental actions/lawsuits against the company; 
 Any environmental issues other than the above.  
 
 
 
a
 adapted from Burritt (1997) 
b
 adapted from Clarkson et al. (2008)
 
c
 adapted from Gray, et al. (1995b).  
d
 adapted from Hackston and Milne (1996).             
e
 adapted from W iseman (1982). 
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4.7.3.4   Coding Process And Decision Rules 
A coding process is carried out to assign each environmental information item in the 
annual report to one of the checklist items using predetermined decision rules. Coding 
decisions are concerned with capturing and identifying information themes or items 
from a disclosure source, while measuring or counting decisions are concerned with 
assigning value to such themes or items once they have been coded for meaning 
(Campbell et al., 2006; Milne and Adler, 1999). Decision rules for environmental 
disclosure categories and items are based on those rules developed by the UK Center 
of Social and Environmental Research (CSEAR) and guidelines on performance 
indicators developed by the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI, 2006). Decision rules 
are established to define which environmental information item is to be disclosed 
under which category or theme, thereby facilitating the coding process. Well-
established decision rules and procedures enhance the objectivity and reliability of the 
research instrument used and, therefore, allow replication by other researchers 
(Krippendorff, 1980). Detailed presentation of the decision rules for coding each of 
environmental disclosure quantity and quality are shown in Appendix B and 
Appendix C respectively. 
The content analysis literature reflects a debate on how best to capture the content of 
environmental disclosure (Campbell et al., 2006). Two commonly suggested 
approaches are employed in the literature; either the number or frequency of 
environmental disclosures (see Cowen et al., 1987; Ness and Mirza, 1991) or the 
amount or volume of disclosures (Gray et al., 1995b). The current study adopts the 
second approach that is argued to arrive into richer data set (Gray et al., 1995b). 
Measurement of disclosure volume can technically be undertaken using one of two 
methods: a measuring unit or a scoring system (Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004). Disclosure 
volume is measured using different units, such as number of words (see Campbell, 
2004; Deegan and Gordon, 1996; Deegan and Rankin, 1996; Wilmshurt and Frost,  
2000), sentences (see Hackston and Milne, 1996; Milne and Adler, 1999; Wiseman, 
1982) or page proportions (see Gray et al., 1995a; Guthrie and Parker, 1990; Patten, 
1991).  
However, the type of content analysis employed in the current study is a scoring 
system, where a coding scale is used to categorize disclosure based on specific items 
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of information found in the reports. This method better suits the purposes of the study 
than mere counting of words, sentences, or page proportions, which are alternative 
means to quantify the extent of disclosure. The counting of specific items of 
information is concerned with categorizing and counting the information itself rather 
than the format in which the information is presented or delivered (Buhr and 
Freedman, 2001). In addition, counting of words, sentences, or page proportion are 
not able to effectively capture non-narrative disclosures such as pictures, photographs, 
charts and graphical representations (McMurtrie, 2005). These pictorial, graphical, 
tabular or other non-narrative disclosure forms are such potentially effective 
communication tools (Beattie and Jones, 1992) that excluding them may limit the 
total volume and quality of disclosed information (Unerman, 2000).  
Moreover, in order to specifically examine corporate environmental reporting from a 
corporate governance perspective, however, it would not be enough just to see how 
much dimensional space devoted by companies to environmental information but 
rather how much specific environmental information disclosed by companies. The use 
of a coding scale to capture a company's environmental disclosure is appropriate as it 
allows for an integration of different types of information into a single figure that is 
comparable across companies (Cormier et al., 2005). In this regard, it is also possible 
to assess the quality or the value relevance of the disclosed information by assigning 
weights and defining scores that vary according to the kind of analysis. Because 
redundant information has no information value, the current study excludes repeated 
information from the coding process, focusing on unique items of information. 
Starting the actual recording process, every annual report was wholly scanned before 
coding to make a judgment about whether any particular item is relevant to any of the 
disclosure categories and to gain a primary understanding. This procedure reduced the 
subjectivity in determining applicable items. During the recording process, the context 
and meaning behind the specific disclosure item is stressed to ensure that it constitutes 
environmental disclosure. Narrative as well as non-narrative disclosures, including 
pictures, photographs, charts and graphical representations, are examined for any 
relevant disclosure items. Because the study focuses on information content it was 
possible to have one sentence containing two or more pieces of information. It was 
also possible to find two or more sentences containing only one piece of information. 
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Repeated information within an annual report was not coded, and hence the same 
information was only considered once.   
A content analysis form or a copy of the checklist was used for recording data from 
the annual reports. There is one data-entry form for each company for each year. The 
quantity of disclosure was recorded by ticking the relevant item in the checklist, while 
the quality of disclosure was captured for the ticked item by assessing and recording 
each of its qualitative characteristics or quality-component measures (see Table 4.4). 
The content of the forms was then transferred into a data sheet in the form of a 
computerised Excel file. The data filled in this Excel file was crosschecked against the 
data manually recorded on the hard forms to ensure that the entry process was 
correctly accomplished free from errors. The mathematical capabilities of Microsoft 
Excel was utilized to generate sums of each category of environmental disclosure as 
well as a total environmental disclosure score and to compute the disclosure indices. 
A database in Microsoft Excel was set up for further processing of the data collected.  
 
4.7.3.4.1   Environmental Disclosure Quantity Coding 
Having decided on the classification framework of environmental disclosures, the 
next step is to quantify the volume of the disclosed information. Environmental 
disclosure quantity is coded by identifying each environmental information item in 
the annual report with one of the checklist items using predetermined decision rules.  
This procedure allowed the codification of the disclosed information into predefined 
categories. As long as quantity measurement is intended, dichotomous scores are used 
to examine the presence or absence of the different items of the checklist using binary 
codes. The presence or disclosure of an item in the annual reports is coded (1), while 
the absence or non-disclosure of an item in the annual reports is coded (0).  
As no specific user group is of particular interest to the research, but rather all diverse 
stakeholder groups are targeted, an un-weighted scoring is deemed appropriate. This 
approach does not discriminate between the relative importance of the items of 
information; i.e. it only emphasizes the presence of environmental disclosures. In 
addition, the un-weighted scores help in mitigating the problems of subjectivity by 
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minimizing the scoring bias associated with the weighting approach (Chau, and Gray, 
2002). Quantification for each of the disclosure categories, therefore, consisted of 
recording whether or not a company made a disclosure in the category. Added 
together, they form the total amount of environmental disclosure per company.  
 
4.7.3.4.2   Environmental Disclosure Quality Coding 
Having processed the coding or recording of the disclosed environmental information 
items among the relevant disclosure categories, the next step is to analyze the nature 
of such information. Environmental disclosure quality is coded by assessing the 
informational content or the qualitative characteristics of the different disclosure items 
found in the checklist. Botosan (2004) argues that the definition of quality should be 
based on well-supported frameworks elaborated by professional accounting bodies 
and standard setters because they reflect a generally accepted notion of disclosure 
quality. This perspective quite fits with the purpose of the current study as no specific 
user group is of particular interest to the research, but rather all diverse stakeholder 
groups are targeted. A broader all-purpose definition of disclosure quality, therefore, 
seems appropriate. Consistent with Botosan's (2004) approach, corporate 
environmental disclosure quality is defined in the current study in terms of the 
information qualities or characteristics identified by the International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB); comparability, understandability, relevance, and reliability 
(IASB, 1989).  
For the purposes of the current study, comparability, understandability, relevance, and 
reliability are defined in a manner consistent with the IASB framework. The current 
study proposed operational definitions for these informational qualities based on prior 
literature to help assess the informational content of the different disclosure items of 
the checklist. „Comparability‟ is permitted with the financial quantification of 
information that can be elaborated through non-financial quantification and 
descriptive forms. „Understandability‟ is facilitated when the economic direction or 
sign of information is clear. „Relevance‟ is achieved via the provision of forward-
looking information in addition to historical information. „Reliability‟ is assured 
through verification or auditing (see section 4.7.4.1.2 for illustration). 
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A framework for the analysis of environmental disclosure quality is suggested that 
considers four different but complementary quality dimensions. Specifically, 
environmental disclosure quality is measured according to four parameters, namely, 
type, direction, outlook and verifiability as defined by the International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB). These quality parameters or dimensions correspond to the 
information qualities of comparability, understandability, relevance, and reliability 
respectively. Table 4.4 depicts the proposed operational definitions for environmental 
disclosure quality dimensions. „Type‟ refers to the quantification nature of 
information; whether it is monetary quantitative (financial quantification), non-
monetary quantitative (non-financial quantification) or declarative (no quantification). 
„Direction‟ refers to the economic sign of information; whether it is good (specific 
credit), bad (specific discredit) or neutral (no specific credit or discredit). „Outlook‟ 
refers to the time orientation of information; whether it is forward- looking (future 
oriented) or historical (past or present oriented).„Verifiability‟ refers to the 
auditability of information; whether it is verifiable (veracity checked) or non-
verifiable (veracity not checked). 
Each of these classifications is in line with previous literature that investigated 
disclosure quality identification and assessment. There have been attempts by 
researchers to examine a combination of some of these information qualities, although 
no prior study – as far as I am aware – has attempted to combine all four parameters 
together or explicitly associate them with information quality characteristics set by 
professional accounting bodies or standard setting organizations. However, a few 
recent studies suggested disclosure indices that assess disclosure quality according to 
the requirements and guidelines of standard setters including the Financial 
Accounting Standard Board (FASB) and Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) (see 
Beretta and Bozzolan, 2008; Brammer and Pavelin, 2008; Clarkson et al., 2008). 
Guthrie and Parker (1990) first raised this issue indicating that the analysis of 
corporate disclosure should focus on both “what was said and how it was said”. 
Consistent with this perspective, many researchers have gone beyond only counting 
the number of disclosures made, and have assigned weights to the information based 
on the type of information disclosed (Botosan, 1997; Bozzolan et al., 2003).  
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Table 4.4 
Proposed Environmental Disclosure Quality Measures 
 
(1) Type (Comparability)  
Monetary quantitative: Statement containing quantitative information that is related 
primarily to financial disclosure of actual financial numbers.  
Non-Monetary quantitative: Statement containing quantitative information that is 
related primarily to actual numbers of a non-financial nature. 
Declarative: Statement containing narrative or descriptive information that does not 
contain either monetary quantitative or non-monetary quantitative information.  
 (2) Direction (Understandability)  
Good: Statement including specific information details that reflect credit to the 
company. 
Bad: Statement including specific information details that reflect discredit to the 
company. 
Neutral: Statement of policy or intent with no details and statement of facts whose 
credit or discredit to the company is not obvious.  
 (3) Outlook (Relevance)  
Forward-Looking: Statement reflecting commitment to future policies and/or actions 
as well as expectations about future conduct.  
Historical: Statement reflecting facts about past or present policies and/or actions as 
well as the actual or achieved conduct.  
 (4) Verifiability (Reliability)  
Verifiable: Statement indicating external verification, review, scoping, and/or audit of 
environmental disclosure. 
Non-Verifiable: Statement indicating no mention or reference to external verification, 
review, scoping, and/or audit of environmental disclosure.  
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The framework suggested by the current study for assessing disclosure quality follows 
a similar line of thinking. Therefore, the disclosure quality score proposed includes 
measures of monetary quantitative versus non-monetary quantitative or declarative 
(e.g. Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Beretta and Bozzolan, 2008; Boesso and Kumar, 2007; 
Cooper and Zainudin, 2009; Gray et al., 1995b; Magness, 2006; Toms; 2002; 
Wiseman, 1982); good or bad versus neutral (e.g. Beretta and Bozzolan, 2008; 
Bozzolan et al., 2009; Gray et al., 1995b); forward-looking versus historical (e.g. 
Beretta and Bozzolan, 2008; Boesso and Kumar, 2007; Brammer and Pavelin, 2008; 
Magness, 2006; O‟Sullivan et al., 2008); and verifiable versus non-verifiable (e.g. 
Bozzolan et al., 2009; Brammer and Pavelin, 2008; Gray et al., 1995b; Prado-
Lorenzo, 2009; Toms, 2002) information items. This type of score provides greater 
insight into the subtle nature of disclosure information than is permitted by the 
measure of volume only. In addition, classifying the information in this manner 
particularly fits with the purpose of the current study as it would permit a closer 
examination of the effectiveness of environmental disclosures in managing various 
stakeholder groups. Figure 4.4 presents the proposed framework for assessing 
corporate environmental disclosure quality. 
It is worth mentioning, however, that these quality measures are considered 
complements rather than substitutes. In other words, they do not represent different 
proxies for environmental disclosure quality, but they are regarded as component 
measures that together make up the aggregate quality of such disclosure. Accordingly, 
an attempt has been made to classify each environmental information item in the 
annual reports as possessing one of the individual quality characteristics within each 
quality dimension or sub-quality.  In addition to classifying the information, relative 
weights have also been assigned to the quality of information disclosed within each of 
the four dimensions listed above. Therefore, the quality of the disclosed information is 
assessed by assigning weights and defining scores that vary according to the distinct 
nature of the disclosure items. Higher weights are assigned to monetary quantitative 
(3) as opposed to non-monetary quantitative (2) or declarative (1); good (2) or bad (2) 
versus neutral (1); forward-looking (2) compared to historical (1); and verifiable (2) 
versus non-verifiable (1) information. It can be argued that these kinds of information 
are likely to give stakeholders a better perspective and increased credibility of a 
company‟s reporting in terms of overall value creation.  
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Figure 4.4 
Proposed Framework For Environmental Disclosure Quality Assessment 
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Monetary quantitative and non-monetary quantitative disclosures were weighted more 
heavily in the disclosure index than declarative disclosures because quantified 
information is more precise and, hence, more useful (Boesso and Kumar, 2007; 
Botosan, 1997) in the decision-making process of various information users or 
stakeholders. Quantification of information is considered more informative in 
reporting corporate performance (Raar, 2007). The significance of precision 
underlying information quantification is particularly emphasized in determining the 
quality of environmental disclosures (see Brammer and Pavelin, 2008; Cormier et al., 
2005). However, monetary quantitative disclosures were weighted more heavily than 
non-monetary quantitative ones because they help stakeholders in assessing the 
financial implications of environmental decisions or actions. Moreover, monetary 
presentation of the company's environmental performance is in line with that of its 
financial performance. The integration of both corporate economic and  environmental 
performances is an important element in demonstrating how the company reconciles 
possible conflict between the financial and environmental objectives and interests of 
different stakeholders (Gray, et al., 1995b). Such financial integration also permits the 
assessment of the environmental impact of any decisions or actions on the overall 
corporate performance. 
Good and bad news were awarded a higher score than neutral ones since they provide 
stakeholders with a specific economic direction of the company's environmental 
activities, thereby facilitating the interpretation of the economic impact of such 
activities. However, good and bad news were awarded equal scores because the 
study's purpose is to assess disclosure quality in terms of whether or not the disclosed 
information has specific economic direction, regardless of which way that direction is.  
Guthrie and Mathews (1985) first raised the issue and suggested that news need to be 
assessed. Following a similar approach, Gray et al. (1995b) emphasized that 
disclosure quality can be captured by analyzing whether the disclosed information  
refers to events that reflect well, badly or neutrally on the reporting company.   
Forward- looking information was weighted more heavily in the disclosure index than 
historical information as the disclosure of such information is likely to provide more 
guidance on future decisions and expectations about the company's prospects. A 
financial report containing forward- looking information is more likely to be perceived 
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as being of higher quality (Ajinkya et al., 2005; Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005; 
Clarkson et al., 1994) and, hence, forward- looking information can be viewed as one 
dimension of reporting quality (O‟Sullivan et al., 2008). According to Beretta and 
Bozzolan (2008), forward- looking information is quality information if it leads to 
better analysts' inferences and supports better future earnings estimates. Forward-
looking information that is based on well- founded expectations enhances corporate 
accountability by reducing information asymmetries (Hooks et al., 2002). Moreover, 
Lev and Zarowin (1999) highlight the value relevance of forward- looking 
information, where the company's projections may help resolve future uncertainty. In 
this regard, the authors emphasize that understanding the past requires improved 
information about the future. 
Verifiable disclosures are of greater significance than non-verifiable disclosures 
because audited information increases the credibility of a company's reporting by 
assuring the accuracy and veracity of such disclosures, which in turn provides 
stakeholders with a reliable foundation on which to base their decisions.  It is argued 
that undertaking assurance on sustainability and environmental disclosures results in 
increased stakeholder confidence in the quality of the disclosed information as well as 
increased stakeholder trust in the degree of a company's commitment to sustainability 
and environmental agendas (Simnett et al., 2009). Moroney et al. (2009) particularly 
found that environmental assurance is associated with the quality of corporate 
environmental disclosures. Solomon (2000) conducted a survey of environmental 
reporting aspects and concluded that verification is necessary for such reporting. It 
seems appropriate, therefore, to assign a higher weight to verifiable disclosures.       
 
4.7.3.4.3   Reliability Of The Coding Process 
Rigorous reliability is demonstrated both in the coding definitions and measuring 
instrument developed to identify and classify annual report disclosures and in the 
accuracy and consistency with which the researcher has applied these definitions and 
instrument. The former is called measurement reliability while the latter is called 
coding reliability (Milne and Adler, 1999). Three forms of reliability of content 
analysis and disclosure measurement; including stability, reproducibility and accuracy 
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(Krippendorff, 1980), are evaluated through four procedures. First, reliability is 
determined through conducting a pilot study using a sample of annual reports of 50 
companies for the year 2007. Second, content analysis of the annual reports used in 
the pilot study was conducted twice at different dates. Third, inter-coder reliability is 
enhanced through examining some annual reports by two coders; researcher and 
independent coder. Fourth, decision rules are established and revised to facilitate 
codifying data gleaned from content analysis of annual reports.  
After examining some annual reports and before finalizing the categories and decision 
rules, a pilot study aimed at testing the reliability of the constructed checklist was 
conducted. Specifically, the pilot study is carried out to test the applicability of the 
checklist to the UK context, to ensure that there is some variability in disclosure 
between different companies, to capture items not yet included in the initial list and to 
eliminate those that were not disclosed by any of the sample companies. Through the 
pilot study, the researcher read over a sample of 50 annual reports for the year 2007 
selected randomly from different industrial sectors in the sample population. The 
sample annual reports were content analyzed to get grasp of what themes or 
categories are common in UK annual reports, given the different contexts involved in 
constructing the research instrument or the checklist; including UK, New Zealand, 
US, Canada, Germany, and France, although each of which is a Western context. The 
results of the pilot study revealed that the research instrument or the checklist 
developed is applicable to the UK context as almost all of the environmental themes 
in annual reports fell within one of the categories already established.  
However, there are few disclosures that did not fit in any of the disclosures categories. 
These include such examples as membership of and/or accreditation by environmental 
development organizations, inclusion in corporate social and environmental 
responsibility indices (e.g. FTSE4Good Index), and launching new environmental 
reporting system. These additional disclosures, however, are added to the ‘Other 
Environmentally-Related Information‟ category as an item called ‘Any environmental 
issues other than the above‟. These additional environmental disclosures might be a 
manifestation of changes over time in environmental reporting guidelines such as the 
emergence of GRI, environmental management systems, and the consequent 
environmental quality assessment criteria and certification. In addition, there are few 
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information items among the GRI guidelines that rarely, if ever, disclosed by 
companies, which can be regarded as inapplicable items. Inapplicable items are 
excluded from the analysis as companies should not be penalized for non-disclosure 
of these items (Chau, and Gray, 2002; Cooke, 1989). Examples of such disclosures 
include information about linking executive compensation to environmental 
performance and adoption of GRI reporting guidelines.  
As an initial pre-testing of the reliability of the coding process, content analysis of the 
annual reports used in the pilot study was conducted twice at different dates to test for 
the stability form of reliability (Krippendorff, 1980) and to check the face validity of 
the numerical results arrived at. Slight differences were observed between both rounds 
which, in turn, suggest that results are replicable. The content analysis forms filled in 
each round were compared for any discrepancies, where sometimes there were 
missing items or over-generously coded items as well as few incidence of switching 
of items within a disclosure category. However, there weren't any differences as 
regards the assignment of disclosure items to the main categories. In this respect, both 
completeness and accuracy of the recording process were assured as any detected 
errors were promptly corrected. 
The reproducibility form of reliability (Krippendorff, 1980) was tested using inter-
coder reliability (Milne and Adler, 1999; Sekaran, 2003) by having another researcher 
independently undertake some of the content analysis for a small sample of annual 
reports to ensure accuracy and consistency (see for example Milne and Adler, 1999). 
The multi-coder perspectives are captured in order to minimize any ambiguity and 
overlapping of meanings or interpretations. Minor variations and disagreements 
between the two coders; researcher and independent coder, were found mainly due to 
items not counted among disclosures. Differences in the coding process between the 
two coders are then discussed to reach a consensus and inconsistencies are reconciled. 
In this respect, the objectivity and reliability of the coding process are greatly 
enhanced.  
In addition, the coding process of assigning environmental disclosures in the annual 
reports to checklist items is carried out using predetermined decision rules. Decision 
rules are established based on those rules developed by the UK Center of Social and 
Environmental Research (CSEAR) and guidelines on performance indicators 
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developed by the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI, 2006). Some changes with respect 
to the decision rules are undertaken where additions are performed to include any 
further relevant items. Well-established decision rules and procedures enhance the 
objectivity and the accuracy form of reliability of the research instrument used and, 
therefore, allow replication by other researchers (Krippendorff, 1980). Detailed 
presentation of the decision rules for coding each of environmental disclosure 
quantity and quality are shown in Appendix B and Appendix C respectively. 
Minor amendments in disclosure categories and the decision rules defining them were 
undertaken following the pilot study conducted and repeated over time and the multi-
coder perspectives captured to enhance the reliability of content analysis and 
disclosure measurement. Consequently, objectivity is achieved through the 
development of disclosure categories to encompass all themes and items of 
environmental disclosure with even new themes arising over time. This is in addition 
to clearly defined and precise decision rules which make the categories exhaustive; 
i.e. all relevant items in the sample annual reports are placed within a category, and 
mutually exclusive; i.e., each relevant item is not classified under more than one 
category (Gray et al., 1995b; Krippendorff, 1980). 
 
4.7.3.5   Measurement And Disclosure Indices 
The checklist is used to derive disclosure indices for each of the quantity and quality 
of total corporate environmental disclosure as well as for each of the quantity and 
quality of each corporate environmental disclosure category. Disclosure indices are 
often applied in accounting research, particularly in studies that examine annual 
reports, where they provide a single-figure summary indicator either of the entire 
contents of corporate reports or of particular aspects of interest such as environmental 
disclosures (Ahmed and Courtis, 1999; Coy and Dixon, 2004). They are computed in 
order to permit further analysis of the data. The disclosure index is a percentage of the 
actual disclosure scores awarded to a company to the maximum possible disclosure 
required or expected (Cooke, 1989). 
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Both weighted (e.g. Barako et al., 2006; Boesso and Kumar, 2007; Cooper and 
Zainudin, 2009; Cormier et al., 2005) and un-weighted (e.g. Chau, and Gray, 2002; 
Ghazali, 2007; Haniffa and Cooke, 2005; Monteiro and Aibar-Guzmán, 2010) 
disclosure indexes have been used in voluntary disclosure literature, each of which 
has its criticism. An un-weighted index, that uses dichotomous scores or nominal 
values of 1 and 0 for disclosure and nondisclosure of specified items, has been 
criticized for its basic assumption that all items are equally important (Barako et al., 
2006). Un-weighted indices can only measure the quantity of disclosure (Beretta and 
Bozzolan, 2008). As long as quality measurement is intended, a weighted index is 
deemed appropriate in order to differentiate between the varying degrees of disclosure 
quality. A weighted index assigns weights according to predefined rankings that 
reflect the importance attributed by different users of information or the nature of the 
disclosed information (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2008). Weighted indices incorporate 
ordinal values, usually three levels, to assess disclosure quality (Beattie et al., 2004). 
A weighted disclosure index has been criticized for its subjectivity and bias towards 
particular users (Barako et al., 2006). Notwithstanding the inherent subjectivity,  
disclosure indices have proved to be a valuable research tool in corporate disclosure 
research (Beattie et al., 2004). In this regard, the validity of the disclosure 
measurement needs to be ascertained. 
Disclosure quality indices can be used to analyze corporate environmental disclosures 
from two different perspectives (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004). The first perspective 
involves developing a composite measure of the quality of environmental disclosures. 
The overall quality index is calculated as the simple arithmetic mean of the sub-
quality indices. In this regard, disclosure sub-quality indices have to be standardized 
to avoid a scale effect. The second perspective integrates all sub-qualities of 
environmental disclosures into the analysis in order to better portray the different 
quality dimensions of the company's disclosure strategy. While a composite or 
summary measure, that collapses different dimensions into a single value, is useful in 
associating disclosure quality with other variables of interest, sub-quality measures 
provide deeper understanding of and richer insights into disclosure quality (Beattie et 
al., 2004), thereby help to comprehensively profile the disclosure quality strategies 
adopted by the company (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004). 
 34:
4.7.3.5.1   Environmental Disclosure Quantity Index 
An un-weighted disclosure quantity index or dichotomous scores are used to examine 
the presence or absence of the different items of the checklist using binary codes. As 
no specific user group is of particular interest to the research, but rather all diverse 
stakeholder groups are targeted, an un-weighted index is deemed appropriate. In 
addition, the un-weighted index helps in mitigating the problems of subjectivity by 
minimizing the scoring bias associated with the weighting approach (Chau, and Gray, 
2002). The presence or disclosure of an item in the annual reports is coded (1), while 
the absence or non-disclosure of an item in the annual reports is coded (0). This 
approach does not discriminate between the relative importance of the items of 
information; i.e. it only emphasizes the presence of environmental disclosures.  
A total score is awarded to each environmental disclosure category in the checklist by 
adding the scores of all items within the category. A total score is also awarded to 
total corporate environmental disclosure by adding the scores of all disclosure 
categories to derive an aggregate score for the company. The maximum applicable 
quantity score which a sample company could earn for the most comprehensive 
disclosure is 34. Disclosure quantity indices are then computed as the percentage of 
the quantity score awarded to maximum applicable quantity score. Hence, Total 
Corporate Environmental Disclosure Quantity Index is calculated as the percentage of 
total quantity score awarded to maximum applicable quantity score. Similarly, 
Corporate Environmental Disclosure Category Quantity Index is calculated as the 
percentage of category quantity score awarded to maximum applicable category 
quantity score. 
Corporate Environmental Disclosure Quantity Index for each company is computed 
according to the following equation: 
                n 
               Σ Quantityi  
            i=1                                
                                       CED Quantity  =                                                
                                                                        MAX Quantity 
Where:  
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CED Quantity = Corporate Environmental Disclosure Quantity Index, 
Quantityi = 1 if item i is disclosed; 0 if item i is not disclosed, 
MAX Quantity = maximum applicable disclosure quantity score, 
n = number of items disclosed. 
The same procedure has been followed to compute environmental disclosure quantity 
index for both total disclosure and each disclosure category in the checklist.  
 
4.7.3.5.2   Environmental Disclosure Quality Index 
A framework for the analysis of environmental disclosure quality is suggested by the 
current study that considers four different but complementary quality dimensions. 
Specifically, environmental disclosure quality is measured according to four 
parameters, namely, type, direction, outlook and verifiability as defined by the 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). These quality dimensions or 
parameters correspond to the four information qualities of comparability, 
understandability, relevance, and reliability respectively as defined by the 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). A weighted disclosure quality 
index is developed to assess the informational content or the qualitative characteristics 
of the different disclosure items of the checklist. As long as quality measurement is 
intended, a weighted index is deemed appropriate in order to differentiate between the 
varying degrees of disclosure quality.  
A different weight is assigned to each individual quality characteristic within each 
quality dimension or sub-quality in an attempt to capture the distinct nature of the 
disclosure items. Higher weights are assigned to monetary quantitative (3) as opposed 
to non-monetary quantitative (2) or declarative (1); good (2) or bad (2) versus neutral 
(1); forward-looking (2) compared to historical (1); and verifiable (2) versus non-
verifiable (1) information.  As scoring scales for each quality dimension are different, 
scores have been proportionally re-scaled to allow the computation of a composite 
measure for aggregate quality for each of total disclosure and its categories.  This re-
scaling procedure is based on the best practice; that is the maximum possible total 
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quality scores for each dimension. In this regard, disclosure sub-quality indices have 
to be standardized to avoid a scale effect.  
A total sub-quality score is awarded to each environmental disclosure category in the 
checklist by adding the sub-quality scores of all items within the category. A total 
sub-quality score is also awarded to total corporate environmental disclosure by 
adding the sub-quality scores of all disclosure categories to derive an aggregate sub-
quality score for the company. The maximum applicable total sub-quality scores 
which a sample company could earn for the highest quality disclosure of 34 items are 
102, 68, 68, and 68 for each of Type (comparability), Direction (understandability), 
Outlook (relevance), and Verifiability (reliability) respectively. Disclosure sub-quality 
indices are then computed as the percentage of the sub-quality score awarded to 
maximum applicable sub-quality score. However, overall disclosure quality indices 
are computed as the arithmetic mean of the four sub-quality indices.  
Hence, Total Corporate Environmental Disclosure Sub-Quality Index is calculated as 
the percentage of total sub-quality score awarded to maximum applicable sub-quality 
score. Similarly, Corporate Environmental Disclosure Category Sub-Quality Index is 
calculated as the percentage of category sub-quality score awarded to maximum 
applicable category sub-quality score. Collectively, Total Corporate Environmental 
Disclosure Quality Index is calculated as the arithmetic mean of the four sub-quality 
indices for all disclosure items or categories. Similarly, Corporate Environmental 
Disclosure Category Quality Index is calculated as the arithmetic mean of the four 
sub-quality indices for the category. 
Corporate Environmental Disclosure Sub-Quality Index for each company is 
computed according to the following equation: 
        n 
               Σ Sub-Qualityi  
       i=1                                
                               CED Sub-Quality =                                                         
                                                                      MAX Sub-Quality 
Where:  
CED Sub-Quality = Corporate Environmental Disclosure Sub-Quality Index, 
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Sub-Qualityi = scoring scale for each sub-quality is applied to item i, 
MAX Sub-Quality = maximum applicable disclosure sub-quality score, 
n = number of items disclosed. 
Using the above formula, Corporate Environmental Disclosure Index for each of the 
four Sub-Qualities of Type, Direction, Outlook, and Verifiability are computed for 
each company. The same procedure has been followed to compute environmental 
disclosure sub-quality index for both total disclosure and each disclosure category in 
the checklist.  
Corporate Environmental Disclosure Type Index for each company is computed 
according to the following equation: 
                 n 
            Σ Typei  
             i=1                                
                                             CED Type =                                            
                                                                         MAX Type 
Where:  
CED Type = Corporate Environmental Disclosure Type Index, 
Typei = 3 if item i is monetary quantitative; 2 if item i is non-monetary quantitative; 1 
if item i is declarative, 
MAX Type = maximum applicable disclosure type score, 
n = number of items disclosed. 
Corporate Environmental Disclosure Direction Index for each company is computed 
according to the following equation: 
                 n 
                Σ Directioni  
             i=1                                
                                      CED Direction =                                            
                                                                         MAX Direction 
Where:  
CED Direction = Corporate Environmental Disclosure Direction Index, 
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Directioni = 2 if item i is good; 2 if item i is bad; 1 if item i is neutral, 
MAX Direction = maximum applicable disclosure direction score, 
n = number of items disclosed. 
Corporate Environmental Disclosure Outlook Index for each company is computed 
according to the following equation: 
                 n 
               Σ Outlooki  
             i=1                                
                                        CED Outlook =                                            
                                                                         MAX Outlook 
Where:  
CED Outlook = Corporate Environmental Disclosure Outlook Index, 
Outlooki = 2 if item i is forward-looking; 1 if item i is historical, 
MAX Outlook = maximum applicable disclosure outlook score, 
n = number of items disclosed. 
Corporate Environmental Disclosure Verifiability Index for each company is 
computed according to the following equation: 
                  n 
                   Σ Verifiabilityi  
              i=1                                
                                  CED Verifiability =                                            
                                                                         MAX Verifiability 
Where:  
CED Verifiability = Corporate Environmental Disclosure Verifiability Index, 
Verifiabilityi = 2 if item i is verifiable; 1 if item i is non-verifiable, 
MAX Verifiability = maximum applicable disclosure verifiability score, 
n = number of items disclosed. 
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Corporate Environmental Disclosure Quality Index for each company is computed 
according to the following equation: 
CED Quality = [CED Typei + CED Directioni + CED Outlooki + CED Verifiabilityi] 
  
4 
Where: 
CED Quality = Corporate Environmental Disclosure Quality Index, 
CED Typei = Corporate Environmental Disclosure Type Index, 
CED Directioni = Corporate Environmental Disclosure Direction Index, 
CED Outlooki = Corporate Environmental Disclosure Outlook Index, 
CED Verifiabilityi = Corporate Environmental Disclosure Verifiability Index. 
The same procedure has been followed to compute environmental disclosure quality 
index for both total disclosure and each disclosure category in the checklist. 
 
4.7.3.5.3   Validity Of Disclosure Measurement 
Although a self-constructed disclosure index is a useful research tool in capturing 
disclosure practices, it requires subjective assessments by the researcher in its 
development and application (Botosan, 1997). Therefore, various tests are essential to 
assess the validity of the disclosure index. Validity represents evidence that the 
instrument, technique or process used to measure a concept does indeed measure the 
intended concept (Sekaran, 2003: 425). The validity of the disclosure indices are 
assessed using content validity and construct validity.  
Content validity ensures that the measure includes an adequate and representative set 
of items that tap the concept (Sekaran, 2003). Several ways can be employed to attest 
content validity including careful definition of the research phenomena under 
investigation through extensive literature review and the use of a panel of expert 
judges (see section 4.7.3.3 for ensuring content validity in checklist development). 
Three UK academics have been asked to refine the preliminary checklist, one of them 
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has considerable practical accounting and auditing experience with UK listed 
companies. Construct validity focuses on consistency with theoretical expectations 
and evidence from literature. Correlation analysis is suggested as a means by which 
construct validity can be established (Sekaran, 2003). 
Correlation coefficients have been used in prior disclosure studies to assess the 
validity of disclosure scores (see Ahmed and Courtis, 1999; Botosan, 1997; Cheng 
and Courtenay, 2006). Following these studies, correlation analysis of the total 
environmental disclosure index and its component indices of environmental 
disclosure categories was conducted. Both Pearson and Spearman correlation 
coefficients show that, for each of disclosure quantity and quality, the indices of all 
environmental disclosure categories are highly correlated to total environmental 
disclosure index (see section 5.3.2.1 and section 6.3.2.1 for construct validity). This 
indicates how well the classification or grouping scheme interprets the total score. 
Moreover, it is expected that a company's disclosure strategies are similar as to the 
different categories of disclosure (Botosan, 1997; Cheng and Courtenay, 2006). In this 
respect, the results also reveal that the indices of the different environmental 
disclosure categories are correlated to each other.  
In addition, correlation between disclosure indices and significant explanatory 
variables identified in prior studies has been used to validate the disclosure index (see 
Ahmed and Courtis, 1999; Botosan, 1997). Therefore, the correlation between each of 
environmental disclosure quantity and quality indices and two corporate 
characteristics, documented by prior disclosure studies to be key determinants 
explaining the variation in disclosure practices, is investigated. These include 
company size and industry. Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients indicate 
that disclosure quantity and quality indices are correlated to each of the two corporate 
characteristics (see section 5.3.2.1 and section 6.3.2.1 for construct validity). Taken 
together the results confirm that disclosure indices have a considerable degree of 
validity in that they consistently capture environmental disclosure practices in the 
annual reports.  
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4.7.4   Definition And Measurement Of Variables 
The following figure, Figure 4.5, depicts the variables used by the current study to 
examine the extent and quality of corporate environmental disclosure practices and 
their association with corporate governance mechanisms. 
 
Figure 4.5 
Research Variables Framework 
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4.7.4.1   Dependent Variables 
The dependent variable of the current study is corporate environmental disclosure in 
the annual reports of UK listed companies. Both the quantity and the quality of such 
disclosure are examined as totals, in addition to disclosure quantity and quality for 
each disclosure category. Hence, the dependent variables include total corporate 
environmental disclosure quantity, corporate environmental disclosure quantity in 
each disclosure category, total corporate environmental disclosure quality and 
corporate environmental disclosure quality in each disclosure category.  
 
4.7.4.1.1   Environmental Disclosure Quantity 
“Environmental disclosures constitute part of what frequently are labelled social 
responsibility disclosures. Social responsibility disclosures can include, among other 
things, disclosures relating to the interaction between an organization and its physical 
environment” (Deegan and Rankin, 1996: 51). Corporate environmental disclosure 
can be defined as the process of disseminating information on the impact corporate 
economic activities have on the natural environment for use by diverse stakeholders. 
Corporate environmental disclosure extends the accountability of companies beyond 
the traditional role of providing financial disclosure assuming that companies have 
wider environmental responsibilities (Gray et al., 1987). The most distinguishing 
feature of environmental disclosure is its voluntary nature, particularly in the UK 
context. Consequently, environmental reports are characterized by their diversity in 
terms of disclosure quantity and quality.   
The dependent variable, corporate environmental disclosure quantity, is measured 
using an un-weighted disclosure index developed and applied over a checklist of 
environmental disclosure items. The disclosure checklist is constructed as a 
measuring instrument and is composed of different sections showing the different 
categories or areas to which each environmental disclosure information belongs. 
Table 4.3 shows the checklist comprising the different environmental disclosure 
categories and items. The disclosure index is calculated based on of the presence or 
absence of each item in the annual reports using binary codes, where the presence of 
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the item in the annual report is coded (1), while the absence of the item is coded (0). 
A total score is awarded to each disclosure category as well as to total disclosure in 
the checklist.  
Disclosure quantity indices are then computed as the percentage of the quantity score 
awarded to maximum applicable quantity score. Hence, Total Corporate 
Environmental Disclosure Quantity Index is calculated as the percentage of total 
quantity score awarded to maximum applicable quantity score. Similarly, Corporate 
Environmental Disclosure Category Quantity Index is calculated as the percentage of 
category quantity score awarded to maximum applicable category quantity score. 
Following is a presentation of the different categories of corporate environmental 
disclosure. 
 
4.7.4.1.1.1   Environmental Policies 
Environmental Policies refer to public statements of an organization's philosophy, 
intentions, and objectives with respect to the environment. An environmental policy 
can be viewed as a framework within which a company manages its environmental 
impacts. Environmental policies include any formal statements specified and/or 
implemented by the company regarding its environmental performance and activities. 
This disclosure category covers strategies, claims, visions, and actions proposed 
towards environmental protection as well as health and safety issues.  
 
4.7.4.1.1.2   Product and Process–Related Environmental Issues 
Product And Process-Related Environmental Issues are concerned with any damage to 
the environment resulting from the manufacturing or use of products such as pollution 
emissions or waste generation, as well as environmental protection resulting from 
improvements in the products or their processing such recycling, energy efficiency, 
and product safety. 
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4.7.4.1.1.3   Compliance with Environmental Laws and Standards 
Compliance With Environmental Laws And Standards disclosure category reflects 
how companies are operating under a regulatory environment that is increasingly 
subject to changes as standards improve as well as the degree to which companies are 
in conformity with such environment. This disclosure category includes any 
statements indicating the company's compliance with pollution laws, health and safety 
standards and regulations, and environmental management standards such as ISO, BS 
OHSAS and PAS. 
 
4.7.4.1.1.4   Environmental Auditing  
Environmental Auditing refers to environmental review, scoping, audit and 
assessment including independent attestation. Environmental Audit can be viewed as 
a management tool comprising systematic, documented, periodic and objective 
evaluation and assessment of both corporate environmental performance and 
environmental disclosure. Therefore, this disclosure category includes any reference 
to environmental internal or external audit or verification of environmental 
performance or systems such as environmental site and facilities assessment, 
environmental machinery and equipment assessment, environmental risk assessment 
and the like. Also included in this category is any reference to environmental internal 
or external audit or verification of environmental information disclosure.  
 
4.7.4.1.1.5   Sustainability 
Sustainability simply refers to the maintenance of well being. Sustainability is 
concerned with the effect of a present action on the availability of future options (Aras 
and Crowther, 2008). Hence, sustainable development is a pattern of resource use that 
meets present human needs while preserving the environment; that is without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs. This disclosure 
category also includes statements about the impact of a company's activities on such 
issues as biodiversity, climate change, acid rain and global warming. 
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4.7.4.1.1.6   Other Environmentally-Related Information 
Other Environmentally-Related Information disclosure category includes statements 
addressing any environmental issues or information that is not included in any of the 
above disclosure categories. Examples of such disclosures include receiving 
environmental or safety awards, environmental education and training, and  
environmental litigation. In addition, this disclosure category is intended to capture 
not only environmental issues that do not fit in any of the other categories but also 
those issues that do not match one of the items specified by this category. 
 
4.7.4.1.2   Environmental Disclosure Quality 
Quality is a generic and holistic term that has different meanings to different people.  
Several definitions of disclosure quality have been suggested in prior literature. Each 
of these definitions refer to a particular qualitative characteristic of the disclosed 
information and largely dependent upon the purpose of the research. Botosan (2004) 
argues that the definition of quality should be based on well-supported frameworks 
elaborated by professional accounting bodies and standard setters because they reflect 
a generally accepted notion of disclosure quality. This perspective quite fits with the 
purpose of the current study as no specific user group is of particular interest to the 
research, but rather all diverse stakeholder groups are targeted. A broader and more 
general all-purpose definition of disclosure quality, therefore, seems appropriate. 
Consistent with Botosan's (2004) approach, corporate environmental disclosure 
quality is defined in the current study in terms of the information qualities or 
characteristics identified by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB); 
comparability, understandability, relevance, and reliability (IASB, 1989). 
 In line with the IASB framework of the qualitative characteristics of information, 
Botosan (2004: 290) argues that “high-quality information is information that helps 
users make informed economic decisions”. For the purposes of the current study, 
comparability, understandability, relevance, and reliability are defined in a manner 
consistent with the IASB framework. „Comparability‟ can be defined as the ability of 
information to consistently allow corporate performance appraisal, pointing out 
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similarities and differences across time, across companies and across standards and 
norms through consistent presentation of information in a form that directly reveals 
impact of environmental activities on overall corporate performance. From the 
researcher's viewpoint, „comparability‟ is permitted with the financial quantification 
of information that can be elaborated through non-financial quantification and 
descriptive forms. „Understandability‟ can be defined as the ease with which users of 
information can perceive, interpret, and evaluate specific environmental topics in 
terms of their benefit or detriment to corporate performance. According to the 
researcher, „understandability‟ is facilitated when the economic direction or sign of 
information is clear. „Relevance‟ can be defined as the ability of information to 
convey expectations about future environmental conduct based on past and present 
performance. From the researcher's viewpoint, „relevance‟ is achieved via the 
provision of forward- looking information in addition to historical information. 
„Reliability‟ can be defined as the credibility of information in terms of accuracy and 
veracity that builds users' confidence and trust in environmental disclosures.  
According to the researcher, „reliability‟ is assured through verification or auditing.  
Quality assessment is based on the information qualities defined by the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB). A framework for the analysis of environmental 
disclosure quality is suggested by the current study that considers four different but 
complementary quality dimensions. Specifically, environmental disclosure quality is 
measured according to type, direction, outlook and verifiability. These quality 
dimensions or parameters correspond to the four information qualities of 
comparability, understandability, relevance, and reliability respectively as defined by 
the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). „Type‟ refers to the 
quantification nature of information; whether it is monetary quantitative (financial 
quantification), non-monetary quantitative (non-financial quantification) or 
declarative (no quantification). „Direction‟ refers to the economic sign of information; 
whether it is good (specific credit), bad (specific discredit) or neutral (no specific 
credit or discredit). „Outlook‟ refers to  the time-frame orientation of information; 
whether it is forward- looking (future oriented) or historical (past or present oriented). 
„Verifiability‟ refers to the auditability of information; whether it is verifiable 
(veracity checked) or non-verifiable (veracity not checked). 
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Raar (2007) defines the types of disclosure in terms of their quantification nature.  
Monetary quantified disclosure is presented in terms of currency. Non- monetary 
quantified disclosure is expressed in numeric terms other than currency such as 
weight, volume, size. Declarative disclosure is a qualitative or descriptive prose only. 
Deegan and Gordon (1996) refer to the news economic direction and differentiate 
between positive and negative disclosures. Accordingly, Deegan and Rankin (1996: 
56) define positive disclosures as “information which presents the company as 
operating in harmony with the environment” and negative disclosures as “disclosures 
that present the company as operating to the detriment of the natural environment”.   
According to the ICAEW (2003), Bozzolan et al. (2009: 443) define forward- looking 
as “any information that might have an effect on subsequent financial statements”.  
Verifiable disclosures are those that have been audited by external auditors and, 
hence, the accuracy and veracity of such disclosures are independently checked, and 
ascertained. 
The dependent variable, corporate environmental disclosure quality, is measured 
using a weighted disclosure index developed to assess the informational content or the 
qualitative characteristics of the different disclosure items of the checklist. The 
disclosure checklist is constructed as a measuring instrument and is composed of 
different sections showing the different categories or areas to which each 
environmental disclosure information belongs. Table 4.3 shows the checklist 
comprising the different environmental disclosure categories and items, while Table 
4.4 depicts the proposed operational definitions for environmental disclosure quality 
dimensions. A different weight is assigned to each individual quality characteristic 
within each quality dimension or sub-quality in an attempt to capture the distinct 
nature of the disclosure items. Higher weights are assigned to monetary quantitative 
(3) as opposed to non-monetary quantitative (2) or declarative (1); good (2) or bad (2) 
versus neutral (1); forward-looking (2) compared to historical (1); and verifiable (2) 
versus non-verifiable (1) information. As scoring scales for each quality dimension 
are different, scores have been proportionally re-scaled to allow the computation of a 
composite measure for aggregate quality for each of total disclosure and its 
categories. This re-scaling procedure is based on the best practice; that is the 
maximum possible total quality scores for each dimension. In this regard, disclosure 
sub-quality indices have to be standardized to avoid a scale effect.          
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A total sub-quality score is awarded to each environmental disclosure category in the 
checklist by adding the sub-quality scores of all items within the category. A total 
sub-quality score is also awarded to total corporate environmental disclosure by 
adding the sub-quality scores of all disclosure categories to derive an aggregate sub-
quality score for the company. The maximum applicable total sub-quality scores 
which a sample company could earn for the highest quality disclosure of 34 items are 
102, 68, 68, and 68 for each of Type (comparability), Direction (understandability), 
Outlook (relevance), and Verifiability (reliability) respectively. Disclosure sub-quality 
indices are then computed as the percentage of the sub-quality score awarded to 
maximum applicable sub-quality score. However, overall disclosure quality indices 
are computed as the arithmetic mean of the four sub-quality indices.  
Hence, Total Environmental Disclosure Sub-Quality Index is calculated as the 
percentage of total sub-quality score awarded to maximum applicable sub-quality 
score. Similarly, Environmental Disclosure Category Sub-Quality Index is calculated 
as the percentage of category sub-quality score awarded to maximum applicable 
category sub-quality score. Collectively, Total Environmental Disclosure Quality 
Index is calculated as the arithmetic mean of the four sub-quality indices for all 
disclosure items or categories. Similarly, Environmental Disclosure Category Quality 
Index is calculated as the arithmetic mean of the four sub-quality indices for the 
category. 
  
4.7.4.2   Independent Variables 
The independent variables of the current study are corporate governance mechanisms 
of UK listed companies. Corporate governance simply refers to how a corporation is 
governed. Corporate governance can be defined as the set of processes, customs, 
policies, laws and institutions affecting the way a corporation is directed, 
administered or controlled. Corporate governance includes also the relationships 
among various interested parties and the goals for which the corporation is governed.  
Corporate governance mechanisms are classified into the following three groups: (1) 
Board Characteristics: board independence, role duality, board size, board meetings,  
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directors' qualifications and experience including education, community influence and 
cross-directorships; (2) Board Committees Characteristics: the presence of corporate 
environmental responsibility (CER) committee or responsible, audit committee 
independence, remuneration committee independence, nomination committee 
independence; and (3) Ownership Structure: ownership concentration, institutional 
ownership.  
 
4.7.4.2.1   Board Characteristics 
The board of directors plays an important role in corporate governance practices 
(Bhagat and Bolton, 2008; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002) and this role may be directly 
linked to companies‟ environmental attention (Halme and Huse, 1997).Board 
characteristics expected to impact environmental disclosure and examined in the 
current study include board independence, role duality, board size, board meetings,  
directors' qualifications and experience including education, community influence and 
cross-directorships. 
 
4.7.4.2.1.1   Board Independence 
Board independence refers to “the degree to which board members are dependent on 
the current CEO or organization” (Ayuso and Argandoña, 2007: 5). Independent non-
executive directors are outside directors as opposed to either insiders, who are 
managers or employees of the firm directors, or dependent non-executive directors, 
who have personal and/or professional relationships with the firm other than board 
membership (Ayuso and Argandoña, 2007; Pfeffer, 1972; Rupley et al., 2011). 
Independent non-executive directors are professional managers who are not involved 
in the direct and daily operations of the company as they are not the company's full-
time employees (Chen and Courtenay, 2006; Lim et al., 2007). Their role is to handle 
company issues involving serious agency problems between managers and 
shareholders, such as determining executive compensation or senior managers‟ 
replacements (Lim et al., 2007). Board independence is measured by the proportion of 
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independent non-executive directors on the board; that is the number of independent 
non-executive directors to the total the number of directors on the board.   
     
4.7.4.2.1.2   Role Duality 
Role duality means that the chief executive officer (CEO) is also holding the position 
of Chairperson of the board. Hence, there are dual roles played by the same person 
(Finkelstein and D' Aveni, 1994). Role duality is measured as a dummy variable with 
the value of 1 if CEO is also the chairman of the board and 0 otherwise. 
 
4.7.4.2.1.3   Board Size 
Board size refers to the number of directors who serve on the board (Zahra and Pearce 
II , 1989). It is measured by the total number of directors on the board.  
 
4.7.4.2.1.4   Board Meetings 
Board Meetings refer to the frequency of meeting occasions organized by board 
members. Meeting frequency reflects the diligence and vigilance of the board in 
carrying their duties (Persons, 2006).  Board meeting frequency is measured by the 
total number of meetings held in a year.  
 
4.7.4.2.1.5   Directors' Qualifications And Experience 
Directors' qualifications and experience reflect the educational background, values, 
skills and expertise of directors. Directors' qualifications and experience are defined 
by the current study as the sum of three factors, namely education, community 
influence, and cross-directorships of board members. 
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4.7.4.2.1.5.1   Education 
Education can be identified as an institutional consequence influencing accounting 
systems and practices (Gray, 1988). Accordingly, the educational background of 
directors can determine their approach to environmental disclosure as reactive or 
proactive (Peters and Romi, 2011). Education is measured by the proportion of 
directors on the board with business, accounting, and/or finance educational 
background; that is the number of directors with business, accounting, and/or finance 
educational background to the total the number of directors on the board.       
 
4.7.4.2.1.5.2   Community Influence 
Community influential directors are defined as directors with experience and linkages 
who provide support and service to the company in terms of networking and 
reputation, through connections with various stakeholders, beyond the competitive 
environment of the firm (Hillman et al., 2000; Mallin and Michelon, 2011; Michelon 
and Parbonetti, 2010). They provide technical expertise and knowledge in specific 
areas, expertise on decision making processes, and access to information or prestige. 
Examples of community influential directors are politicians, academic ians, military 
officers, members of clergy and religious leaders, and members of social or 
community organizations as well as members of professional bodies (who are 
affiliated with financial institutions, law firms, advertising agencies, accounting or 
consulting firms and engineering consultants) and regulators (Baysinger and 
Zardkoohi, 1986; Hillman et al., 2000) or holding a combination of any of these 
positions and memberships. They also include those directors retired from or ex-
holders of these positions and memberships. Community influence is measured by the 
proportion of community influential directors on the board; that is the number of 
directors with community influence to the total the number of directors on the board.  
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4.7.4.2.1.5.3   Cross-Directorships 
Cross-directorships is another aspect of directors' qualifications and experience that 
exists when directors serve on more than one board. Cross-directorships variable is 
measured by the proportion of directors on the board with cross-directorships; that is 
the number of directors with cross-directorships to the total the number of directors on 
the board.       
 
4.7.4.2.2   Board Committees Characteristics  
Board committees are associated with improved corporate governance (Forker 1992; 
Davis 2001).Board roles and functions are enhanced through the establishment of 
specialized committees (Zahra and Pearce II, 1989). Board committees characteristics 
expected to impact environmental disclosure and examined in the current study 
include the presence of corporate environmental responsibility (CER) committee or 
responsible, audit committee independence, remuneration committee independence 
and nomination committee independence. 
 
4.7.4.2.2.1   Corporate Environmental Responsibility (CER) Committee Presence 
The presence of a corporate environmental responsibility (CER) committee or a 
responsible at board level may demonstrate the board's commitment towards 
environmentally responsible behaviour (Monks and Minow, 1995). Social and 
environmental responsibility committees help companies in determining and 
identifying the major societal and environmental concerns that are likely to influence 
corporate performance (Kohls, 1986). Board CER committee is typically in charge of 
reviewing CER issues; identifying non-financial risks and monitoring risk 
management; establishing policies and standards; monitoring compliance with and 
performance against company CER policies; reviewing company reporting on CER;  
and overseeing philanthropic activity (Mackenzie, 2007). The presence of a corporate 
environmental responsibility (CER) committee or a responsible is measured as a 
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dummy variable with the value of 1 if the company has a board- level CER committee 
or responsible and 0 otherwise. 
 
4.7.4.2.2.2   Audit Committee Independence 
Audit committees are defined as being “responsible for overseeing the financial 
reporting process and ensuring the objectivity of the external audit” (Uzun et al., 
2004: 36). An independent audit committee should help the board to meet its statutory 
and fiduciary responsibilities (Weir et al., 2002). Following Ayuso and Argandoña 
(2007: 5) definition of independence, audit committee independence can be defined as 
“the degree to which board [audit committee] members are dependent on the current 
CEO or organization”. Audit committee independence is measured by the proportion 
of independent non-executive directors on the audit committee; that is the number of 
independent non-executive directors to the total the number of directors on the audit 
committee.        
 
4.7.4.2.2.3   Remuneration Committee Independence 
A remuneration committee, also called compensation committee, is responsible to the 
board for assessing management‟s performance and recommending appropriate 
remuneration packages of directors (Nelson et al., 2010; Uzun et al., 2004). 
Following Ayuso and Argandoña (2007: 5) definition of independence, remuneration 
committee independence can be defined as “the degree to which board [remuneration 
committee] members are dependent on the current CEO or organization”. 
Remuneration committee independence is measured by the proportion of independent 
non-executive directors on the remuneration committee; that is the number of 
independent non-executive directors to the total the number of directors on the 
remuneration committee.  
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4.7.4.2.2.4   Nomination Committee Independence 
A nomination committee is suggested as a way to help ensure a formal and 
transparent procedure for the appointment of new directors to the board. In doing so, 
nomination committees review gathered information to enable the assessment and 
selection of candidates for nomination to membership on the board (Carson, 2002; 
Uzun et al., 2004). Following Ayuso and Argandoña (2007: 5) definition of 
independence, nomination committee independence can be defined as “the  degree to 
which board [nomination committee] members are dependent on the current CEO or 
organization”. Nomination committee independence is measured by the proportion of 
independent non-executive directors on the nomination committee; that is the number 
of independent non-executive directors to the total the number of directors on the 
nomination committee.        
 
4.7.4.2.3   Ownership Structure 
Concentration and type of ownership have been suggested as significant factors in 
explaining variability in voluntary disclosure practices. Ownership Structure expected 
to impact environmental disclosure and examined in the current study includes 
ownership concentration and institutional ownership. 
 
4.7.4.2.3.1   Ownership Concentration 
Ownership concentration or a closely held ownership means that the shares of the 
company are concentrated in the hands of a few large shareholders rather than being 
widely held by a large number of shareholders each holding a small portion of the 
company‟s shares. Ownership concentration or blockholdings is the percentage of 
ordinary shares held by substantial shareholders. Under the listing rules for the 
London Stock Exchange firms must, in the report of the directors in their annual 
report and accounts, disclose the identities behind shareholdings in excess of 3% 
(Davies et al., 1999). Ownership concentration is measured by the percentage of total 
shares held by blockholders or shareholdings in excess of 3%.  
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4.7.4.2.3.2   Institutional Ownership 
Institutional investors are organizations which pool large sums of money and invest 
those sums in securities, real property and other investment assets. Institutional 
investors include pension funds, mutual funds, investment banks, insurance 
companies and private firms (Ingley and van der Walt 2004; Mahoney and Roberts, 
2007). Institutional ownership is measured by the percentage of total shares held by 
institutional investors. Companies are only required by London Stock Exchange 
listing rules to disclose those shareholdings in excess of 3% of company common 
stock (Davies et al., 1999). Therefore the measure of institutional shareholding used 
by the current study will not capture the portions of stock held by investors owning 
less than 3% of company stock. 
 
4.7.4.3   Control Variables 
The control variables of the current study are corporate characteristics of UK listed 
companies. Company characteristics are predominantly considered to be important 
determinants of corporate environmental disclosure. They act as intervening variables 
and should be controlled for in empirical investigations (Cowen et al., 1987; Roberts, 
1992; Ullmann, 1985). Considerable academic research has investigated the 
relationship between corporate characteristics and environmental disclosures in 
companies' annual reports. Prior empirical evidence indicated that corporate 
characteristics significantly explain the variability in environmental disclosure 
practices.  
The present study's control variables, mostly financial variables, are obtained from 
DataStream database that provides on- line information and computation services to 
the global securities industry. These control variables include company size, industry, 
profitability, leverage, liquidity, systematic risk, and cross- listing. They are 
commonly classified as follows: structure-related variables (company size and 
leverage); performance-related variables (profitability and liquidity); and market- 
related variables (industry membership, systematic risk, and cross listing) (Haniffa 
and Cooke, 2002; Lang and Lundholm, 1993). 
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4.7.4.3.1   Size  
Corporate size has been predominantly associated with corporate environmental 
disclosure practices. Large companies that can afford additional costs of providing 
environmental disclosure, tend to employ highly-skilled calibers and expertise and 
have sophisticated reporting systems to provide comprehensive disclosures (Buzby, 
1975; Monteiro and Aibar-Guzman, 2010). Based on agency theory, Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) pointed out that there is a higher potential for conflict of interest 
between owners managers in large-size companies and, accordingly, greater agency 
costs. Therefore, agency theory predicts an increase in environmental disclosure for 
larger companies as a means of mitigating agency conflicts and reducing agency 
costs. A stakeholder theory, however, argues that larger companies disclose more 
information in order to attract capital in financial market (Choi, 1973; Cooke, 1991). 
Large firms may be especially driven to make environmental disclosures as they have 
more stakeholders who might be concerned about the company's environmental 
performance, which is disclosed to them mostly through formal communication 
channels (Cowen et al., 1987; Trotman and Bradley, 1981). Accordingly, larger 
companies have greater responsibility to provide information to various stakeholders 
groups in addressing the wider interests and greater demands of such diverse 
stakeholders. 
Corporate size has consistently been found to have significant and positive association 
with voluntary disclosure levels in general (Barako et al.; 2006; Boesso, and Kumar, 
2007; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002) and environmental disclosure in particular (Adams et 
al., 1998; Brammer and Pavelin, 2008; Cormier et al., 2011; Cormier et al., 2005; 
Deegan and Gordon, 1996; Gray et al., 2001; Hackston and Milne, 1996; Magness, 
2006; Patten, 2002; Peters and Romi, 2011; Rupley et al., 2011; Stanny and Ely, 
2008). This relationship is revealed not only in the context of disclosure quantity but 
also for disclosure quality (Brammer and Pavelin, 2008; Lang and Lundholm, 1993; 
O‟Sullivan et al., 2008; Rupley et al., 2011). Drawing on the theoretical and empirical 
evidence from prior studies, the current study expects a positive relationship between 
company size and the quantity and quality of environmental disclosure in the annual 
reports of UK listed companies. 
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Different measures of company size have been used in the disclosure literature such 
as total assets, total sales, capital employed, number of employees, turnover, 
shareholders' equity and market capitalization. Given that no theoretical justification 
exists for a particular measure, reviewing the literature reveals that there are no 
significant differences among the results of studies employing different measures. In 
addition, it can be observed that total assets is the most popular measure of company 
size in prior literature (see Brammer and Pavelin, 2008; Gul and Leung, 2004; Haniffa 
and Cooke, 2002; Ho and Wong, 2001; Monteiro and Aibar-Guzman, 2010; Peters 
and Romi, 2011; Rupley et al., 2011). Therefore, corporate size is measured in the 
current study using the natural logarithm of total assets.  
 
4.7.4.3.2   Industry 
Industry nature is commonly proposed as a significant firm-level driver of corporate 
environmental disclosure practices. A stakeholder theory, however, argues that 
companies operating in environmentally-sensitive industries or high profile industries 
are more likely to disclose information about their environmental performance. 
Environmentally-sensitive companies are likely to disclose more environmental 
information to reflect sensitivity to their particular problems (Cowen et al., 1987; Neu 
et al. 1998; Patten, 2002). In addition, industrial sensitivity towards the environment 
intensifies stakeholders‟ requests for corporate environmental information as a means 
of addressing their environmental concerns. Industries identified by prior literature to 
be of high environmental sensitivity include oil and gas, chemicals, construction and 
building materials, mining, forestry and paper, and utilities (Cormier and Magnan, 
2007; Wilmshurst and Frost, 2000).  
Empirical evidence on the relationship between the nature of industry and the level 
and quality of environmental disclosure is mixed. A considerable number of studies 
reported evidence of a significant positive association between environmental 
disclosure and industry sensitivity (Adams et al., 1998; Brammer and Pavelin, 2008; 
Campbell, 2004; Cormier et al., 2005;  Deegan and Gordon, 1996; García-Ayuso and 
Larrinaga, 2003; Gray et al., 2001; Hackston and Milne, 1996; Halme and Huse, 
1997). However, other studies were unable to confirm a significant association 
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between environmental disclosure and industry type (Cooper and Zainudin, 2009; 
Stanny and Ely, 2008). Drawing on the theoretical and empirical evidence from prior 
studies, the current study expects a positive relationship between industry sensitivity 
and the quantity and quality of environmental disclosure in the annual reports of UK 
listed companies. 
Industry is commonly measured in the disclosure literature as a dummy variable 
according to companies' degree of environmental sensitivity, where companies are 
categorized as being of high sensitivity or low sensitivity (see Campbell, 2004; 
Cooper and Zainudin, 2009; Cowen et al., 1987; Deegan and Gordon, 1996; Reverte, 
2009). Alternatively, classification is made according to industries intuitive appeal; 
those industries with consumer visibility, a high level of political risk and intense 
competition, where companies are categorized as being of high profile or low profile 
(see Roberts, 1992). Sometimes, however, distinction is made between manufacturing 
companies and non manufacturing companies (see Ho and Taylor, 2007; Lim et al., 
2007). Nevertheless, some studies examined the effect of each industrial sector on 
disclosure decisions (see Brammer and Pavelin, 2008; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; 
Michelon and Parbonetti, 2010; Peters and Romi, 2011). Although the manufacturing-
non manufacturing classification is arguably very simple to produce specific 
associations, the individual sector classification may be too complex in terms of 
interpreting the results (Cooper and Zainudin, 2009). Accordingly, industry is 
measured in the current study as a dummy variable with the value of 1 if the company 
belongs to an environmentally sensitive industry and 0 otherwise.  
 
4.7.4.3.3   Profitability 
Profitability is commonly cited as a factor influencing social and environmental 
disclosure. However, profitability has inconclusive relationship to environmental 
disclosure. A plausible explanation for a positive association is that management has 
the flexibility to undertake and disclose extensive environmental responsibility 
activities to stakeholders (Heinze, 1976). Based on agency theory, managers in 
profitable companies can use disclosure to handle the information asymmetry problem 
and to maintain their positions and compensation (Giner, 1997; Singhvi, 1968) and, 
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hence, the assumption that more profitable companies are more likely to provide 
enhanced disclosure. Similarly, stakeholder theory argues that profitability is the 
motive to disclose environmental information (Gray et al., 1995a) and predicts a 
positive association between accounting-based measures of financial performance and 
corporate social and environmental disclosure (Roberts, 1992). High profitable 
companies induce management to disclose more information in order to distinguish 
themselves from less profitable companies as a means of attracting investors and 
raising capital (Singhvi and Desai, 1971), where enhanced financial performance 
strongly influences the level of support management can commit to social and 
environmental responsibility activities (Ullmann, 1985). In addition, s 
environmentally responsive firms are expected to be more profitable as they should 
possess the same requisite skills to run a company profitably (Belkaoui and Karpik, 
1989). On the other hand, low profitable companies avoid disclosing more 
information to conceal their poor performance, given that during periods of low 
profitability stakeholders' economic demands take priority over voluntary social and 
environmental interests (Ullman, 1985). 
Empirically, evidence of the relationship between profitability and environmental 
disclosure is quite mixed. On one hand, a significant positive relationship between the 
two variables is documented by Cooper and Zainudin (2009), Haniffa and Cooke 
(2005) and Neu et al. (1998). On the other hand, a significant negative relationship 
between firm profitability and environmental disclosure is found by Ho and Taylor 
(2007). Nevertheless, some prior studies indicated no significant association between 
environmental disclosures and profitability (Brammer and Pavelin, 2008; García-
Sánchez, 2008; Hackston and Milne, 1996; Michelon and Parbonetti, 2010; Peters and 
Romi, 2011; Stanny and Ely, 2008). Drawing on the above theoretical evidence, the 
current study expects a positive relationship between profitability and the quantity and 
quality of environmental disclosure in the annual reports of UK listed companies. 
Two types of profitability measures have been used in the disclosure literature : 
accounting-based measures such as return on assets, return on equity, earnings before 
interest and taxes, and market-based measures such as stock-market returns. In the 
context of accounting disclosure, accounting-based measure are more preferable as 
market-based measures reflect investors‟ evaluations of company performance, thus 
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ignoring other important stakeholder groups (McGuire et al., 1988; Reverte, 2009). A 
commonly employed measure of profitability is return on assets (ROA) (see Belkaoui 
and Karpik, 1989; Brammer and Pavelin, 2008; Cormier et al., 2011; Cormier et al., 
2010; Lim et al., 2007; Patten, 1991; Peters and Romi, 2011). Accordingly, 
profitability is measured in the current study using the natural logarithm of return on 
assets. 
 
4.7.4.3.4   Leverage 
Leverage has been suggested as a possible explanatory variable of environmental 
disclosure practices. It represents a company's ability to meet its obligations. Agency 
theory predicts a positive relationship between leverage and disclosure. It argues that 
highly leveraged companies incur more monitoring costs (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976) and may, therefore, disclose more information to reduce these agency costs  
(Ahmed and Courtis, 1999). From a stakeholder perspective, however, there is an 
expectation that highly- leveraged companies will disclose more information in their 
annual reports as a means of enhancing their chance of raising funds from financial 
institutions (Ahmed and Nicholls, 1994; Barako et al., 2006).  
Empirical findings on the relationship between leverage and environmental disclosure 
are inconclusive. While some studies found a significant positive association between 
leverage and environmental disclosure (e.g. Clarkson et al., 2008; Naser et al., 2006; 
Parsa and Kouhy, 2008) other studies found a significant negative association (e,g. 
Belkaoui and Karpik, 1989; Brammer and Pavelin, 2006; Cooper and Zainudin, 2009; 
Cormier et al., 2011; Cormier and Magnan, 2003). Nevertheless, other studies were 
unable to confirm any significant association between leverage and environmental 
disclosure (see Al Arussi et al., 2009; Branco and Rodrigues, 2008; Cormier et al., 
2005; Ho and Taylor, 2007; Haniffa and Cooke 2005; Michelon and Parbonetti, 2010; 
Peters and Romi, 2011; Reverte, 2009; Stanny and Ely, 2008).  
Drawing on the above theoretical evidence, the current study expects a positive 
relationship between leverage and the quantity and quality of environmental 
disclosure in the annual reports of UK listed companies. Leverage has been measured 
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in the disclosure literature using the ratio of debt to assets, the ratio of debt to 
shareholders equity or the ratio of debt to standard capital employed. The ratio of debt 
to assets is commonly used in prior studies (see Al Arussi et al., 2009; Barako et al., 
2006; Brammer and Pavelin, 2006; Clarkson et al., 2008; Cormier et al., 2011; 
Cormier et al., 2010; Haniffa and Cooke 2002; Huafang and Jianguo, 2007; 
O‟Sullivan et al., 2008; Peters and Romi, 2011). Accordingly, leverage is measured in 
the current study as the ratio of total debt to total assets. 
 
4.7.4.3.5   Liquidity 
Liquidity has been proposed as a firm-level explanatory variable of environmental 
disclosure practices. It is argued that the soundness of the firm as being evaluated in 
terms of high liquidity is associated with greater levels of disclosure (Cooke, 1989). 
From a stakeholder-agency perspective, managers may be motivated to disclose more 
information about the company's liquidity in order to satisfy the needs of various 
stakeholders, particularly, shareholders and creditors. Wallace and Naser (1995) 
argued that regulatory institutions, investors and creditors are concerned with the 
going concern status of companies. This brings an expectation that highly- liquid 
companies would release more information to demonstrate the company's ability to 
cover its obligations as they come due (Barako et al., 2006). 
Empirical evidence on the relationship between liquidity and corporate environmental 
disclosure are quit limited. Ho and Taylor (2007) found a significant negative 
association. However, in the context of voluntary disclosure, Gul and Leung (2004) 
documented significant negative relationship between liquidity and voluntary 
disclosure, while Barako et al. (2006) were unable to confirm any significant 
association between the two variables. In an even wider context of corporate 
disclosure in general, Camfferman and Cooke (2002) found a significant positive 
association between liquidity and disclosure in the annual reports of UK and Dutch 
companies. 
Drawing on the above theoretical evidence, the current study expects a positive 
relationship between liquidity and the quantity and quality of environmental 
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disclosure in the annual reports of UK listed companies. A company's liquidity has 
been predominantly measured in the disclosure literature using the current ratio (see 
Barako et al., 2006; Camfferman and Cooke, 2002). Accordingly, liquidity is 
measured in the current study using the current ratio, defined as current assets to 
current liabilities. 
 
4.7.4.3.6   Systematic Risk 
Systematic risk can be a significant driver of environmental disclosure practices.  
Environmental risk assessments are now a key part of credit risk analyses (Cormier et 
al., 2005). Consistent with an agency perspective, additional environmental disclosure 
help investors in high risk companies to reduce their information asymmetries and, 
hence reduce the costs of private information acquisition (Lang and Lundholm, 1993), 
thereby increasing firm value to investor. A stakeholder theory argues that high level 
of systematic risk makes it more difficult for investors to precisely assess a firm‟s 
value (Cormier et al., 2005; Foster, 1986) and therefore companies are expected to 
voluntary disclose more information to satisfy stakeholders‟ needs. In addition, 
companies with high systematic risk may disclose social and environmental 
information as a means of reducing this risk (Trotman and Bradley, 1981).  
Empirical evidence on the relationship between systematic risk and environmental 
disclosure is inconclusive. On the one hand, Trotman and Bradley (1981) documented 
that companies which provide social and environmental responsibility information 
have a higher systematic risk. Importantly, Cormier et al., 2005 found that 
information costs, as proxied by risk, are potentially important determinants of 
environmental disclosure quality. On the other hand, Belkaoui and Karpik (1989) and 
Roberts (1992) found significant negative relationship between the level of corporate 
social and environmental disclosure and systematic risk. In a similar vein, Cormier et 
al. (2011) indirectly deduced a significant negative association of risk with 
environmental disclosure by revealing a positive association with information 
asymmetry. Nevertheless, García-Ayuso and Larrinaga (2003) and Michelon and 
Parbonetti (2010) were unable to confirm any significant association between 
systematic risk and environmental disclosure.  
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Drawing on the above theoretical evidence, the current study expects a positive 
relationship between systematic risk and the quantity and quality of environmental 
disclosure in the annual reports of UK listed companies. One of the most popular 
indicators of risk is a statistical measure called beta. Beta is a measure of a stock's 
volatility in relation to the market. This measure is extensively used in the disclosure 
literature to measure a company's risk (Cormier et al., 2011; Cormier et al., 2005; 
Michelon and Parbonetti, 2010; Roberts, 1992; Trotman and Bradley, 1981). 
Accordingly, beta is used to measure systematic risk in the current study. 
 
4.7.4.3.7   Cross-Listing 
Cross-listing means that companies are listed on multiple stock exchanges, mostly 
internationally. Cross- listing is suggested as an important factor in explaining the 
variation in environmental disclosure practices. Grüning (2007) indicates that listing 
status can be identified as the key element in understanding the network of related 
drivers of corporate disclosure. When listed internationally companies have to adhere 
to the national regulations of stock exchanges in each of the listing countries. 
Disclosure quality in annual reports is greatly influenced by the listing rules and 
requirements of stock exchanges (Singhvi and Desai, 1971). Hence cross- listed 
companies may provide extensive disclosures to fulfill such international challenges 
as compared to nationally- listed companies ( Cooke, 1989; Gray et al., 1995d). In 
addition, Haniffa and Cooke (2005) argue that such multiple- listed companies would 
disclose a great deal of social and environmental information, especially if listed in 
developed countries. Accordingly, and in line with agency theory, disclosure can limit 
the monitoring and agency costs resulting from the existence of a greater number of 
shareholders (Reverte, 2009). Consistent with a stakeholder perspective, however, 
companies listed on multiple stock exchanges have to respond to and address the 
needs and expectations of tremendously increasing and diverse stakeholder groups by 
disseminating comprehensive and high-quality information through enhanced 
corporate disclosure. Therefore, both agency theory and stakeholder theory predict a 
positive relationship between disclosure and listing status.  
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The majority of prior empirical studies provide evidence of a significant positive 
association between listing status and environmental disclosure (see Haniffa and 
Cooke, 2005; Peters and Romi, 2011; Reverte, 2009), although Michelon and 
Parbonetti (2010) were unable to detect the significance of such relationship. Drawing 
on the theoretical and empirical evidence from prior studies, the current study expects 
a positive relationship between cross- listing and the quantity and quality of 
environmental disclosure in the annual reports of UK listed companies. 
Cross-listing is commonly measured in the disclosure literature as a dummy variable 
according to whether or not companies have multiple listings either domestically or 
both domestically and internationally (see Haniffa and Cooke, 2005; Michelon and 
Parbonetti, 2010; Peters and Romi, 2011), although some studies limit the measure to 
listing on one or more of the top stock exchanges as measured by market 
capitalization (see Cormier et al., 2010; Peters and Romi, 2011). Other prior studies 
used the number of foreign stock markets (e.g Reverte, 2009) or the number of 
countries (e.g Grüning, 2007) in which a company is listed. Accordingly, cross-listing 
is measured in the current study as a dummy variable with the value of 1 if the 
company is listed on multiple stock exchanges and 0 otherwise.  
 
Table 4.5 provides a summary of the operational definition or measurement of each of 
the dependent variables, the independent variables and the control variables, along 
with their data sources. The dependent variables, corporate environmental disclosure 
quantity and quality, are obtained by content analysizing annual reports. The 
independent variables, corporate governance variables, are sourced from annual 
reports. An exception is ownership structure variables, where ownership data 
concerning ownership concentration and institutional ownership are extracted from 
the 2004-2007 London Stock Exchange Yearbooks. The control variables, mostly 
financial variables, are obtained from DataStream database that provides on-line 
information and computation services to the global securities industry.  
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Table 4.5 
Operational definitions of variables 
Variable  Operational Definition Data Source 
Dependent variables 
Total Corporate Environmental 
Disclosure Quantity  
Percentage of total quantity score 
awarded to maximum applicable 
quantity score  
Company annual report 
Corporate Environmental 
Disclosure Category Quantity  
Percentage of category quantity score 
awarded to maximum applicable 
category quantity score 
Company annual report 
Total Corporate Environmental 
Disclosure Quality 
Percentage of total quality score awarded 
to maximum applicable quality score  
Company annual report 
Corporate Environmental 
Disclosure Category Quality 
Percentage of category quality score 
awarded to maximum applicable 
category quality score 
Company annual report 
Independent variables 
Board Independence 
Proportion of independent non- 
executive directors on the board 
Company annual report 
Role Duality 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if CEO is 
also chairman, 0 otherwise 
Company annual report 
Board Size Total number of directors on the board  Company annual report 
Board Meetings Total number of board meetings per year Company annual report 
Education 
Proportion of directors on the board with 
business and/or accounting background  
Company annual report 
Community Influence 
Proportion of directors on the board with 
community influence 
Company annual report 
Cross-Directorships 
Proportion of directors on the board with 
cross directorship 
Company annual report 
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Variable  Operational Definition Data Source 
CER Committee Presence 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
company has a board-level CER 
committee or responsible, 0 otherwise 
Company annual report 
Audit Committee 
Independence 
Proportion of independent non-executive 
directors on audit committee 
Company annual report 
Remuneration Committee 
Independence 
Proportion of independent non-executive 
directors on remuneration committee 
Company annual report 
Nomination Committee 
Independence 
Proportion of independent non-executive 
directors on nomination committee 
Company annual report 
Ownership Structure 
Percentage of total shares held by 
blockholders or shareholders in excess of 
3%  
London Stock Exchange 
Yearbook 
Institutional Ownership 
Percentage of total shares held by 
institutional investors 
London Stock Exchange 
Yearbook 
Control variables 
Size Natural logarithm of total assets DataStream database 
Industry 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
company belongs to an environmentally 
sensitive industry, 0 otherwise 
DataStream database 
Profitability Natural logarithm of return on assets DataStream database 
Leverage Ratio of total debt to total assets DataStream database 
Liquidity Current ratio DataStream database 
Systematic Risk Beta DataStream database 
Cross-Listing 
Dummy variable equals to 1 if the 
company is listed on multiple stock 
exchanges, 0 otherwise 
DataStream database 
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4.7.5   Model Specification 
The following four models are developed to help measure the total quantity of 
corporate environmental disclosure and the quantity of corporate environmental 
disclosure in each disclosure category as well as the total quality of corporate 
environmental disclosure and the quality of corporate environmental disclosure in 
each disclosure category. 
 
Model  1   
CEDQUAN  =  ß0  +  ß1  B_IND  +  ß2  R_DUAL  +  ß3  B_SIZE  +  ß4  B_MEET  +    
                          ß5  D_EDU  +  ß6  D_COMINF +  ß7  D_CROSSDIR  + 
                          ß8  CER_COM  +  ß9  AUD_COM  +  ß10  REM_COM  + 
                          ß11  NOM_COM  +  ß12  OWN_CONC  +  ß13  INST_OWN  + 
                          ß14  SIZE  +  ß15  INDUSTRY  +  ß16  PROFIT  +  ß17  LEVERAGE  + 
                          ß18  LIQUIDITY  +  ß19  BETA  +  ß20  LISTING  +  Є  
 
Model  2   
CEDQUANC  =  ß0  +  ß1  B_IND  +  ß2  R_DUAL  +  ß3  B_SIZE  +  ß4  B_MEET  +    
                          ß5  D_EDU  +  ß6  D_COMINF +  ß7  D_CROSSDIR  + 
                          ß8  CER_COM  +  ß9  AUD_COM  +  ß10  REM_COM  + 
                          ß11  NOM_COM  +  ß12  OWN_CONC  +  ß13  INST_OWN  + 
                          ß14  SIZE  +  ß15  INDUSTRY  +  ß16  PROFIT  +  ß17  LEVERAGE  + 
                          ß18  LIQUIDITY  +  ß19  BETA  +  ß20  LISTING  +  Є  
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Model  3 
CEDQUAL  =  ß0  +  ß1  B_IND  +  ß2  R_DUAL  +  ß3  B_SIZE  +  ß4  B_MEET  +    
                          ß5  D_EDU  +  ß6  D_COMINF +  ß7  D_CROSSDIR  + 
                          ß8  CER_COM  +  ß9  AUD_COM  +  ß10  REM_COM  + 
                          ß11  NOM_COM  +  ß12  OWN_CONC  +  ß13  INST_OWN  + 
                          ß14  SIZE  +  ß15  INDUSTRY  +  ß16  PROFIT  +  ß17  LEVERAGE  + 
                          ß18  LIQUIDITY  +  ß19  BETA  +  ß20  LISTING  +  Є  
 
Model  4 
CEDQUALC  =  ß0  +  ß1  B_IND  +  ß2  R_DUAL  +  ß3  B_SIZE  +  ß4  B_MEET  +    
                          ß5  D_EDU  +  ß6  D_COMINF +  ß7  D_CROSSDIR  + 
                          ß8  CER_COM  +  ß9  AUD_COM  +  ß10  REM_COM  + 
                          ß11  NOM_COM  +  ß12  OWN_CONC  +  ß13  INST_OWN  + 
                          ß14  SIZE  +  ß15  INDUSTRY  +  ß16  PROFIT  +  ß17  LEVERAGE  + 
                          ß18  LIQUIDITY  +  ß19  BETA  +  ß20  LISTING  +  Є  
 
Where : 
CEDQUAN        =    Total Corporate Environmental Disclosure Quantity; 
CEDQUANC     =    Corporate Environmental Disclosure Category Quantity; 
CEDQUAL        =    Total Corporate Environmental Disclosure Quality; 
CEDQUALC     =    Corporate Environmental Disclosure Category Quality; 
ß0                       =    Intercept; 
ß1 to ß20             =    Coefficient of slope parameters; 
Є                        =    Error term; 
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B_IND               =    Board Independence; 
R_DUAL           =    Role Duality; 
B_SIZE              =    Board Size; 
B_MEET            =    Board Meetings; 
D_EDU              =    Education; 
D_COMINF       =    Community Influence; 
D_CROSSDIR   =    Cross-Directorship; 
CER_COM         =    Corporate Environmental Responsibility Committee (CER);  
AUD_COM        =    Audit Committee Independence; 
REM_COM        =    Remuneration Committee Independence; 
NOM_COM       =    Nomination Committee Independence;                                 
OWN_CONC     =    Ownership Concentration;  
INST_OWN       =    Institutional Ownership; 
SIZE                   =    Firm Size;  
INDUSTRY       =    Industry; 
PROFIT              =    Profitability;  
LEVERAGE      =    Leverage; 
LIQUIDITY       =    Liquidity;  
BETA                 =    Systematic risk; 
LIST                   =    Cross-Listing.    
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4.7.6   Econometric Model Statistical Tests 
The statistical package, STATA 11, is used for performing the statistical analyses 
including descriptive statistics, Pearson and Spearman correlations and Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) multiple regression tests. In addition, GLS regression is 
undertaken to further test the research hypotheses and to attest the reliability of the 
main OLS regression results. Finally, sensitivity analysis using Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) pooled regression with robust standard error is carried out to check the 
sensitivity and, hence, the robustness of the main regression analysis.  
Descriptive statistics of the data gathered are calculated for each of the dependent, 
independent and control variables. Pearson and Spearman correlations analyses are 
carried out to identify the correlation between the dependent and independent 
variables. Correlation coefficients are used as a check for multicolinearity, in addition 
to Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) test. They are also intended to attest the validity of 
the research instrument. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) cross sectional panel 
regression analysis is undertaken to identify the association between corporate 
environmental disclosure and corporate governance, while controlling for corporate 
characteristics. Four models are tested in which the dependent variables are total 
corporate environmental disclosure quantity, corporate environmental disclosure 
quantity in each disclosure category, total corporate environmental disclosure quality 
and corporate environmental disclosure quality in each disclosure category. The 
independent variables are corporate governance mechanisms and the control variables 
are corporate characteristics. Data are paneled according to time or the four years 
examined; 2004-2007 inclusive. Panel data are better able to identify and measure 
effects that are simply not detectable in pure cross-section or pure time-series data.  
Research hypotheses are mainly examined using OLS. However, GLS regression is 
undertaken to further test the research hypotheses and to attest the reliability of the 
main OLS regression results. In addition, a pooled ordinary least square (OLS) 
regression is applied in comparison to the panel regression as it deals with the whole 
observations as one unit with the same intercept and same error distribution. The 
standard error robust regression test would be used as the data are not normally 
distributed. The data are analyzed at confidence levels of 99%, 95%, and 90%.  
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4.8   CONCLUSION 
This chapter articulates the methodology employed by the present study based on the 
purpose and objectives of the study. Based on stakeholder-agency theory, the main 
objectives of the present study is to empirically examine the relationship between 
corporate governance mechanisms and the quantity and quality of corporate 
environmental disclosure practices in UK companies' annual reports and to provide an 
in-depth investigation of environmental disclosure quality identification and 
assessment. To fulfill these research objectives, the current study adopts an objective 
methodological position of philosophical assumptions.  
Ontologically, the current study adopts a realism position. Epistemologically, the 
study takes a positivism position. Regarding the human nature assumptions, the 
current study assumes determinism. Accordingly, human beings are mainly 
considered as conditioned by their external circumstances.  In this regard, the current 
research seeks objectively measurable and observable human behaviour. These 
philosophical assumptions imply that the study is inclined towards an objective 
nomothetic methodology, where quantitative research methods are made use of. 
Therefore, the study seeks a quantitatively measured description and exploration of 
the perceived reality of environmental disclosure and corporate governance. 
It is also argued that the interpretive-functionalist transition zone is the appropriate 
research paradigm that fits with the objective research philosophy and methodological 
position adopted by the current study. Therefore, the deductive approach, also referred 
to as the hypothetico-deductive approach, is considered to be more suitable to the 
present study. Using the survey strategy and employing quantitative methods, the 
research seeks to gather the required data based on a longitudinal time horizon, using 
the research technique of content analysis. 
Consequently, the current study would include two different, but complementary, 
quantitative empirical research analyses. The differentiation is based on the 
phenomenon being analyzed for achieving the research objectives. First, quantitative 
analysis, using content analysis of a sample of UK companies' annual reports, will be 
undertaken to examine the quantity of corporate environmental disclosure practices 
and their association with corporate governance mechanisms, over a period of four 
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years. Second, quantitative analysis, using content analysis of a sample of UK 
companies' annual reports, will be undertaken to examine the quality of corporate 
environmental disclosure practices and their association with corporate governance 
mechanisms, over a period of four years. 
Finally, research design provides a description of the research methods employed, 
while providing substantiation for using the content analysis method in undertaking 
the research. The impact of corporate governance on the quantity and quality of 
corporate environmental disclosure is examined using content analysis method. The 
annual reports of FTSE-All share companies are examined for years 2004-2007 
inclusive. A checklist of environmental disclosure items and categories is developed 
and environmental disclosure indices are computed. In doing so, the study 
distinguishes between the different categories or areas of activity to which 
environmental disclosure relates as well as between the different types of 
environmental information content.  
The research methodology serves as a link between the theoretical perspective and the 
empirical analysis of the research. Based on the adopted theoretical framework, the 
selected methodology portrays the sequential stages through which the empirical 
analysis will progress in the following chapters. In this respect, the next two chapters 
are devoted to empirically examining the relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms and the quantity of corporate environmental disclosure, as well as 
examining the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and the quality 
of corporate environmental disclosure, along with investigating environmental 
disclosure quality identification and assessment issues. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
EXAMINING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
ENVIRONMENTAL DISCLOSURE QUANTITY AND 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
5.1   INTRODUCTION 
Determining the research methodology, deciding on the relevant philosophical 
assumptions and methodological choices, and constructing the appropriate research 
design, portray the necessary steps for proceeding in the empirical study. Based on 
stakeholder-agency theory, the main objectives of the present study is to empirically 
examine the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and the quantity 
and quality of corporate environmental disclosure practices in UK companies' annual 
reports and to provide an in-depth investigation of environmental disclosure quality 
identification and assessment. 
This chapter constitutes the first part of the empirical work aimed at quantitatively 
investigating the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and the 
quantity of corporate environmental disclosure practices in UK companies' annual 
reports. It commences with carrying out some descriptive analyses of the variables of 
interest to measure the quantity of corporate environmental disclosure practices in the 
annual reports and its trend over time. Moreover, correlation analyses are undertaken 
to detect any autocorrelations among variables. Correlation coefficients are also 
intended to attest the construct validity of the disclosure measurement. Using 
regression analysis, the chapter proceeds with testing the hypotheses developed for 
examining the relationship in question, while controlling for corporate characteristics.  
Two models are tested in which the dependent variables are total corporate 
environmental disclosure quantity and the quantity of disclosure within each 
disclosure category. Finally, sensitivity analysis is carried out to check the robustness 
of the main regression analysis. Results are discussed and analyzed in terms of the 
theoretical framework adopted and conclusions are drawn from statistical findings. 
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5.2   EXAMINING THE EXTENT AND TREND OF CORPORATE 
        ENVIRONMENTAL DISCLOSURE QUANTITY 
Corporate environmental disclosure quantity indices provide a measure of the extent 
of total environmental disclosure as well as environmental disclosure within each 
disclosure category. These indices are computed for the four years of the study to 
provide the trend in environmental disclosure practices in the annual reports over 
time. Descriptive statistics are performed to help carry out the required analyses. Data 
are panelled by year, along with data pooling in order to permit thorough analysis of 
total corporate environmental disclosure and each corporate environmental disclosure 
category. The results of the descriptive statistics for each of the yearly panels as well 
as the pooled environmental disclosure quantity are shown in the following tables. 
 
Table 5.1 
Descriptive Statistics Of Environmental Disclosure Quantity Panel A: 2004 
Variable  
Mean 
(Median) 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min. 
(Max.) 
Standard 
Skewness 
Standard 
Kurtosis 
Total Environmental 
Disclosure  
32.47  
(32.35) 
14.91 
0.00 
(70.59) 
-0.15 2.66 
Environmental Policies 
34.14 
(33.33) 
15.38 
0.00    
(75.00) 
0.05 3.13 
Product and Process-
Related Environmental 
Issues 
34.22  
(37.50) 
22.83 
0.00       
(100.00) 
0.22 2.46 
Compliance with 
Environmental Laws 
and Standards 
35.26       
(25.00) 
28.74 
0.00      
(100.00) 
0.37 2.09 
Environmental 
Auditing 
83.41     
(100.00) 
37.28 
0.00       
(100.00) 
-1.80 4.23 
Sustainability 
27.73       
(0.00) 
30.45 
0.00       
(100.00) 
0.61 2.43 
Other Environmentally-
Related Information 
19.84 
(14.29) 
15.61 
0.00    
(71.43) 
0.50 2.76 
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Table 5.1 shows the descriptive statistics of total environmental disclosure quantity 
and the quantity of environmental disclosure within each of the disclosure categories 
for the first panel of data for the year 2004. The overall environmental disclosure 
quantity level represents 32.47% of the examined checklist items, which varies 
between 0% and 70.59% for the lowest and highest UK companies disclosures 
respectively. Moreover, environmental auditing disclosure represents the highest 
disclosure quantity level of 83.41%, while other environmentally-related information 
disclosure represents the lowest disclosure quantity level of 19.84%. This indicates 
that environmental auditing is a dominant category of environmental disclosure that 
most companies in the examined sample agree to disclose.  
In addition, statistics reveal that the maximum disclosure quantity of 100% is 
presented by product and process-related environmental issues, compliance with 
environmental laws and standards, environmental auditing and sustainability. 
However, for all disclosure categories, the minimum disclosure quantity is 0%, which 
means that at least one of the sample companies missed at least one of these 
environmental disclosure categories.  
The descriptive statistics show the normality of environmental disclosure data. It is 
observed that sustainability represents the maximum standard skewness of 0.61, while 
the environmental auditing shows the minimum standard skewness of -1.80. This 
indicates that the minimum and maximum skewness are within the normally 
distributed range of ±1.96 (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). However, the data are 
considered to be normally distributed if the standard kurtosis statistics fall within the 
range of ±3 (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). Accordingly, in terms of the standard 
kurtosis statistics, environmental disclosure data are not normally distributed. 
Particularly, the disclosure categories of environmental policies and environmental 
auditing exceed the range of ±3 indicating that such data are not normally distributed. 
As a consequence, a robust analysis is necessary for any hypotheses test related to the 
entire data.   
 
 
 
 989
Table 5.2 
Descriptive Statistics Of Environmental Disclosure Quantity Panel B: 2005 
Variable  
Mean 
(Median) 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min. 
(Max.) 
Standard 
Skewness 
Standard 
Kurtosis 
Total Environmental 
Disclosure  
35.92  
(35.29) 
13.69 
0.00 
(76.47) 
-0.01 3.08 
Environmental Policies 
36.72 
(33.33) 
14.11 
0.00    
(83.33) 
0.22 3.60 
Product and Process-
Related Environmental 
Issues 
38.21  
(37.50) 
21.69 
0.00       
(100.00) 
0.01 2.44 
Compliance with 
Environmental Laws 
and Standards 
42.47       
(50.00) 
30.27 
0.00      
(100.00) 
0.13 1.98 
Environmental 
Auditing 
89.08     
(100.00) 
31.25 
0.00       
(100.00) 
-2.51 7.28 
Sustainability 
30.79       
(50.00) 
31.10 
0.00       
(100.00) 
0.49 2.35 
Other Environmentally-
Related Information 
22.09 
(14.29) 
15.85 
0.00    
(71.43) 
0.44 2.77 
 
Table 5.2 presents the descriptive statistics of total environmental disclosure quantity 
and the quantity of environmental disclosure within each of the disclosure categories 
for the second panel of data for the year 2005. The results indicate that the mean total 
environmental disclosure quantity level is 35.92%, which is slightly higher than 
previous year's level. Moreover, environmental auditing disclosure represents the 
highest disclosure quantity level of 89.08%, while other environmentally-related 
information disclosure represents the lowest disclosure quantity level of 22.09%.   
Regarding the standard skewness statistics, the presented data are not normally 
distributed. It is observed that the standard skewness of environmental auditing 
disclosure is -2.51 which exceeds the range of ±1.96 evidencing the normality of the 
data (see Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). This result is confirmed by the standard kurtosis 
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statistics, where the standard kurtosis of total environmental disclosure as well as that 
of each of environmental policies and environmental auditing disclosure categories 
exceed the normality range of ±3 (see Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006), indicating that such 
data are not normally distributed.  
 
Table 5.3 
Descriptive Statistics Of Environmental Disclosure Quantity Panel C: 2006 
Variable  
Mean 
(Median) 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min. 
(Max.) 
Standard 
Skewness 
Standard 
Kurtosis 
Total Environmental 
Disclosure  
40.35  
(41.18) 
13.56 
0.00 
(70.59) 
-0.29 3.05 
Environmental Policies 
40.21 
(41.67) 
14.12 
0.00    
(83.33) 
0.07 3.22 
Product and Process-
Related Environmental 
Issues 
44.05  
(50.00) 
21.64 
0.00  
(100.00) 
-0.21 2.49 
Compliance with 
Environmental Laws 
and Standards 
50.98  
(50.00) 
30.29 
0.00      
(100.00) 
-0.09 2.09 
Environmental 
Auditing 
91.70       
(100.00) 
27.64 
0.00       
(100.00) 
-3.02 10.14 
Sustainability 
35.15 
(50.00) 
32.07 
0.00       
(100.00) 
0.36 2.30 
Other Environmentally-
Related Information 
24.46 
(28.57) 
15.74 
0.00    
(71.43) 
0.33 2.64 
 
Table 5.3 shows the descriptive statistics of total environmental disclosure quantity 
and the quantity of environmental disclosure within each of the disclosure categories 
for the third panel of data for the year 2006. The overall environmental disclosure 
quantity level represents 40.35% of the examined checklist items, which is higher 
than the level of the previous two years.  Moreover, environmental auditing disclosure 
represents the highest disclosure quantity level of 91.70%, while other 
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environmentally- related information disclosure represents the lowest disclosure 
quantity level of 24.46%.  
Regarding the standard skewness statistics, the presented data are not normally 
distributed. It is observed that the standard skewness of environmental auditing 
disclosure is -3.02 which exceeds the range of ±1.96 evidencing the normality of the 
data (see Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). This result is confirmed by the standard kurtosis 
statistics, where the standard kurtosis for total environmental disclosure as well as for 
each of environmental policies and environmental auditing disclosure categories 
exceed the normality range of ±3 (see Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006), indicating that such 
data are not normally distributed. As a consequence, a robust analysis is necessary for 
any hypotheses test related to the entire data.      
 
Table 5.4 
Descriptive Statistics Of Environmental Disclosure Quantity Panel D: 2007 
Variable  
Mean 
(Median) 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min. 
(Max.) 
Standard 
Skewness 
Standard 
Kurtosis 
Total Environmental 
Disclosure  
45.03 
(47.06) 
13.90 
2.94 
(76.47) 
-0.28 2.73 
Environmental Policies 
44.25 
(41.67) 
14.44 
0.00    
(91.67) 
0.21 3.19 
Product and Process-
Related Environmental 
Issues 
50.22  
(50.00) 
20.71 
0.00       
(100.00) 
-0.26 2.73 
Compliance with 
Environmental Laws 
and Standards 
55.24  
(50.00) 
29.34 
0.00      
(100.00) 
-0.17 2.10 
Environmental 
Auditing 
92.58 
(100.00) 
26.27 
0.00       
(100.00) 
-3.25 11.55 
Sustainability 
46.07  
(50.00) 
31.86 
0.00       
(100.00) 
0.07 2.45 
Other Environmentally-
Related Information 
27.51 
(28.57) 
16.21 
0.00    
(71.43) 
0.22 2.47 
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Table 5.4 presents the descriptive statistics of total environmental disclosure quantity 
and the quantity of environmental disclosure within each of the disclosure categories 
for the fourth panel of data for the year 2007. The results show that the mean total 
environmental disclosure quantity level is 45.03% of the examined checklist items, 
which varies between 2.94% and 76.47% for the lowest and highest UK companies 
disclosures respectively. This disclosure level is higher than the level of the previous 
three years, indicating an increased awareness of corporate environmental 
responsibility. Moreover, environmental auditing disclosure represents the highest 
disclosure quantity level of 92.58%, while other environmentally-related information 
disclosure represents the lowest disclosure quantity level of 27.51%. This indicates 
that environmental auditing is a dominant category of environmental disclosure that 
most companies in the examined sample agree to disclose. 
In addition, statistics reveal that the maximum disclosure quantity of 100% is 
presented by product and process-related environmental issues, compliance with 
environmental laws and standards, environmental auditing and sustainability. 
However, for all disclosure categories, the minimum disclosure quantity is 0%, which 
means that at least one of the sample companies missed at least one of these 
environmental disclosure categories.  
Regarding the standard skewness statistics, the presented data are not normally 
distributed. It is observed that the standard skewness of environmental auditing 
disclosure is -3.25 which exceeds the range of ±1.96 evidencing the normality of the 
data (see Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). However, the data are considered to be normally 
distributed if the standard kurtosis statistics fall within the range of ±3 (Haniffa and 
Hudaib, 2006). Accordingly, in terms of the standard kurtosis statistics, environmental 
disclosure data are not normally distributed. Particularly, the disclosure categories of 
environmental policies and environmental auditing exceed the range of ±3 indicating 
that such data are not normally distributed. As a consequence, a robust analysis is 
necessary for any hypotheses test related to the entire data.  
 
 
 982
Table 5.5 
Descriptive Statistics Of Pooled Environmental Disclosure Quantity  
Variable  
Mean 
(Median) 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min. 
(Max.) 
Standard 
Skewness 
Standard 
Kurtosis 
Total Environmental 
Disclosure  
38.44 
(38.24) 
         
14.78 
 
0.00  
(76.47) 
   -0.19 2.83 
Environmental Policies 
38.83 
(41.67) 
        
14.99 
 
0.00    
(91.67) 
0.10 3.29 
Product and Process-
Related Environmental 
Issues 
41.68  
(37.50) 
        
22.52 
 
0.00       
(100.00) 
-0.08 2.41 
Compliance with 
Environmental Laws 
and Standards 
45.99  
(50.00) 
        
30.61 
  
0.00      
(100.00) 
0.06 1.99 
Environmental 
Auditing 
89.19 
(100.00) 
       
31.06 
 
0.00       
(100.00) 
-1.5 3.25 
Sustainability 
34.93  
(50.00) 
        
32.09 
 
0.00       
(100.00) 
0.37 2.29 
Other Environmentally-
Related Information 
23.47 
(28.57) 
        
16.09 
 
0.00    
(71.43) 
0.37 2.61 
 
Table 5.5 shows the descriptive statistics of the pooled total environmental disclosure 
quantity and the quantity of environmental disclosure within each of the disclosure 
categories. The overall environmental disclosure quantity level represents 38.44% of 
the examined checklist items. This disclosure level reflects the average increase in the 
environmental disclosure quantity over the period under investigation. Although the 
average environmental disclosure quantity is relatively low, there is an increasing 
trend in the quantity of environmental disclosure practices over the study period. Such 
an increasing trend over time emphasizes the increased awareness of corporate 
environmental responsibility by UK listed companies.  
Moreover, environmental auditing disclosure steadily represents the highest 
disclosure quantity level of 89.19%, indicating that companies are using this sort of 
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disclosure as an effective tool in assuring the credibility of environmental practices 
and, hence, demonstrating environmental commitment and accountability to various 
stakeholders. On the other hand, other environmentally-related disclosure information 
represents the lowest disclosure quantity level of 23.47%. This result can be attributed 
to the nature of this disclosure category that includes environmental information not 
being addressed under any of the other environmental disclosure main categories.  
In addition, the maximum average disclosure quantity is 76.47%, while the minimum 
average disclosure quantity is 0%, indicating a great variation in the quantity of 
environmental disclosure practices among the sample companies. This finding might 
be the effect of examining a wide range of companies with different sizes and varying 
degrees of environmental sensitivity. However, statistics reveal that the maximum 
disclosure quantity of 100% is presented by product and process-related 
environmental issues, compliance with environmental laws and standards, 
environmental auditing and sustainability, which means that at least one company has 
disclosed all the expected environmental disclosure items within these categories. On 
the contrary, for all disclosure categories, the minimum disclosure quantity is 0%, 
which means that at least one of the sample companies missed disclosing any 
information about at least one of these environmental disclosure categories.  
The descriptive statistics show the normality of environmental disclosure data. It is 
observed that both sustainability and other environmentally- related information 
disclosure represent the maximum standard skewness of 0.37, while the 
environmental auditing shows the minimum standard skewness of -1.5. This indicates 
that the minimum and maximum skewness are within the normally distributed range 
of ±1.96 (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). However, the data are considered to be 
normally distributed if the standard kurtosis statistics fall within the range of ±3 
(Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006).  Accordingly, in terms of the standard kurtosis statistics, 
environmental disclosure data are not normally distributed. Particularly, the disclosure 
categories of environmental policies and environmental auditing exceed the range of 
±3 indicating that such data are not normally distributed. As a consequence, a robust 
analysis is necessary for testing research hypotheses related to the entire data.   
The extent and trend of corporate environmental disclosure quantity are portrayed in 
Figure 5.1.  
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Figure 5.1 
Extent And Trend Of Corporate Environmental Disclosure Quantity 
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Figure 5.1 depicts the extent of total corporate environmental disclosure quantity in 
each of the sample years, 2004-2007 inclusive. It also shows the trend in the quantity 
of such disclosure over time. Although the average environmental disclosure quantity 
is relatively low, there is an increasing trend in the quantity of environmental 
disclosure practices over the study period, where the mean environmental disclosure 
quantity is 32.47%, 35.92%, 40.35% and 45.03% for each of the four years 
respectively. Such an increasing trend over time emphasizes the increased awareness 
of corporate environmental responsibility by UK listed companies. This increase is 
associated with the general increase in corporate reporting as guided by the 
recommendations set by professional accounting bodies and standard setters such as 
Global Reporting Initiative (GRI). In addition, increased corporate environmental 
responsibility can be attributed to the adoption of the relevant codes of best practice 
following the issuance of the Combined Code (2003) of corporate governance in the 
UK.  
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Using a pie chart, the distribution of the total environmental disclosure quantity over 
the sample years is displayed in Figure 5.2, while the distribution of the total 
environmental disclosure quantity over the different disclosure categories is 
represented in Figure 5.3.       
 
Figure 5.2 
Distribution Of Total Environmental Disclosure Quantity Over Years  
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Figure 5.2 displays total corporate environmental disclosure quantity distributed over 
the sample years, 2004-2007 inclusive. It shows the contribution made by each year 
towards the average quantity of such disclosure. The figure also confirms the 
increasing trend in the quantity of corporate environmental disclosure over the years, 
where 2004 has the smallest share, followed by 2005 and then 2006, with 2007 
accounting for the greatest quantity contribution towards total disclosure quantity. 
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Figure 5.3 
Distribution Of Total Environmental Disclosure Quantity Over Categories 
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Figure 5.3 portrays total corporate environmental disclosure quantity distributed over 
the different environmental disclosure categories. It shows the contribution made by 
each category towards the average quantity of such disclosure.  The pie chart indicates 
that the greatest quantity component of corporate environmental disclosure is 
environmental auditing disclosure, representing 32.54% of the total disclosure 
quantity. The result reveals that companies are using this sort of disclosure as an 
effective tool in assuring the credibility of environmental practices and, hence, 
demonstrating environmental commitment and accountability to various stakeholders.  
On the other hand, other environmentally-related information disclosure represents 
the smallest quantity component of corporate environmental disclosure with a share of 
8.564% out of the total disclosure quantity. This result can be attributed to the nature 
of this disclosure category that includes environmental information not being 
addressed under any of the other environmental disclosure main categories.  
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5.3   EXAMINING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ENVIRONMENTAL 
        DISCLOSURE QUANTITY AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE  
This section is aimed at investigating the relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms and the quantity of corporate environmental disclosure practices in UK 
companies' annual reports. Corporate governance mechanisms are classified into the 
following three groups: (1) Board Characteristics: board independence, role duality, 
board size, board meetings, directors' qualifications and experience including 
educational background, community influence and cross-directorships; (2) Board 
Committees Characteristics: the presence of corporate environmental responsibility 
(CER) committee or responsible, audit committee independence, remuneration 
committee independence, nomination committee independence; and (3) Ownership 
Structure: ownership concentration, institutional ownership. In addition, the study 
controls for some corporate characteristics including company size, industry, 
profitability, leverage, liquidity, systematic risk, and cross-listing. 
The section starts with some descriptive statistics of corporate governance 
mechanisms and corporate characteristics. Correlation analyses are then undertaken to 
detect any autocorrelations among variables. Different regression analyses are carried 
out to test the validity of the developed hypotheses in examining the relationship in 
question. Two models are tested in which the dependent variables are total corporate 
environmental disclosure quantity and the quantity of disclosure within each category. 
Finally, sensitivity analysis is carried out to check the robustness of the main 
regression analysis. Results are discussed and analyzed in terms of the theoretical 
framework adopted and conclusions are drawn from statistical findings. 
 
5.3.1   Descriptive Statistics  
Descriptive statistics are performed for each of corporate governance mechanisms and 
corporate characteristics. The results of the descriptive statistics are shown in the 
following tables. 
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Table 5.6 
Descriptive Statistics Of Corporate Governance Mechanisms  
Variable  
Mean 
(Median) 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min. 
(Max.) 
Standard 
Skewness 
Standard 
Kurtosis 
Board Independence  
46.73 
(50.00) 
         
11.25 
 
 
0.00  
(100.00) 
   -0.10 3.82 
Role Duality 
0.04 
(0.00) 
0.19 
0.00    
(1.00) 
4.82 24.21 
Board Size 
8.96 
(8.00) 
          
2.65 
 
 
4.00       
(21.00) 
0.96 4.12 
Board Meetings 
8.91 
(8.00) 
          
3.04 
 
  
3.00      
(44.00) 
2.72 24.67 
Education 
41.79 
(40.00) 
         
17.59 
 
 
0.00    
(100.00) 
0.50 3.31 
Community Influence 
69.59  
(71.43) 
        
23.86 
 
 
0.00       
(100.00) 
-0.60 2.53 
Cross-directorships 
66.88 
(67.95) 
        
21.53 
 
  
0.00      
(100.00) 
-0.41 2.61 
Corporate Environmental 
Responsibility (CER) 
Committee Presence 
0.63 
(1.00) 
         
0.48 
 
 
0.00       
(1.00) 
-0.56 1.31 
Audit Committee 
Independence 
96.19  
(100.00) 
        
12.49 
 
 
0.00       
(100.00) 
-3.81 18.94 
Remuneration Committee 
Independence 
93.34 
(100.00) 
        
15.16 
 
 
0.00    
(100.00) 
-2.97 14.18 
Nomination Committee 
Independence 
72.51 
(71.43) 
        
17.05 
 
 
0.00  
(100.00) 
-0.24 3.52 
Ownership Concentration 
37.66  
(34.79) 
        
20.18 
 
 
0.00       
(98.61) 
0.54 2.88 
Institutional Ownership 
32.59 
(29.54) 
        
18.98 
 
 
0.00    
(98.61) 
0.78 3.33 
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Table 5.6 shows the descriptive statistics of the different corporate governance 
mechanisms examined in explaining the variability in the quantity of corporate 
environmental disclosure practices. The mean board independence is 46.73%, 
indicating that approximately half of the directors are independent non-executive, 
which is in line with UK Corporate Governance Code (2010). The mean role duality 
is 0.04, reflecting compliance by the majority of the sample companies with the 
corporate governance principle of separating the CEO and chairman roles. However, 
the average board size is 8.96, being similar to that found in the Pensions and 
Investment Research Consultants (PIRC, 1998) survey of UK FTSE 350 companies of 
9.80, revealing that large board size has been traditional practice in UK companies 
over time. The average board meetings is 8.91 per year, while the mean directors' 
qualifications and experience vary between 41.79% for education, 69.59% for 
community influence, and 66.88% for cross-directorships.  
With respect to board committees, the mean presence of a CER committee on the 
board is 0.63, indicating that the majority of the sample companies support the 
formation of such committees, which in turn highlights the emphasis placed by UK 
companies on environmental issues. Moreover, the mean independence is 96.19%, 
93.34%, and 72.51% for each of the audit, remuneration, and nomination committees 
respectively, revealing the relatively high degree of independence within board 
committees. Regarding ownership structure, it can be observed that the mean 
ownership concentration and mean institutional ownership are quite close (37.66 and 
32.59 respectively), reflecting the fact that institutional ownership constitute the major 
and dominant form of blockholdings.  
These results are considered to be reasonable following the issuance of the Combined 
Code (2003) of corporate governance in the UK. It may be worth mentioning that 
although the code is voluntary, in that it provides only guidelines of best practice of 
corporate governance, London Stock Exchange listing rules require companies to 
adhere to corporate governance principals. UK listed companies follow the Combined 
Code's (2003) rule of “comply or explain”, with small companies having an excuse 
for noncompliance if adherence is infeasible or impractical. This is particularly true 
given the wide variation in most corporate governance mechanisms, ranging from a 
minimum of 0 to a maximum of 100%. Such great variation can also be attributed to 
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the unfamiliarity by some companies with the adequate application of the principles 
of the newly issued code succeeding the period under investigation.  
Regarding the standard skewness statistics, the presented data are not normally 
distributed. It is observed that the standard skewness of each of role duality, board 
meetings, audit committee independence and remuneration committee independence 
exceeds the range of ±1.96 evidencing that the normality of the data (see Haniffa and 
Hudaib, 2006). This result is confirmed by the standard kurtosis statistics, where the 
standard kurtosis for most of the corporate governance mechanisms exceed the 
normality range of ±3 (see Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006), indicating that such data are 
not normally distributed. As a consequence, a robust analysis is necessary for any 
hypotheses test related to the entire data.    
 
Table 5.7 
Descriptive Statistics Of Corporate Characteristics  
Variable  
Mean 
(Median) 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min. 
(Max.) 
Standard 
Skewness 
Standard 
Kurtosis 
Size  
5.91 
(5.82) 
           
0.74 
 
4.30  
(8.16) 
           
0.44 
 
2.82 
Industry 
0.36 
(0.00) 
          
0.48 
 
 
0.00  
(1.00) 
0.59 1.35 
Profitability  
0.87  
(0.91) 
          
0.35 
 
 
-2.00       
(1.84) 
-1.70 11.76 
Leverage 
1.17  
(1.34) 
          
0.58 
 
  
-1.70 
(2.12) 
-2.05 7.99 
Liquidity 
1.54 
(1.26) 
          
1.94 
 
 
0.00       
(50.00) 
17.75 430.14 
Systematic Risk 
1.00  
(0.99) 
          
0.35 
 
 
0.02       
(2.19) 
0.24 3.03 
Cross-Listing 
0.11 
(0.00) 
          
0.31 
 
 
0.00    
(1.00) 
2.51 7.28 
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Table 5.7 shows the descriptive statistics of the different corporate characteristics 
being controlled for. It can be observed that the sample companies are approximately 
divided equally between large and small companies (a mean of 5.91 between a 
minimum of 4.30 and a maximum of 8.16). However, the majority of the sample 
companies are operating in industries with lower environmental sensitivity (a mean of 
0.36 between a minimum of 0.00 and a maximum of 1.00). There appears to be a wide 
variation between the maximum and minimum values among most of the company's 
attributes. This result is expected reflecting the impact of examining a wide range of 
companies with different size, varying degrees of environmental sensitivity, and 
various levels of profitability, leverage, liquidity, systematic risk, as well as different 
listing status. Liquidity has the greatest variation ranging from 0% to 50%. Therefore 
these variables are highly skewed, indicating the lack of normality in distribution. 
Particularly, leverage, liquidity and cross- listing exceeds the normality range of 
±1.96. In addition, the standard kurtosis for almost all corporate characteristics, with 
the exception of size and industry, exceed the normality range of ±3 (see Haniffa and 
Hudaib, 2006), indicating that such data are not normally distributed. Accordingly, 
more attention is required in the analysis of such non-parametric data and 
interpretation of the results.  
 
5.3.2   Correlation Analysis 
Correlation analysis is carried out to detect any autocorrelation between corporate 
environmental disclosure quantity and each of the different corporate governance 
mechanisms and corporate characteristics. Such bivariate analysis is undertaken using 
Pearson correlation and Spearman's Rank correlation. Both parametric and non 
parametric tests are used to examine the required relationships in order to allow for 
the non normality for some of the variables in question. In addition, correlation 
coefficients are also intended to attest the construct validity of the disclosure 
measurement and to check for multicollinearity. Pearson and Spearman's Rank 
correlation coefficients for the association between each of the total corporate 
environmental disclosure quantity and the quantity of disclosure within each category 
and all corporate governance and corporate characteristics included in the analysis are 
shown in the following tables. 
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Table 5.8 
Pearson Correlations Of Environmental Disclosure Quantity to Corporate Governance Mechanisms And Corporate Characteristics 
 TED EP PPEI CELS EA S OEI BI RD BS BM E CI CD CERP ACI RCI NCI OC IO SZ IND PRO LEV LIQ SR CL 
TED 1                           
EP 0.8441* 1                          
PPEI 0.7941* 0.5374* 1                         
CELS 0.6736* 0.4780* 0.4029* 1                        
EA 0.4496* 0.3428* 0.2755* 0.2417* 1                       
S 0.5364* 0.3996* 0.3197* 0.2110* 0.2641* 1                      
OEI 0.6786* 0.4768* 0.3853* 0.3199* 0.3270* 0.3697* 1                     
BI 0.1138* 0.0939* 0.0800* 0.0116 0.1037* 0.2324* 0.0569 1                    
RD -
0.1786* 
-
0.1460* 
-
0.0971* 
-
0.1042* 
-
0.1140* 
-
0.1283* 
-
0.1898* 
0.0149 1                   
BS 0.1296* 0.1694* 0.0096 -0.0109 0.1420* 0.2557* 0.1189* 0.1565* -
0.0679* 
1                  
BM 0.0436 0.0071 -0.0127 0.048 0.0479 0.0585 0.1042* 0.0175 0.0153 -
0.1317* 
1                 
E -0.007 0.0247 -0.0193 -0.0064 
-
0.1387* 
0.0066 -0.0012 0.1369* 
-
0.0852* 
-
0.2652* 
0.0287 1                
CI 0.0048 0.0559 -0.0277 -0.0354 -0.0158 0.0956* -0.0314 0.1404* -0.0006 -0.0345 0.0041 0.2218* 1               
CD 0.2086* 0.2135* 0.0719* 0.1174* 0.2380* 0.2930* 0.1105* 0.4310* -
0.2145* 
0.3368* -0.0551 -
0.0719* 
0.0809* 1              
CERP 0.3014* 0.2294* 0.2328* 0.1357* 0.3197* 0.2052* 0.2506* 0.0964* -
0.0970* 
0.1995* -
0.0732* 
-0.0335 0.034 0.2309* 1             
ACI 0.1486* 0.1073* 0.1382* 0.0693* 0.0834* 0.1421* 0.0903* 0.3994* 
-
0.0760* 
-0.0297 -0.027 0.1595* 0.05 0.0604 0.0542 1            
RCI 0.0563 0.0318 0.0477 0.0255 0.0519 0.051 0.0515 0.3264* -0.0251 -0.064 0.0133 0.1557* 0.0719* 0.0229 -0.0002 0.7453* 1           
NCI -0.0044 -0.0098 -0.0092 -0.0225 0.0475 0.0253 0.0166 0.3052* -0.0266 -0.0635 0.0068 0.1506* 0.0436 0.039 0.0235 0.4150* 0.4345* 1          
OC 
-
0.2396* 
-
0.1956* 
-
0.1272* 
-
0.1587* 
-
0.1475* 
-
0.2449* 
-
0.1973* 
-
0.2789* 
0.1235* 
-
0.2332* 
0.0053 0.0189 -0.0188 
-
0.2311* 
-
0.1482* 
-
0.2627* 
-
0.2301* 
0.0372 1         
IO 
-
0.1318* 
-
0.0903* 
-
0.1006* 
-
0.1073* 
-
0.0895* 
-
0.1371* 
-0.0614 
-
0.1506* 
-0.0504 
-
0.1128* 
0.0069 0.0176 -0.0546 
-
0.0758* 
-
0.0877* 
-
0.2123* 
-
0.2041* 
0.0297 0.8384* 1        
SZ 0.2960* 0.3164* 0.1209* 0.0868* 0.2416* 0.3966* 0.2356* 0.4072* -
0.1199* 
0.6647* -0.0519 -
0.1386* 
0.0222 0.4817* 0.2537* 0.1353* 0.0285 -0.009 -
0.4584* 
-
0.3314* 
1       
IND 0.1690* 0.2049* 0.0473 0.1426* 0.0840* 0.0846* 0.1196* 0.0061 0.0174 0.0473 -
0.1062* 
-0.0403 -0.0061 0.0327 0.0943* 0.0498 0.0813* -0.0456 -
0.1252* 
-
0.0696* 
0.0401 1      
PRO 0.0666 0.045 0.0504 0.0341 0.0322 0.0593 0.0638 0.0193 -0.0324 0.0629 -0.0489 -0.0106 0.0764* -0.0492 0.0978* 0.0288 0.0469 -0.0467 -0.052 
-
0.0750* 
-0.001 0.0445 1     
LEV 0.1301* 0.1927* 0.0289 0.001 0.1236* 0.0955* 0.1300* 0.0755* -.0713* 0.1806* -0.0208 0.0166 -0.0153 0.1319* 0.0974* 0.0720* 0.0002 0.0141 -.0964* -0.0387 0.2922* -.0951* -.0845* 1    
LIQ -0.035 -.0703* -0.0077 0.0750* -0.0147 -0.0184 -.0986* -0.0452 0.0272 -0.0605 -0.0572 0.033 -0.0142 -0.0521 -.0828* 0.0293 0.0476 -0.0053 -0.0229 -0.0372 -.1502* 0.0800* 0.1021* -.3231* 1   
SR 0.1051* 0.1146* 0.0291 0.1120* -0.0023 0.0231 0.1015* 0.0251 -0.0263 0.0125 -0.0336 0.0613 -.1455* 0.0652* 0.056 0.0179 0.003 -
0.0816* 
-0.0284 0.063 0.0978* 0.2084* -0.0373 0.0856* -
0.0483 
1  
CL -0.0496 -0.0155 -0.0455 -.0857* -0.036 0.0771* -0.0631 0.0989* -.0698* 0.2982* -0.0442 0.0234 0.0316 0.1627* 0.0114 0.0003 0.0038 0.0587 -0.0186 -0.0424 0.2363* -0.057 -0.0043 0.049 -0.019 
-
0.0586 
1 
* Significance at confidence level of 95%. TED Total Environmental Disclosure, EP Environmental Policies, PPEI Product and Process-Related Environmental Issues, CELS Compliance with Environmental Laws and Standards, EA Environmental Auditing, S Sustainabili ty , OEI Other 
Environmentally-Related Information, BI Board Independence, RD Role Duality , BS Board Size, BM Board Meetings, E Education, CI Community  Influence, CD Cross-Directorships, CERP Corporate Environmental Responsibility  (CER) Committee Presence, ACI Audit Committee 
Independence, RCI Remuneration Committee Independence, NCI Nomination Committee Independence, OC Ownership concentration, IO Institutional Ownership, SZ Size, IND Industry , PRO Profitability , LEV Leverage, LIQ Liquidity , SR Systematic Risk, CL Cross-Listing.  
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Table 5.9 
Spearman Correlations Of Environmental Disclosure Quantity to Corporate Governance Mechanisms And Corporate Characteristics  
 TED EP PPEI CELS EA S OEI BI RD BS BM E CI CD CERP ACI RCI NCI OC IO SZ IND PRO LEV LIQ SR CL 
TED 1                           
EP 0.8275* 1                          
PPEI 0.7990* 0.5406* 1                         
CELS 0.6566* 0.4629* 0.3891* 1                        
EA 0.3340* 0.2493* 0.2140* 0.1860* 1                       
S 0.5297* 0.3889* 0.3462* 0.1750* 0.2271* 1                      
OEI 0.6533* 0.4366* 0.3860* 0.3090* 0.2777* 0.3460* 1                     
BI 0.1392* 0.1396* 0.0725* 0.0155 0.1288* 0.2387* 0.0521 1                    
RD -
0.1895* 
-
0.1573* 
-
0.1509* 
-
0.1250* 
-
0.1404* 
-
0.1382* 
-
0.1898* 
0.0163 1                   
BS 0.1003* 0.1089* 0.0155 -0.039 0.1319* 0.2395* 0.1136* 0.2178* -0.0442 1                  
BM 0.0292 0.0053 -0.0104 0.0665 0.0329 0.0061 0.0614 0.0419 -0.0103 -
0.1149* 
1                 
E 0.1072* 0.1221* 0.0861* 0.0498 -0.0448 0.0605 0.0710* 0.1117* 
-
0.0788* 
-
0.2450* 
0.0322 1                
CI 0.0594 0.0871* 0.0204 0.0113 0.0355 0.1182* 0.0073 0.1699* -
0.0828* 
-0.0328 -0.007 0.2201* 1               
CD 0.1981* 0.2214* 0.0597 0.0876* 0.2390* 0.3275* 0.0873* 0.4743* -
0.1946* 
0.3132* -0.0334 -0.0126 0.1503* 1              
CERP 0.2461* 0.1589* 0.2134* 0.1003* 0.2640* 0.2003* 0.2334* 0.1270* -
0.1285* 
0.1828* -0.0142 0.0546 0.0645 0.2241* 1             
ACI 0.1677* 0.1125* 0.1510* 0.0602 0.0967* 0.1641* 0.1180* 0.3187* -0.0538 0.0046 0.0206 0.1225* 0.034 0.0373 0.0576 1            
RCI 0.0584 0.0434 0.0321 0.0227 0.0647 0.0342 0.0547 0.2211* -0.0024 -0.0123 0.043 0.0927* 0.0777* 0.0087 0.0017 0.5694* 1           
NCI -0.0239 -0.0314 -0.0164 -0.0211 0.0341 0.0311 0.0045 0.2653* -0.0664 -0.0025 0.0571 0.0979* 0.0109 0.0750* 0.0533 0.3194* 0.3476* 1          
OC 
-
0.2429* 
-
0.1772* 
-
0.1556* 
-
0.1266* 
-
0.0958* 
-
0.2520* 
-
0.1776* 
-
0.2733* 
0.0774* 
-
0.3061* 
-
0.0993* 
0.0022 
-
0.0844* 
-
0.2211* 
-
0.1330* 
-
0.1934* 
-
0.1616* 
0.0248 1         
IO 
-
0.1457* 
-
0.0828* 
-
0.1282* 
-
0.0882* 
-0.0678 
-
0.1664* 
-0.0504 
-
0.1368* 
-0.0137 
-
0.1873* 
-
0.0763* 
0.0285 
-
0.0753* 
-
0.0999* 
-
0.0714* 
-
0.1420* 
-
0.1409* 
 
0.0162 0.8451* 1        
SZ 0.2498* 0.2555* 0.1133* 0.0244 0.1989* 0.3992* 0.2006* 0.4464* -
0.1021* 
0.6364* -0.0311 -
0.0780* 
0.0541 0.5114* 0.2236* 0.1606* 0.0452 0.0366 -
0.4979* 
-
0.3742* 
1       
IND 0.1955* 0.1895* 0.0688 0.1618* 0.0719* 0.0891* 0.1586* 0.0041 0.0156 0.0629 -
0.0897* 
-0.0458 -0.0234 0.0192 0.0950* 0.0237 0.0538 -
0.0812* 
-
0.1342* 
-0.0663 0.0447 1      
PRO 0.0576 0.0457 0.0268 0.0133 -0.0109 0.0722* 0.0402 0.0255 -0.0383 0.058 -0.037 0.0046 0.0651 -0.0219 0.1027* 0.0224 0.019 
-
0.1092* 
-0.0404 -0.0228 -0.0081 0.1031* 1     
LEV 0.0770* 0.1113* 0.01 -0.0096 0.1366* 0.0777* 0.1401* 0.0577 -0.0666 0.1953* -0.0419 0.017 -
0.0767* 
0.1505* 0.1040* 0.0656 -0.0246 -0.0235 -
0.1543* 
-
0.0919* 
0.3184* -
0.1163* 
-
0.1160* 
1    
LIQ 0.0771* 0.0223 0.0314 0.2429* -0.0444 -
0.1091* 
-0.012 -
0.0826* 
-0.009 -
0.2006* 
-
0.0929* 
0.0177 -0.04 -
0.1183* 
-
0.0778* 
0.0096 0.0384 -
0.1094* 
0.0158 0.0554 -
0.2444* 
0.2698* 0.1400* -
0.3146* 
1   
SR 0.0989* 0.0915* 0.0335 0.0772* -0.0248 0.0055 0.1015* -0.0277 -0.0075 -0.0053 0.0271 0.1169* -
0.1266* 
-0.0339 0.0297 0.0212 0.0175 -
0.0955* 
0.0098 0.0775* 0.0482 0.1936* -0.0154 0.0234 0.0991* 1  
CL -0.0084 0.0264 -0.0256 -0.0471 0.0442 0.1266* -0.0344 0.1301* -0.0583 0.2664* 
-
0.0747* 
-0.0181 0.0201 0.2304* 0.0374 -0.0131 0.029 0.1048* -0.0342 -0.0539 0.2565* -0.0167 -0.0149 -0.0011 
-
0.1536* 
-
0.0407 
1 
* Significance at confidence level of 95%. TED Total Environmental Disclosure, EP Environmental Policies, PPEI Product and Process-Related Environmental Issues, CELS Compliance with Environmental Laws and Standards, EA Environmental Auditing, S Sustainabili ty , OEI Other 
Environmentally-Related Information, BI Board Independence, RD Role Duality , BS Board Size, BM Board Meetings, E Education, CI Community  Influence, CD Cross-Directorships, CERP Corporate Environmental Responsibility  (CER) Committee Presence, ACI Audit Committee 
Independence, RCI Remuneration Committee Independence, NCI Nomination Committee Independence, OC Ownership concentration, IO Institutional Ownership, SZ Size, IND Industry , PRO Profitability , LEV Leverage, LIQ Liquidity , SR Systematic Risk, CL Cross-Listing.  
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Table 5.8 presents a Pearson correlation matrix for the variables included in the 
analysis. Pearson correlation coefficients show association of each of the total 
corporate environmental disclosure quantity and the quantity of disclosure within each 
category to all corporate governance and corporate characteristics included in the 
analysis. The significant association is identified at confidence level of 95%. Results 
indicate that at this level of environmental disclosure quantity there is a significant 
association between total environmental disclosure quantity and most corporate 
governance characteristics, including board independence, role duality, board size, 
cross-directorships, corporate environmental responsibility (CER) committee 
presence, audit committee independence, ownership concentration and institutional 
ownership. Referred to the correlation coefficients, there is a positive relationship 
between total environmental disclosure quantity and each of board independence, 
board size, cross-directorships, corporate environmental responsibility (CER) 
committee presence and audit committee independence, while there is a negative 
relationship between total environmental disclosure quantity and each of role duality, 
ownership concentration and institutional ownership. Most of these results are in 
agreement with research hypotheses regarding the association between total 
environmental disclosure quantity and the different corporate governance 
mechanisms. 
Regarding the different categories of environmental disclosure, there is a s ignificant 
positive relationship between board independence and disclosure quantity of each of 
environmental policies, product and process-related environmental issues, 
environmental auditing and sustainability. There is a consistently significant negative 
relationship between role duality and disclosure quantity of each of the disclosure 
categories. Board size is significantly and positively associated with disclosure 
quantity of each of environmental policies, environmental auditing, sustainability and 
other environmentally-related information. Board meetings is associated with only 
other environmentally-related information quantity and directors' education is 
associated with only environmental auditing disclosure quantity, while community 
influential directors is correlated to only sustainability disclosure quantity. However, 
cross-directorships have a persistent significant and positive relationship to disclosure 
quantity of each of the disclosure categories. Similarly, corporate environmental 
responsibility (CER) committee presence and audit committee independence are 
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significantly and positively associated with disclosure quantity of each of 
environmental disclosure categories. Finally, ownership structure including both 
ownership concentration and institutional ownership are significantly and negatively 
associated with disclosure quantity of each of the disclosure categories.  
Results also reveal a significant positive relationship between total environmental 
disclosure quantity and corporate characteristics including company size, industry, 
leverage and systematic risk. No significant relationship is detected between total 
environmental disclosure quantity and each of profitability, liquidity and cross-listing. 
With respect to environmental disclosure categories, the results confirmed the 
significant positive association of both company size and industry with disclosure 
quantity of almost all disclosure categories. However, for the other corporate 
characteristics including leverage, liquidity, systematic risk and cross- listing, the 
results are partially supported for some of the disclosure categories. Nevertheless, the 
insignificant relationship of profitability to disclosure quantity is consistently 
confirmed for all environmental disclosure categories.  
Table 5.9 presents a Spearman correlation matrix for the variables included in the 
analysis. Spearman's rank correlation coefficients show association of each of the 
total corporate environmental disclosure quantity and the quantity of disclosure within 
each category to all corporate governance and corporate characteristics included in the 
analysis. The significant association is identified at confidence level of 95%. Results 
for total corporate environmental disclosure quantity strongly support the findings of 
the Pearson test regarding all corporate governance variables, except for directors' 
education, which was found to be significantly and positively associated with total 
disclosure quantity. Moreover, concerning the different categories of environmental 
disclosure, Spearman coefficients show consistent results with Pearson correlations of 
almost all corporate governance variables, including board independence, role duality, 
board size, cross-directorships, corporate environmental responsibility (CER) 
committee presence, audit committee independence, ownership concentration and 
institutional ownership, to disclosure quantity of most of the disclosure categories. 
However, board meetings have no significant relationship to disclosure quantity of 
any of the categories, while directors' education was found to be associated with 
disclosure quantity of each of environmental policies, product and process-related 
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environmental issues and other environmentally-related information. Community 
influential directors are correlated to disclosure quantity of environmental policies in 
addition to sustainability. Most of these results are in agreement with research 
hypotheses regarding the association between environmental disclosure quantity and 
the different corporate governance mechanisms. 
Spearman coefficients also support the results of the Pearson test regarding almost all 
corporate characteristics, revealing a significant positive relationship between total 
environmental disclosure quantity and each of company size, industry, leverage and 
systematic risk, and insignificant relationship with each of profitability and cross-
listing. However, unlike Pearson coefficients, liquidity appeared to have significant 
positive association with total disclosure quantity. With respect to environmental 
disclosure categories, the results confirmed the significant positive association of both 
company size and industry with disclosure quantity of almost all disclosure 
categories. However, for the other corporate characteristics including profitability, 
leverage, liquidity, systematic risk and cross-listing, the results are partially supported 
for some of the disclosure categories. 
 
5.3.2.1   Construct Validity  
Construct validity of the disclosure measurement focuses on consistency with 
theoretical expectations and evidence from literature. Correlation analysis is 
suggested as a means by which construct validity can be established (Sekaran, 2003). 
Correlation coefficients have been used in prior disclosure studies to assess the 
validity of disclosure scores (see Ahmed and Courtis, 1999; Botosan, 1997; Cheng 
and Courtenay, 2006). Using correlation analysis, two tests are performed to check 
the construct validity of the disclosure indices. Primarily, correlation between the 
disclosure index and its component indices has been employed. In addition, 
correlation between disclosure indices and significant explanatory variables identified 
in prior studies has been used to validate the disclosure index (see Ahmed and 
Courtis, 1999; Botosan, 1997). 
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Following these studies, correlation analysis of the total environmental disclosure 
quantity index and its component indices of environmental disclosure categories was 
conducted. The results of Pearson correlation and Spearman's rank correlation are 
shown in Table 5.8 and Table 5.9 respectively. Both Pearson and Spearman 
correlation coefficients show that the disclosure quantity indices of all environmental 
disclosure categories are highly correlated to the total environmental disclosure 
quantity index. This indicates how well the classification or grouping scheme 
interprets the total score. Moreover, it is expected that a company's disclosure 
strategies are similar as to the different categories of disclosure (Botosan, 1997; 
Cheng and Courtenay, 2006). In this respect, the results also reveal that the quantity 
indices of the different environmental disclosure categories are correlated to each 
other.  
In addition, two corporate characteristics documented by prior disclosure studies to be 
key determinants in explaining the variation in disclosure practices are company size 
and industry. Therefore, the correlation between the quantity indices of each of total 
environmental disclosure and its categories and each of company size and industry is 
investigated. Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients indicate that total 
environmental disclosure quantity index is correlated to each of the two corporate 
characteristics. Results also show that disclosure quantity indices of almost all 
environmental disclosure categories are correlated to each of company size and 
industry (see Table 5.8 and Table 5.9 respectively). Taken together the results confirm 
that disclosure quantity indices have a considerable degree of validity in that they 
consistently capture the quantity of environmental disclosure practices in the annual 
reports.    
 
5.3.2.2   Multicollinearity Check 
Multicollinearity implies the existence of a linear relationship between two or more 
explanatory variables. Multicollinearity makes it difficult to differentiate the 
individual effects of the explanatory variables and regression estimators may be 
biased in that they tend to have large variances (Murray, 2006). Furthermore, if there 
is a perfect linear relationship among the explanatory variables, the estimates for a 
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regression model cannot be uniquely computed. The possible existence of 
multicollinearity is tested based on the correlation matrix incorporating all the 
independent and control variables. Both Pearson and Spearman's rank correlation 
matrices show that correlation coefficients are less than 0.8, the limit or cut off 
correlation percentage commonly suggested by prior studies after which 
multicollinearity is likely to exist (see Gujarati, 2003). These results suggest that there 
is no need to be concerned about the correlation of either the independent variables to 
each other, the control variables to each other, or the independent variables to the 
control variables.  
An exception is the coefficient of correlation between the two independent variables 
representing ownership structure. Specifically, there is a slight multicollinearity 
between ownership concentration and institutional ownership, where Pearson and 
Spearman correlation coefficients are 0.8384 and 0.8160 respectively (see Table 5.8 
and Table 5.9). This result is expected given that institutional ownership constitutes 
the major and dominant form of blockholdings. However, as such multicollinearity is 
only slightly in excess of the optimal limit, results indicate that multicollinearity is 
unlikely to be a potential problem. Nevertheless, the statistical effect of including both 
ownership concentration and institutional ownership in the same regression model 
will be further examined. 
The possible existence of multicollinearity is further tested through computing the 
variance inflation factor (VIF). According to Gujarati (2003), there is no problem if 
the VIF is less than 10 and the tolerance coefficient is greater than 0.10. Table 5.10 
presents the variance inflation factor (VIF) and tolerance coefficients of each of the 
explanatory variable. The table shows that the highest VIF is 5.21 and the mean VIF 
is 1.91. Moreover, the lowest tolerance coefficient is 0.192. Therefore, the results of 
VIF and tolerance coefficients indicate that there is no unacceptable level of 
multicollinearity among the current study's variables, confirming that there is no need 
to be concerned about the correlation between the explanatory variables.   
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Table 5.10  
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) Of Corporate Governance Mechanisms And 
Corporate Characteristics 
Variable  VIF Tolerance  1/VIF 
Ownership Concentration 5.21 0.192 
Institutional Ownership 4.57 0.219 
Size  2.99 0.335 
Audit Committee Independence  2.72 0.368 
Remuneration Committee Independence  2.58 0.388 
Board Size 2.23 0.448 
Board Independence 1.94 0.517 
Cross-directorships 1.63 0.614 
Nomination Committee Independence 1.47 0.682 
Liquidity  1.28 0.783 
Leverage 1.25 0.802 
Education 1.24 0.808 
Cross-Listing 1.22 0.823 
Role Duality 1.20 0.836 
Industry 1.18 0.847 
Systematic Risk 1.13 0.883 
Corporate Environmental Responsibility 
(CER) Committee Presence 
1.13 0.886 
Community Influence 1.13 0.887 
Profitability 1.09 0.916 
Board Meetings 1.08 0.927 
Mean VIF 1.91 
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5.3.3   Regression Analysis 
Multiple regression analysis using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) longitudinal panel 
regression with robust standard error is employed to test the developed research 
hypotheses. Such multivariate analysis is undertaken to examine the relationship 
between corporate environmental disclosure quantity and each of the different 
corporate governance mechanisms after controlling for corporate characteristics. Two 
models are tested in which the dependent variables are total corporate environmental 
disclosure quantity and the quantity of disclosure within each disclosure category. 
In addition, Generalized Least Squares (GLS) regression is performed to further test 
the research hypotheses and to attest the reliability of the main OLS regression results.  
GLS takes into consideration that the variances of the observations might be unequal 
and/or there might be a certain degree of correlation between the observations. 
Finally, sensitivity analysis using pooled cross-sectional Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) regression with robust standard error is carried out to check the sensitivity and, 
hence, the robustness of the main regression analysis. Results are discussed and 
analyzed in terms of the theoretical framework adopted and conclusions are drawn 
from statistical findings. 
 
5.3.3.1   OLS Regression Analysis 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) longitudinal panel regression with robust standard 
error is employed to test the developed research hypotheses. The advantage of panel 
data regression is that it takes the time effect into account. The robust standard error 
option is applied in order to adjust the OLS parametric test to fit with non-parametric 
data, as shown by the descriptive statistics indicating that the study's data are not 
normally distributed. The results of the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression of 
corporate governance on environmental disclosure quantity are shown in Table 5.11.   
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Table 5.11        
OLS Longitudinal Panel Regression With Robust Standard Error Of Corporate Governance On Environmental Disclosure Quantity  
 TED EP PPEI CELS  EA  S OEI 
 Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
Intercept 6.99 0.228 -1.86 0.711 32.29*  0.052 38.62*  0.069 34.29** 0.025 -83.31**  0.026 -3.39 0.190 
BI -0.11** 0.011 -0.13** 0.025 -0.03 0.431 -0.16 0.198 -0.11 0.296 -0.02 0.722 -0.17*** 0.001 
RD -11.38*** 0.001 -7.77*** 0.003 -16.86*** 0.000 -13.99**  0.047 -13.03 0.249 -9.45 0.121 -10.11**  0.018 
BS -0.27 0.446 -0.06 0.857 -0.86 0.274 -0.19 0.499 -0.58 0.203 0.56 0.361 -0.19 0.390 
BM 0.42**  0.045 0.31 0.161 -0.07 0.307 1.23**  0.045 0.66 0.236 0.56 0.256 0.63*** 0.002 
E 0.06 0.213 0.09*  0.077 0.03 0.453 0.01 0.849 -0.13 0.149 0.13 0.302 0.05*  0.083 
CI 0.00 0.864 0.03 0.248 -0.03 0.294 0.00 0.922 -0.01 0.809 0.06 0.110 -0.02 0.403 
CD 0.06**  0.010 0.07*** 0.005 -0.03* 0.089 0.16*** 0.001 0.24*** 0.007 0.20**  0.014 0.00 0.963 
CERP 4.42*** 0.000 1.21 0.203 8.09*** 0.000 4.15**  0.015 12.07*** 0.000 4.24*** 0.009 4.76*** 0.001 
ACI 0.09 0.129 0.04 0.528 0.23**  0.019 -0.02 0.877 0.09 0.180 0.31*  0.068 0.01 0.843 
RCI 0.01 0.772 0.02 0.622 -0.05 0.228 0.04 0.777 0.10 0.225 -0.12 0.206 0.06 0.109 
NCI -0.06* 0.073 -0.05 0.105 -0.12** 0.032 -0.04 0.352 -0.05 0.464 -0.07 0.502 0.00 0.923 
OC -0.10*** 0.002 -0.07** 0.025 -0.04 0.587 -0.17*** 0.006 0.21 0.208 -0.06 0.358 -0.23*** 0.003 
IO 0.04 0.170 0.07**  0.021 -0.07 0.383 -0.04 0.291 -0.18 0.343 0.02 0.734 0.21**  0.013 
SZ 3.78**  0.020 4.66*** 0.002 3.31 0.169 -1.46 0.546 4.67*  0.058 12.22** 0.016 3.47*** 0.008 
IND 4.72*** 0.001 6.26*** 0.005 2.18*  0.092 6.47**  0.041 3.89**  0.049 4.91*** 0.002 3.87*** 0.007 
PRO -0.26 0.418 0.29 0.699 -1.43 0.298 -4.61** 0.011 0.25 0.809 2.68 0.511 1.76 0.120 
LEV 0.90**  0.034 2.40**  0.016 -1.69 0.118 1.31 0.306 2.47 0.320 -1.38 0.482 1.38 0.101 
LIQ 0.80*  0.063 0.22 0.279 -0.65 0.228 7.39*** 0.005 -0.35 0.827 0.67 0.665 -0.07 0.927 
SR -1.18 0.341 -0.73 0.450 -2.42 0.261 0.92 0.595 -3.67 0.187 -4.52 0.330 -0.44 0.538 
CL -2.26* 0.079 -2.12* 0.083 -1.97 0.322 -3.02 0.457 -1.60 0.675 1.22 0.614 -3.47* 0.061 
Adjusted R
2
 (%) 20.35 18.91 10.63 10.14 14.38 22.65 15.87 
***p ≤ 0.01, **p ≤ 0.05, and *p ≤ 0.10.   
TED Total Environmental Disclosure, EP Environmental Policies, PPEI Product and Process-Related Environmental Issues, CELS  Compliance with Environmental Laws and Standards, EA 
Environmental Auditing, S Sustainability, OEI Other Environmentally-Related Information, BI Board Independence, RD Role Duality, BS Board Size, BM Board Meetings, E Education, CI 
Community Influence, CD Cross-Directorships, CERP Corporate Environmental Responsibility (CER) Committee Presence, ACI Audit Committee Independence, RCI Remuneration 
Committee Independence, NCI Nomination Committee Independence, OC Ownership concentration, IO Institutional Ownership, SZ Size, IND Industry, PRO Profitability, LEV Leverage, 
LIQ Liquidity , SR Systematic Risk, CL Cross-Listing.  
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Table 5.11 presents the results of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) longitudinal panel 
regression with robust standard error of corporate governance on environmental 
disclosure quantity. Results show a significant positive association between total 
environmental disclosure quantity and each of board meetings (p ≤ 0.05), cross-
directorships (p ≤ 0.05) and the presence of corporate environmental responsibility 
(CER) committee (p ≤ 0.01). Results also indicate a strong significant negative 
association of total environmental disclosure quantity with each of board 
independence (p ≤ 0.05), role duality (p ≤ 0.01) and ownership concentration (p ≤ 
0.01) and relatively less significant negative association with nomination committee 
independence (p ≤ 0.10). However, no significant association is found between total 
environmental disclosure quantity and each of board size, directors’ education and 
community influence, audit committee independence, remuneration committee 
independence, and institutional ownership, although the positive relationships are 
mostly in the expected direction, except for board size where a negative relationship is 
documented. The adjusted R Squared of the model is 20.35% indicating that 20.35% 
of the changes in total environmental disclosure quantity is explained by the changes 
in its examined determinants.  
Regarding the different categories of environmental disclosure, there is a s ignificant 
negative relationship between board independence and disclosure quantity of each of 
environmental policies (p ≤ 0.05) and other environmentally-related information (p ≤ 
0.01). Similarly, there is a strong significant negative relationship between role 
duality and disclosure quantity of each of environmental policies (p ≤ 0.01), product 
and process-related environmental issues (p ≤ 0.01), compliance with environmental 
laws and standards (p ≤ 0.05) and other environmentally-related information (p ≤ 
0.05). However, board size has insignificant association with the disclosure quantity 
of all of the disclosure categories. There is also a significant positive relationship 
between board meetings and disclosure quantity of each of compliance with 
environmental laws and standards (p ≤ 0.05) and other environmentally-related 
information (p ≤ 0.01).  
With respect to directors' qualifications and experience, although education has only 
marginally significant positive association with the disclosure quantity of each of 
environmental policies (p ≤ 0.10) and other environmentally-related information (p ≤ 
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0.10), community influence is associated with the disclosure quantity of none of the 
disclosure categories, while cross-directorships has a persistent strong significant and 
positive relationship to disclosure quantity of almost all of the disclosure categories 
including environmental policies (p ≤ 0.01), compliance with environmental laws and 
standards (p ≤ 0.01), environmental auditing (p ≤ 0.01) and sustainability (p ≤ 0.05).  
Referring to board committees, corporate environmental responsibility (CER) 
committee presence has a strong significant positive relationship to disclosure 
quantity of almost all of the disclosure categories (p ≤ 0.01), except for environmental 
policies. There is a significant positive relationship between audit committee 
independence and disclosure quantity of each of product and process-related 
environmental issues (p ≤ 0.05) and sustainability (p ≤ 0.10). However, no significant 
association is detected between remuneration committee independence and the 
disclosure quantity of all of the disclosure categories, while a significant negative 
relationship is found between nomination committee independence and disclosure 
quantity of only product and process-related environmental issues (p ≤ 0.05). 
As for ownership structure, it can be observed that ownership concentration is 
significantly and negatively associated with disclosure quantity of each of 
environmental policies (p ≤ 0.05), compliance with environmental laws and standards 
(p ≤ 0.01) and other environmentally- related information (p ≤ 0.01). However, 
institutional ownership is found to be significantly and positively associated with 
disclosure quantity of each of environmental policies (p ≤ 0.05) and other 
environmentally- related information (p ≤ 0.05).  
Results also reveal a significant positive relationship between total environmental 
disclosure quantity and corporate characteristics including company size (p ≤ 0.05), 
industry (p ≤ 0.01), leverage (p ≤ 0.05) and liquidity (p ≤ 0.10), while a significant 
negative relationship to cross- listing (p ≤ 0.10). No significant relationship is detected 
between total environmental disclosure quantity and each of profitability and 
systematic risk. Concerning environmental disclosure categories, the results 
confirmed the significant positive association of company size with disclosure 
quantity of most disclosure categories. It is also observed that disclosure quantity of 
all environmental disclosure categories has significant relationship (p ≤ 0.01) with 
industry. However, for the other corporate characteristics including leverage, liquidity 
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and cross- listing, the results partially supported the insignificant relationship to the 
quantity of some of the disclosure categories. Nevertheless, the insignificant 
relationship of profitability to disclosure quantity is confirmed for most of the 
disclosure categories, while that of systematic risk is consistently confirmed for all 
environmental disclosure categories.  
 
5.3.3.2   GLS Regression Analysis 
Generalized Least Squares (GLS) longitudinal panel regression with robust standard 
error is carried out to further test the research hypotheses and to attest the reliability of 
the main OLS regression results. GLS is a technique for estimating the unknown 
parameters in a linear regression model. GLS is applied when the variances of the 
observations are unequal or when there is a certain degree of correlation between the 
observations. Unequal variances may exist due to the presence of outliers and 
skewness. In this regard, it is preferable to give less weight for observations arising 
from populations with greater variability than the weight given for observations from 
populations with smaller variability. However, OLS does not make use of the 
information pertaining to the unequal variability of the dependent variable as it 
assigns equal weight to each observation (See Gujarati, 2003). 
The advantage of panel data regression is that it takes the time effect into account. 
The robust standard error option is applied in order to adjust the GLS parametric test 
to fit with non-parametric data, as shown by the descriptive statistics indicating that 
the study's data are not normally distributed. The results of the Generalized Least 
Squares (GLS) regression of corporate governance on environmental disclosure 
quantity are shown in Table 5.12.   
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Table 5.12        
GLS Longitudinal Panel Regression With Robust Standard Error Of Corporate Governance On Environmental Disclosure Quantity  
 TED EP PPEI CELS  EA  S OEI 
 Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
Intercept -5.34 0.369 -11.77 0.114 16.97 0.131 15.95 0.281 28.03*** 0.004 -99.45*** 0.000 -10.59*** 0.000 
BI -0.09*** 0.001 -0.11*** 0.000 -0.01 0.858 -0.12 0.310 -0.10 0.232 0.00 0.944 -0.16*** 0.000 
RD -11.19*** 0.000 -7.60*** 0.000 -16.63*** 0.000 -13.87*** 0.004 -13.08 0.161 -8.86** 0.030 -9.98*** 0.000 
BS -0.50 0.118 -0.25 0.453 -1.15* 0.069 -0.60* 0.072 -0.68* 0.051 0.23 0.603 -0.33 0.111 
BM 0.47*** 0.000 0.35**  0.028 -0.01 0.770 1.31*** 0.000 0.68 0.127 0.63*  0.082 0.66*** 0.000 
E 0.06*  0.057 0.09*** 0.003 0.04 0.237 0.03 0.480 -0.12* 0.072 0.14 0.163 0.06*** 0.007 
CI 0.01 0.705 0.03 0.105 -0.02 0.275 0.01 0.789 -0.01 0.825 0.07**  0.022 -0.02 0.362 
CD 0.04*** 0.001 0.06*** 0.000 -0.05*** 0.005 0.14*** 0.000 0.23*** 0.000 0.18*** 0.000 -0.01 0.829 
CERP 4.74*** 0.000 1.47**  0.039 8.47*** 0.000 4.71*** 0.000 12.23*** 0.000 4.68*** 0.000 4.95*** 0.000 
ACI 0.18**  0.015 0.12 0.147 0.35*** 0.000 0.15 0.346 0.13*** 0.000 0.44*** 0.002 0.06**  0.028 
RCI -0.07 0.231 -0.04 0.479 -0.15*** 0.007 -0.09 0.601 0.07 0.257 -0.22* 0.077 0.02 0.553 
NCI -0.05** 0.035 -0.04** 0.036 -0.11*** 0.000 -0.02 0.633 -0.05 0.444 -0.05 0.597 0.01 0.645 
OC -0.09*** 0.000 -0.07*** 0.005 -0.03 0.676 -0.15*** 0.000 0.22*  0.085 -0.06 0.337 -0.23*** 0.000 
IO 0.07*** 0.002 0.09*** 0.000 -0.04 0.565 0.01 0.779 -0.17 0.300 0.06 0.150 0.23*** 0.000 
SZ 4.77*** 0.000 5.46*** 0.000 4.54**  0.023 0.26 0.909 5.11*** 0.001 13.63*** 0.000 4.06*** 0.000 
IND 4.69*** 0.000 6.23*** 0.000 2.14**  0.043 6.45*** 0.002 3.90*** 0.001 4.81*** 0.000 3.85*** 0.000 
PRO 1.83**  0.015 1.97*  0.066 1.17 0.308 -0.83 0.600 1.27 0.202 5.52 0.129 2.99*** 0.000 
LEV 0.95*** 0.000 2.44*** 0.000 -1.63*** 0.008 1.51*  0.067 2.56 0.229 -1.44 0.433 1.40**  0.028 
LIQ 0.78*** 0.008 0.20 0.239 -0.67 0.108 7.39*** 0.000 -0.34 0.816 0.60 0.670 -0.09 0.906 
SR 0.01 0.996 0.23 0.822 -0.94 0.622 2.84 0.297 -3.25* 0.081 -2.61 0.600 0.28 0.416 
CL -1.72** 0.015 -1.68*** 0.009 -1.31 0.371 -2.00 0.595 -1.30 0.712 1.90 0.321 -3.15*** 0.005 
Adjusted R
2
 (%) 21.40 19.53 11.33 10.93 14.45 23.02 16.17 
***p ≤ 0.01, **p ≤ 0.05, and *p ≤ 0.10.   
TED Total Environmental Disclosure, EP Environmental Policies, PPEI Product and Process-Related Environmental Issues, CELS  Compliance with Environmental Laws and Standards, EA 
Environmental Auditing, S Sustainability, OEI Other Environmentally-Related Information, BI Board Independence, RD Role Duality, BS Board Size, BM Board Meetings, E Education, CI 
Community Influence, CD Cross-Directorships, CERP Corporate Environmental Responsibility (CER) Committee Presence, ACI Audit Committee Independence, RCI Remuneration 
Committee Independence, NCI Nomination Committee Independence, OC Ownership concentration, IO Institutional Ownership, SZ Size, IND Industry, PRO Profitability, LEV Leverage, 
LIQ Liquidity , SR Systematic Risk, CL Cross-Listing.  
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Table 5.12 presents the results of Generalized Least Squares (GLS) longitudinal panel 
regression with robust standard error of corporate governance on environmental 
disclosure quantity. Results show a significant positive association between total 
environmental disclosure quantity and each of board meetings (p ≤ 0.01), directors’ 
education (p ≤ 0.10), cross-directorships (p ≤ 0.01), the presence of corporate 
environmental responsibility (CER) committee (p ≤ 0.01), audit committee 
independence (p ≤ 0.05) and institutional ownership (p ≤ 0.01). Results also indicate a 
strong significant negative association of total environmental disclosure quantity with 
each of board independence (p ≤ 0.01), role duality (p ≤ 0.01) and ownership 
concentration (p ≤ 0.01) and relatively less significant negative association with 
nomination committee independence (p ≤ 0.05). However, no significant association 
is found between total environmental disclosure quantity and each of board size, 
directors’ community influence and remuneration committee independence. The 
adjusted R Squared of the model is 21.40% indicating that 21.40% of the changes in 
total environmental disclosure quantity are explained by the changes in its examined 
determinants.  
Regarding the different categories of environmental disclosure, there is a strong 
significant negative relationship between board independence and disclosure quantity 
of each of environmental policies (p ≤ 0.01) and other environmentally-related 
information (p ≤ 0.01). Similarly, there is a strong significant negative relationship 
between role duality and disclosure quantity of each of environmental policies (p ≤ 
0.01), product and process-related environmental issues (p ≤ 0.01), compliance with 
environmental laws and standards (p ≤ 0.01), sustainability (p ≤ 0.05) and other 
environmentally- related information (p ≤ 0.01). However, board size has marginally 
significant negative association with the disclosure quantity of each of product and 
process-related environmental issues (p ≤ 0.10), compliance with environmental laws 
and standards (p ≤ 0.10) and environmental auditing (p ≤ 0.10). There is also a 
significant positive relationship between board meetings and disclosure quantity of 
each of environmental policies (p ≤ 0.05), compliance with environmental laws and 
standards (p ≤ 0.01), sustainability (p ≤ 0.10) and other environmentally-related 
information (p ≤ 0.01).  
 222
With respect to directors' qualifications and experience, although education has strong 
significant positive association with the disclosure quantity of each of environmental 
policies (p ≤ 0.01) and other environmentally-related information (p ≤ 0.01), it has 
only marginally significant negative association with the disclosure quantity of 
environmental auditing (p ≤ 0.10). However, community influence is significantly and 
positively associated with the disclosure quantity of only sustainability (p ≤ 0.05), 
while cross-directorships has a persistent strong significant and positive relationship 
to disclosure quantity of almost all of the disclosure categories including 
environmental policies (p ≤ 0.01), compliance with environmental laws and standards 
(p ≤ 0.01), environmental auditing (p ≤ 0.01) and sustainability (p ≤ 0.01).  
Referring to board committees, corporate environmental responsibility (CER) 
committee presence has a strong significant positive relationship to disclosure 
quantity of all of the disclosure categories (p ≤ 0.01), with diminishing impact on 
environmental policies quantity (p ≤ 0.05). There is also a significant positive 
relationship between audit committee independence and disclosure quantity of each of 
product and process-related environmental issues (p ≤ 0.01), environmental auditing 
(p ≤ 0.01), sustainability (p ≤ 0.01) and other environmentally-related information (p 
≤ 0.05). However, a significant negative association is detected between remuneration 
committee independence and the disclosure quantity of each of product and process- 
related environmental issues (p ≤ 0.01) and sustainability (p ≤ 0.10). Similarly, a 
significant negative relationship is found between nomination committee 
independence and disclosure quantity of each of environmental policies (p ≤ 0.05) and 
product and process-related environmental issues (p ≤ 0.01). 
As for ownership structure, it can be observed that ownership concentration is 
significantly and negatively associated with disclosure quantity of each of 
environmental policies (p ≤ 0.01), compliance with environmental laws and standards 
(p ≤ 0.01) and other environmentally- related information (p ≤ 0.01). However, 
institutional ownership is found to be significantly and positively associated with 
disclosure quantity of each of environmental policies (p ≤ 0.01) and other 
environmentally- related information (p ≤ 0.01).  
Results also reveal a significant positive relationship between total environmental 
disclosure quantity and corporate characteristics including company size (p ≤ 0.01), 
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industry (p ≤ 0.01), profitability (p ≤ 0.05), leverage (p ≤ 0.01) and liquidity (p ≤ 
0.01), while a significant negative relationship to cross- listing (p ≤ 0.05). No 
significant relationship is detected between total environmental disclosure quantity 
and systematic risk. Concerning environmental disclosure categories, the results 
confirmed the significant positive association of company size with disclosure 
quantity of almost all disclosure categories. It is also observed that disclosure quantity 
of all environmental disclosure categories has significant relationship (p ≤ 0.01) with 
industry. However, for the other corporate characteristics including profitability, 
leverage, liquidity and cross- listing, the results partially supported the insignificant 
relationship to the quantity of some of the disclosure categories. Nevertheless, the 
insignificant relationship of systematic risk to disclosure quantity is confirmed for 
most of the environmental disclosure categories.  
 
5.3.4   Discussion Of Statistical Results 
A variety of statistical tests and analyses, including descriptive statistics, correlation 
analysis and regression analysis,  are undertaken in order to measure the extent and 
trend in corporate environmental disclosure quantity and to examine the relationship 
between corporate governance mechanisms and the quantity of corporate 
environmental disclosure practices in UK companies' annual reports, while 
controlling for corporate characteristics. The results of the different statistical 
analyses are discussed and analyzed in terms of the theoretical framework adopted 
and conclusions are drawn from statistical findings.  
The results of the descriptive statistics showed that there is a relatively low level of 
corporate environmental disclosure quantity in the UK (38.44%), indicating the 
relative existence of an information gap or information asymmetry problem. This, in 
turn, implies that managers are having more information than stakeholders that they 
may use for their own interests, which might be at the expense of the interests of the 
other stakeholders. Although the average environmental disclosure quantity is 
relatively low, there is an increasing trend in the quantity of environmental disclosure 
practices over the study period. Such an increasing trend over time emphasizes the 
increased awareness of corporate environmental responsibility by UK listed 
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companies. This increase is associated with the general increase in corporate reporting 
as guided by the recommendations set by professional accounting bodies and standard 
setters such as Global Reporting Initiative (GRI). In addition, increased corporate 
environmental responsibility can be attributed to the adoption of the relevant codes of 
best practice following the issuance of the Combined Code (2003) of corporate 
governance in the UK.  
Moreover, environmental auditing disclosure steadily represents the highest 
disclosure quantity level of 89.19%, indicating that companies are using this sort of 
disclosure as an effective tool in assuring the credibility of environmental practices 
and, hence, demonstrating environmental commitment and accountability to various 
stakeholders. On the other hand, other environmentally-related information disclosure 
represents the lowest disclosure quantity level of 23.47%. This result can be attributed 
to the nature of this disclosure category that includes environmental information not 
being addressed under any of the other environmental disclosure main categories. In 
addition, the maximum average disclosure quantity is 76.47%, while the minimum 
average disclosure quantity is 0%, indicating a great variation in the quantity of 
environmental disclosure practices among the sample companies. This finding might 
be the effect of examining a wide range of companies with different sizes and varying 
degrees of environmental sensitivity as indicated by the descriptive statistics of 
corporate characteristics.  
Descriptive statistics of the different corporate governance mechanisms examined are 
considered to be reasonable following the issuance of the Combined Code (2003) of 
corporate governance in the UK. It may be worth mentioning that although the code is 
voluntary, in that it provides only guidelines of best practice of corporate governance, 
London Stock Exchange listing rules require companies to adhere to corporate 
governance principals. UK listed companies follow the Combined Code's (2003) rule 
of “comply or explain”, with small companies having an excuse for noncompliance if 
adherence is infeasible or impractical. This is particularly true given the wide 
variation in most corporate governance mechanisms, ranging from a minimum of 0 to 
a maximum of 100%. Such great variation can also be attributed to the unfamiliarity 
by some companies with the adequate application of the principles of the newly 
issued code succeeding the period under investigation.  
 222
The results of both correlation and regression analyses revealed a significant 
association between environmental disclosure quantity and most corporate 
governance mechanisms. Seven corporate governance variables were found to be 
statistically significant in impacting upon overall corporate environmental disclosure 
quantity, while controlling for corporate characteristics. Specifically, higher 
environmental disclosure quantity is associated with lower percentage of independent 
non-executive directors on the board, separation of the dual role of CEO and 
chairman, higher frequency of board meetings, greater cross-directorships of board 
members, presence of board- level corporate environmental responsibility (CER) 
committee or responsible, lower percentage of independent non-executive directors on 
the nomination committee and lower ownership concentration. In addition, it appears 
that other corporate governance mechanisms are significant at some categorical levels 
of environmental disclosure quantity. In other words, for some disclosure categories, 
higher environmental disclosure quantity is also associated with higher percentage of 
directors qualified in business, accounting and/or finance, higher percentage of 
independent non-executive directors on the audit committee and higher percentage of 
institutional ownership. Neither board size, community influence nor remuneration 
committee independence shows a significant association with environmental 
disclosure quantity, although the positive relationships are mostly in the expected 
direction, except for board size where a negative relationship is documented.  
The adjusted R Squared of the regression model is 20.35% indicating that 20.35% of 
the changes in total environmental disclosure quantity is explained by the changes in 
its examined determinants.  The value of R Squared is considered acceptable in 
comparison to the findings of previous environmental disclosure literature. For 
example, the reported R Squared is comparable to that of Halme and Huse (1997) as 
21.2%, Peters and Romi (2011) as 25% and Post et al. (2011) as 24%. In the context 
of social disclosures, the reported R Squared is comparable to that of Ghazali (2007) 
as 27% and Hossain and Reaz (2007) as 25.6%, while in the context of voluntary 
disclosures in general, the reported R Squared is comparable to that of Gul and Leung 
(2004) as 19% and Lim et al. (2007) as 19.33%. 
The proportion of independent non-executive directors on the board is significantly 
and negatively associated with total environmental disclosure quantity as well as with 
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the disclosure quantity of each of environmental policies and other environmentally-
related information. While this result is contrary to expectation, it suggests that where 
companies lack board independence, they mitigate the agency problems associated 
with this lack of independence by providing more environmental disclosures, so that 
stakeholders' rights to information are not affected. Another possible explanation for 
this finding may be inadequate application of corporate governance code during the 
period of this study as the code was newly emerged. In this regard, directors' true 
independence may be questionable and the existence of grey directors on the board  
might be problematic. Accordingly, directors' tenure should be taken into 
consideration when assessing board independence. Otherwise, decisions tuning occurs 
which might not be in the best interests of stakeholders. However, this result is 
consistent with the findings of Barako et al. (2006) and Haniffa and Cooke (2002), 
who provide evidence of negative association of outside directors on the board to 
voluntary disclosure. Although Brammer and Pavelin (2006) were unable to confirm a 
significant relationship, Post et al. (2011) documented a positive association between 
the proportion of independent non-executive directors and environmental disclosures.  
Role duality showed a strong significant negative association with total environmental 
disclosure quantity as well as with the disclosure quantity of each of environmental 
policies, product and process-related environmental issues, compliance with 
environmental laws and standards and other environmentally-related information. In 
line with the stakeholder-agency theoretical framework adopted, the separation of the 
dual roles of CEO and chairman is likely to provide necessary checks and balances 
over management's performance (Fama and Jensen, 1983) and, accordingly, decrease 
the possibility of restricting information flow (McKendall et al., 1999) and 
withholding unfavorable information from reaching stakeholders (Ho and Wong, 
2001). This result is consistent with earlier evidence on the relationship of role duality 
to voluntary disclosure (e.g. Gul and Leung, 2004; Huafang and Jianguo, 2007),  
although no evidence exists of such relationship to environmental disclosure (e.g. Al 
Arussi et al., 2009; Michelon and Parbonetti, 2010).  
Board size displayed no significant association with total environmental disclosure 
quantity as well as with the disclosure quantity of all environmental disclosure 
categories. In addition, such insignificant association is negative, which is contrary to 
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expectation. A possible explanation for this finding may be the existence of an 
inverted “U” shaped- relationship to environmental disclosure, with an optimal board 
size existing midway, as assumed by Cormier et al. (2011). Below this optimal board 
size, there is a positive relation between board size and information asymmetry 
followed by a negative relationship. Descriptive statistics indicated that large board 
size has been traditional practice in UK companies over time. Too large or 
excessively sized boards may be plagued with agency conflicts and monitoring 
problems. This due to the lack of coordination associated with a large board, which 
slows down the decision making process and decreases board efficiency (Jensen, 
1993; Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Yermack, 1996). The finding is also in line with the 
evidence from prior studies, where Halme and Huse (1997) and Michelon and 
Parbonetti (2010) were unable to confirm a significant relationship of board size to 
environmental disclosures. Nevertheless, evidence of a positive association between 
board size and environmental disclosure is documented by Cormier et al. (2011). 
Board meetings frequency has a significant positive association with total 
environmental disclosure quantity as well as with the disclosure quantity of each of 
compliance with environmental laws and standards and other environmentally-related 
information. This result can be interpreted in the context of the proposed framework, 
as an increasing board activity, represented by meeting frequency, influences the 
board's ability to act as an effective monitoring mechanism in mitigating agency 
conflicts (Xie et al., 2003). Increased monitoring is expected to result in reduced 
information asymmetry and lower agency costs, thereby increasing disclosures 
(Nelson et al., 2010). In addition, an active board that meets more often is able to 
devote more time to issues such as social and environmental responsibility, being 
reflected in an increased quantity of social and environmental information.  Although 
not previously addressed in environmental disclosure research, Laksmana (2008) 
documents that a board having more time to meet leads to increased extent of 
voluntary disclosure and transparency. 
Directors’ education, although found to have insignificant relationship to total 
environmental disclosure quantity, is significantly and positively associated with the 
disclosure quantity of each of environmental policies and other environmentally-
related information. An educated manager can have a broader perspective and 
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superior pattern of thinking and, thus, is more likely understand the wider interests of 
various stakeholders (Akhtaruddin and Abdur Rouf, 2011; Welford, 2007). However, 
the insignificance of educational background to overall environmental disclosure 
quantity and the marginal significance to categorical environmental disclosure 
quantity suggest the need for directors' environmental education in addition to 
accounting and/or business education. Currently, no prior empirical evidence exists on 
the relationship between directors' education and a direct measure of corporate 
environmental disclosure. However, in the context of voluntary disclosure in general, 
although Haniffa and Cooke (2002) found insignificant relationship, Akhtaruddin and 
Abdur Rouf (2011) documented a significant positive association between board 
members qualified in business and accounting and the extent of voluntary disclosure. 
Community influence has insignificant association with total environmental 
disclosure quantity. This result is confirmed for the disclosure quantity of all of the 
disclosure categories. Although this finding is contrary to expectation, the positive 
relationship is in the expected direction as to overall environmental disclosure 
quantity and the disclosure quantity of some of the disclosure categories. In line with 
the theoretical framework adopted, community influential directors facilitate 
information acquisition and processing by establishing contacts with stakeholders, 
thereby help absorb environmental uncertainty and enhance corporate social and 
environmental performance (Mallin and Michelon, 2011). However, the relationship 
of community influence to environmental disclosure might not be evident where other 
forms of directors' qualifications and experience act as substituting factors affecting 
information provision. Other possible explanations for this finding are that directors 
with such community influence and relationship networks could spread themselves 
too thinly or that they have direct relationships and contacts with stakeholders through 
which information dissemination takes place as opposed to annual report disclosures. 
Empirical evidence by Michelon and Parbonetti (2010) showed that the proportion of 
community influential directors on the board positively affects sustainability,  
environmental, and strategic disclosure, given that no other forms of directors' 
qualifications and experience have been employed.  
Cross-directorships showed a persistent strong significant and positive relationship to 
total environmental disclosure quantity as well as to disclosure quantity of almost all 
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of the disclosure categories including environmental policies, compliance with 
environmental laws and standards, environmental auditing and sustainability.  This 
result can be interpreted in the context of the proposed framework, as an increasing 
proportion of directors on the board with cross-directorships better equips boards to 
carry out their governance roles as directors gain the necessary skills and experience 
needed to understand and address the wider environmental responsibilities towards 
various stakeholders. Consequently, cross-directorships have important implications 
for disclosure practices through greater access to information (Haniffa and Cooke, 
2002). This result is consistent with the findings of Haniffa and Cooke (2005) and 
Rupley et al. (2011), who provide evidence of significant positive association 
between cross-directorships and each of corporate social and environmental 
disclosures respectively. 
The presence of corporate environmental responsibility (CER) committee has a strong 
significant positive relationship to total environmental disclosure quantity as well as 
to the disclosure quantity of almost all of the disclosure categories. Consistent with 
the adopted theoretical framework, companies with a CER committee are more likely 
to disclose environmental information because the committee members will require  
management to demonstrate accountability by ensuring that the firm is following 
well-established environmental reporting guidelines and recommendations. As the 
CER committee is responsible for ensuring the quality of the company's 
environmental reporting policies, the establishment of such committee can be 
regarded as a means of addressing stakeholders' interests and responding to their 
expectations (Michelon and Parbonetti, 2010; Peters and Romi, 2011). Although 
McKendall et al. (1999), Michelon and Parbonetti (2010) and Rupley et al. (2011) 
were unable to confirm a significant relationship, evidence of the existence of a 
significant positive association between the presence of a CER committee on the 
board and corporate environmental disclosures is documented by Hassan (2010) and 
Peters and Romi (2011). 
Audit committee independence, although found to have insignificant relationship to  
total environmental disclosure quantity, is significantly and positively associated with 
the disclosure quantity of each of product and process-related environmental issues 
and sustainability. Independence of the audit committee members can significantly 
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contribute to the committee's effectiveness (Xie et al., 2003), as it enables the 
committee to carry out its responsibilities objectively (Abbott et al., 2004).  However, 
a possible explanation for an insignificant relationship to overall environmental 
disclosure quantity may be due to lack of environmental audit undertaken by 
companies and, consequently, the role of independent non-executive directors on the 
audit committee may not be evident. Another possible explanation for this finding can 
be attributed to the existence of grey directors whose true independence may be 
questionable. The finding of a significant positive association between audit 
committee independence and the disclosure quantity of some environmental 
disclosure categories is in line with earlier evidence by O’Sullivan et al. (2008) as to 
voluntary disclosure practices.  
Remuneration committee independence revealed no significant association with total 
environmental disclosure quantity as well as with the disclosure quantity of all of the 
disclosure categories. While this result is contrary to expectation, it can be interpreted 
in terms of a lack of linkage between pay and environmental performance in setting 
remuneration and, consequently, the role of independent non-executive directors on 
the remuneration committee may not be evident. Another possible explanation for this 
finding can be attributed to the existence of grey directors whose true independence 
may be questionable. However, the positive relationship is in the expected direction as 
to overall environmental disclosure quantity and the disclosure quantity of most of the 
disclosure categories, suggesting that managers will act in the best interests of 
stakeholders by providing the necessary disclosures in order to receive considerable 
pay and retain their position in the firm. The finding of a positive association between 
remuneration committee independence and the disclosure quantity of most 
environmental disclosure categories is in line with earlier evidence by O’Sullivan et 
al. (2008) as to voluntary disclosure practices.  
Nomination committee independence is significantly and negatively associated with 
total environmental disclosure quantity as well as with the disclosure quantity of 
product and process-related environmental issues. While this result is contrary to 
expectation, it suggests that agency problems associated with lack of directors' 
independence on the nomination committee are mitigated by providing more 
environmental disclosures. Another possible explanation for this finding can be 
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attributed to the existence of grey directors whose true independence may be 
questionable. No prior empirical evidence exists on the relationship between 
nomination committee independence and corporate environmental disclosure. 
Nevertheless, in the context of voluntary disclosure in general, Cheung et al. (2010) 
found that companies with board- level committees including a nomination committee 
tend to more transparent. 
Ownership concentration showed a strong significant negative association with total 
environmental disclosure quantity as well as with the disclosure quantity of each of 
environmental policies, compliance with environmental laws and standards and other 
environmentally- related information. This result can be interpreted in the context of 
the proposed framework, as an increasing concentration of ownership in the hands of 
a few large shareholders is associated with less agency conflicts and, hence, a 
decreasing likelihood of companies disclosing additional information on their social 
and environmental performance. This result is consistent with the findings of 
Brammer and Pavelin (2006) and Cormier et al. (2005), who provide evidence of 
significant negative association of ownership concentration with environmental 
disclosure quantity in annual reports. Evidence of such relationship is also 
documented by both Reverte (2009) and Prado-Lorenzo et al. (2009) as to corporate 
social responsibility disclosure and by Barako et al. (2006) in the context of corporate 
voluntary disclosure in general. 
Institutional ownership, although found to have insignificant relationship to  total 
environmental disclosure quantity, is significantly and positively associated with the 
disclosure quantity of each of environmental policies and other environmentally-
related information. The positive relationship is in the expected direction, suggesting 
that institutional investors have strong incentives to monitor corporate disclosure 
practices and influence corporate values due to their large ownership stake (Barako et 
al., 2006) and that they may consider environmental issues to be important as a means 
of long-term value creation (Halme and Huse, 1997; Prado-Lorenzo et al., 2009; 
Welford, 2007). However, a possible explanation for the existence of an insignificant 
relationship to overall environmental disclosure quantity may be due to the substantial 
representation of institutional investors in UK companies’ blockholdings. In other 
words, this result is expected given that institutional ownership constitutes the major 
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and dominant form of blockholdings. Institutional shareholders, thus, represent a key 
stakeholder group who are more sophisticated (Guan et al., 2007), have power 
(O’Sullivan et al., 2008), have access to the information they need (Cormier et al., 
2005) and, therefore, can obtain the required information from alternative sources 
other than corporate disclosure (Berthelot et al., 2003). Another possible explanation 
for this finding may be due to the lack of stakeholder engagement in the corporate 
governance process and, consequently, the role of institutional investors in shaping 
corporate disclosure decisions may not be evident. The finding of a significant 
positive association between institutional investors and the disclosure quantity of 
some environmental disclosure categories is in line with earlier evidence by Barako et 
al. (2006) in the context of corporate voluntary disclosures.  
Results also reveal a significant positive relationship between total environmental 
disclosure quantity and corporate characteristics including company size, industry, 
leverage and liquidity, while a significant negative relationship to cross-listing. No 
significant relationship is detected between total environmental disclosure quantity 
and each of profitability and systematic risk. Concerning environmental disclosure 
categories, the results confirmed the significant positive association of company size 
with disclosure quantity of most disclosure categories. It is also observed that 
disclosure quantity of all environmental disclosure categories has significant 
relationship with industry. However, for the other corporate characteristics including 
leverage, liquidity and cross- listing, the results are partially supported for some of the 
disclosure categories. Nevertheless, the insignificant relationship of profitability to 
disclosure quantity is confirmed for most of the disclosure categories, while that of 
systematic risk is consistently confirmed for all environmental disclosure categories.  
These results are consistent with the dominant trend in previous literature, where the 
results of the majority of previous studies concerning corporate characteristics 
indicate that there is a significant positive association between corporate 
environmental disclosure and each of company size (Adams et al., 1998; Brammer 
and Pavelin, 2006; Cormier et al., 2011; Cormier et al., 2005; Deegan and Gordon, 
1996; Gray et al., 2001; Hackston and Milne, 1996; Magness, 2006; Patten, 2002; 
Peters and Romi, 2011; Rupley et al., 2011; Stanny and Ely, 2008) and industry 
(Adams et al., 1998; Brammer and Pavelin, 2006; Campbell, 2004; Cormier et al., 
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2005;  Deegan and Gordon, 1996; García-Ayuso and Larrinaga, 2003; Gray et al., 
2001; Hackston and Milne, 1996; Halme and Huse, 1997), while there is no 
association between corporate environmental disclosure and profitability (Brammer 
and Pavelin, 2006; García-Sánchez, 2008; Hackston and Milne, 1996; Michelon and 
Parbonetti, 2010; Peters and Romi, 2011; Stanny and Ely, 2008).  
However, results of prior literature on the association of environmental disclosure 
with other corporate characteristics are mixed. Consistent with the current study's 
findings, the significant positive association between environmental disclosure and 
leverage is previously documented by Clarkson et al., 2008; Naser et al., 2006; Parsa 
and Kouhy, 2008, while that of liquidity is previously documented by Camfferman 
and Cooke (2002) in the context of corporate disclosure in general. The finding of 
insignificant association between environmental disclosure and systematic risk is 
similar to that of García-Ayuso and Larrinaga (2003) and Michelon and Parbonetti 
(2010). Nevertheless, the significant negative association between environmental 
disclosure and cross- listing is in line with earlier evidence by Hope et al. (2011) who 
indicated that more stringent disclosure requirements as a result of cross- listing in 
highly organized stock exchanges are likely reduce voluntary disclosures. 
From the above discussion, it can be noticed that there is a high level of agreement 
between the results of OLS and GLS regressions about the significance of corporate 
governance variables as well as corporate characteristics variables. Similar GLS 
regression results are found as in the previous OLS regression analysis. Although the 
significance of additional corporate governance mechanisms, including directors’ 
education, audit committee independence and institutional ownership, is detected in 
impacting upon total environmental disclosure quantity, such significance was already 
documented in terms of categorical environmental disclosure quantity in the OLS 
regression analysis. Nevertheless, the different regression analyses agree as to the 
direction of such relationships. Generally, the results of the GLS regression are 
largely consistent with results and findings of the main OLS regression.  
Accordingly, the results of the panel regression analysis agree with the research 
hypotheses regarding the existence of a significant positive relationship between 
environmental disclosure quantity and each of board meetings (H4a), cross-
directorships (H7a), and the presence of corporate environmental responsibility (CER) 
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committee (H8a), while a negative significant relationship to each of role duality (H2a) 
and ownership concentration (H12a). However, results partially support the research 
hypotheses regarding the association between environmental disclosure quantity and 
each of each of board independence (H1a) and nomination committee independence 
(H11a), in that the relationships are significant although the negative association is 
contrary to expectation. In addition, research hypotheses regarding the significant 
positive relationship of environmental disclosure quantity to other corporate 
governance mechanisms, including directors’ education (H5a), audit committee 
independence (H9a) and institutional ownership (H13a), are partially supported at some 
categorical levels of environmental disclosure quantity. Moreover, the results partially 
support the research hypotheses regarding the association between environmental 
disclosure quantity and each of community influence (H6a) and remuneration 
committee independence (H10a), in that the positive relationships are in the expected 
direction although they are insignificant. Nevertheless, the research hypothesis 
regarding the association between environmental disclosure quantity and board size 
(H3a) is totally unsupported as the relationship is neither positive nor significant. 
Furthermore, the results of the panel regression analysis agree with most of the 
research hypotheses concerning the variability in the relationship of each of the 
corporate governance mechanisms to disclosure quantity among the different 
environmental disclosure categories. Specifically, the relationship between 
environmental disclosure quantity and each of board independence (H1b), role duality 
(H2b), board meetings (H4b), directors’ education (H5b), directors’ community 
influence (H6b), cross-directorships (H7b), audit committee independence (H9b), 
remuneration committee independence (H10b), nomination committee independence 
(H11b), ownership concentration (H12b) and institutional ownership (H13b) differs 
among the different categories of environmental disclosure. However, the research 
hypotheses concerning the variability in such relationship are not relatively supported 
for each of board size (H3b) and the presence of corporate environmental 
responsibility (CER) committee (H8b). In other words, consistent relationships among 
almost all of the different environmental disclosure categories were documented, 
wherein disclosure quantity has dominant insignificant negative association with 
board size and persistent significant positive association with corporate environmental 
responsibility (CER) committee presence. 
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In conclusion, the overall results provide support for the study's general argument that 
corporate governance plays an important role in determining how companies mitigate 
agency problems and respond to the needs and interests of various stakeholder groups 
and, consequently, in determining the quantity of environmental disclosures in the 
annual reports. In this respect, sound systems of corporate governance are serving as 
both monitoring and accountability mechanisms, by which managers' opportunistic 
manipulation is controlled and companies are made responsive to the rights and needs 
of stakeholders, thereby reducing information asymmetry or the information 
expectation gap. In other words, the stakeholder-agency theoretical framework 
adopted by the current study is greatly supported by the study's findings. 
 
5.3.5   Sensitivity Analysis 
A number of sensitivity tests are performed to check the robustness of the main 
analysis and, hence to attest the reliability of the results. Sensitivity analysis is aimed 
at examining how sensitive the results and findings towards using alternative model 
specifications or changing the statistical tests in the determination environmental 
disclosure quantity. Two types of robustness check are undertaken. First, in addition 
to using a composite measure of environmental disclosure quantity, the different 
categories of environmental disclosures are integrated into the analysis in order to 
better portray the different areas and aspects of the company's disclosure strategy. 
Second, alternative regression analyses are carried out to check the sensitivity of the 
main statistical regression test. Hence, in addition to the main Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) regression analysis, Generalized Least Squares (GLS) regression analysis is 
also undertaken to allow for possible unequal variances of the observations as well as 
for any potential degree of correlation between the observations. Moreover, sensitivity 
analysis using pooled cross-sectional Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression with 
robust standard error is employed as a robustness check of the main regression 
analysis.   
While a composite or summary measure, that collapses different disclosure categories 
into a single value, is useful in associating disclosure quantity with other variables of 
interest, the analysis of the different disclosure categories provide deeper 
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understanding of and richer insights into disclosure quantity (see Beattie et al., 2004), 
thereby help to comprehensively profile the disclosure strategies adopted by the 
company (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004). Aggregated measures shift attention away 
from what is and what is not being reported in terms of the different themes or items 
being reported (Chapman and Milne, 2004). Accordingly, the current study reports 
both aggregated quantity and disaggregated categorical quantity of environmental 
disclosures. Environmental disclosure quantity of each of the different disclosure 
categories is used alternatively as the dependent variable. Corporate governance 
mechanisms are then regressed on total environmental disclosure quantity as well as 
the disclosure quantity of each of the different disclosure categories. In this regard, 
the break down of environmental disclosure quantity provides a better overall picture 
of the governance relation to disclosure quantity. Taken together, results from these 
various specifications are largely consistent with total regression results. In other 
words, although the relationship of corporate governance to disclosure quantity differs 
across different disclosure categories, results do not alter the main inferences drawn 
from total environmental disclosure quantity model reported findings.  
Generalized Least Squares (GLS) regression analysis is also undertaken to allow for 
possible unequal variances of the observations as well as for any potential degree of 
correlation between the observations. GLS regression analysis makes use of the 
information pertaining to the unequal variability of the dependent variable as opposed 
to OLS regression analysis that assigns equal weight to each observation (See 
Gujarati, 2003). Similar results are found as in the previous OLS regression analysis. 
Although the significance of additional corporate governance mechanisms is detected 
in impacting upon total environmental disclosure quantity, such significance was 
already documented in terms of categorical environmental disclosure quantity in the 
OLS regression analysis. Generally, the results and findings are largely consistent 
with results of the main OLS regression. Moreover, sensitivity analysis using pooled 
cross-sectional Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression with robust standard error is 
employed as a robustness check of the main regression analysis. Contrary to panel 
data analysis, pooled regression analysis deals with large number of observations as 
one unit without differentiating between the different groups of data. The results of 
the pooled cross-sectional Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression of corporate 
governance on environmental disclosure quantity are shown in Table 5.13.   
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Table 5.13        
Pooled Cross Sectional OLS Regression With Robust Standard Error Of Corporate Governance On Environmental Disclosure Quantity  
 TED EP PPEI CELS  EA  S OEI 
 Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
Intercept -5.34 0.490 -11.77 0.133 16.97 0.158 15.95 0.344 28.03 0.116 -99.45*** 0.000 -10.59 0.224 
BI -0.09 0.123 -0.11* 0.065 -0.01 0.926 -0.12 0.370 -0.10 0.326 0.00 0.977 -0.16** 0.019 
RD -11.19*** 0.001 -7.60** 0.020 -16.63*** 0.000 -13.87**  0.015 -13.08 0.191 -8.86 0.146 -9.98*** 0.002 
BS -0.50** 0.048 -0.25 0.343 -1.15*** 0.003 -0.60 0.322 -0.68 0.205 0.23 0.677 -0.33 0.269 
BM 0.47**  0.027 0.35*  0.081 -0.01 0.968 1.31*** 0.003 0.68*  0.073 0.63 0.180 0.66**  0.010 
E 0.06**  0.040 0.09*** 0.004 0.04 0.414 0.03 0.686 -0.12 0.101 0.14**  0.033 0.06*  0.082 
CI 0.01 0.802 0.03 0.169 -0.02 0.468 0.01 0.874 -0.01 0.909 0.07 0.141 -0.02 0.461 
CD 0.04 0.105 0.06**  0.020 -0.05 0.306 0.14**  0.031 0.23*** 0.001 0.18*** 0.002 -0.01 0.781 
CERP 4.74*** 0.000 1.47 0.196 8.47*** 0.000 4.71**  0.047 12.23*** 0.000 4.68*  0.060 4.95*** 0.000 
ACI 0.18*** 0.001 0.12**  0.049 0.35*** 0.000 0.15 0.220 0.13 0.297 0.44*** 0.000 0.06 0.347 
RCI -0.07 0.103 -0.04 0.426 -0.15** 0.039 -0.09 0.323 0.07 0.396 -0.22** 0.012 0.02 0.742 
NCI -0.05 0.154 -0.04 0.307 -0.11** 0.043 -0.02 0.784 -0.05 0.420 -0.05 0.459 0.01 0.829 
OC -0.09* 0.092 -0.07 0.185 -0.03 0.766 -0.15 0.177 0.22*  0.066 -0.06 0.593 -0.23*** 0.000 
IO 0.07 0.217 0.09*  0.094 -0.04 0.704 0.01 0.929 -0.17 0.175 0.06 0.585 0.23*** 0.000 
SZ 4.77*** 0.000 5.46*** 0.000 4.54*** 0.008 0.26 0.922 5.11**  0.031 13.63*** 0.000 4.06*** 0.001 
IND 4.69*** 0.000 6.23*** 0.000 2.14 0.215 6.45*** 0.007 3.90*  0.057 4.81**  0.036 3.85*** 0.001 
PRO 1.83 0.209 1.97 0.172 1.17 0.612 -0.83 0.789 1.27 0.736 5.52*  0.057 2.99*  0.067 
LEV 0.95 0.325 2.44**  0.020 -1.63 0.279 1.51*  0.431 2.56 0.182 -1.44 0.468 1.40 0.159 
LIQ 0.78 0.214 0.20 0.753 -0.67 0.488 7.39*** 0.000 -0.34 0.822 0.60 0.708 -0.09 0.914 
SR 0.01 0.996 0.23 0.879 -0.94 0.676 2.84 0.369 -3.25* 0.180 -2.61 0.442 0.28 0.858 
CL -1.72 0.237 -1.68 0.291 -1.31 0.596 -2.00 0.586 -1.30 0.670 1.90 0.612 -3.15* 0.079 
R
2
 (%) 21.40 19.53 11.33 10.93 14.45 23.02 16.17 
***p ≤ 0.01, **p ≤ 0.05, and *p ≤ 0.10.   
TED Total Environmental Disclosure, EP Environmental Policies, PPEI Product and Process-Related Environmental Issues, CELS  Compliance with Environmental Laws and Standards, EA 
Environmental Auditing, S Sustainability, OEI Other Environmentally-Related Information, BI Board Independence, RD Role Duality, BS Board Size, BM Board Meetings, E Education, CI 
Community Influence, CD Cross-Directorships, CERP Corporate Environmental Responsibility (CER) Committee Presence, ACI Audit Committee Independence, RCI Remuneration 
Committee Independence, NCI Nomination Committee Independence, OC Ownership concentration, IO Institutional Ownership, SZ Size, IND Industry, PRO Profitability, LEV Leverage, 
LIQ Liquidity , SR Systematic Risk, CL Cross-Listing. 
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Table 5.13 displays the results of pooled cross-sectional Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) regression with robust standard error of corporate governance on 
environmental disclosure quantity. The results of the pooled regression showed 
approximately the same R Squared as the panel data regression analysis indicating 
that the pooled regression has the same strength of the main panel regression. Similar 
results are found as in the panel data regression analysis.  
Although the significance of additional corporate governance mechanisms, including 
directors’ education and audit committee independence, is detected in impacting upon 
total environmental disclosure quantity, such significance was already documented in 
terms of categorical environmental disclosure quantity in the main regression 
analysis. An exception is the arising significance of board size with total 
environmental disclosure quantity; however it is still not being supported by almost 
all of environmental disclosure categories. While the significance of other corporate 
governance mechanisms, such as board independence, cross-directorships and 
nomination committee independence, to total environmental disclosure quantity is 
marginally diminishing, evidence of such significance still exists in terms of 
categorical environmental disclosure quantity. Nevertheless, the different regression 
analyses agree as to the direction of such relationships. Generally, the results and 
findings are largely consistent with results of the main OLS regression. Accordingly, 
the pooled regression indicates that the results of the panel data analysis are not 
sensitive to changing the type of statistical test employed. Moreover, the selected 
panel data analysis is well fitted with the examined data.  
In summary, these sensitivity analyses show general consistency with the overall 
findings. Taken together, the results of using alternative model specifications as well 
as the results of changing the statistical tests in the determination environmental 
disclosure quantity do not alter the main inferences drawn from the reported findings 
of the aggregate model specification and the main statistical analysis. In this regard, 
the sensitivity analysis confirms the reliability of the results and findings and, hence, 
supports the generalization of such results.   
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5.4   CONCLUSION 
This chapter presents the first part of the empirical work aimed at quantitatively 
investigating the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and the 
quantity of corporate environmental disclosure practices in UK companies' annual 
reports. A variety of statistical tests and analyses, including descriptive statistics, 
correlation analysis and regression analysis, are undertaken in order to measure the 
extent and trend in corporate environmental disclosure quantity and to examine the 
relationship in question, while controlling for corporate characteristics. Finally, 
sensitivity analysis is carried out to check the robustness of the main regression 
analysis. The results are discussed and analyzed in terms of the theoretical framework 
adopted and conclusions are drawn from statistical findings.  
Descriptive statistics showed that there is a relatively low level of corporate 
environmental disclosure quantity in the UK, indicating the relative existence of an 
information gap or information asymmetry problem. However, there is an increasing 
trend in the quantity of environmental disclosure practices over the study period, 
emphasizing the increased awareness of corporate environmental responsibility by 
UK listed companies over time. Moreover, environmental auditing disclosure steadily 
represents the highest disclosure quantity level, while other environmentally-related 
disclosure represents the lowest disclosure quantity level. In addition, there is a great 
variation in the quantity of environmental disclosure practices among the sample 
companies. This finding might be the effect of examining a wide range of companies 
with different sizes and varying degrees of environmental sensitivity as indicated by 
the descriptive statistics of corporate characteristics. Descriptive statistics of corporate 
governance mechanisms are considered reasonable following the issuance of the 
Combined Code (2003) of corporate governance in the UK.   
Results also revealed a significant association between environmental disclosure 
quantity and most corporate governance mechanisms. Specifically, higher 
environmental disclosure quantity is associated with lower percentage of independent 
non-executive directors on the board, separation of the dual role of CEO and 
chairman, higher frequency of board meetings, greater cross-directorships of board 
members, presence of board- level corporate environmental responsibility (CER) 
committee or responsible, lower percentage of independent non-executive directors on 
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the nomination committee and lower ownership concentration. In addition, it appears 
that other corporate governance mechanisms are significant at some categorical levels 
of environmental disclosure quantity. In other words, for some disclosure categories, 
higher environmental disclosure quantity is also associated with higher percentage of 
directors qualified in business, accounting and/or finance, higher percentage of 
independent non-executive directors on the audit committee and higher percentage of 
institutional ownership. Neither board size, community influence nor remuneration 
committee independence shows a significant association with environmental 
disclosure quantity, although the positive relationships are mostly in the expected 
direction, except for board size where a negative relationship is documented.  
In conclusion, the overall results reinforce the study's general argument that corporate 
governance plays an important role in determining how companies mitigate agency 
problems and respond to the needs and interests of various stakeholder groups and, 
consequently, in determining the quantity of environmental disclosures in the annual 
reports. The significant association between environmental disclosure quantity and 
most corporate governance characteristics indicates the appropriate application of the 
corporate governance concepts in the UK context following the launching of the new 
paradigm in the corporate governance code, which in turn supports the level of 
environmental disclosure. In this respect, sound systems of corporate governance are 
serving as both monitoring and accountability mechanisms, by which managers' 
opportunistic manipulation is controlled and companies are made responsive to the 
rights and needs of stakeholders, thereby reducing information asymmetry or the 
information expectation gap. In other words, the stakeholder-agency theoretical 
framework adopted by the current study is greatly supported by the study's findings. 
However, research should not be confined to the examination of the impact of 
governance mechanisms on the quantity of environmental disclosures only, rather 
than a consideration of the quality of the disclosed information as well. Focusing on 
the quantity of disclosures does not mean that such disclosures are of higher quality so 
as to reflect the true state of the company's disclosure strategies. Therefore, the next 
chapter is devoted to empirically examining the relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms and the quality of corporate environmental disclosure in the 
annual reports of UK companies.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
EXAMINING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
ENVIRONMENTAL DISCLOSURE QUALITY AND 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
6.1   INTRODUCTION 
Determining the research methodology, deciding on the relevant philosophical 
assumptions and methodological choices, and constructing the appropriate research 
design, portray the necessary steps for proceeding in the empirical study. Based on 
stakeholder-agency theory, the main objectives of the present study is to empirically 
examine the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and the quantity 
and quality of corporate environmental disclosure practices in UK companies' annual 
reports and to provide an in-depth investigation of environmental disclosure quality 
assessment. 
This chapter constitutes the second part of the empirical work aimed at quantitatively 
investigating the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and the 
quality of corporate environmental disclosure practices in UK companies' annual 
reports. It commences with carrying out some descriptive analyses of the variables of 
interest to measure the quality of corporate environmental disclosure practices in the 
annual reports and its trend over time. Moreover, correlation analyses are undertaken 
to detect any autocorrelations among variables. Correlation coefficients are also 
intended to attest the construct validity of the disclosure measurement. Using 
regression analysis, the chapter proceeds with testing the hypotheses developed for 
examining the relationship in question, while controlling for corporate characteristics. 
Two models are tested in which the dependent variables are total corporate 
environmental disclosure quality and the quality of disclosure within each disclosure 
category. Finally, sensitivity analysis is carried out to check the robustness of the 
main regression analysis. Results are discussed and analyzed in terms of the 
theoretical framework adopted and conclusions are drawn from statistical findings. 
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6.2   EXAMINING THE EXTENT AND TREND OF CORPORATE 
        ENVIRONMENTAL DISCLOSURE QUALITY 
Corporate environmental disclosure quality indices provide a measure of the extent of 
total environmental disclosure quality as well as disclosure quality within each 
disclosure category. These indices are computed for the four years of the study to 
provide the trend in environmental disclosure practices in the annual reports over 
time. Descriptive statistics are performed to help carry out the required analyses. Data 
are panelled by year, along with data pooling in order to permit thorough analysis of 
total corporate environmental disclosure and each corporate environmental disclosure 
category. The results of the descriptive statistics for each of the yearly panels as well 
as the pooled environmental disclosure quality are shown in the following tables. 
 
Table 6.1 
Descriptive Statistics Of Environmental Disclosure Quality Panel A: 2004 
Variable  
Mean 
(Median) 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min. 
(Max.) 
Standard 
Skewness 
Standard 
Kurtosis 
Total Environmental 
Disclosure  
71.74 
 (72.30) 
5.24 
45.83 
 (83.33) 
-1.10 5.66 
Environmental Policies 
71.44 
 (71.48) 
6.19 
45.83 
 (87.50) 
-0.69 4.09 
Product and Process-
Related Environmental 
Issues 
71.38 
(70.83) 
6.85 
50.00       
(91.67) 
-0.25 3.48 
Compliance with 
Environmental Laws 
and Standards 
74.69     
(75.00) 
6.92 
58.33     
(91.67) 
-0.43 3.81 
Environmental 
Auditing 
70.98     
(70.83) 
4.15 
58.33       
(91.67) 
-0.01 9.66 
Sustainability 
72.55 
(70.83) 
6.97 
58.33       
(91.67) 
0.28 4.15 
Other Environmentally-
Related Information 
73.19 
(70.83) 
5.68 
52.08 
 (91.67) 
-0.09 5.57 
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Table 6.1 shows the descriptive statistics of total environmental disclosure quality and 
the quality of environmental disclosure within each of the disclosure categories for the 
first panel of data for the year 2004. The overall environmental disclosure quality 
represents 71.74% of the maximum quality of the disclosed checklist items, which 
varies between 45.83% and 83.33% for the lowest and highest UK companies’ 
disclosure quality respectively. Moreover, compliance with environmental laws and 
standards disclosure represents the highest disclosure quality of 74.69%, while 
environmental auditing disclosure represents the lowest disclosure quality of 70.98%. 
This indicates that compliance with environmental laws and standards is a dominant 
category of quality environmental disclosure that most companies in the examined 
sample agree to efficiently disclose.  
In addition, statistics reveal that the maximum disclosure quality of 91.67% is 
presented by product and process-related environmental issues, compliance with 
environmental laws and standards, environmental auditing, sustainability and other 
environmentally- related information, which means that at least one company has 
mostly provided the expected high quality environmental disclosure within these 
categories. However, environmental policies showed the minimum disclosure quality 
of 45.83%, which means that at least one of the sample companies has provided such 
low quality environmental policies disclosure.  
The descriptive statistics show the normality of environmental disclosure data. It is 
observed that the standard skewness of total environmental disclosure quality and that 
of environmental disclosure quality of all disclosure categories are within the 
normally distributed range of ±1.96 (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). However, the data 
are considered to be normally distributed if the standard kurtosis statistics fall within 
the range of ±3 (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). Accordingly, environmental disclosure 
data are not normally distributed, as the standard kurtosis statistics of total 
environmental disclosure quality and that of all disclosure categories exceed the range 
of ±3 indicating that such data are not normally distributed. As a consequence, a 
robust analysis is necessary for any hypotheses test related to the entire data.   
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Table 6.2 
Descriptive Statistics Of Environmental Disclosure Quality Panel B: 2005 
Variable  
Mean 
(Median) 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min. 
(Max.) 
Standard 
Skewness 
Standard 
Kurtosis 
Total Environmental 
Disclosure  
72.22 
(72.79) 
4.84 
45.83 
(85.42) 
-1.21 7.11 
Environmental Policies 
71.95 
(71.78) 
5.90 
45.83    
(87.50) 
-0.69 5.00 
Product and Process-
Related Environmental 
Issues 
72.09 
  (72.22) 
6.66 
45.83        
(91.67) 
-0.55 4.22 
Compliance with 
Environmental Laws 
and Standards 
74.61       
(75.00) 
6.15 
58.33      
(91.67) 
-0.51 4.06 
Environmental 
Auditing 
70.99     
(70.83) 
4.05 
58.33       
(91.67) 
0.15 10.96 
Sustainability 
73.18       
(70.83) 
7.52 
33.33       
(91.67) 
-1.16 10.13 
Other Environmentally-
Related Information 
73.67 
(73.61) 
5.56 
58.33   
(91.67) 
0.07 4.50 
 
Table 6.2 presents the descriptive statistics of total environmental disclosure quality 
and the quality of environmental disclosure within each of the disclosure categories 
for the second panel of data for the year 2005. The results indicate that the mean total 
environmental disclosure quality is 72.22%, which is slightly higher than previous 
year's level. Moreover, compliance with environmental laws and standards disclosure 
represents the highest disclosure quality of 74.61%, while environmental auditing 
disclosure represents the lowest disclosure quality of 70.99%.   
Regarding the standard skewness statistics, the presented data are normally 
distributed. It is observed that the standard skewness of total environmental disclosure 
quality and that of all disclosure categories are within the range of ±1.96 evidencing 
the normality of the data (see Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). This result is not supported 
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by the standard kurtosis statistics, where the standard kurtosis of total environmental 
disclosure quality and that of all disclosure categories exceed the normality range of 
±3 (see Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006), indicating that such data are not normally 
distributed.  
 
Table 6.3 
Descriptive Statistics Of Environmental Disclosure Quality Panel C: 2006 
Variable  
Mean 
(Median) 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min. 
(Max.) 
Standard 
Skewness 
Standard 
Kurtosis 
Total Environmental 
Disclosure  
72.90 
(73.61) 
5.00 
45.83 
(85.91) 
-1.63 8.56 
Environmental Policies 
72.83 
 (72.92) 
6.19 
45.83    
(86.46) 
-0.73 4.64 
Product and Process-
Related Environmental 
Issues 
72.97 
(73.33) 
6.94 
45.83 
(91.67) 
-0.63 4.43 
Compliance with 
Environmental Laws 
and Standards 
74.55 
  (75.00) 
6.25 
50.00      
(91.67) 
-0.90 4.69 
Environmental 
Auditing 
71.39       
(70.83) 
4.13 
58.33       
(91.67) 
0.36 9.21 
Sustainability 
73.74 
(70.83) 
6.36 
58.33       
(91.67) 
0.07 4.36 
Other Environmentally-
Related Information 
73.82 
(75.00) 
5.97 
45.83    
(91.67) 
-0.62 6.18 
 
Table 6.3 shows the descriptive statistics of total environmental disclosure quality and 
the quality of environmental disclosure within each of the disclosure categories for the 
third panel of data for the year 2006. The overall environmental disclosure quality 
represents 72.90% of the maximum quality of the disclosed checklist items, which is 
higher than the level of the previous two years. Moreover, compliance with 
environmental laws and standards disclosure represents the highest disclosure quality 
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of 74.55%, while environmental auditing disclosure represents the lowest disclosure  
quality of 71.39%. 
Regarding the standard skewness statistics, the presented data are normally 
distributed. It is observed that the standard skewness of total environmental disclosure 
quality and that of all disclosure categories are within the range of ±1.96 evidencing 
the normality of the data (see Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). This result is not supported 
by the standard kurtosis statistics, where the standard kurtosis of total environmental 
disclosure quality and that of all disclosure categories exceed the normality range of 
±3 (see Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006), indicating that such data are not normally 
distributed. As a consequence, a robust analysis is necessary for any hypotheses test 
related to the entire data.      
 
Table 6.4 
Descriptive Statistics Of Environmental Disclosure Quality Panel D: 2007 
Variable  
Mean 
(Median) 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min. 
(Max.) 
Standard 
Skewness 
Standard 
Kurtosis 
Total Environmental 
Disclosure  
74.07 
(74.38) 
4.66 
47.40 
 (86.27) 
-1.09 7.66 
Environmental Policies 
74.34 
 (74.36) 
5.78 
48.96    
(88.02) 
-0.55 4.29 
Product and Process-
Related Environmental 
Issues 
74.81 
(75.83) 
6.58 
45.83       
(91.67) 
-0.72 4.60 
Compliance with 
Environmental Laws 
and Standards 
74.29 
  (75.00) 
6.46 
45.83      
(91.67) 
-0.77 5.24 
Environmental 
Auditing 
72.72 
(70.83) 
5.36 
58.33       
(91.67) 
0.91 6.38 
Sustainability 
73.90 
  (70.83) 
6.74 
58.33      
(91.67) 
0.28 3.96 
Other Environmentally-
Related Information 
73.66 
 (73.61) 
5.50 
58.33    
(91.67) 
-0.18 4.61 
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Table 6.4 presents the descriptive statistics of total environmental disclosure quality 
and the quality of environmental disclosure within each of the disclosure categories 
for the fourth panel of data for the year 2007. The results show that the mean total 
environmental disclosure quality is 74.07% of the maximum quality of the disclosed 
checklist items, which varies between 47.40% and 86.27% for the lowest and highest 
UK companies disclosures respectively. This disclosure quality is higher than the 
quality of the previous three years, indicating an increased awareness of corporate  
environmental responsibility. Moreover, product and process-related environmental 
issues disclosure represents the highest disclosure quality of 74.81%, while 
environmental auditing disclosure represents the lowest disclosure quality of 72.72%. 
Product and process-related environmental issues disclosure is expected to accurately 
reveal any damage to the environment resulting from the manufacturing or use of 
products as well as environmental protection resulting from improvements in the 
products or their processing. However, environmental auditing disclosure is the 
product of the environmental auditing process that is characterized by its diversity due 
to “lack of mandatory regulation, sketchy adoption of voluntary guidelines, and 
variable quality of verification” (Hammond and Miles, 2004).    
In addition, statistics indicate that the maximum disclosure quality of 91.67% is 
presented by product and process-related environmental issues, compliance with 
environmental laws and standards, environmental auditing, sustainability and other 
environmentally- related information. However, product and process-related 
environmental issues and compliance with environmental laws and standards showed 
the minimum disclosure quality of 45.83%.  
Regarding the standard skewness statistics, the presented data are normally 
distributed. It is observed that the standard skewness of total environmental disclosure 
quality and that of all disclosure categories are within the range of ±1.96 evidencing 
the normality of the data (see Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). This result is not supported 
by the standard kurtosis statistics, where the standard kurtosis of total environmental 
disclosure quality and that of all disclosure categories exceed the normality range of 
±3 (see Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006), indicating that such data are not normally 
distributed. As a consequence, a robust analysis is necessary for any hypotheses test 
related to the entire data.  
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Table 6.5 
Descriptive Statistics Of Pooled Environmental Disclosure Quality  
Variable  
Mean 
(Median) 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min. 
(Max.) 
Standard 
Skewness 
Standard 
Kurtosis 
Total Environmental 
Disclosure  
72.74 
(73.21) 
           
5.01 
 
 
45.83  
(86.27) 
   -1.24 7.02 
Environmental Policies 
72.65 
(72.92) 
          
6.11 
 
 
45.83    
(88.02) 
-0.66 4.47 
Product and Process-
Related Environmental 
Issues 
72.87 
(72.92) 
          
6.86 
 
 
45.83       
(91.67) 
-0.52 4.02 
Compliance with 
Environmental Laws 
and Standards 
74.52  
(75.00) 
          
6.43 
 
  
45.83      
(91.67) 
-0.66 4.50 
Environmental 
Auditing 
71.54 
(70.83) 
          
4.52 
 
 
58.33       
(91.67) 
0.61 8.83 
Sustainability 
73.42  
(70.83) 
          
6.88 
 
 
33.33       
(91.67) 
-0.20 6.13 
Other Environmentally-
Related Information 
73.60 
(73.61) 
          
5.67 
 
 
45.83    
(91.67) 
-0.23 5.28 
 
Table 6.5 shows the descriptive statistics of the pooled total environmental disclosure 
quality and the quality of environmental disclosure within each of the disclosure 
categories. The overall environmental disclosure quality represents 72.74% of the 
maximum quality of the disclosed checklist items. It reflects the average increase in 
the environmental disclosure quality over the period under investigation. The average 
environmental disclosure quality is considered relatively high. Furthermore, there is a 
slightly increasing trend in the quality of environmental disclosure practices over the 
study period. Such an increasing trend over time emphasizes the increased awareness 
of corporate environmental responsibility by UK listed companies.  
Moreover, compliance with environmental laws and standards disclosure steadily 
represents the highest disclosure quality of 74.52%, given that specific high quality 
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information is necessary to report on the actions taken by the company in order to 
show commitment to and conformity with statutory environmental requirements and, 
hence, accountability to various stakeholders. On the other hand, environmental 
auditing disclosure represents the lowest disclosure quality of 71.54%. This result is 
expected given that environmental auditing disclosure is the product of the 
environmental auditing process that is characterized by “lack of mandatory regulation, 
sketchy adoption of voluntary guidelines, and variable quality of verification” 
(Hammond and Miles, 2004). 
In addition, the maximum average disclosure quality is 86.27%, while the minimum 
average disclosure quality is 45.83%, indicating a great variation in the quality of 
environmental disclosure practices among the sample companies. This finding might 
be the effect of examining a wide range of companies with different sizes and varying 
degrees of environmental sensitivity. However, statistics reveal that the maximum 
disclosure quality of 91.67% is presented by product and process-related 
environmental issues, compliance with environmental laws and standards, 
environmental auditing, sustainability and other environmentally-related information, 
which means that at least one company has mostly provided the expected high quality 
environmental disclosure within these categories. On the contrary, the minimum 
disclosure quality is 33.33%, as shown by sustainability, which means that at least one 
of the sample companies has provided low quality sustainability disclosure.  
The descriptive statistics show the normality of environmental disclosure data. It is 
observed that the standard skewness of total environmental disclosure quality and that 
of environmental disclosure quality of all disclosure categories are within the 
normally distributed range of ±1.96 (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). However, the data 
are considered to be normally distributed if the standard kurtosis statistics fall within 
the range of ±3 (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). Accordingly, environmental disclosure 
data are not normally distributed, as the standard kurtosis statistics of total 
environmental disclosure quality and that of all disclosure categories exceed the range 
of ±3 indicating that such data are not normally distributed. As a consequence, a 
robust analysis is necessary for any hypotheses test related to the entire data.   
The extent and trend of corporate environmental disclosure quality are portrayed in 
Figure 6.1.  
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Figure 6.1 
Extent And Trend Of Corporate Environme ntal Disclosure Quality 
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Figure 6.1 depicts the extent of total corporate environmental disclosure quality in 
each of the sample years, 2004-2007 inclusive. It also shows the trend in the quality 
of such disclosure over time. The average environmental disclosure quality is 
considered relatively high. Furthermore, there is a slightly increasing trend in the 
quality of environmental disclosure practices over the study period, where the mean 
environmental disclosure quality is 71.74%, 72.22%, 72.90% and 74.07% for each of 
the four years respectively. Such an increasing trend over time emphasizes the 
increased awareness of corporate environmental responsibility by UK listed 
companies. The increased quality is associated with the general increase in corporate 
reporting as guided by the recommendations set by professional accounting bodies 
and standard setters such as Global Reporting Initiative (GRI). In addition, increased 
corporate environmental responsibility can be attributed to the adoption of the 
relevant codes of best practice following the issuance of the Combined Code (2003) 
of corporate governance in the UK.  
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Using a pie chart, the distribution of the total environmental disclosure quality over 
the sample years is displayed in Figure 6.2, while the distribution of the total 
environmental disclosure quality over the different disclosure categories is 
represented in Figure 6.3.       
 
Figure 6.2 
Distribution Of Total Environmental Disclosure Quality Over Years  
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Figure 6.2 displays total corporate environmental disclosure quality distributed over 
the sample years, 2004-2007 inclusive. It shows the contribution made by each year 
towards the average quality of such disclosure. The figure also confirms the 
increasing trend in the quality of corporate environmental disclosure over the years, 
where 2004 has the smallest share, followed by 2005 and then 2006, with 2007 
accounting for the greatest quality contribution towards total disclosure quality. 
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Figure 6.3 
Distribution Of Total Environmental Disclosure Quality Over Categories 
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Figure 6.3 portrays total corporate environmental disclosure quality distributed over 
the different environmental disclosure categories. It shows the contribution made by 
each category towards the average quality of such disclosure. The pie chart indicates 
that the greatest quality component of corporate environmental disclosure is 
environmental policies disclosure, representing 19.34% of the total disclosure quality. 
The result reveals that companies are using this sort of disclosure as an effective tool 
in conveying an organization's philosophy, intentions, and objectives with respect to 
the environment and, hence, demonstrating environmental commitment and 
accountability to various stakeholders. On the other hand, sustainability disclosure 
represents the smallest quality component of corporate environmental disclosure with 
a share of 11.92% out of the total disclosure quality. This result can be attributed to 
the nature of this disclosure category, which includes broader environmental 
information on the maintenance of well being, that is technically difficult to assess. 
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6.3   EXAMINING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ENVIRONMENTAL 
        DISCLOSURE QUALITY AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE  
This section is aimed at investigating the relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms and the quality of corporate environmental disclosure practices in UK 
companies' annual reports. Corporate governance mechanisms are classified into the 
following three groups: (1) Board Characteristics: board independence, role duality, 
board size, board meetings, directors' qualifications and experience including 
educational background, community influence and cross-directorships; (2) Board 
Committees Characteristics: the presence of corporate environmental responsibility 
(CER) committee or responsible, audit committee independence, remuneration 
committee independence, nomination committee independence; and (3) Ownership 
Structure: ownership concentration, institutional ownership. In addition, the study 
controls for some corporate characteristics including company size, industry, 
profitability, leverage, liquidity, systematic risk, and cross-listing. 
The section starts with some descriptive statistics of corporate governance 
mechanisms and corporate characteristics. Correlation analyses are then undertaken to 
detect any autocorrelations among variables. Different regression analyses are carried 
out to test the validity of the developed hypotheses in examining the relationship in 
question. Two models are tested in which the dependent variables are total corporate 
environmental disclosure quality and the quality of disclosure within each category. 
Finally, sensitivity analysis is carried out to check the robustness of the main 
regression analysis. Results are discussed and analyzed in terms of the theoretical 
framework adopted and conclusions are drawn from statistical findings. 
 
6.3.1   Descriptive Statistics  
Descriptive statistics are performed for each of corporate governance mechanisms and 
corporate characteristics. The results of the descriptive statistics are shown in the 
following tables. 
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Table 6.6 
Descriptive Statistics Of Corporate Governance Mechanisms  
Variable  
Mean 
(Median) 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min. 
(Max.) 
Standard 
Skewness 
Standard 
Kurtosis 
Board Independence  
46.73 
(50.00) 
         
11.25 
 
 
0.00  
(100.00) 
   -0.10 3.82 
Role Duality 
0.04 
(0.00) 
0.19 
0.00    
(1.00) 
4.82 24.21 
Board Size 
8.96 
(8.00) 
          
2.65 
 
 
4.00       
(21.00) 
0.96 4.12 
Board Meetings 
8.91 
(8.00) 
          
3.04 
 
  
3.00      
(44.00) 
2.72 24.67 
Education 
41.79 
(40.00) 
         
17.59 
 
 
0.00    
(100.00) 
0.50 3.31 
Community Influence 
69.59  
(71.43) 
        
23.86 
 
 
0.00       
(100.00) 
-0.60 2.53 
Cross-directorships 
66.88 
(67.95) 
        
21.53 
 
  
0.00      
(100.00) 
-0.41 2.61 
Corporate Environmental 
Responsibility (CER) 
Committee Presence 
0.63 
(1.00) 
         
0.48 
 
 
0.00       
(1.00) 
-0.56 1.31 
Audit Committee 
Independence 
96.19  
(100.00) 
        
12.49 
 
 
0.00       
(100.00) 
-3.81 18.94 
Remuneration Committee 
Independence 
93.34 
(100.00) 
        
15.16 
 
 
0.00    
(100.00) 
-2.97 14.18 
Nomination Committee 
Independence 
72.51 
(71.43) 
        
17.05 
 
 
0.00  
(100.00) 
-0.24 3.52 
Ownership Concentration 
37.66  
(34.79) 
        
20.18 
 
 
0.00       
(98.61) 
0.54 2.88 
Institutional Ownership 
32.59 
(29.54) 
        
18.98 
 
 
0.00    
(98.61) 
0.78 3.33 
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Table 6.6 shows the descriptive statistics of the different corporate governance 
mechanisms examined in explaining the variability in the quality of corporate 
environmental disclosure practices. The mean board independence is 46.73%, 
indicating that approximately half of the directors are independent non-executive, 
which is in line with UK Corporate Governance Code (2010). The mean role duality 
is 0.04, reflecting compliance by the majority of the sample companies with the 
corporate governance principle of separating the CEO and chairman roles. However, 
the average board size is 8.96, being similar to that found in the Pensions and 
Investment Research Consultants (PIRC, 1998) survey of UK FTSE 350 companies of 
9.80, revealing that large board size has been traditional practice in UK companies 
over time. The average board meetings is 8.91 per year, while the mean directors' 
qualifications and experience vary between 41.79% for education, 69.59% for 
community influence, and 66.88% for cross-directorships.  
With respect to board committees, the mean presence of a CER committee on the 
board is 0.63, indicating that the majority of the sample companies support the 
formation of such committees, which in turn highlights the emphasis placed by UK 
companies on environmental issues. Moreover, the mean independence is 96.19%, 
93.34%, and 72.51% for each of the audit, remuneration, and nomination committees 
respectively, revealing the relatively high degree of independence within board 
committees. Regarding ownership structure, it can be observed that the mean 
ownership concentration and mean institutional ownership are quite close (37.66 and 
32.59 respectively), reflecting the fact that institutional ownership constitute the major 
and dominant form of blockholdings.  
These results are considered to be reasonable following the issuance of the Combined 
Code (2003) of corporate governance in the UK. It may be worth mentioning that 
although the code is voluntary, in that it provides only guidelines of best practice of 
corporate governance, London Stock Exchange listing rules require companies to 
adhere to corporate governance principals. UK listed companies follow the Combined 
Code's (2003) rule of “comply or explain”, with small companies having an excuse 
for noncompliance if adherence is infeasible or impractical. This is particularly true 
given the wide variation in most corporate governance mechanisms, ranging from a 
minimum of 0 to a maximum of 100%. Such great variation can also be attributed to 
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the unfamiliarity by some companies with the adequate application of the principles 
of the newly issued code succeeding the period under investigation.  
Regarding the standard skewness statistics, the presented data are not normally 
distributed. It is observed that the standard skewness of each of role duality, board 
meetings, audit committee independence and remuneration committee independence 
exceeds the range of ±1.96 evidencing that the normality of the data (see Haniffa and 
Hudaib, 2006). This result is confirmed by the standard kurtosis statistics, where the 
standard kurtosis for most of the corporate governance mechanisms exceed the 
normality range of ±3 (see Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006), indicating that such data are 
not normally distributed. As a consequence, a robust analysis is necessary for any 
hypotheses test related to the entire data.    
 
Table 6.7 
Descriptive Statistics Of Corporate Characteristics  
Variable  
Mean 
(Median) 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min. 
(Max.) 
Standard 
Skewness 
Standard 
Kurtosis 
Size  
5.91 
(5.82) 
           
0.74 
 
4.30  
(8.16) 
           
0.44 
 
2.82 
Industry 
0.36 
(0.00) 
          
0.48 
 
 
0.00  
(1.00) 
0.59 1.35 
Profitability  
0.87  
(0.91) 
          
0.35 
 
 
-2.00       
(1.84) 
-1.70 11.76 
Leverage 
1.17  
(1.34) 
          
0.58 
 
  
-1.70 
(2.12) 
-2.05 7.99 
Liquidity 
1.54 
(1.26) 
          
1.94 
 
 
0.00       
(50.00) 
17.75 430.14 
Systematic Risk 
1.00  
(0.99) 
          
0.35 
 
 
0.02       
(2.19) 
0.24 3.03 
Cross-Listing 
0.11 
(0.00) 
          
0.31 
 
 
0.00    
(1.00) 
2.51 7.28 
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Table 6.7 shows the descriptive statistics of the different corporate characteristics 
being controlled for. It can be observed that the sample companies are approximately 
divided equally between large and small companies (a mean of 5.91 between a 
minimum of 4.30 and a maximum of 8.16). However, the majority of the sample 
companies are operating in industries with lower environmental sensitivity (a mean of 
0.36 between a minimum of 0.00 and a maximum of 1.00). There appears to be a wide 
variation between the maximum and minimum values among most of the company's 
attributes. This result is expected reflecting the impact of examining a wide range of 
companies with different size, varying degrees of environmental sensitivity, and 
various levels of profitability, leverage, liquidity, systematic risk, as well as different 
listing status. Liquidity has the greatest variation ranging from 0% to 50%. Therefore 
these variables are highly skewed, indicating the lack of normality in distribution. 
Particularly, leverage, liquidity and cross- listing exceeds the normality range of 
±1.96. In addition, the standard kurtosis for almost all corporate characteristics, with 
the exception of size and industry, exceed the normality range of ±3 (see Haniffa and 
Hudaib, 2006), indicating that such data are not normally distributed. Accordingly, 
more attention is required in the analysis of such non-parametric data and 
interpretation of the results.  
 
6.3.2   Correlation Analysis 
Correlation analysis is carried out to detect any autocorrelation between corporate 
environmental disclosure quality and each of the different corporate governance 
mechanisms and corporate characteristics. Such bivariate analysis is undertaken using 
Pearson correlation and Spearman's Rank correlation. Both parametric and non 
parametric tests are used to examine the required relationships in order to allow for 
the non normality for some of the variables in question. In addition, correlation 
coefficients are also intended to attest the construct validity of the disclosure 
measurement and to check for multicollinearity. Pearson and Spearman's Rank 
correlation coefficients for the association between each of the total corporate 
environmental disclosure quality and the quality of disclosure within each category 
and all corporate governance and corporate characteristics included in the analysis are 
shown in the following tables. 
 333 
Table 6.8 
Pearson Correlations Of Environmental Disclosure Quality to Corporate Governance Mechanisms And Corporate Characteristics  
 TED EP PPEI CELS EA S OEI BI RD BS BM E CI CD CERP ACI RCI NCI OC IO SZ IND PRO LEV LIQ SR CL 
TED 1                           
EP 0.8881* 1                          
PPEI 
0.8449* 0.6449* 1     
                    
CELS 0.6095* 0.4131* 0.3689* 1                        
EA 0.5106* 0.4394* 0.3415* 0.2628* 1                       
S 0.5205* 0.2884* 0.4295* 0.2773* 0.1568* 1                      
OEI 
0.6026* 0.4165* 0.4126* 0.3282* 0.3650* 0.2508* 1 
                    
BI 0.1025* 0.1014* 0.1409* 0.0598 0.0263 0.0959* 0.1170* 1                    
RD -
0.0840* 
-
0.0779* 
-
0.1170* -0.0053 -0.0476 -0.0677 -0.0207 0.0149 1      
             
BS 
0.1545* 0.1180* 0.1564* 0.0791* 0.0733* 0.0974* 0.1548* 0.1565* 
-
0.0679* 1     
             
BM 
0.0437 0.0552 0.0764* 0.0402 0.007 -0.061 0.0106 0.0175 0.0153 
-
0.1317* 1    
             
E -0.0591 -0.0026 0.0068 -0.0607 0.0124 -0.007 -0.0406 0.1369* 
-
0.0852* 
-
0.2652* 0.0287 1   
             
CI -0.02 -0.0282 -0.0072 -0.0429 0.0024 -0.0209 0.0133 0.1404* -0.0006 -0.0345 0.0041 0.2218* 1               
CD 
0.2144* 0.1656* 0.1735* 0.1375* 0.0376 0.2315* 0.1851* 0.4310* 
-
0.2145* 0.3368* -0.0551 
-
0.0719* 0.0809* 1 
             
CERP 
0.2243* 0.1573* 0.2303* 0.1736* 0.0711* 0.1093* 0.1097* 0.0964* 
-
0.0970* 0.1995* 
-
0.0732* -0.0335 0.034 0.2309* 1      
       
ACI 0.0945* 0.1192* 0.0930* 0.0505 0.0281 -0.0133 0.0599 0.3994* 
-
0.0760* -0.0297 -0.027 0.1595* 0.05 0.0604 0.0542 1     
       
RCI 0.0089 0.0315 -0.0194 0.0055 -0.017 -0.0649 0.0316 0.3264* -0.0251 -0.064 0.0133 0.1557* 0.0719* 0.0229 -0.0002 0.7453* 1           
NCI 
0.0358 0.0422 0.0497 -0.0036 
-
0.0785* -0.0396 0.0044 0.3052* -0.0266 -0.0635 0.0068 0.1506* 0.0436 0.039 0.0235 0.4150* 0.4345* 1   
       
OC 
-
0.1405* 
-
0.1294* 
-
0.1197* -0.0422 -0.0384 -0.006 
-
0.1279* 
-
0.2789* 0.1235* 
-
0.2332* 0.0053 0.0189 -0.0188 
-
0.2311* 
-
0.1482* 
-
0.2627* 
-
0.2301* 0.0372 1  
       
IO -0.0388 -0.0316 -0.0543 0.0028 0.0311 0.0134 
-
0.0928* 
-
0.1506* -0.0504 
-
0.1128* 0.0069 0.0176 -0.0546 
-
0.0758* 
-
0.0877* 
-
0.2123* 
-
0.2041* 0.0297 0.8384* 1 
       
SZ 0.2614* 0.2319* 0.3002* 0.1017* 0.0872* 0.1530* 0.2510* 0.4072* 
-
0.1199* 0.6647* -0.0519 
-
0.1386* 0.0207 0.4873* 0.2537* 0.1353* 0.0285 -0.009 
-
0.4584* 
-
0.3314* 1       
IND 
0.1322* 0.1486* 0.0266 0.0663 0.0868* -0.0306 0.0868* 0.0061 0.0174 0.0473 
-
0.1062* -0.0403 -0.0052 0.036 0.0943* 0.0498 0.0813* -0.0456 
-
0.1252* 
-
0.0696* 0.0401 1      
PRO 0.0393 0.0221 0.0624 0.0165 0.0427 -0.0359 -0.036 0.0193 -0.0324 0.0629 -0.0489 -0.0106 0.0809* -0.0454 0.0978* 0.0288 0.0469 -0.0467 -0.052 
-
0.0750* -0.001 0.0445 1     
LEV 0.1125* 0.1333* 0.1113* 0.0372 0.0132 0.0493 0.0707 0.0755* 
-
0.0713* 0.1806* -0.0208 0.0166 -0.0175 0.1324* 0.0974* 0.0720* 0.0002 0.0141 
-
0.0964* -0.0387 0.2922* 
-
0.0951* 
-
0.0845* 1    
LIQ -
0.0943* 
-
0.0957* 
-
0.0988* -0.0705 -0.0222 -0.0532 
-
0.0902* -0.0452 0.0272 -0.0605 -0.0572 0.033 -0.0142 -0.052 
-
0.0828* 0.0293 0.0476 -0.0053 -0.0229 -0.0372 
-
0.1502* 0.0800* 0.1021* 
-
0.3231* 1   
SR 
0.1402* 0.1818* 0.1272* 0.1078* 0.0666 0.0505 0.0349 0.0251 -0.0263 0.0125 -0.0336 0.0613 
-
0.1509* 0.0633 0.056 0.0179 0.003 
-
0.0816* -0.0284 0.063 0.0978* 0.2084* -0.0373 0.0856* 
-
0.0483 1  
CL -0.0203 -0.0284 0.0048 0.0888* 0.0898* -0.002 0.0813* 0.0989* 
-
0.0698* 0.2982* -0.0442 0.0234 0.0338 0.1678* 0.0114 0.0003 0.0038 0.0587 -0.0186 -0.0424 0.2363* -0.057 -0.0043 0.049 -0.019 
-
0.0586 1 
* Significance at confidence level of 95%. TED Total Environmental Disclosure, EP Environmental Policies, PPEI Product and Process-Related Environmental Issues, CELS Compliance with Environmental Laws and Standards, EA Environmental Auditing, S Sustainabili ty , OEI Other 
Environmentally-Related Information, BI Board Independence, RD Role Duality , BS Board Size, BM Board Meetings, E Education, CI Community  Influence, CD Cross-Directorships, CERP Corporate Environmental Responsibility  (CER) Committee Presence, ACI Audit Committee 
Independence, RCI Remuneration Committee Independence, NCI Nomination Committee Independence, OC Ownership concentration, IO Institutional Ownership, SZ Size, IND Industry , PRO Profitability , LEV Leverage, LIQ Liquidity , SR Systematic Risk, CL Cross-Listing.  
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Table 6.9 
Spearman Correlations Of Environmental Disclosure Quality to Corporate Governance Mechanisms And Corporate Characteristics  
 TED EP PPEI CELS EA S OEI BI RD BS BM E CI CD CERP ACI RCI NCI OC IO SZ IND PRO LEV LIQ SR CL 
TED 
1 
              
             
EP 0.8280* 1                          
PPEI 
0.7497* 0.5052* 1            
             
CELS 0.4899* 0.2589* 0.2475* 1                        
EA 0.3794* 0.3482* 0.2634* 0.1725* 1                       
S 0.4594* 0.2131* 0.3944* 0.2800* 0.1529* 1                      
OEI 
0.5156* 0.3295* 0.2809* 0.2888* 0.2772* 0.2761* 1        
             
BI 0.1986* 0.2438* 0.1568* 0.0458 0.0814 0.0876 0.0563 1                    
RD -0.0719 -0.0053 
-
0.1187* 0.0122 -0.0286 -0.0869 0.0145 -0.0346 1      
             
BS 
0.1567* 0.1264* 0.1213* 0.1084* 0.0417 0.1071* 0.1980* 0.1721* 0.0071 1     
             
BM 
0.1750* 0.1724* 0.1130* 0.0785 -0.0101 -0.0267 0.0574 0.06 0.0177 
-
0.1004* 1    
             
E 0.077 0.098 0.0634 0.014 0.0169 0.0618 -0.0314 0.1754* -0.0875 
-
0.2901* 0.1270* 1   
             
CI -0.0722 -0.0296 -0.0756 
-
0.1102* -0.0073 -0.0684 0.0476 0.2161* -0.0487 -0.0085 -0.0918 0.2555* 1  
             
CD 
0.1752* 0.1561* 0.0741 0.1286* -0.0172 0.1910* 0.1213* 0.4356* 
-
0.1203* 0.2942* 
-
0.1070* 0.0626 0.2639* 1 
             
CERP 
0.1194* 0.0824 0.1043* 0.0833 0.0193 0.1137* -0.0146 0.0925 -0.0234 0.0675 0.0435 0.2117* 0.1082* 0.1786* 
1 
             
ACI 0.1014* 0.1684* 0.0556 -0.0843 0.0768 -0.0651 0.0085 0.2151* 0.0215 
-
0.1379* 0.0929 0.0531 -0.0072 -0.0589 0.0013 1            
RCI -0.0262 -0.0031 -0.0773 -0.0449 -0.0383 -0.0691 0.0286 0.1212* 0.0463 -0.0226 0.0478 0.0695 0.0783 0.0057 -0.0361 0.3488* 1           
NCI 
0.1240* 0.1524* 0.0943 0.0239 -0.0185 -0.0155 -0.0148 0.2209* 0.0492 0.0154 0.034 0.1292* 0.045 -0.0038 0.044 0.1966* 0.2712* 1          
OC 
-
0.1155* 
-
0.1383* -0.0144 -0.0378 0.0027 0.0321 
-
0.1520* 
-
0.2066* 0.0913 
-
0.1947* 
-
0.1619* -0.012 
-
0.1149* 
-
0.1561* -0.059 
-
0.1125* 
-
0.1475* 0.0684 1         
IO -0.0476 -0.0687 0.0282 0.0201 0.0415 0.0485 
-
0.1456* 
-
0.1005* 0.0377 
-
0.1292* 
-
0.1433* -0.0052 -0.0831 -0.0744 -0.0485 -0.0984 
-
0.1619* 0.035 0.8841* 1        
SZ 0.2318* 0.2399* 0.1809* 0.0634 0.0429 0.096 0.1961* 0.3681* -0.0962 0.6650* -0.0389 
-
0.1170* 0.1422* 0.4518* 0.1255* -0.0458 -0.0235 -0.0251 
-
0.3782* 
-
0.2934* 1       
IND 
-0.0117 -0.0222 -0.0767 -0.0095 0.075 -0.0316 0.0566 -0.0925 -0.0149 0.0556 
-
0.1357* -0.0952 -0.0424 0.0021 0.0158 0.0074 0.034 
-
0.1004* 
-
0.1134* -0.0838 -0.0054 1      
PRO 0.0378 0.0614 0.0467 -0.0542 0.1360* -0.0575 0.0156 0.1441* 
-
0.1180* 0.0986 -0.0155 -0.0197 0.0017 0.0269 0.0235 0.1144* 0.0785 
-
0.1643* 
-
0.1176* -0.0679 0.0713 0.1025* 1     
LEV 0.0525 0.1438* -0.0197 0.0396 -0.0496 0.0523 0.0341 0.0296 0.0697 0.0874 -0.0244 0.0857 -0.0023 0.1131* 0.0745 -0.0475 -0.0928 -0.0084 -0.0203 -0.0025 0.1946* 
-
0.1542* 
-
0.1848* 1    
LIQ 
-0.0722 -0.057 -0.0915 -0.076 0.0482 
-
0.1124* -0.0601 
-
0.1054* 
-
0.1030* 
-
0.1691* 
-
0.1043* -0.0759 -0.0939 -0.0834 
-
0.1646* 0.0431 0.0548 
-
0.1668* -0.0032 0.0581 
-
0.2615* 0.2988* 0.2236* 
-
0.2861* 1   
SR 
0.1067* 0.0807 0.1457* 0.0823 0.0411 0.0156 -0.0161 -0.0953 -0.0413 -0.0663 0.1057* 0.1021* 
-
0.1407* 
-
0.1249* 0.0409 0.0082 0.0401 0.0035 0.0422 0.0857 -0.0704 0.2065* -0.0306 -0.0358 0.1219* 1  
CL 0.0915 0.098 0.052 0.1138* 0.1438* 0.0064 0.077 0.1395* -0.0337 0.3582* -0.0793 -0.0481 0.0294 0.2674* 0.0391 -0.0705 0.0526 0.0942 -0.0366 -0.0525 0.3864* 0.0646 0.0291 -0.0325 
-
0.2154* 
-
0.0451 1 
* Significance at confidence level of 95%. TED Total Environmental Disclosure, EP Environmental Policies, PPEI Product and Process-Related Environmental Issues, CELS Compliance with Environmental Laws and Standards, EA Environmental Auditing, S Sustainabili ty , OEI Other 
Environmentally-Related Information, BI Board Independence, RD Role Duality , BS Board Size, BM Board Meetings, E Education, CI Community  Influence, CD Cross-Directorships, CERP Corporate Environmental Responsibility  (CER) Committee Presence, ACI Audit Committee 
Independence, RCI Remuneration Committee Independence, NCI Nomination Committee Independence, OC Ownership concentration, IO Institutional Ownership, SZ Size, IND Industry , PRO Profitability , LEV Leverage, LIQ Liquidity , SR Systematic Risk, CL Cross-Listing.  
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Table 6.8 presents a Pearson correlation matrix for the variables included in the 
analysis. Pearson correlation coefficients show association of each of the total 
corporate environmental disclosure quality and the quality of disclosure within each 
category to all corporate governance and corporate characteristics included in the 
analysis. The significant association is identified at confidence level of 95%. Results 
indicate that at this level of environmental disclosure quality there is a significant 
association between total environmental disclosure quality and most corporate 
governance characteristics, including board independence, role duality, board size, 
cross-directorships, corporate environmental responsibility (CER) committee 
presence, audit committee independence and ownership concentration. Referred to the 
correlation coefficients, there is a positive relationship between total enviro nmental 
disclosure quality and each of board independence, board size, cross-directorships, 
corporate environmental responsibility (CER) committee presence and audit 
committee independence, while there is a negative relationship between total 
environmental disclosure quality and each of role duality and ownership 
concentration. Most of these results are in agreement with research hypotheses 
regarding the association between total environmental disclosure quality and the 
different corporate governance mechanisms. 
Regarding the different categories of environmental disclosure, there is a s ignificant 
positive relationship between board independence and disclosure quality of each of 
environmental policies, product and process-related environmental issues, 
sustainability and other environmentally- related information. There is a consistently 
significant negative relationship between role duality and disclosure quality of each of 
environmental policies and product and process-related environmental issues. Board 
size is significantly and positively associated with disclosure quality of each of the 
disclosure categories. Board meetings are associated with only product and process-
related environmental issues quality. However, cross-directorships have a persistent 
significant and positive relationship to disclosure quality of almost all of the 
disclosure categories. Similarly, corporate environmental responsibility (CER) 
committee presence is significantly and positively associated with disclosure quality 
of each of environmental disclosure categories. Audit committee independence is 
significantly and positively associated with disclosure quality of each of 
environmental policies and product and process-related environmental issues, while 
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nomination committee independence is significantly and negatively associated with 
only environmental auditing disclosure quality. Finally, as to the ownership structure, 
ownership concentration is significantly and negatively associated with disclosure 
quality of each of environmental policies, product and process-related environmental 
issues and other environmentally-related information, while institutional ownership is 
significantly and negatively associated with only other environmentally-related 
information quality.   
Results also reveal a significant positive relationship between total environmental 
disclosure quality and corporate characteristics including company size, industry, 
leverage and systematic risk, while a significant negative relationship between total 
environmental disclosure quality and liquidity. No significant relationship is detected 
between total environmental disclosure quality and each of profitability and cross-
listing. With respect to environmental disclosure categories, the results confirmed the 
significant positive association of company size with disclosure quality of all 
disclosure categories. However, for the other corporate characteristics including 
industry, leverage, liquidity, systematic risk and cross- listing, the results are partially 
supported for some of the disclosure categories. Nevertheless, the insignificant 
relationship of profitability to disclosure quality is consistently confirmed for all 
environmental disclosure categories.  
Table 6.9 presents a Spearman correlation matrix for the variables included in the 
analysis. Spearman's rank correlation coefficients show association of each of the 
total corporate environmental disclosure quality and the quality of disclosure within 
each category to all corporate governance and corporate characteristics included in the 
analysis. The significant association is identified at confidence level of 95%. Results 
for total corporate environmental disclosure quality strongly support the findings of 
the Pearson test regarding all corporate governance variables, except for role duality, 
board meetings and nomination committee independence, where the former one was 
no longer significant while the latter two were found to be significantly and positively 
associated with total disclosure quality. Moreover, concerning the different categories 
of environmental disclosure, Spearman coefficients show consistent results with 
Pearson correlations of almost all corporate governance variables, including board 
independence, role duality, board size, board meetings, cross-directorships, corporate 
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environmental responsibility (CER) committee presence, audit committee 
independence, ownership concentration and institutional ownership, to disclosure 
quality of some of the disclosure categories, with that of other categories diminishing 
in significance. However, community influential directors was found to be associated 
with disclosure quality of compliance with environmental laws and standards, while 
nomination committee independence is correlated to environmental policies 
disclosure quality but not to that of environmental auditing. Most of these results are 
in agreement with research hypotheses regarding the association between 
environmental disclosure quality and the different corporate governance mechanisms. 
Spearman coefficients also support the results of the Pearson test regarding the 
significant positive relationship between total environmental disclosure quality and 
each of company size and systematic risk, and insignificant relationship with each of 
profitability and cross- listing. However, unlike Pearson coefficients, industry, 
leverage and liquidity appeared to have insignificant association with total disclosure 
quality. With respect to environmental disclosure categories, the results confirmed the 
significant positive association of company size with disclosure quality of most 
disclosure categories as well as the insignificant association of industry with total 
disclosure quality. However, for the other corporate characteristics including 
profitability, leverage, liquidity, systematic risk and cross- listing, the results are 
partially supported for some of the disclosure categories. 
 
6.3.2.1   Construct Validity  
Construct validity of the disclosure measurement focuses on consistency with 
theoretical expectations and evidence from literature. Correlation analysis is 
suggested as a means by which construct validity can be established (Sekaran, 2003). 
Correlation coefficients have been used in prior disclosure studies to assess the 
validity of disclosure scores (see Ahmed and Courtis, 1999; Botosan, 1997; Cheng 
and Courtenay, 2006). Using correlation analysis, two tests are performed to check 
the construct validity of the disclosure indices. Primarily, correlation between the 
disclosure index and its component indices has been employed. In addition, 
correlation between disclosure indices and significant explanatory variables identified 
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in prior studies has been used to validate the disclosure index (see Ahmed and 
Courtis, 1999; Botosan, 1997). 
Following these studies, correlation analysis of the total environmental disclosure 
quality index and its component indices of environmental disclosure categories was 
conducted. The results of Pearson correlation and Spearman's rank correlation are 
shown in Table 6.8 and Table 6.9 respectively. Both Pearson and Spearman 
correlation coefficients show that the disclosure quality indices of all environmental 
disclosure categories are highly correlated to the total environmental disclosure 
quality index. This indicates how well the classification or grouping scheme interprets 
the total score. Moreover, it is expected that a company's disclosure strategies are 
similar as to the different categories of disclosure (Botosan, 1997; Cheng and 
Courtenay, 2006). In this respect, the results also reveal that the quality indices of the 
different environmental disclosure categories are correlated to each other.  
In addition, two corporate characteristics documented by prior disclosure studies to be 
key determinants in explaining the variation in disclosure practices are company size 
and industry. Therefore, the correlation between the quality indices of each of total 
environmental disclosure and its categories and each of company size and industry is 
investigated. Pearson correlation coefficients indicate that total environmental 
disclosure quality index is correlated to each of the two corporate characteristics. 
Results also show that disclosure quality indices of almost all environmental 
disclosure categories are correlated to each of company size and industry (see Table 
6.8). Spearman correlation coefficients confirmed such results as to company size (see 
Table 6.9). Taken together the results confirm that disclosure quality indices have a 
considerable degree of validity in that they consistently capture the quality of 
environmental disclosure practices in the annual reports.    
 
6.3.2.2   Multicollinearity Check 
Multicollinearity implies the existence of a linear relationship between two or more 
explanatory variables. Multicollinearity makes it difficult to differentiate the 
individual effects of the explanatory variables and regression estimators may be 
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biased in that they tend to have large variances (Murray, 2006). Furthermore, if there 
is a perfect linear relationship among the explanatory variables, the estimates for a 
regression model cannot be uniquely computed. The possible existence of 
multicollinearity is tested based on the correlation matrix incorporating all the 
independent and control variables. Both Pearson and Spearman's rank correlation 
matrices show that correlation coefficients are less than 0.8, the limit or cut off 
correlation percentage commonly suggested by prior studies after which 
multicollinearity is likely to exist (see Gujarati, 2003). These results suggest that there 
is no need to be concerned about the correlation of either the independent variables to 
each other, the control variables to each other, or the independent variables to the 
control variables.  
An exception is the coefficient of correlation between the two independent variables 
representing ownership structure. Specifically, there is a slight multicollinearity 
between ownership concentration and institutional ownership, where Pearson and 
Spearman correlation coefficients are 0.8384 and 0.8841 respectively (see Table 6.8 
and Table 6.9). This result is expected given that institutional ownership constitute the 
major and dominant form of blockholdings. However, as such multicollinearity is 
only slightly in excess of the optimal limit, results indicate that multicollinearity is 
unlikely to be a potential problem. Nevertheless, the statistical effect of including both 
ownership concentration and institutional ownership in the same regression model 
will be further examined.  
The possible existence of multicollinearity is further tested through computing the 
variance inflation factor (VIF). According to Gujarati (2003), there is no problem if 
the VIF is less than 10 and the tolerance coefficient is greater than 0.10. Table 6.10 
presents the variance inflation factor (VIF) and tolerance coefficients of each of the 
explanatory variable. The table shows that the highest VIF is 5.21 and the mean VIF 
is 1.91. Moreover, the lowest tolerance coefficient is 0.192. Therefore, the results of 
VIF and tolerance coefficients indicate that there is no unacceptable level of 
multicollinearity among the current study's variables, confirming that there is no need 
to be concerned about the correlation between the explanatory variables.   
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Table 6.10  
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) Of Corporate Governance Mechanisms And 
Corporate Characteristics 
Variable  VIF Tolerance  1/VIF 
Ownership Concentration 5.21 0.192 
Institutional Ownership 4.57 0.219 
Size  2.99 0.335 
Audit Committee Independence  2.72 0.368 
Remuneration Committee Independence  2.58 0.388 
Board Size 2.23 0.448 
Board Independence 1.94 0.517 
Cross-directorships 1.63 0.614 
Nomination Committee Independence 1.47 0.682 
Liquidity  1.28 0.783 
Leverage 1.25 0.802 
Education 1.24 0.808 
Cross-Listing 1.22 0.823 
Role Duality 1.20 0.836 
Industry 1.18 0.847 
Systematic Risk 1.13 0.883 
Corporate Environmental Responsibility 
(CER) Committee Presence 
1.13 0.886 
Community Influence 1.13 0.887 
Profitability 1.09 0.916 
Board Meetings 1.08 0.927 
Mean VIF 1.91 
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6.3.3   Regression Analysis 
Multiple regression analysis using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) longitudinal panel 
regression with robust standard error is employed to test the developed research 
hypotheses. Such multivariate analysis is undertaken to examine the relationship 
between corporate environmental disclosure quality and each of the different 
corporate governance mechanisms after controlling for corporate characteristics. Two 
models are tested in which the dependent variables are total corporate environmental 
disclosure quality and the quality of disclosure within each disclosure category. 
In addition, Generalized Least Squares (GLS) regression is performed to further test 
the research hypotheses and to attest the reliability of the main OLS regression results.  
GLS takes into consideration that the variances of the observations might be unequal 
and/or there might be a certain degree of correlation between the observations. 
Finally, sensitivity analysis using pooled cross-sectional Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) regression with robust standard error is carried out to check the sensitivity and, 
hence, the robustness of the main regression analysis. Results are discussed and 
analyzed in terms of the theoretical framework adopted and conclusions are drawn 
from statistical findings. 
 
6.3.3.1   OLS Regression Analysis 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) longitudinal panel regression with robust standard 
error is employed to test the developed research hypotheses. The advantage of panel 
data regression is that it takes the time effect into account. The robust standard error 
option is applied in order to adjust the OLS parametric test to fit with non-parametric 
data, as shown by the descriptive statistics indicating that the study's data are not 
normally distributed. The results of the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression of 
corporate governance on environmental disclosure quality are shown in Table 6.11.   
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Table 6.11        
OLS Longitudinal Panel Regression With Robust Standard Error Of Corporate Governance On Environmental Disclosure Quality  
 TED EP PPEI CELS  EA  S OEI 
 Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
Intercept 60.13*** 0.000 54.60*** 0.000 55.14*** 0.001 72.77*** 0.000 71.23*** 0.000 67.87*** 0.003 61.99*** 0.000 
BI -0.02 0.388 -0.03** 0.045 0.01 0.811 0.01 0.479 0.01 0.784 -0.01 0.740 -0.01 0.397 
RD -1.90* 0.069 -1.52* 0.076 -5.35** 0.028 2.19 0.156 -1.25 0.432 -5.98** 0.025 0.55 0.873 
BS -0.03 0.836 0.01 0.964 -0.10 0.428 -0.06 0.716 0.04 0.373 0.05 0.859 -0.06 0.676 
BM 0.20**  0.033 0.28*** 0.007 0.23**  0.023 0.04 0.661 -0.01 0.766 0.00 0.998 0.02 0.457 
E 0.01 0.566 0.02 0.171 0.01 0.619 -0.01 0.526 0.01 0.605 0.01 0.490 0.00 0.799 
CI -0.01 0.128 -0.01 0.161 -0.03** 0.016 -0.01 0.541 0.00 0.864 -0.03 0.200 -0.01 0.217 
CD 0.02 0.110 0.02 0.286 0.00 0.869 0.03*  0.051 -0.01 0.610 0.08**  0.026 0.03*  0.059 
CERP 1.10 0.191 0.46 0.585 2.26*** 0.005 1.90 0.191 0.25 0.599 0.84 0.142 0.25 0.466 
ACI 0.04 0.162 0.06*  0.072 0.04 0.292 0.05*  0.070 0.02 0.381 -0.01 0.920 0.02*  0.068 
RCI -0.02 0.202 -0.02 0.219 -0.05** 0.017 -0.02 0.462 0.00 0.787 0.00 0.915 0.01 0.749 
NCI 0.00 0.951 0.00 0.963 0.02 0.175 -0.01 0.841 -0.04** 0.031 -0.02 0.550 -0.01 0.594 
OC 0.00 0.806 -0.01 0.742 -0.01 0.675 -0.02** 0.021 -0.03 0.195 0.04 0.179 0.03 0.111 
IO 0.01 0.772 0.01 0.764 0.02 0.560 0.03**  0.035 0.04 0.115 -0.03 0.133 -0.04** 0.024 
SZ 1.34*  0.099 1.60*  0.051 2.53*  0.093 -0.74 0.153 0.04 0.908 0.63 0.544 1.85**  0.037 
IND 1.33**  0.011 1.79**  0.020 0.11 0.810 1.09**  0.049 0.72 0.151 -0.46 0.362 1.68*** 0.002 
PRO 0.33 0.592 0.30 0.734 1.11 0.230 0.88 0.270 0.16 0.668 -1.44 0.215 -0.37 0.679 
LEV 0.05 0.887 0.48 0.381 -0.01 0.981 -0.37 0.635 -0.05 0.845 -0.17 0.784 0.03 0.956 
LIQ -0.64** 0.021 -0.47* 0.052 -0.68** 0.039 -1.51*** 0.000 -0.23 0.431 -0.29 0.578 -1.08 0.111 
SR 0.83 0.297 1.44 0.234 1.19 0.137 1.64 0.182 -0.08 0.906 0.81 0.529 -0.18 0.880 
CL -0.08 0.896 -0.14 0.832 -0.91 0.302 1.72**  0.019 1.43*  0.056 -1.88 0.237 -0.36 0.462 
Adjusted R
2
 (%) 15.90 14.22 17.94 9.41 4.61 9.59 11.02 
***p ≤ 0.01, **p ≤ 0.05, and *p ≤ 0.10.   
TED Total Environmental Disclosure, EP Environmental Policies, PPEI Product and Process-Related Environmental Issues, CELS  Compliance with Environmental Laws and Standards, EA 
Environmental Auditing, S Sustainability, OEI Other Environmentally-Related Information, BI Board Independence, RD Role Duality, BS Board Size, BM Board Meetings, E Education, CI 
Community Influence, CD Cross-Directorships, CERP Corporate Environmental Responsibility (CER) Committee Presence, ACI Audit Committee Independence, RCI Remuneration 
Committee Independence, NCI Nomination Committee Independence, OC Ownership concentration, IO Institutional Ownership, SZ Size, IND Industry, PRO Profitability, LEV Leverage, 
LIQ Liquidity , SR Systematic Risk, CL Cross-Listing.  
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Table 6.11 presents the results of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) longitudinal panel 
regression with robust standard error of corporate governance on environmental 
disclosure quality. Results show a significant positive association between total 
environmental disclosure quality and board meetings (p ≤ 0.05), while a significant 
negative association of total environmental disclosure quality with role duality (p ≤ 
0.10). However, no significant association is found between total environmental 
disclosure quality and each of board independence, board size, directors’ education, 
community influence, cross-directorships, corporate environmental responsibility 
(CER) committee presence, audit committee independence, remuneration committee 
independence, nomination committee independence, ownership concentration and 
institutional ownership. Nevertheless, the positive relationship of total environmental 
disclosure quality to each of directors’ education, cross-directorships, corporate 
environmental responsibility (CER) committee presence, audit committee 
independence, nomination committee independence and institutional ownership are in 
the expected direction. Contrary to expectation, however, a negative relationship of 
total environmental disclosure quality to each of board independence, board size, 
community influence and remuneration committee independence is documented, 
while a positive relationship to ownership concentration is found. The adjusted R 
Squared of the model is 15.90% indicating that 15.90% of the changes in total 
environmental disclosure quality is explained by the changes in its examined 
determinants.  
Regarding the different categories of environmental disclosure, there is a s ignificant 
negative relationship between board independence and environmental policies 
disclosure quality (p ≤ 0.05). Similarly, there is a significant negative relationship 
between role duality and disclosure quality of each of environmental policies (p ≤ 
0.10), product and process-related environmental issues (p ≤ 0.05) and sustainability 
(p ≤ 0.05). However, board size has insignificant association with the disclosure 
quality of all of the disclosure categories. There is also a strong significant positive 
relationship between board meetings and disclosure quality of each of environmental 
policies (p ≤ 0.01) and product and process-related environmental issues (p ≤ 0.05).  
With respect to directors' qualifications and experience, although education is 
associated with the disclosure quality of none of the disclosure categories, community 
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influence has significant negative association with only product and process-related 
environmental issues disclosure quality (p ≤ 0.05), while cross-directorships has a 
significant positive relationship to the disclosure quality of each of compliance with 
environmental laws and standards (p ≤ 0.10), sustainability (p ≤ 0.05) and other 
environmentally- related information (p ≤ 0.10).  
Referring to board committees, corporate environmental responsibility (CER) 
committee presence has a strong significant positive relationship to product and 
process-related environmental issues disclosure quality (p ≤ 0.01). There is only 
marginally significant positive relationship between audit committee independence 
and disclosure quality of each of environmental policies (p ≤ 0.10), compliance with 
environmental laws and standards (p ≤ 0.10) and other environmentally-related 
information (p ≤ 0.10). However, a significant negative relationship is detected 
between remuneration committee independence and product and process-related 
environmental issues disclosure quality (p ≤ 0.05) as well as between nomination 
committee independence and environmental auditing disclosure quality (p ≤ 0.05).  
As for ownership structure, it can be observed that ownership concentration is 
significantly and negatively associated with only compliance with environmental laws 
and standards disclosure quality (p ≤ 0.05). However, institutional ownership is found 
to be significantly and positively associated with compliance with environmental laws 
and standards disclosure quality (p ≤ 0.05), but significantly and negatively associated 
with other environmentally-related information disclosure quality (p ≤ 0.05).   
Results also reveal a significant positive relationship between total environmental 
disclosure quality and corporate characteristics including company size (p ≤ 0.10) and 
industry (p ≤ 0.05), while a significant negative relationship to liquidity (p ≤ 0.05). No 
significant relationship is found between total environmental disclosure quality and 
each of profitability, leverage, systematic risk and cross- listing. Concerning 
environmental disclosure categories, the results confirmed the significant positive 
association of each of company size and industry, as well as the significant negative 
association of liquidity, with the disclosure quality of some disclosure categories. 
Similarly, the insignificant relationship of the other corporate characteristics, 
including profitability, leverage and systematic risk, to disclosure quality is 
consistently confirmed for all environmental disclosure categories. However, for 
 333
cross- listing, the results partially supported the insignificant relationship for most of 
the disclosure categories, but not for others where a significant positive association is  
detected.  
 
6.3.3.2   GLS Regression Analysis 
Generalized Least Squares (GLS) longitudinal panel regression with robust standard 
error is carried out to further test the research hypotheses and to attest the reliability of 
the main OLS regression results. GLS is a technique for estimating the unknown 
parameters in a linear regression model. GLS is applied when the variances of the 
observations are unequal or when there is a certain degree of correlation between the 
observations. Unequal variances may exist due to the presence of outliers and 
skewness. In this regard, it is preferable to give less weight for observations arising 
from populations with greater variability than the weight given for observations from 
populations with smaller variability. However, OLS does not make use of the 
information pertaining to the unequal variability of the dependent variable as it 
assigns equal weight to each observation (See Gujarati, 2003). 
The advantage of panel data regression is that it takes the time effect into account.  
The robust standard error option is applied in order to adjust the GLS parametric test 
to fit with non-parametric data, as shown by the descriptive statistics indicating that 
the study's data are not normally distributed. The results of the Generalized Least 
Squares (GLS) regression of corporate governance on environmental disclosure 
quality are shown in Table 6.12.   
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Table 6.12        
GLS Longitudinal Panel Regression With Robust Standard Error Of Corporate Governance On Environmental Disclosure Quality  
 TED EP PPEI CELS  EA  S OEI 
 Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
Intercept 58.52*** 0.000 52.68*** 0.000 52.44*** 0.000 74.15*** 0.000 69.40*** 0.000 65.94*** 0.000 61.29*** 0.000 
BI -0.02  0.408 -0.03** 0.016 0.01 0.708 0.01 0.516 0.01 0.649 0.00 0.994 -0.01 0.401 
RD  -1.84*** 0.001 -1.39*** 0.003 -5.04*** 0.000 2.11*  0.099 -0.94 0.417 -6.04*** 0.000 0.64 0.835 
BS -0.06 0.638 -0.03 0.826 -0.16 0.143 -0.04 0.820 0.00 0.971 0.03 0.907 -0.07 0.580 
BM 0.21*** 0.000 0.28*** 0.000 0.24*** 0.000 0.04 0.659 -0.01 0.764 0.00 0.986 0.02 0.292 
E 0.01 0.477 0.03*  0.055 0.01 0.531 -0.01 0.448 0.01 0.507 0.01 0.464 0.00 0.822 
CI -0.01** 0.035 -0.01* 0.058 -0.03*** 0.000 -0.01 0.498 0.00 0.928 -0.03 0.114 -0.01 0.120 
CD 0.02**  0.026 0.02 0.214 0.00 0.955 0.04*** 0.002 -0.01 0.448 0.08*** 0.000 0.03*** 0.004 
CERP 1.14*  0.082 0.50 0.510 2.31*** 0.000 1.86 0.101 0.30 0.507 0.87**  0.031 0.26 0.383 
ACI 0.05**  0.026 0.08*** 0.002 0.05*  0.089 0.04**  0.044 0.04*  0.097 0.01 0.821 0.02*** 0.000 
RCI -0.03* 0.071 -0.04* 0.070 -0.07*** 0.000 -0.01 0.694 -0.02 0.344 -0.01 0.686 0.00 0.909 
NCI 0.00 0.865 0.00 0.956 0.02*  0.054 -0.01 0.780 -0.03*** 0.000 -0.02 0.572 -0.01 0.583 
OC 0.00 0.842 0.00 0.771 -0.01 0.661 -0.02*** 0.000 -0.03* 0.070 0.04*  0.059 0.03**  0.018 
IO 0.01 0.605 0.01 0.607 0.02 0.430 0.03*** 0.001 0.05**  0.012 -0.02** 0.040 -0.04*** 0.000 
SZ 1.48*** 0.009 1.76*** 0.000 2.76*** 0.008 -0.84** 0.041 0.21 0.552 0.69 0.438 1.89*** 0.000 
IND 1.32*** 0.000 1.77*** 0.000 0.11 0.800 1.12*** 0.002 0.70**  0.044 -0.46 0.305 1.68*** 0.000 
PRO 0.62 0.277 0.67 0.421 1.59**  0.025 0.57 0.386 0.56 0.147 -1.06 0.192 -0.25 0.739 
LEV 0.05 0.882 0.45 0.315 0.00 0.994 -0.36 0.613 -0.10 0.634 -0.21 0.714 0.04 0.939 
LIQ -0.64*** 0.000 -0.47*** 0.002 -0.69*** 0.001 -1.49*** 0.000 -0.26 0.295 -0.35 0.451 -1.08** 0.025 
SR 1.01*  0.083 1.67**  0.047 1.51**  0.024 1.45 0.146 0.17 0.770 1.01 0.383 -0.13 0.908 
CL -0.01 0.984 -0.05*** 0.009 -0.86 0.202 1.67*** 0.000 1.46*** 0.003 -1.90 0.138 -0.35 0.398 
Adjusted R
2
 (%) 16.05 14.37  18.10 9.48 4.90 9.70 11.04 
***p ≤ 0.01, **p ≤ 0.05, and *p ≤ 0.10.   
TED Total Environmental Disclosure, EP Environmental Policies, PPEI Product and Process-Related Environmental Issues, CELS  Compliance with Environmental Laws and Standards, EA 
Environmental Auditing, S Sustainability, OEI Other Environmentally-Related Information, BI Board Independence, RD Role Duality, BS Board Size, BM Board Meetings, E Education, CI 
Community Influence, CD Cross-Directorships, CERP Corporate Environmental Responsibility (CER) Committee Presence, ACI Audit Committee Independence, RCI Remuneration 
Committee Independence, NCI Nomination Committee Independence, OC Ownership concentration, IO Institutional Ownership, SZ Size, IND Industry, PRO Profitability, LEV Leverage, 
LIQ Liquidity , SR Systematic Risk, CL Cross-Listing.  
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Table 6.12 presents the results of Generalized Least Squares (GLS) longitudinal panel 
regression with robust standard error of corporate governance on environmental 
disclosure quality. Results show a significant positive association between total 
environmental disclosure quality and each of board meetings (p ≤ 0.01), cross-
directorships (p ≤ 0.05), corporate environmental responsibility (CER) committee  
presence (p ≤ 0.10) and audit committee independence (p ≤ 0.05). Results also 
indicate a significant negative association of total environmental disclosure quality 
with each of role duality (p ≤ 0.01) and community influence (p ≤ 0.05) and relatively 
less significant negative association with remuneration committee independence (p ≤ 
0.10). However, no significant association is found between total environmental 
disclosure quality and each of board independence, board size, directors’ education, 
nomination committee independence, ownership concentration and institutional 
ownership. Nevertheless, the positive relationship of total environmental disclosure 
quality to each of directors’ education, nomination committee independence and 
institutional ownership are in the expected direction. Contrary to expectation, 
however, a negative relationship of total environmental disclosure quality to each of 
board independence and board size is documented, while a positive relationship to  
ownership concentration is found. The adjusted R Squared of the model is 16.05% 
indicating that 16.05% of the changes in total environmental disclosure quality is 
explained by the changes in its examined determinants.  
Regarding the different categories of environmental disclosure, there is a significant 
negative relationship between board independence and environmental policies 
disclosure quality (p ≤ 0.05). Similarly, there is a strong significant negative 
relationship between role duality and disclosure quality of each of environmental 
policies (p ≤ 0.01), product and process-related environmental issues (p ≤ 0.01) and 
sustainability (p ≤ 0.01). However, board size has insignificant association with the 
disclosure quality of all of the disclosure categories. There is also a strong significant 
positive relationship between board meetings and disclosure quality of each of 
environmental policies (p ≤ 0.01) and product and process-related environmental 
issues (p ≤ 0.01).  
With respect to directors' qualifications and experience, although education has only 
marginally significant positive association with environmental policies (p ≤ 0.10) 
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disclosure quality, community influence is significantly and negatively associated 
with the disclosure quality of each of environmental policies (p ≤ 0.10) and product 
and process-related environmental issues (p ≤ 0.01), while cross-directorships has a 
persistent strong significant and positive relationship to the disclosure quality of each 
of compliance with environmental laws and standards (p ≤ 0.01), sustainability (p ≤ 
0.01) and other environmentally-related information (p ≤ 0.01).   
Referring to board committees, corporate environmental responsibility (CER) 
committee presence has a strong significant positive relationship to product and 
process- related environmental issues disclosure quality (p ≤ 0.01), with diminishing 
impact on sustainability disclosure quality (p ≤ 0.05). There is also a significant 
positive relationship between audit committee independence and the disclosure 
quality of almost all disclosure categories including environmental policies (p ≤ 0.01), 
product and process-related environmental issues (p ≤ 0.10), compliance with 
environmental laws and standards (p ≤ 0.05), environmental auditing (p ≤ 0.10) and 
other environmentally-related information (p ≤ 0.01). However, a significant negative 
association is detected between remuneration committee independence and the 
disclosure quality of each of environmental policies (p ≤ 0.10) and product and 
process- related environmental issues (p ≤ 0.01). Similarly, a significant negative 
relationship is found between nomination committee independence and environmental 
auditing disclosure quality (p ≤ 0.01), although a marginally significant positive 
relationship to product and process-related environmental issues disclosure quality (p 
≤ 0.10) is revealed.  
As for ownership structure, it can be observed that ownership concentration is 
significantly and negatively associated with disclosure quality of each of compliance 
with environmental laws and standards (p ≤ 0.01) and environmental auditing (p ≤ 
0.10), while significantly and positively associated with disclosure quality of each of 
sustainability (p ≤ 0.10) and other environmentally-related information (p ≤ 0.05). 
However, institutional ownership is found to be significantly and positively associated 
with disclosure quality of each of compliance with environmental laws and standards 
(p ≤ 0.01) and environmental auditing (p ≤ 0.05), while significantly and negatively 
associated with disclosure quality of each of sustainability (p ≤ 0.05) and other 
environmentally- related information (p ≤ 0.01).  
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Results also reveal a strong significant positive relationship between total 
environmental disclosure quality and corporate characteristics including company size 
(p ≤ 0.01) and industry, while a significant negative relationship to liquidity (p ≤ 
0.05). No significant relationship is found between total environmental disclosure 
quality and each of profitability, leverage, systematic risk and cross-listing. 
Concerning environmental disclosure categories, the results confirmed the significant 
positive association of each of company size and industry, as well as the significant 
negative association of liquidity, with the disclosure quality of most disclosure 
categories. However, for the other corporate characteristics including profitability, 
systematic risk and cross- listing, the results partially supported the insignificant 
relationship to the quality of some of the disclosure categories. Nevertheless, the 
insignificant relationship of leverage to disclosure quality is consistently confirmed 
for all environmental disclosure categories.  
 
6.3.3.3   Further Analysis 
A further analysis of the different dimensions or sub-qualities of total environmental 
disclosure quality, including comparability (type), understandability (direction), 
relevance (outlook) and reliability (verifiability), is undertaken. These disclosure sub-
qualities are individually investigated so that a deeper insight into the different quality 
dimensions of the company's disclosure strategy is thoroughly depicted. Accordingly, 
the analysis accommodates both aggregated quality and disaggregated dimensional 
quality of environmental disclosures. Environmental disclosure quality of each of the 
different quality dimensions is used alternatively as the dependent variable. Corporate 
governance mechanisms are then regressed on total environmental disclosure quality 
as well as each of the different disclosure sub-qualities or quality dimensions, while 
controlling for corporate characteristics. In this regard, the break down of 
environmental disclosure quality provides a better overall picture of the governance 
relation to disclosure quality. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) longitudinal panel 
regression with robust standard error is employed. The results of the Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) regression of corporate governance on environmental disclosure 
quality dimensions are shown in Table 6.13. 
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Table 6.13        
OLS Longitudinal Panel Regression With Robust Standard Error  
Of Corporate Governance On Environmental Disclosure Quality Dimensions  
 
Total Environmental 
Disclosure Quality 
Comparability  
(Type) 
Understandability 
(Direction) 
Relevance    
(Outlook) 
Reliability 
(Verifiability) 
 Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
Intercept 60.13*** 0.000 13.65*** 0.003 96.41*** 0.000 43.83*** 0.000 86.79*** 0.000 
BI -0.02 0.388 0.00 0.960 -0.06 0.154 0.02 0.385 -0.03 0.282 
RD -1.90* 0.069 -2.24 0.372 -4.83 0.125 -0.38 0.616 -0.13 0.951 
BS -0.03 0.836 -0.07 0.750 0.08 0.830 0.00 0.969 -0.12 0.108 
BM 0.20**  0.033 0.50*** 0.003 0.36*** 0.007 0.07 0.459 -0.12 0.403 
E 0.01 0.566 0.03 0.172 -0.02 0.532 -0.01 0.357 0.03 0.187 
CI -0.01 0.128 -0.02** 0.038 0.01 0.325 -0.01 0.110 -0.03* 0.071 
CD 0.02 0.110 0.04*  0.079 0.00 0.890 0.02 0.150 0.02 0.312 
CERP 1.10 0.191 1.27*  0.077 1.79*  0.064 0.28 0.637 1.09 0.460 
ACI 0.04 0.162 0.04 0.359 0.03 0.522 0.04*  0.052 0.03 0.658 
RCI -0.02 0.202 -0.02 0.498 -0.02 0.392 -0.05** 0.013 0.02 0.701 
NCI 0.00 0.951 0.02 0.529 -0.01 0.791 0.02 0.312 -0.03* 0.086 
OC 0.00 0.806 -0.07** 0.044 -0.05 0.196 -0.02 0.224 0.12*** 0.004 
IO 0.01 0.772 0.04 0.194 0.05 0.411 0.00 0.895 -0.07** 0.016 
SZ 1.34*  0.099 3.65**  0.013 -0.31 0.806 0.76*  0.067 1.22 0.147 
IND 1.33**  0.011 2.94*** 0.002 1.51**  0.049 -0.51 0.274 1.38 0.117 
PRO 0.33 0.592 0.73 0.184 0.19 0.781 0.16 0.742 0.21 0.853 
LEV 0.05 0.887 1.07*** 0.008 -1.11* 0.057 0.16 0.482 0.18 0.860 
LIQ -0.64** 0.021 0.03 0.893 -1.74** 0.016 0.31**  0.023 -1.13** 0.023 
SR 0.83 0.297 -0.61 0.554 -0.04 0.931 2.32**  0.019 1.62 0.227 
CL -0.08 0.896 -0.91 0.410 0.08 0.938 -0.35 0.616 0.71 0.575 
Adjusted R
2
 (%) 15.90 28.49 8.72 9.25 4.86 
***p ≤ 0.01, **p ≤ 0.05, and *p ≤ 0.10.   
BI Board Independence, RD Role Duality, BS Board Size, BM Board Meetings, E Education, CI Community Influence, CD Cross-Directorships, CERP Corporate Environmental 
Responsibility (CER) Committee Presence, ACI Audit Committee Independence, RCI Remuneration Committee Independence, NCI Nomination Committee Independence, OC Ownership 
concentration, IO Institutional Ownership, SZ Size, IND Industry, PRO Profitability, LEV Leverage, LIQ Liquidity , SR Systematic Risk, CL Cross-Listing. 
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Table 6.13 depicts the results of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) longitudinal panel 
regression with robust standard error of corporate governance on environmental 
disclosure quality dimensions. Regarding the comparability dimension, results show a 
significant positive association between the type of environmental disclosure and each 
of board meetings (p ≤ 0.01), cross-directorships (p ≤ 0.10) and the presence of 
corporate environmental responsibility (CER) committee (p ≤ 0.10), while a 
significant negative association with each of community influence (p ≤ 0.05) and 
ownership concentration (p ≤ 0.05). As for the understandability dimension, results 
indicate a significant positive association between the direction of environmental 
disclosure and each of board meetings (p ≤ 0.01) and corporate environmental 
responsibility (CER) committee presence (p ≤ 0.10). Concerning the relevance 
dimension, results reveal a significant positive association between the outlook of 
environmental disclosure and audit committee independence (p ≤ 0.10), while a 
significant negative association with remuneration committee independence (p ≤ 
0.05). As for the reliability dimension, results show a significant positive association 
between the verifiability of environmental disclosure and ownership concentration (p 
≤ 0.01), while a significant negative association with each of community influence (p 
≤ 0.10), nomination committee independence (p ≤ 0.10) and institutional ownership (p 
≤ 0.05). Results also reveal a significant positive relationship between total 
environmental disclosure quality dimensions and corporate characteristics including 
company size, industry, leverage and systematic risk while a significant negative 
relationship to liquidity. No significant relationship is found between total 
environmental disclosure quality dimensions and each of profitability and cross-
listing.  
 
6.3.4   Discussion Of Statistical Results 
A variety of statistical tests and analyses, including descriptive statistics, correlation 
analysis and regression analysis, are undertaken in order to measure the extent and 
trend in corporate environmental disclosure quality and to examine the relationship 
between corporate governance mechanisms and the quality of corporate 
environmental disclosure practices in UK companies' annual reports, while 
controlling for corporate characteristics. The results of the different statistical 
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analyses are discussed and analyzed in terms of the theoretical framework adopted 
and conclusions are drawn from statistical findings.  
The results of the descriptive statistics showed that there is a relatively high level of 
corporate environmental disclosure quality in the UK (72.74%), indicating that 
companies are demonstrating their accountability by which they are made responsive 
to the rights and needs of various stakeholders through reducing information 
asymmetry. This, in turn, implies that managers are acting in the best interests of 
stakeholders by attempting to satisfy their environmental information needs.  
Furthermore, there is a slightly increasing trend in the quality of environmental 
disclosure practices over the study period. Such an increasing trend over time 
emphasizes the increased awareness of corporate environmental responsibility by UK 
listed companies. This increase is associated with the general increase in corporate 
reporting as guided by the recommendations set by professional accounting bodies 
and standard setters such as Global Reporting Initiative (GRI). In addition, increased 
corporate environmental responsibility can be attributed to the adoption of the 
relevant codes of best practice following the issuance of the Combined Code (2003) 
of corporate governance in the UK.  
Moreover, compliance with environmental laws and standards disclosure steadily 
represents the highest disclosure quality of 74.52%, given that specific high quality 
information is necessary to report on the actions taken by the company in order to 
show commitment to and conformity with statutory environmental requirements and, 
hence, accountability to various stakeholders. On the other hand, environmental 
auditing disclosure represents the lowest disclosure quality of 71.54%. This result is 
expected given that environmental auditing disclosure is the product of the 
environmental auditing process that is characterized by “lack of mandatory regulation, 
sketchy adoption of voluntary guidelines, and variable quality of verification” 
(Hammond and Miles, 2004). In addition, the maximum average disclosure quality is 
86.27%, while the minimum average disclosure quality is 45.83%, indicating a great 
variation in the quality of environmental disclosure practices among the sample 
companies. This finding might be the effect of examining a wide range of companies 
with different sizes and varying degrees of environmental sensitivity. 
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Descriptive statistics of the different corporate governance mechanisms examined are 
considered to be reasonable following the issuance of the Combined Code (2003) of 
corporate governance in the UK. It may be worth mentioning that although the code is 
voluntary, in that it provides only guidelines of best practice of corporate governance, 
London Stock Exchange listing rules require companies to adhere to corporate 
governance principals. UK listed companies follow the Combined Code's (2003) rule 
of “comply or explain”, with small companies having an excuse for noncompliance if 
adherence is infeasible or impractical. This is particularly true given the wide 
variation in most corporate governance mechanisms, ranging from a minimum of 0 to 
a maximum of 100%. Such great variation can also be attributed to the unfamiliarity 
by some companies with the adequate application of the principles of the newly 
issued code succeeding the period under investigation.  
The results of both correlation and regression analyses revealed a significant 
association between environmental disclosure quality and most corporate governance 
mechanisms. Two corporate governance variables were found to be statistically 
significant in impacting upon overall corporate environmental disclosure quality, 
while controlling for corporate characteristics. Specifically, higher environmental 
disclosure quality is associated with the separation of the dual role of CEO and 
chairman as well as with higher frequency of board meetings. In addition, it appears 
that other corporate governance mechanisms are significant at some categorical levels 
of environmental disclosure quality. In other words, for some disclosure categories, 
higher environmental disclosure quality is also associated with lower percentage of 
independent non-executive directors on the board, lower percentage of community 
influential directors, greater cross-directorships of board members, presence of board-
level corporate environmental responsibility (CER) committee or responsible, higher 
percentage of independent non-executive directors on the audit committee, lower 
percentage of independent non-executive directors on the remuneration committee, 
lower percentage of independent non-executive directors on the nomination 
committee, lower percentage of ownership concentration and higher percentage of 
institutional ownership. Neither board size nor directors' education show a significant 
association with environmental disclosure quality, although the positive relationship is 
in the expected direction for education, but not for board size where a negative 
relationship is documented.  
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The adjusted R Squared of the regression model is 15.90% indicating that 15.90% of 
the changes in total environmental disclosure quality is explained by the changes in its 
examined determinants. The value of R Squared is considered acceptable in 
comparison to the findings of previous environmental disclosure literature. For 
example, the reported R Squared is comparable to that of Halme and Huse (1997) as 
21.2%, Marshall et al. (2011) as18%, Peters and Romi (2011) as 25%, Post et al. 
(2011) as 24% and Rupley et al. (2011) as 25.73%. In the context of social 
disclosures, the reported R Squared is comparable to that of Hassan (2010) as 12.18% 
and Prado-Lorenzo (2009) as 22%, while in the context of voluntary disclosures in 
general, the reported R Squared is comparable to that of Gul and Leung (2004) as 
19%, Lim et al. (2007) as 19.33% and O’Sullivan et al. (2008) as 12.4% and 10%.  
The proportion of independent non-executive directors on the board, although found 
to have insignificant relationship to total environmental disclosure quality, is 
significantly and negatively associated with the disclosure quality of environmental 
policies. While this result is contrary to expectation, it suggests that where companies 
lack board independence, they mitigate the agency problems associated with this lack 
of independence by providing quality environmental disclosures, so that stakeholders' 
rights to information are not affected. Another possible explanation for this finding 
may be inadequate application of corporate governance code during the period of this 
study as the code was newly emerged. In this regard, directors' true independence may 
be questionable and the existence of grey directors on the board might be problematic. 
Accordingly, directors' tenure should be taken into consideration when assessing 
board independence. Otherwise, decisions tuning occurs which might not be in the 
best interests of stakeholders. However, this result is consistent with the findings of 
Barako et al. (2006) and Haniffa and Cooke (2002), who provide evidence of negative 
association of outside directors on the board to voluntary disclosure. Although 
Brammer and Pavelin (2008) were unable to confirm a significant relationship,  
Rupley et al. (2011) documented a positive association between the proportion of 
independent non-executive directors and environmental disclosures quality.  
Role duality showed a significant negative association with total environmental 
disclosure quality as well as with the disclosure quality of each of environmental 
policies, product and process-related environmental issues and sustainability. In line 
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with the stakeholder-agency theoretical framework adopted, the separation of the dual 
roles of CEO and chairman is likely to provide necessary checks and balances over 
management's performance (Fama and Jensen, 1983) and, accordingly, decrease the 
possibility of restricting information flow (McKendall et al., 1999) and withholding 
unfavorable information from reaching stakeholders (Ho and Wong, 2001).  This 
result is consistent with earlier evidence on the relationship of role duality to 
voluntary disclosure (e.g. Forker (1992); Gul and Leung, 2004; Huafang and Jianguo, 
2007), although no evidence exists of such relationship to environmental disclosure 
(e.g. Al Arussi et al., 2009; Michelon and Parbonetti, 2010; Rupley et al., 2011).  
Board size displayed no significant association with total environmental disclosure 
quality as well as with the disclosure quality of all environmental disclosure 
categories. In addition, such insignificant association is negative, which is contrary to 
expectation. A possible explanation for this finding may be the existence of an 
inverted “U” shaped- relationship to environmental disclosure, with an optimal board 
size existing midway, as assumed by Cormier et al. (2011). Below this optimal board 
size, there is a positive relation between board size and information asymmetry 
followed by a negative relationship. Descriptive statistics indicated that large board 
size has been traditional practice in UK companies over time. Too large or 
excessively sized boards may be plagued with agency conflicts and monitoring 
problems. This due to the lack of coordination associated with a large board, which 
slows down the decision making process and decreases board efficiency (Jensen, 
1993; Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Yermack, 1996). The finding is also in line with the 
evidence from prior studies, where Halme and Huse (1997) and Michelon and 
Parbonetti (2010) were unable to confirm a significant relationship of board size to 
environmental disclosures. Nevertheless, evidence of the existence of a positive 
association between board size and environmental disclosure quality is documented 
by Cormier et al. (2011). 
Board meetings frequency has a significant positive association with total 
environmental disclosure quality as well as with the disclosure quality of each of 
environmental policies and product and process-related environmental issues. This 
result can be interpreted in the context of the proposed framework, as an increasing 
board activity, represented by meeting frequency, influences the board's ability to act 
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as an effective monitoring mechanism in mitigating agency conflicts (Xie et al., 
2003). Increased monitoring is expected to result in reduced information asymmetry 
and lower agency costs, thereby increasing disclosures (Nelson et al., 2010). In 
addition, an active board that meets more often is able to devote more time to issues 
such as social and environmental responsibility, being reflected in an increased 
quality of social and environmental information. Although not previously addressed 
in environmental disclosure research, Laksmana (2008) documents that a board 
having more time to meet leads to increased voluntary disclosure and transparency. 
Directors’ education has insignificant association with total environmental disclosure 
quality. This result is confirmed for the disclosure quality of all of the disclosure 
categories. Although this finding is contrary to expectation, the positive relationship is 
in the expected direction as to overall environmental disclosure quality and the 
disclosure quality of almost all of the disclosure categories. An educated manager can 
have a broader perspective and superior pattern of thinking and, thus, is more likely 
understand the wider interests of various stakeholders (Akhtaruddin and Abdur Rouf, 
2011; Welford, 2007). However, the insignificance of educational background to 
environmental disclosure quality suggests the need for directors' environmental 
education in addition to accounting and/or business education. Currently, no prior 
empirical evidence exists on the relationship between directors' education and a direct 
measure of corporate environmental disclosure. However, in the context of voluntary 
disclosure in general, although Haniffa and Cooke (2002) found insignificant 
relationship, Akhtaruddin and Abdur Rouf (2011) documented a significant positive 
association between board members qualified in business and accounting and 
voluntary disclosure. 
Community influence, although found to have insignificant relationship to total 
environmental disclosure quality, is significantly and negatively associated with the 
disclosure quality of product and process-related environmental issues. While this 
finding is contrary to expectation, it suggests that where directors lack community 
influence, they mitigate the agency problems associated with this lack of information 
access by providing quality environmental disclosures, so that stakeholders' rights to 
information are not affected. However, the relationship of community influence to 
environmental disclosure might not be evident where other forms of directors' 
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qualifications and experience act as substituting factors affecting information 
provision. Other possible explanations for this finding are that directors with such 
community influence and relationship networks could spread themselves too thinly or 
that they have direct relationships and contacts with stakeholders through which 
information dissemination takes place as opposed to annual report disclosures. 
Empirical evidence by Michelon and Parbonetti (2010) showed that the proportion of 
community influential directors on the board positively affects sustainability,  
environmental, and strategic disclosure, given that no other forms of directors' 
qualifications and experience have been employed.  
Cross-directorships have insignificant relationship to total environmental disclosure 
quality but have significant positive relationship to disclosure quality of compliance 
with environmental laws and standards, sustainability and other environmentally-
related information. This result can be interpreted in the context of the proposed 
framework, as an increasing proportion of directors on the board with cross-
directorships better equips boards to carry out their governance roles as directors gain 
the necessary skills and experience needed to understand and address the wider 
environmental responsibilities towards various stakeholders. Consequently, cross-
directorships have important implications for disclosure practices through greater 
access to information (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). However, the relationship of cross-
directorships to the overall environmental disclosure quality might not be evident as 
directors serving on too many boards could spread themselves too thinly. The finding 
of a significant positive relationship is consistent with that of Haniffa and Cooke 
(2005) and Rupley et al. (2011), who provide evidence of significant positive 
association between cross-directorships and each of corporate social and 
environmental disclosures respectively. 
The presence of corporate environmental responsibility (CER) committee has 
insignificant relationship to total environmental disclosure quality while a strong 
significant positive relationship to product and process-related environmental issues 
disclosure quality. Consistent with the adopted theoretical framework, companies 
with a CER committee are more likely to disclose environmental information because 
the committee members will require management to demonstrate accountability by 
ensuring that the firm is following well-established environmental reporting 
 333
guidelines and recommendations. As the CER committee is responsible for ensuring 
the quality of the company's environmental reporting policies, the establishment of 
such committee can be regarded as a means of addressing stakeholders' interests and 
responding to their expectations (Michelon and Parbonetti, 2010; Peters and Romi, 
2011). However, such relationship is strongly evident as to the disclosure quality of 
product and process-related environmental issues, where a technical expertise on 
these environmental issues is necessary for information processing and reporting. 
Although McKendall et al. (1999), Michelon and Parbonetti (2010) and Rupley et al. 
(2011) were unable to confirm a significant relationship, evidence of the existence of 
a significant positive association between the presence of a CER committee on the 
board and corporate environmental disclosures is documented by Hassan (2010) and 
Peters and Romi (2011). 
Audit committee independence, although found to have insignificant relationship to  
total environmental disclosure quality, is significantly and positively associated with 
the disclosure quality of each of environmental policies, compliance with 
environmental laws and standards and other environmentally- related information. 
Independence of the audit committee members can significantly contribute to the 
committee's effectiveness (Xie et al., 2003), as it enables the committee to carry out 
its responsibilities objectively (Abbott et al., 2004).  However, a possible explanation 
for an insignificant relationship to overall environmental disclosure quality may be 
due to lack of environmental audit undertaken by companies and, consequently, the 
role of independent non-executive directors on the audit committee may not be 
evident. Another possible explanation for this finding can be attributed to the 
existence of grey directors whose true independence may be questionable. The finding 
of a significant positive association between audit committee independence and the 
disclosure quality of some environmental disclosure categories is in line with earlier 
evidence by O’Sullivan et al. (2008) as to voluntary disclosure practices.  
Remuneration committee independence revealed no significant association with total 
environmental disclosure quality while a significant negative relationship is detected 
between remuneration committee independence and product and process-related 
environmental issues disclosure quality. While this result is contrary to expectation, it 
suggests that agency problems associated with lack of directors' independence on the 
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remuneration committee are mitigated by providing more environmental disclosures. 
However, the insignificant relationship to overall environmental disclosure quality 
can be interpreted in terms of a lack of linkage between pay and environmental 
performance in setting remuneration and, consequently, the role of independent non-
executive directors on the remuneration committee may not be evident.  Another 
possible explanation for this finding can be attributed to the existence of grey 
directors whose true independence may be questionable. The finding of a negative 
association between a remuneration committee independence and categorical 
disclosure quality is contrary to earlier evidence by O’Sullivan et al. (2008) as to 
voluntary disclosure practices, who documented a positive association. 
Nomination committee independence revealed no significant association with total 
environmental disclosure quality while a significant negative relationship is detected 
between nomination committee independence and environmental auditing disclosure 
quality. While this result is contrary to expectation, it suggests that agency problems 
associated with lack of directors' independence on the nomination committee are 
mitigated by providing more environmental disclosures. Another possible explanation 
for this finding can be attributed to the existence of grey directors whose true 
independence may be questionable. No prior empirical evidence exists on the 
relationship between nomination committee independence and corporate 
environmental disclosure. Nevertheless, in the context of voluntary disclosure in 
general, Cheung et al. (2010) found that companies with board- level committees 
including a nomination committee tend to more transparent. 
Ownership concentration showed insignificant negative association with total 
environmental disclosure quality but is significantly and negatively associated with 
compliance with environmental laws and standards disclosure quality. This result can 
be interpreted in the context of the proposed framework, as an increasing 
concentration of ownership in the hands of a few large shareholders is associated with 
less agency conflicts and, hence, a decreasing likelihood of companies disclosing 
additional quality information on their social and environmental performance. 
However, such relationship to total environmental disclosure quality might not be 
evident as a measure of overall ownership may not capture the unique individual 
interests, and hence the influence, of each particular shareholders group. The finding 
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of a significant negative association at the categorical level of environmental 
disclosure is consistent with that of Brammer and Pavelin (2008) and Cormier et al. 
(2005), who provide evidence of significant negative association of ownership 
concentration with environmental disclosure quality in annual reports. Evidence of 
such relationship is also documented by both Reverte (2009) and Prado-Lorenzo et al. 
(2009) as to corporate social responsibility disclosure and by Barako et al. (2006) in 
the context of corporate voluntary disclosure in general. 
Institutional ownership, although found to have insignificant relationship to  total 
environmental disclosure quality, is significantly and positively associated with 
compliance with environmental laws and standards disclosure quality but significantly 
and negatively associated with other environmentally-related information disclosure 
quality. The positive relationship is in the expected direction, suggesting that 
institutional investors have strong incentives to monitor corporate disclosure practices 
and influence corporate values due to their large ownership stake (Barako et al., 2006) 
and that they may consider environmental issues to be important as a means of long-
term value creation (Halme and Huse, 1997; Prado-Lorenzo et al., 2009; Welford, 
2007). However, a possible explanation for the existence of an insignificant 
relationship to overall environmental disclosure quality may be due to the substantial 
representation of institutional investors in UK companies’ blockholdings. In other 
words, this result is expected given that institutional ownership constitutes the major 
and dominant form of blockholdings. Institutional shareholders, thus, represent a key 
stakeholder group who are more sophisticated (Guan et al., 2007), have power 
(O’Sullivan et al., 2008), have access to the information they need (Cormier et al., 
2005) and, therefore, can obtain the required information from alternative sources 
other than corporate disclosure (Berthelot et al., 2003). Another possible explanation 
for this finding may be due to the lack of stakeholder engagement in the corporate 
governance process and, consequently, the role of institutional investors in shaping 
corporate disclosure decisions may not be evident. The finding of insignificant 
relationship to total environmental disclosure quality is consistent with that of Rupley 
et al. (2011) who found no evidence of a relation between institutional shareholders 
and any of the measures of voluntary environmental disclosures. Similarly, the 
finding of a significant positive association between institutional investors and the 
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disclosure quality of categorical environmental disclosure is in line with earlier 
evidence by Barako et al. (2006) in the context of corporate voluntary disclosures.  
Results also reveal a significant positive relationship between total environmental 
disclosure quality and corporate characteristics including company size and industry, 
while a significant negative relationship to liquidity. No significant relationship is 
detected between total environmental disclosure quality and each of profitability, 
leverage, systematic risk and cross- listing. Concerning environmental disclosure 
categories, the results confirmed the significant positive association of each of 
company size and industry, as well as the significant negative association of liquidity, 
with the disclosure quality of some disclosure categories. Similarly, the insignificant 
relationship of the other corporate characteristics, including profitability, leverage and 
systematic risk, to disclosure quality is consistently confirmed for all environmental 
disclosure categories. However, for cross- listing, the results partially supported the 
insignificant relationship for most of the disclosure categories, but not for others 
where a significant positive association is detected.  
These results are consistent with the dominant trend in previous literature, where the 
results of the majority of previous studies concerning corporate characteristics 
indicate that there is a significant positive association between corporate 
environmental disclosure and each of company size (e.g. Adams et al., 1998; 
Brammer and Pavelin, 2008; Cormier et al., 2011; Cormier et al., 2005; Deegan and 
Gordon, 1996; Gray et al., 2001; Hackston and Milne, 1996; Magness, 2006; Patten, 
2002; Peters and Romi, 2011; Rupley et al., 2011; Stanny and Ely, 2008) and industry 
(e.g. Adams et al., 1998; Brammer and Pavelin, 2008; Campbell, 2004; Cormier et 
al., 2005;  Deegan and Gordon, 1996; García-Ayuso and Larrinaga, 2003; Gray et al., 
2001; Hackston and Milne, 1996; Halme and Huse, 1997), while there is no 
association between corporate environmental disclosure and profitability (e.g. 
Brammer and Pavelin, 2008; García-Sánchez, 2008; Hackston and Milne, 1996; 
Michelon and Parbonetti, 2010; Peters and Romi, 2011; Stanny and Ely, 2008).  
However, results of prior literature on the association of environmental disclosure 
with other corporate characteristics are mixed. Consistent with the current study's 
findings, the insignificant association between environmental disclosure and leverage 
is previously documented (e.g. Al Arussi et al., 2009; Branco and Rodrigues, 2008; 
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Cormier et al., 2005; Ho and Taylor, 2007; Haniffa and Cooke 2005; Michelon and 
Parbonetti, 2010; Peters and Romi, 2011; Reverte, 2009; Stanny and Ely, 2008), while 
the significant negative association of liquidity to environmental disclosure is 
previously documented by Ho and Taylor (2007) as to triple bottom line reporting and 
by Gul and Leung (2004) as to voluntary disclosure in general. The finding of 
insignificant association between environmental disclosure and systematic risk is 
similar to that of García-Ayuso and Larrinaga (2003) and Michelon and Parbonetti 
(2010). In line with earlier evidence, the significant positive association between 
categorical environmental disclosure and cross- listing is documented by Haniffa and 
Cooke (2005), Peters and Romi (2011) and Reverte (2009), although Michelon and 
Parbonetti (2010) were unable to detect the significance of such relationship as to 
total environmental disclosure. 
From the above discussion, it can be noticed that there is a high level of agreement 
between the results of OLS and GLS regressions about the significance of corporate 
governance variables as well as corporate characteristics variables. Similar GLS 
regression results are found as in the previous OLS regression analysis. Although the 
significance of additional corporate governance mechanisms, including directors’ 
community influence, cross-directorships, the presence of corporate environmental 
responsibility (CER) committee, audit committee independence and remuneration 
committee independence, is detected in impacting upon total environmental disclosure 
quality, such significance was already documented in terms of categorical 
environmental disclosure quality in the OLS regression analysis. Nevertheless, the 
different regression analyses agree as to the direction of such relationships. Generally, 
the results of the GLS regression are largely consistent with results and findings of the 
main OLS regression.  
A further analysis of the different dimensions or sub-qualities of total environmental 
disclosure quality provided a deeper insight into the different quality dimensions of 
the company's disclosure strategy. For the comparability dimension, results show a 
significant positive association with each of board meetings, cross-directorships and 
corporate environmental responsibility (CER) committee presence, while a significant 
negative association with each of community influence and ownership concentration. 
For the understandability dimension, results indicate a significant positive association 
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with board meetings and corporate environmental responsibility (CER) committee  
presence. For the relevance dimension, results reveal a significant positive association 
with audit committee independence, while a significant negative association with 
remuneration committee independence. For the reliability dimension, results show a 
significant positive association with ownership concentration, while a significant 
negative association with each of community influence, nomination committee 
independence and institutional ownership. Although board independence and role 
duality are no longer significant, results remain substantively the same either on the 
aggregate disclosure quality level or on the categorical disclosure quality level. 
However, it appears that the comparability dimension or the type of disclosure is the 
key quality dimension associated with most corporate governance mechanisms in 
explaining corporate environmental disclosure quality. This inference is reinforced by 
referring to the explanatory power of the comparability model of 28.49%, as 
compared to those of the understandability, relevance and reliability models of 8.72%, 
9.25% and 4.86% respectively. 
Accordingly, the results of the panel regression analysis agree with the research 
hypotheses regarding the existence of a significant positive relationship between 
environmental disclosure quality and board meetings (H4c), while a negative 
significant relationship to role duality (H2c). In addition, research hypotheses 
regarding the significant relationship of environmental disclosure quality to other 
corporate governance mechanisms, including board independence (H1c), community 
influence (H6c), cross-directorships (H7c), corporate environmental responsibility 
(CER) committee presence (H8c), audit committee independence (H9c), remuneration 
committee independence (H10c), nomination committee independence (H11c), 
ownership concentration (H12c) and institutional ownership (H13c), are partially 
supported at some categorical levels of environmental disclosure quality. Moreover, 
the results partially support some of these research hypotheses, in that the positive 
relationships are in the expected direction. Contrary to expectation, however, the 
existence of a positive relationship between environmental disclosure quality and each 
of board independence, community influence and remuneration committee 
independence was not supported, where a negative relationship is found. Similarly, 
the research hypothesis regarding the association between environmental disclosure 
quality and directors’ education (H5c) is partially supported, in that the positive 
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relationship is in the expected direction although it is insignificant. Nevertheless, the 
research hypothesis regarding the association between environmental disclosure 
quality and board size (H3c) is totally unsupported as the relationship is neither 
positive nor significant.  
Furthermore, the results of the panel regression analysis agree with most of the 
research hypotheses concerning the variability in the relationship of each of the 
corporate governance mechanisms to disclosure quality among the different 
environmental disclosure categories. Specifically, the relationship between 
environmental disclosure quality and each of board independence (H1d), role duality 
(H2d), board size (H3d), board meetings (H4d), directors’ community influence (H6d), 
cross-directorships (H7d), the presence of corporate environmental responsibility 
(CER) committee (H8d), audit committee independence (H9d), remuneration 
committee independence (H10d), nomination committee independence (H11d), 
ownership concentration (H12d) and institutional ownership (H13d) differs among the 
different categories of environmental disclosure. However, the research hypothesis 
concerning the variability in such relationship is not relatively supported for directors’ 
education (H5d). In other words, consistent relationship among almost all of the 
different environmental disclosure categories was documented, wherein disclosure 
quality has dominant insignificant positive association with education. 
In conclusion, the overall results provide support for the study's general argument that 
corporate governance plays an important role in determining how companies mitigate 
agency problems and respond to the needs and interests of various stakeholder groups 
and, consequently, in determining the quality of environmental disclosures in the 
annual reports. In this respect, sound systems of corporate governance are serving as 
both monitoring and accountability mechanisms, by which managers' opportunistic 
manipulation is controlled and companies are made responsive to the rights and needs 
of stakeholders, thereby reducing information asymmetry or the information 
expectation gap. In other words, the stakeholder-agency theoretical framework 
adopted by the current study is greatly supported by the study's findings. 
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6.3.5   Sensitivity Analysis 
A number of sensitivity tests are performed to check the robustness of the main 
analysis and, hence to attest the reliability of the results. Sensitivity analysis is aimed 
at examining how sensitive the results and findings are towards using alternative 
model specifications or changing the statistical tests in the determination 
environmental disclosure quality. Two types of robustness check are undertaken. 
First, in addition to using a composite measure of environmental disclosure quality, 
the different categories of environmental disclosures are integrated into the analysis in 
order to better portray the different areas and aspects of the company's disclosure 
strategy. Moreover, the different sub-qualities of total environmental disclosure 
quality are individually investigated so that a deeper insight into the different quality 
dimensions of the company's disclosure strategy is thoroughly depicted. Second, 
alternative regression analyses are carried out to check the sensitivity of the main 
statistical regression test. Hence, in addition to the main Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) regression analysis, Generalized Least Squares (GLS) regression analysis is 
also undertaken to allow for possible unequal variances of the observations as well as 
for any potential degree of correlation between the observations. Moreover, sensitivity 
analysis using pooled cross-sectional Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression with 
robust standard error is employed as a robustness check of the main regression 
analysis.    
While a composite or summary measure, that collapses different disclosure categories 
into a single value, is useful in associating disclosure quality with other variables of 
interest, the analysis of the different disclosure categories as well as the different 
quality dimensions provide deeper understanding of and richer insights into disclosure 
quality (see Beattie et al., 2004), thereby help to comprehensively profile the 
disclosure quality strategies adopted by the company (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004).  
Aggregated measures shift attention away from what is and what is not being reported 
in terms of the different themes or items being reported and from the quality of such 
items (Chapman and Milne, 2004). Accordingly, the current study reports both 
aggregated quality and disaggregated categorical quality of environmental 
disclosures. Environmental disclosure quality of each of the different disclosure 
categories is used alternatively as the dependent variable. Corporate governance 
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mechanisms are then regressed on total environmental disclosure quality as well as 
the disclosure quality of each of the different disclosure categories.  
Moreover, a further analysis of the different dimensions or sub-qualities of total 
environmental disclosure quality is undertaken. Accordingly, the current study reports 
both aggregated quality and disaggregated dimensional quality of environmental 
disclosures. Environmental disclosure quality of each of the different quality 
dimensions is used alternatively as the dependent variable. Corporate governance 
mechanisms are then regressed on total environmental disclosure quality as well as 
each of the different disclosure sub-qualities or quality dimensions. In this regard, the 
break down of environmental disclosure quality either by category or dimension 
provides a better overall picture of the governance relation to disclosure quality. 
Taken together, results from these various specifications are largely consistent with 
total regression results. In other words, although the relationship of corporate 
governance to disclosure quality differs across the different disclosure categories as 
well the different disclosure quality dimensions, results do not alter the main 
inferences drawn from total environmental disclosure quality model reported findings. 
Generalized Least Squares (GLS) regression analysis is also undertaken to allow for 
possible unequal variances of the observations as well as for any potential degree of 
correlation between the observations. GLS regression analysis makes use of the 
information pertaining to the unequal variability of the dependent variable as opposed 
to OLS regression analysis that assigns equal weight to each observation (See 
Gujarati, 2003). Similar results are found as in the previous OLS regression analysis. 
Although the significance of additional corporate governance mechanisms is detected 
in impacting upon total environmental disclosure quality, such significance was 
already documented in terms of categorical environmental disclosure quality in the 
OLS regression analysis. Generally, the results and findings are largely consistent 
with results of the main OLS regression. Moreover, sensitivity analysis using pooled 
cross-sectional Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression with robust standard error is 
employed as a robustness check of the main regression analysis. Contrary to panel 
data analysis, pooled regression analysis deals with large number of observations as 
one unit as opposed to data grouping. The results of the pooled cross-sectional 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression are shown in Table 6.14.   
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Table 6.14        
Pooled Cross Sectional OLS Regression With Robust Standard Error Of Corporate Governance On Environmental Disclosure Quality  
 TED EP PPEI CELS  EA  S OEI 
 Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
Intercept 58.52*** 0.000 52.68*** 0.000 52.44*** 0.000 74.15*** 0.000 69.40*** 0.000 65.94*** 0.000 61.29*** 0.000 
BI -0.02 0.412 -0.03 0.288 0.01 0.692 0.01 0.724 0.01 0.580 0.00 0.997 -0.01 0.656 
RD -1.84 0.117 -1.39 0.330 -5.04*** 0.004 2.11 0.245 -0.94 0.364 -6.04 0.136 0.64 0.802 
BS -0.06 0.526 -0.03 0.797 -0.16 0.275 -0.04 0.811 0.00 0.984 0.03 0.885 -0.07 0.564 
BM 0.21*** 0.003 0.28*** 0.001 0.24**  0.013 0.04 0.681 -0.01 0.918 0.00 0.987 0.02 0.813 
E 0.01 0.406 0.03*  0.097 0.01 0.588 -0.01 0.590 0.01 0.523 0.01 0.752 0.00 0.830 
CI -0.01 0.106 -0.01 0.169 -0.03** 0.014 -0.01 0.212 0.00 0.968 -0.03** 0.048 -0.01 0.432 
CD 0.02*  0.088 0.02 0.222 0.00 0.958 0.04**  0.028 -0.01 0.458 0.08*** 0.000 0.03**  0.041 
CERP 1.14*** 0.003 0.50 0.299 2.31*** 0.000 1.86*** 0.002 0.30 0.496 0.87 0.246 0.26 0.627 
ACI 0.05**  0.016 0.08*** 0.002 0.05*  0.064 0.04 0.196 0.04*  0.065 0.01 0.777 0.02 0.442 
RCI -0.03** 0.045 -0.04* 0.054 -0.07*** 0.001 -0.01 0.689 -0.02 0.310 -0.01 0.527 0.00 0.928 
NCI 0.00 0.828 0.00 0.939 0.02 0.133 -0.01 0.677 -0.03** 0.037 -0.02 0.445 -0.01 0.595 
OC 0.00 0.915 0.00 0.820 -0.01 0.668 -0.02 0.468 -0.03 0.131 0.04 0.271 0.03 0.169 
IO 0.01 0.614 0.01 0.518 0.02 0.396 0.03 0.406 0.05**  0.031 -0.02 0.564 -0.04 0.112 
SZ 1.48*** 0.000 1.76*** 0.000 2.76*** 0.000 -0.84 0.183 0.21 0.596 0.69 0.397 1.89*** 0.000 
IND 1.32*** 0.000 1.77*** 0.000 0.11 0.829 1.12**  0.033 0.70 0.105 -0.46 0.522 1.68*** 0.001 
PRO 0.62 0.161 0.67 0.221 1.59**  0.036 0.57 0.464 0.56 0.184 -1.06 0.300 -0.25 0.718 
LEV 0.05 0.896 0.45 0.269 0.00 0.995 -0.36 0.513 -0.10 0.813 -0.21 0.769 0.04 0.946 
LIQ -0.64** 0.017 -0.47 0.135 -0.69* 0.058 -1.49*** 0.000 -0.26 0.387 -0.35 0.360 -1.08*** 0.004 
SR 1.01**  0.046 1.67*** 0.006 1.51**  0.042 1.45**  0.042 0.17 0.761 1.01 0.353 -0.13 0.840 
CL -0.01 0.986 -0.05 0.945 -0.86 0.348 1.67*  0.071 1.46**  0.025 -1.90 0.154 -0.35 0.684 
R
2
 (%) 16.05 14.37 18.10 9.48 4.90 9.70 11.04 
***p ≤ 0.01, **p ≤ 0.05, and *p ≤ 0.10.   
TED Total Environmental Disclosure, EP Environmental Policies, PPEI Product and Process-Related Environmental Issues, CELS  Compliance with Environmental Laws and Standards, EA 
Environmental Auditing, S Sustainability, OEI Other Environmentally-Related Information, BI Board Independence, RD Role Duality, BS Board Size, BM Board Meetings, E Education, CI 
Community Influence, CD Cross-Directorships, CERP Corporate Environmental Responsibility (CER) Committee Presence, ACI Audit Committee Independence, RCI Remuneration 
Committee Independence, NCI Nomination Committee Independence, OC Ownership concentration, IO Institutional Ownership, SZ Size, IND Industry, PRO Profitability, LEV Leverage, 
LIQ Liquidity , SR Systematic Risk, CL Cross-Listing. 
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Table 6.14 displays the results of pooled cross-sectional Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) regression with robust standard error of corporate governance on 
environmental disclosure quality. The results of the pooled regression showed 
approximately the same R Squared as the panel data regression analysis indicating 
that the pooled regression has the same strength of the main panel regression. Similar 
results are found as in the panel data regression analysis.  
Although the significance of additional corporate governance mechanisms, including 
cross-directorships, corporate environmental responsibility (CER) committee 
presence, audit committee independence and remuneration committee independence, 
is detected in impacting upon total environmental disclosure quality, such significance 
was already documented in terms of categorical environmental disclosure quality in 
the main regression analysis. While the significance of role duality to total 
environmental disclosure quality is marginally diminishing, evidence of such 
significance still exists in terms of categorical environmental disclosure quality. 
Nevertheless, the different regression analyses agree as to the direction of such 
relationships. Generally, the results and findings are largely consistent with results of 
the main OLS regression. Accordingly, the pooled regression indicates that the results 
of the panel data analysis are not sensitive to changing the type of statistical test 
employed. Moreover, the selected panel data analysis is well fitted with the examined 
data.  
In summary, these sensitivity analyses show general consistency with the overall 
findings. Taken together, the results of using alternative model specifications as well 
as the results of changing the statistical tests in the determination environmental 
disclosure quality do not alter the main inferences drawn from the reported findings of 
the aggregate model specification and the main statistical analysis. In this regard, the 
sensitivity analysis confirms the reliability of the results and findings and, hence, 
supports the generalization of such results.   
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6.4   CONCLUSION 
This chapter presents the second part of the empirical work aimed at quantitatively 
investigating the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and the 
quality of corporate environmental disclosure practices in UK companies' annual 
reports. A variety of statistical tests and analyses, including descriptive statistics, 
correlation analysis and regression analysis, are undertaken in order to measure the 
extent and trend in corporate environmental disclosure quality and to examine the 
relationship in question, while controlling for corporate characteristics. Finally, 
sensitivity analysis is carried out to check the robustness of the main regression 
analysis. The results are discussed and analyzed in terms of the theoretical framework 
adopted and conclusions are drawn from statistical findings.  
Descriptive statistics showed that there is a relatively high level of corporate 
environmental disclosure quality in the UK, indicating that companies are 
demonstrating their accountability by which they are made responsive to the rights 
and needs of various stakeholders. Furthermore, there is a slightly increasing trend in 
the quality of environmental disclosure practices over the study period, emphasizing 
the increased awareness of corporate environmental responsibility by UK listed 
companies over time. Moreover, compliance with environmental laws and standards 
disclosure steadily represents the highest disclosure quality, while environmental 
auditing disclosure represents the lowest disclosure quality. In addition, there is a 
great variation in the quality of environmental disclosure practices among the sample 
companies. This finding might be the effect of examining a wide range of companies 
with different sizes and varying degrees of environmental sensitivity as indicated by 
the descriptive statistics of corporate characteristics. Descriptive statistics of corporate 
governance mechanisms are considered reasonable following the issuance of the 
Combined Code (2003) of corporate governance in the UK.   
Results also revealed a significant association between environmental disclosure 
quality and most corporate governance mechanisms. Specifically, higher 
environmental disclosure quality is associated with the separation of the dual role of 
CEO and chairman as well as with higher frequency of board meetings.  In addition, it 
appears that other corporate governance mechanisms are significant at some 
categorical levels of environmental disclosure quality. In other words, for some 
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disclosure categories, higher environmental disclosure quality is also associated with 
lower percentage of independent non-executive directors on the board, lower 
percentage of community influential directors, greater cross-directorships of board 
members, presence of board- level corporate environmental responsibility (CER) 
committee or responsible, higher percentage of independent non-executive directors 
on the audit committee, lower percentage of independent non-executive directors on 
the remuneration committee, lower percentage of independent non-executive directors 
on the nomination committee, lower percentage of ownership concentration and 
higher percentage of institutional ownership. Neither board size nor directors' 
education show a significant association with environmental disclosure quality, 
although the positive relationship is in the expected direction for education, but not 
for board size where a negative relationship is documented.  
A further analysis of the different sub-qualities of total environmental disclosure 
quality provided a deeper insight into the different quality dimensions of the 
company's disclosure strategy. Although board independence and role duality are no 
longer significant, results remain substantively the same either on the aggregate 
disclosure quality level or on the categorical disclosure quality level. However, it 
appears that the comparability dimension or the type of disclosure is the key quality 
dimension associated with most corporate governance mechanisms in explaining 
corporate environmental disclosure quality. 
In conclusion, the overall results reinforce the study's general argument that corporate 
governance plays an important role in determining how companies mitigate agency 
problems and respond to the needs and interests of various stakeholder groups and, 
consequently, in determining the quality of environmental disclosures in the annual 
reports. The significant association between environmental disclosure quality and 
most corporate governance characteristics indicates the appropriate application of the 
corporate governance concepts in the UK context following the launching of the new 
paradigm in the corporate governance code, which in turn supports the quality of 
environmental disclosure. However, the insignificance of some corporate governance 
characteristics indicates the need for some attention either in revising the principles of 
the corporate governance code or in their application.  In this respect, sound systems 
of corporate governance are serving as both monitoring and accountability 
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mechanisms, by which managers' opportunistic manipulation is controlled and 
companies are made responsive to the rights and needs of stakeholders, thereby 
reducing information asymmetry or the information expectation gap. In other words, 
the stakeholder-agency theoretical framework adopted by the current study is greatly 
supported by the study's findings. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSION 
 
7.1   INTRODUCTION 
The increasing global concern for the environment and the consequent academic 
interest in researching corporate environmental disclosure practices have given  
tremendous impetus for initializing the current research. In a parallel movement,  
corporate governance has recently become one of the most distinctive features of 
modern corporations. Corporate environmental disclosure is, arguably, one of the 
greatest challenges facing the implementation of corporate governance. In this 
respect, environmental disclosure can be regarded as a means of ensuring sound 
corporate governance that integrates transparency in its environmental performance  
and promotes the notion of accountability to various stakeholder groups. Hence, there 
is a need to consider the relationship between a company and its stakeholders, as 
defined by corporate governance structures, when forming the environmental policy 
of an organization. 
The main objective of the current study is to empirically examine the relationship  
between corporate governance and each of the quantity and the quality of corporate 
environmental disclosures in the UK, while controlling for some corporate 
characteristics as well as an in-depth exploration of quality identification and 
assessment issues. Accordingly, the thesis is expected to contribute to the accounting 
knowledge in three different but interrelated contexts. First, the thesis provides an 
updated documentary of UK corporate environmental disclosure practices and 
empirical evidence on the association between corporate governance mechanisms and 
the quantity of environmental disclosure in the annual reports of UK companies. 
Second, the thesis provides empirical evidence on the association between corporate 
governance mechanisms and the quality of environmental disclosure in the annual 
reports of UK companies, negating the traditional belief of quantity representation of 
quality and shifting disclosure quality perspective from volumetric measurement to 
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semantic assessment. Third, the thesis provides an in-depth exploration of quality 
identification and assessment issues, seeking to highlight the contribution made by the 
qualitative characteristics or attributes of information to overall corporate 
environmental disclosure quality.  
This concluding chapter summarizes the results and findings of the current research 
and the interpretation of these results in light of the suggested conceptual framework, 
attempting to place them in perspective while highlighting the major contributions of 
the study. The chapter also discusses the potential implications of these findings in 
promoting environmental responsibility and accountability. The chapter concludes 
with an outline of the study's limitations along with some suggestions for future 
research. 
 
7.2   SUGESTED CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
The present study explores the relationship between corporate governance and 
environmental disclosure. The study argues that better accountability of top 
management turns into an increasing level of stakeholders' environmental information 
satisfaction. Based on stakeholder-agency theory, the study's argument can be put 
forward as follows. Companies are increasingly considering the importance of 
demonstrating commitment to environmental responsibility, through the provision of 
comprehensive and high-quality environmental disclosure as means of managing their 
relationships with stakeholders. In this respect, sound systems of corporate 
governance are serving as accountability mechanisms, by which companies are made 
responsive to the rights and needs of stakeholders, through reducing information 
asymmetry. Therefore, it can be argued that the quantity and quality of corporate 
environmental disclosure directed to various stakeholders  are enhanced when 
managers' opportunism is monitored by corporate governance mechanisms.  
 The suggested conceptual framework of the current study provides a comprehensive 
view of the relationship between corporate environmental disclosure and corporate 
governance mechanisms as shown in the following figure:  
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Figure 7.1 
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At the heart of the analysis is corporate environmental disclosure. Figure 7.1 portrays 
the relationship between corporate governance and environmental disclosure, as 
controlled by corporate characteristics. Based on stakeholder-agency theory, it is 
argued that corporate environmental disclosure directed to various stakeholders is 
enhanced when managers' opportunistic manipulation is monitored by corporate 
governance mechanisms. As shown in the figure, stakeholders link to the company 
either through engagement or dialogue. Stakeholders' engagement with the company 
takes place through participating in corporate governance systems and ownership 
structures. Stakeholders' dialogue with the company takes place partially through 
environmental disclosure where companies report on their environmental 
performance. These links allow a correspondence between stakeholders' expectat ions 
and company’s behavior, thereby enhancing the quantity and quality of environmental 
disclosure. Accordingly, corporate governance mechanisms adopted by the company 
give an indication about how stakeholders’ interests are considered at the board level,  
as reflected in environmental disclosure practices.  
Figure 7.1 highlights an important element in the existing linkage among the 
considered variables, that is, accountability. Both governance and environmental 
disclosure are based on the notion of accountability. A better accountability of top 
management turns into an increasing level of stakeholders' environmental information 
satisfaction. It is the board of directors who decides the definition of the 
accountability of the company, thereby affecting the environmental disclosures 
reported to stakeholders. In addition, by establishing external links with stakeholders, 
directors attract valuable resources vital to the companies’ viability (Michelon and 
Parbonetti, 2010).  
An information gap, also referred to as information asymmetry, exists between 
directors and stakeholders due to absence of information or manipulation of the 
disclosed information, resulting in failure to satisfy the stakeholders' expectations 
towards the firm's disclosure (Hooks et al., 2002). Voluntary disclosures, including 
environmental disclosure, diminish informational asymmetries between a firm and its 
stakeholders (Brammer and Pavelin, 2008). It reduces the information gap as it 
provides stakeholders with relative confidence that the stock transactions occur at a 
fair price which increase stock liquidity (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Kim and 
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Verrecchia, 1994). In addition, voluntary disclosure reduces uncertainty and, hence, 
reduces the information asymmetry which, in turn, reduces the cost of external 
financing (Healy and Palepu, 2001). Such “stakeholder reporting can also be viewed 
as a significant strategic tool that is used by management to improve communication 
with a company’s stakeholders, providing a foundation for trust and openness” 
(Boesso and Kumar, 2007: 278-279). Accordingly, enhancing the quantity and quality 
of environmental disclosure is considered to be an effective means of reducing the 
information gap.  
The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) states that “A primary goal of reporting is to 
contribute to an ongoing stakeholder dialogue. Reports alone provide little value to 
inform stakeholders or support a dialogue that influences the decisions and behavior 
of both the reporting organization and its stakeholders” (GRI, 2002: 9). Alternatively, 
accountability supports stakeholders' relationship with the firm by providing 
information for different decisions. Therefore, accountability narrows the information 
asymmetry between the management and different stakeholders, and in between the 
different categories of stakeholders (Lev, 1989). Figure 7.1 highlights this important 
linkage, where accountability would increase the awareness towards the complexity 
of information disclosures and, hence, would reduce the information gap or 
asymmetry.  
Based on the above considerations and given the absence of significant corporate 
governance variables in environmental disclosure studies, important relationships 
should exist among different mechanisms of accountability. Therefore, the present  
study aims at empirically examining the impact of corporate governance mechanisms, 
after controlling for company-specific characteristics, on the quantity and quality of 
corporate environmental disclosures in the annual reports of UK companies. The 
study is based on stakeholder-agency theory as a basic motive for the efforts made to 
reduce the information gap by reaching stakeholders' expectations about 
environmental disclosure through sound corporate governance structures.  
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7.3   FINDINGS AND INTERPRETATION 
The first part of the empirical work aims at quantitatively investigating the 
relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and the quantity of corporate 
environmental disclosure practices in UK companies' annual reports. A variety of 
statistical tests and analyses, including descriptive statistics, correlation analysis and 
regression analysis, are undertaken in order to measure the extent and trend in 
corporate environmental disclosure quantity and to examine the relationship in 
question, while controlling for corporate characteristics. Finally, sensitivity analysis is 
carried out to check the robustness of the main regression analysis.  
Descriptive statistics showed that there is a relatively low level of corporate 
environmental disclosure quantity in the UK, indicating the relative existence of an 
information gap or information asymmetry problem. However, there is an increasing 
trend in the quantity of environmental disclosure practices over the study period, 
emphasizing the increased awareness of corporate environmental responsibility by 
UK listed companies over time. Moreover, environmental auditing disclosure steadily 
represents the highest disclosure quantity level, while other environmentally-related 
disclosure represents the lowest disclosure quantity level. In addition, there is a great 
variation in the quantity of environmental disclosure practices among the sample 
companies. This finding might be the effect of examining a wide range of companies 
with different sizes and varying degrees of environmental sensitivity as indicated by 
the descriptive statistics of corporate characteristics. Descriptive statistics of corporate 
governance mechanisms are considered reasonable following the issuance of the 
Combined Code (2003) of corporate governance in the UK.   
Results also revealed a significant association between environmental disclosure 
quantity and most corporate governance mechanisms. Specifically, higher 
environmental disclosure quantity is associated with lower percentage of independent 
non-executive directors on the board, separation of the dual role of CEO and 
chairman, higher frequency of board meetings, greater cross-directorships of board 
members, presence of board- level corporate environmental responsibility (CER) 
committee or responsible, lower percentage of independent non-executive directors on 
the nomination committee and lower ownership concentration. In addition, it appears 
that other corporate governance mechanisms are significant at some categorical levels 
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of environmental disclosure quantity. In other words, for some disclosure categories, 
higher environmental disclosure quantity is also associated with higher percentage of 
directors qualified in business, accounting and/or finance, higher percentage of 
independent non-executive directors on the audit committee and higher percentage of 
institutional ownership. Neither board size, community influence nor remuneration 
committee independence shows a significant association with environmental 
disclosure quantity, although the positive relationships are mostly in the expected 
direction, except for board size where a negative relationship is documented.  
In conclusion, the overall results reinforce the study's general argument that corporate 
governance plays an important role in determining how companies mitigate agency 
problems and respond to the needs and interests of various stakeholder groups and, 
consequently, in determining the quantity of environmental disclosures in the annual 
reports. The significant association between environmental disclosure quantity and 
most corporate governance characteristics indicates the appropriate application of the 
corporate governance concepts in the UK context following the launching of the new 
paradigm in the corporate governance code, which in turn supports the level of 
environmental disclosure. In this respect, sound systems of corporate governance are 
serving as both monitoring and accountability mechanisms, by which managers' 
opportunistic manipulation is controlled and companies are made responsive to the 
rights and needs of stakeholders, thereby reducing information asymmetry or the 
information expectation gap. In other words, the stakeholder-agency theoretical 
framework adopted by the current study is greatly supported by the study's findings. 
However, research should not be confined to the examination of the impact of 
governance mechanisms on the quantity of environmental disclosures only, rather 
than a consideration of the quality of the disclosed information as well. Focusing on 
the quantity of disclosures does not mean that such disclosures are of higher quality so 
as to reflect the true state of the company's disclosure strategies.  
The second part of the empirical work aims at quantitatively investigating the 
relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and the quality of corporate 
environmental disclosure practices in UK companies' annual reports. A variety of 
statistical tests and analyses, including descriptive statistics, correlation analysis and 
regression analysis, are undertaken in order to measure the extent and trend in 
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corporate environmental disclosure quality and to examine the relationship in 
question, while controlling for corporate characteristics. Finally, sensitivity analysis is 
carried out to check the robustness of the main regression analysis. The results are 
discussed and analyzed in terms of the theoretical framework adopted and 
conclusions are drawn from statistical findings.  
Descriptive statistics showed that there is a relatively high level of corporate 
environmental disclosure quality in the UK, indicating that companies are 
demonstrating their accountability by which they are made responsive to the rights 
and needs of various stakeholders. Furthermore, there is a slightly increasing trend in 
the quality of environmental disclosure practices over the study period, emphasizing 
the increased awareness of corporate environmental responsibility by UK listed 
companies over time. Moreover, compliance with environmental laws and standards 
disclosure steadily represents the highest disclosure quality, while environmental 
auditing disclosure represents the lowest disclosure quality. In addition, there is a 
great variation in the quality of environmental disclosure practices among the sample 
companies. This finding might be the effect of examining a wide range of companies 
with different sizes and varying degrees of environmental sensitivity as indicated by 
the descriptive statistics of corporate characteristics. Descriptive statistics of corporate 
governance mechanisms are considered reasonable following the issuance of the 
Combined Code (2003) of corporate governance in the UK.   
Results also revealed a significant association between environmental disclosure 
quality and most corporate governance mechanisms. Specifically, higher 
environmental disclosure quality is associated with the separation of the dual role of 
CEO and chairman as well as with higher frequency of board meetings.  In addition, it 
appears that other corporate governance mechanisms are significant at some  
categorical levels of environmental disclosure quality. In other words, for some 
disclosure categories, higher environmental disclosure quality is also associated with 
lower percentage of independent non-executive directors on the board, lower 
percentage of community influential directors, greater cross-directorships of board 
members, presence of board- level corporate environmental responsibility (CER) 
committee or responsible, higher percentage of independent non-executive directors 
on the audit committee, lower percentage of independent non-executive directors on 
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the remuneration committee, lower percentage of independent non-executive directors 
on the nomination committee, lower percentage of ownership concentration and 
higher percentage of institutional ownership. Neither board size nor directors' 
education show a significant association with environmental disclosure quality, 
although the positive relationship is in the expected direction for education, but not 
for board size where a negative relationship is documented.  
A further analysis of the different sub-qualities of total environmental disclosure 
quality provided a deeper insight into the different quality dimensions of the 
company's disclosure strategy. Although board independence and role duality are no 
longer significant, results remain substantively the same either on the aggregate 
disclosure quality level or on the categorical disclosure quality level. However, it 
appears that the comparability dimension or the type of disclosure is the key quality 
dimension associated with most corporate governance mechanisms in explaining 
corporate environmental disclosure quality. 
In conclusion, the overall results reinforce the study's general argument that corporate 
governance plays an important role in determining how companies mitigate agency 
problems and respond to the needs and interests of various stakeholder groups and, 
consequently, in determining the quality of environmental disclosures in the annual 
reports. The significant association between environmental disclosure quality and 
most corporate governance characteristics indicates the appropriate application of the 
corporate governance concepts in the UK context following the launching of the new 
paradigm in the corporate governance code, which in turn supports the quality of 
environmental disclosure. However, the insignificance of some corporate governance 
characteristics indicates the need for some attention either in revising the principles of 
the corporate governance code or in their application.  In this respect, sound systems 
of corporate governance are serving as both monitoring and accountability 
mechanisms, by which managers' opportunistic manipulation is controlled and 
companies are made responsive to the rights and needs of stakeholders, thereby 
reducing information asymmetry or the information expectation gap. In other words, 
the stakeholder-agency theoretical framework adopted by the current study is greatly 
supported by the study's findings. 
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It is worth mentioning that although corporate environmental disclosure quantity in 
UK companies' annual reports is relatively low, corporate environmental disclosure 
quality is comparatively high, negating the traditional belief of quantity representation 
of quality and shifting disclosure quality perspective from volumetric measurement to 
semantic assessment. The finding of a relatively low level of environmental disclosure 
quantity can be interpreted as a reluctance or disinclination UK companies, 
particularly those of low environmental sensitivity, to report on corporate issues that 
have limited environmental impact. In other words, companies tend to be selective in 
disclosing environmental information about corporate activities. However, the finding 
of a comparatively high of environmental disclosure quality can be interpreted as a 
tendency of UK companies to disseminate comparable, understandable, relevant and 
verifiable environmental information, demonstrating their accountability in 
responding to the rights and needs of various stakeholders. Despite these results, 
environmental disclosure quantity was found to be more associated with corporate 
governance mechanisms than environmental disclosure quality, indicating the need 
for some attention either in revising the principles of the corporate governance code 
or in their application. 
The main contribution or originality of the current research is its being the first study, 
to the best of my knowledge, to empirically address corporate environmental 
disclosure quality assessment in line with the international accounting standards 
framework. The study introduces to the academic literature an extensive four-
dimensional framework for assessing environmental disclosure quality. The metric 
developed by the current study is the first comprehensive aggregate environmental-
disclosure measure, as far as I am aware, that attempts to capture the qualitative 
characteristics of information in a manner consistent with well-supported frameworks 
elaborated by professional accounting bodies and standard setting organizations. It 
negates the traditional belief of quantity representation of quality and shifts disclosure 
quality perspective from volumetric measurement to semantic assessment. Such 
research investigating issues as environmental disclosure quality identification a nd 
assessment that are still relatively unexplored is quite essential.  
Botosan (2004) recommends that quality identification and measurement issues and 
questions are critically important and worthy of careful attention, and suggests that 
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addressing these issues and questions, through the development of disclosure quality 
assessment frameworks in a specific research context, represents a necessary next step 
in the advancement of disclosure research.  Furthermore, Beatti et al. (2004) highlights 
the pressing need for research effort devoted to developing new ways of documenting 
disclosure practices, identifying disclosure quality dimensions and exploring possible 
measurement proxies. In this respect, the current study is expected to fill an existing 
gap in corporate environmental disclosure literature by adding to a relatively 
underdeveloped research area which is corporate environmental disclosure quality 
assessment. 
Consequently, it intends to systematically extend prior research within a UK context 
and to overcome the limitations inherent in prior research. The current study 
contributes to two streams of literature, the disclosure literature and corporate 
governance literature, by providing updated documentary and empirical evidence on 
the association between corporate governance mechanisms and each of the quantity 
and quality of environmental disclosure practices in the annual reports of UK 
companies, while controlling for corporate characteristics. In doing so, it (a) 
distinguishes between the different categories or areas of activity to which the 
environmental disclosure relates; (b) incorporates several corporate governance 
mechanisms as possible explanatory variables for the quantity and quality of 
corporate environmental disclosure practices of UK companies; (c) develops a 
broadly defined disclosure quality index in line with the international accounting 
standards framework that captures the distinct nature of disclosure items and that 
distinguishes the different types of information content; (d) examines the annual 
reports of a large and industrially diverse sample, that is, FTSE All-Share Index; (e) 
conducts both longitudinal and cross-sectional analysis over 2004-2007 inclusive; and 
(f) employs several types of regression models and statistical analyses, including 
descriptive statistics; Pearson and Spearman correlations; and OLS, GLS and pooled 
OLS regressions.  
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7.4   POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The major strength of the current study is its practical implications and its usefulness 
in providing data for further extensive environmental disclosure quality development. 
The informativeness or value relevance of environmental disclosure is a critical issue 
for standard-setters, investors, corporate decision-makers, and researchers (Berthelot 
et al., 2003). Accordingly, the study has the potential of attracting the attention of 
those concerned about corporate accounting and who may be interested in using its 
findings in order to inform any future endeavour to guide UK companies' corporate 
environmental disclosure practices, by embedding and integrating such guidance 
within companies' corporate governance structures. 
This research has potential policy implications. Results of the study generally showed 
that many of the corporate governance factors investigated appear to have a greater 
and stronger influence on the quantity rather than the quality. Such finding has 
important implications for different policy makers. It helps to inform standard-setters 
and regulators about the importance of sound corporate governance in providing the 
foundations of comprehensive and quality environmental disclosure by establishing 
value-creating relationships with various stakeholders. Currently, there is much 
emphasis on increasing the quantity of the disclosed information, without much 
consideration as to the informativeness of such disclosure for stakeholders’ decision-
making, as being integrated into governance mechanisms. Particularly influential is 
the necessity of incorporating greater transparency into corporate governance 
structures, by introducing new environmental reporting laws and regulations, by 
reinforcing changes in company law relating to governance, by ensuring compliance 
mechanisms are in place and by benchmarking and auditing their implementation. In 
summary, voluntary initiatives of environmental reporting have to be underpinned by 
an appropriate legal framework if such initiatives are to be value-creative.  
The study also provides valuable insights for managers wishing to enhance the 
efficiency of the environmental message that they convey to various stakeholders; for 
investors seeking to promote the long-term financial worthiness of their investments; 
for researchers aiming to constructively engage with corporate environmental 
disclosure research for the purpose of identifying the underlying relationships; and for 
environmentalists searching for innovative solutions to maintain long-term 
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sustainability and well-being through incorporating ecological concepts into other 
disciplines, including accounting. In particular, these different classes of stakeholders 
should pay careful attention to environmental disclosure quality rather than mere 
consideration of disclosure quantity in finding effective ways of addressing their ever 
changing and varied concerns and interests.  
 
7.5   LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
The study has some limitations that could be addressed in future research. The 
construction of disclosure indices is not free from subjectivity or bias. The use of an 
index of corporate environmental disclosure quality to arrive at an aggregate 
disclosure quality score involves attaching an equal weighting to the various quality 
dimensions. However, the assumption that every quality dimension is equally 
important to all stakeholders may be justified for the purposes of the current study. As 
no specific user group is of particular interest to the research, but rather all diverse 
stakeholder groups are targeted, this approach is deemed appropriate.  
A further concern arises when focusing on annual report disclosures only, where 
environmental disclosures could be provided via alternative means of communication, 
although the heterogeneous nature of the information disclosed in these media 
impedes comparability and, hence, generalization.  The study's findings are also 
limited by the potential problem of endogeneity. It is possible that governance 
characteristics and disclosure quality are endogenously determined.  
In spite of these limitations, the results of the study contribute to the relevant literature 
in a number of ways.  These limitations must be weighed against the contribution 
made to gain new perspectives into environmental disclosure practices. Further 
research that builds on and extends the ideas presented in this  study may be fruitful. 
The comprehensive framework developed in this study for identifying and assessing 
environmental disclosure quality, is an initial step in the direction of examining 
environmental disclosure from the stakeholder perspective, negating the traditional 
belief of quantity representation of quality and shifting disclosure quality perspective 
from volumetric measurement to semantic assessment.  Future studies can utilize and 
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expand on this framework to investigate other drivers of corporate environmental 
disclosure quality. The study's empirically derived and validated scale for 
environmental disclosure quality assessment could also help future researchers in 
studying the disclosure quality of other types of voluntary disclosures. Future 
researchers could examine the variations in the quality of voluntary disclosures along 
these lines. 
Other additions to the literature would be to examine the association between 
corporate governance variables and environmental disclosure in media other than 
annual reports; to conduct comparative studies among different countries concerning 
the relationship between corporate governance and environmental disclosure; to 
undertake a more detailed industry classification and analysis, given the consensus on 
the importance attached to industrial sensitivity of environmental disclosure practices; 
to conduct qualitative analysis seeking the views and perspectives of acknowledged 
experts regarding the identity and nature of environmental disclosure quality; and to 
investigate different measures of corporate environmental performance other than 
environmental disclosure, such as analyst disclosure rankings. These suggestions can 
provide further insights into the relationship in question and might improve the 
explanatory power of future studies. 
Moreover, the focus of disclosure quality assessment could be directed towards the 
interaction between quality measures and/or dimensions, rather than the relative 
importance of these measures and dimensions. In such multi-dimensional analysis, 
higher quality should be attached to those disclosures that combine different quality 
dimensions as well as different types of measures within each dimension.  
Of considerable importance would be future studies on the auditing or assurance 
process of corporate environmental reporting including the mechanism of the process, 
the unique qualifications of environmental auditors and the characteristics of the audit 
committee necessary for undertaking such environmental auditing. 
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7.6   CONCLUSION  
This chapter summarizes the results and findings of the current research and the 
interpretation of these results in light of the suggested conceptual framework, 
attempting to place them in perspective while highlighting the major contributions of 
the study. It is concluded that the overall results reinforce the study's general 
argument that corporate governance plays an important role in determining how 
companies mitigate agency problems and respond to the needs and interests of various 
stakeholder groups and, consequently, in determining the quantity and quality of 
environmental disclosures in the annual reports. In this respect, sound systems of 
corporate governance are serving as both monitoring and accountability mechanisms, 
by which managers' opportunistic manipulation is controlled and companies are made 
responsive to the rights and needs of stakeholders, thereby reducing information 
asymmetry or the information expectation gap.  
The main contribution or originality of the current research is its being the first study, 
to the best of my knowledge, to empirically address corporate environmental 
disclosure quality assessment in line with the international accounting standards 
framework. The study introduces to the academic literature an extensive four-
dimensional framework for assessing environmental disclosure quality. The metric 
developed by the current study is the first comprehensive aggregate environmental-
disclosure measure, as far as I am aware, that attempts to capture the qualitative 
characteristics of information in a manner consistent with well-supported frameworks 
elaborated by professional accounting bodies and standard setting organizations. Such 
research investigating issues as environmental disclosure quality identification and 
assessment that are still relatively unexplored is quite essential.   
Accordingly, the study has the potential of attracting the attention of those concerned 
about corporate accounting and who may be interested in using its findings in order to 
inform any future endeavour to guide UK companies' corporate environmental 
disclosure practices, by embedding and integrating such guidance within companies' 
corporate governance structures. However, it is unlikely that environmental disclosure 
could develop voluntarily without the interference of the regulatory power with more 
enforceable laws. In conclusion, voluntary initiatives of environmental reporting have 
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to be underpinned by an appropriate legal framework if such initiatives are to be 
value-creative.  
 The chapter also discusses the potential implications of these findings for promoting 
environmental responsibility and accountability. The chapter concludes with an 
outline of the study's limitations along with some suggestions for future research. The 
comprehensive framework developed in this study for identifying and assessing 
environmental disclosure quality, is an initial step in the direction of examining 
environmental disclosure from the stakeholder perspective, negating the traditional 
belief of quantity representation of quality and shifting disclosure quality perspective 
from volumetric measurement to semantic assessment. Future researchers can utilize 
and expand on this framework to investigate the variations in the quality of 
environmental and other voluntary disclosures along these lines. 
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Appendix A 
Sample Companies 
 Company Name Industry 
1 Abbot Group plc Oil & Gas 
2 Acal plc Support Services 
3 AEA Technology plc Support Services 
4 Aegis Group plc Media & Photography 
5 AG Barr plc Beverages 
6 AGA Foodservice Group plc Housing Goods & Textiles 
7 Aggreko plc Business Support Services 
8 Alizyme plc Pharmaceuticals 
9 Alpha Airports Group plc Transport 
10 Amec plc Oil & Gas 
11 Anglo American plc Mining 
12 Arena Leisure plc Leisure Entertainment & Hotels 
13 ARM Holdings plc Information Technology Hardware 
14 Arriva plc Travel & Leisure 
15 Ashtead Group plc Business Support Services 
16 Associated British Foods plc Food Producers & Processors 
17 AstraZeneca plc Pharmaceuticals 
18 Autonomy Corporation plc Computer Software & Services 
19 Aveva Group plc Computer Software & Services 
20 Avis Europe plc Travel & Leisure 
21 Axis-Shield plc Pharmaceuticals 
22 Axon Group plc Computer Software & Services 
23 Babcock International Group plc Business Support Services 
24 BAE Systems plc Aerospace & Defence 
25 Balfour Beatty plc Construction & Building Materials 
26 Barratt Developments plc Construction & Building Materials 
27 BATM Advanced Comm. Ld Information Technology Hardware 
28 BBA Group plc Transport 
29 Bellway plc Housing Goods & Textiles 
30 Berkeley Group Holdings Construction & Building Materials 
31 BG Group plc Oil & Gas 
32 BHP Billiton plc Mining 
33 Biocompatibles International plc Health 
34 Bloomsbury Publishing plc Media & Photography 
35 Bodycote International plc Engineering & Machinery 
36 Bovis Homes Group plc Construction & Building Materials 
37 BP plc Oil & Gas 
38 BPP Holdings plc Support Services 
39 British Airways plc Airlines & Airports 
40 British American Tobacco plc Tobacco 
41 British Polythene Industries plc Packaging 
42 British Sky Broadcasting Group plc Media 
43 Brown (N) Group plc General Retailers 
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44 BSS Group plc Support Services 
45 BT Group plc Telecommunications Services 
46 BTG plc Pharmaceuticals 
47 Cable & Wireless plc Telecommunications Services 
48 Cadbury plc Food Producers & Processors 
49 Cairn Energy plc Oil & Gas 
50 Capita Group plc Business Support Services 
51 Care UK plc Health 
52 Carillion plc Construction & Building Materials 
53 Carnival plc Travel & Leisure 
54 Carpetright plc General Retailers 
55 Centrica plc Gas Distribution 
56 Charter International plc Engineering & Machinery 
57 Chloride Group plc Electronic & Electrical Equipment 
58 Chrysalis Group plc Media & Photography 
59 Clinton Cards plc General Retailers 
60 Cobham plc Aerospace & Defence 
61 Colt Telecom Group plc Telecommunications Services 
62 Communisis plc Business Support Services 
63 Computacenter plc Computer Software & Services 
64 Cookson Group plc Engineering & Machinery 
65 Croda International plc Chemicals 
66 Daily Mail & General Trust (A Shs) plc Media & Photography 
67 Dairy Crest Group plc Food Producers & Processors 
68 Dana Petroleum plc Oil & Gas 
69 Davis Service Group plc Business Support Services 
70 De La Rue plc Business Support Services 
71 Dechra Pharmaceuticals plc Pharmaceuticals 
72 Delta plc Chemicals 
73 Devro plc Food Producers & Processors 
74 Diageo plc Beverages 
75 Dialight plc Electronic & Electrical Equipment 
76 Dimension Data Holdings plc Computer Software & Services 
77 Diploma plc Support Services 
78 Domino Printing Sciences plc Electronic & Electrical Equipment 
79 DSG International plc General Retailers 
80 Electrocomponents plc Support Services 
81 Elementis plc Chemicals 
82 Emblaze Ltd Computer Software & Services 
83 Enterprise Inns plc Restaurants Pubs & Breweries 
84 Euromoney Institutional Investors plc Media & Photography 
85 Expro International Group plc Oil & Gas 
86 Fenner plc Engineering & Machinery 
87 Filtronic plc Information Technology Hardware 
88 Findel plc General Retailers 
89 FirstGroup plc Travel & Leisure 
90 Forth Ports plc Transport 
91 French Connection Group plc General Retailers 
 456
92 Future plc Media & Photography 
93 Galiform plc Support Services 
94 Game Group plc General Retailers 
95 GKN plc Automobiles & Parts 
96 GlaxoSmithKline plc Pharmaceuticals 
97 Go-Ahead Group plc Travel & Leisure 
98 Goldshield Group plc Pharmaceuticals 
99 Greene King plc Restaurants Pubs & Breweries 
100 Greggs plc Food & Drug Retailers 
101 Group 4 Securicor plc(G4S plc) Business Support Services 
102 GUS plc(Home Retail Group plc) General Retailers 
103 Halma plc Electronic & Electrical Equipment 
104 Hays plc Support Services 
105 Headlam Group plc Housing Goods & Textiles 
106 Holidaybreak plc Leisure Entertainment & Hotels 
107 Homeserve plc Business Support Services 
108 Hunting plc Oil & Gas 
109 Imagination Technologies Group plc Information Technology Hardware 
110 IMI plc Engineering & Machinery 
111 Imperial Tobacco Group plc Tobacco 
112 Inchcape plc Automobiles & Parts 
113 Informa plc Media & Photography 
114 International Power plc Electricity 
115 Interserve plc Business Support Services 
116 Invensys plc Computer Software & Services 
117 ITE Group plc Media & Photography 
118 Jarvis plc Business Support Services 
119 JJB Sports plc General Retailers 
120 Johnson Matthey plc Chemicals 
121 Johnson Service Group plc Business Support Services 
122 Johnston Press plc Media & Photography 
123 Kelda Group plc Water 
124 Keller Group plc Construction & Building Materials 
125 Kier Group plc Construction & Building Materials 
126 Kingfisher plc General Retailers 
127 Ladbrokes plc Leisure Entertainment & Hotels 
128 Laura Ashley Holdings plc General Retailers 
129 Logica plc Computer Software & Services 
130 Lonmin plc Mining 
131 Low & Bonar plc Construction & Building Materials 
132 Luminar plc Leisure Entertainment & Hotels 
133 Marks & Spencer Group plc General Retailers 
134 Marshalls plc Construction & Building Materials 
135 McBride plc Personal Care & Household Products 
136 Meggitt plc Aerospace & Defence 
137 Metalrax Group plc Engineering & Machinery 
138 Millennium & Copthorne Hotels plc Leisure Entertainment & Hotels 
139 MITIE Group plc Business Support Services 
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140 Morgan Crucible Company plc Electronic & Electrical Equipment 
141 Morgan Sindall plc Construction & Building Materials 
142 Morrison (WM) Supermarkets plc Food & Drug Retailers 
143 Morse plc Computer Software & Services 
144 Mothercare plc General Retailers 
145 National Express Group plc Transport 
146 National Grid plc Electricity 
147 Nestor Healthcare Group plc Electricity 
148 Next plc General Retailers 
149 Northgate Information Solutions plc Computer Software & Services 
150 Northgate plc Transport 
151 Oxford Instruments plc Electronic & Electrical Equipment 
152 Pace Micro Technology plc Electronic & Electrical Equipment 
153 Parity Group plc Computer Software & Services 
154 Pearson plc Media & Photography 
155 Pendragon plc General Retailers 
156 Pennon Group plc Water 
157 Persimmon plc Construction & Building Materials 
158 Premier Farnell plc Support Services 
159 Psion plc Information Technology Hardware 
160 Rank Group plc Travel & Leisure 
161 Reckitt Benckiser Group plc Personal Care & Household Products 
162 Reed Elsevier plc Media & Photography 
163 Regus Group plc Business Support Services 
164 Renishaw plc Electronic & Electrical Equipment 
165 Rentokil Initial plc Business Support Services 
166 Restaurant Group plc Restaurants Pubs & Breweries 
167 Rexam plc Packaging 
168 Ricardo plc Support Services 
169 Rio Tinto plc Mining 
170 RM plc Computer Software & Services 
171 Robert Walters plc Support Services 
172 Robert Wiseman Dairies plc Food Producers & Processors 
173 Rolls-Royce Group plc Aerospace & Defence 
174 Rotork plc Engineering & Machinery 
175 Royal Dutch Shell plc 'A'  Oil & Gas 
176 RPC Group plc Packaging 
177 RPS Group plc Business Support Services 
178 SABMiller plc Beverages 
179 Sage Group plc Computer Software & Services 
180 Sainsbury (J) plc Food & Drug Retailers 
181 Scottish & Southern Energy plc Electricity 
182 SDL plc Computer Software & Services 
183 Senior plc Aerospace & Defence 
184 Serco Group plc Business Support Services 
185 Severn Trent plc Water 
186 Shanks Group plc Support Services 
187 Shire Ld Pharmaceuticals 
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188 SIG plc Support Services 
189 SkyePharma plc Pharmaceuticals 
190 SMG plc Media & Photography 
191 Smith & Nephew plc Health 
192 Smith (DS) plc Forestry & Paper 
193 Smiths Group plc Diversified Industrials 
194 Spectris plc Electronic & Electrical Equipment 
195 Speedy Hire plc Business Support Services 
196 Spirax-Sarco Engineering plc Engineering & Machinery 
197 Spirent Communications plc Information Technology Hardware 
198 SSL International plc Personal Care & Household Products 
199 Stagecoach Group plc Travel & Leisure 
200 SurfControl plc Computer Software & Services 
201 Tarsus Group plc Media & Photography 
202 Tate & Lyle plc Food Producers & Processors 
203 Ted Baker plc General Retailers 
204 Telecom Plus plc Telecommunications Services 
205 Tesco plc Food & Drug Retailers 
206 The Vitec Group plc Engineering & Machinery 
207 Tomkins plc Engineering & Machinery 
208 Topps Tiles plc General Retailers 
209 Travis Perkins plc Support Services 
210 Trinity Mirror plc Media & Photography 
211 UK Coal plc Mining 
212 UMECO plc Aerospace & Defence 
213 Unilever plc Food Producers & Processors 
214 Uniq plc Food Producers & Processors 
215 United Business Media plc Media & Photography 
216 United Utilities plc Water 
217 Victrex plc Chemicals 
218 Vodafone Group plc Telecommunications Services 
219 VT Group plc Aerospace & Defence 
220 Weir Group plc Engineering & Machinery 
221 Wetherspoon (JD) plc Restaurants Pubs & Breweries 
222 Whitbread plc Restaurants Pubs & Breweries 
223 Wilmington Group plc Media & Photography 
224 Wolseley plc Construction & Building Materials 
225 WPP Group plc Media & Photography 
226 WS Atkins plc Business Support Services 
227 WSP Group plc Business Support Services 
228 Xaar plc Electronic & Electrical Equipment 
229 Yule Catto & Co plc Chemicals 
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Appendix B 
Decision Rules For Environmental Disclosure Quantity 
 
 Any disclosure item that discusses or mentions the natural environment as 
well as health and safety and/or their relationship to the organization is 
recorded. 
 
 All disclosures must be explicitly stated, they cannot be implied meanings. 
 
 All disclosures that fit within the categories and items are to be included no 
matter how much it is advertising. 
 
 All disclosure items are to be recorded regardless of their format, including 
financial statements, narratives, and non-narratives such as pictures, 
photographs, charts and graphical representations. 
 
 Disclosures having more than one possible classification or containing two or 
more information items are classified under each relevant category or item. 
 
 Repeated disclosures are not recorded, disclosures containing the same 
information item are considered only once. 
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Appendix C 
Decision Rules For Environmental Disclosure Quality 
 
 Type: Monetary Quantitative/Non-monetary Quantitative/Declarative 
classification  
            A disclosure item containing a combination of two or all three disclosure types 
of monetary quantitative, non-monetary quantitative, and declarative 
information is classified as comprising the type of measure with the highest 
quality. Monetary quantitative disclosures have the highest priority, with non-
monetary quantitative disclosures having the second priority while declarative 
disclosures have the lowest priority, in case of multiple types in one disclosure 
item. 
  
 Direction: Good/Bad/Neutral classification  
            A disclosure item classified as comprising good or bad news must contain 
specific and detailed information that make its economic direction clear. No 
specificity or detail that obviously deems the information item as positive or 
negative implies a neutral classification. 
 
 Outlook: Forward-Looking/Historical classification 
            A disclosure item containing a combination of both forward- looking and 
historical information is classified as comprising the time orientation with 
higher quality. Forward- looking disclosures have higher priority over 
historical disclosures in case of multiple outlooks in one disclosure item. 
  
 Verifiability: Verifiable/Non-Verifiable classification 
            A disclosure item is classified as comprising verifiable information if at least 
one of three situations exist: (1) the disclosure is found in one of the externally 
audited sections of the annual report; (2) the independent auditor report 
explicitly states that the environmental report is audited; and/or (3) the annual 
report contains reference in any section to an environmental disclosure audit 
being undertaken. Otherwise, the disclosure is classified as non-verifiable. 
 
